


# CHALLENGE 1 REPORT

## Importing “chal1” File To Ghidra

After importing the “chal1” file into Ghidra and it turns the machine code back into readable form i started to search for entry point and i found an interesting function called FUN\_00101486 showing in Screenshot 1.



Screenshot 1

## Decompiled The Function

Using the Ghidra Decompiler, the assembly instructions were translated into C-like pseudocode for better readability as we can see in Screenshot 2.

```
out Navigation Search Select Help
Decompile: FUN_00101486 - (naf)
1
2/* WARNING: Removing unreachable block (ram,0x00101525) */
3
4undefined8
5FUN_00101486(undefined8 param_1,undefined8 param_2,undefined8 param_3,undefined8 param_4,
6        undefined8 param_5,undefined8 param_6)
7
8{
9    size_t sVar1;
10   long lVar2;
11
12  sVar1 = strlen(&DAT_00102011);
13  malloc(sVar1 < 2);
14  lVar2 = ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME,0,1,0,param_5,param_6,param_2);
15  if (lVar2 == -1) {
16      puts("Well done!");
17  }
18  else {
19      puts("No flag for you :(");
20  }
21  return 0;
22}
23
```

Screenshot 2

Inside the function, an if condition was observed that decides which message the program prints.

The two possible outputs were:

- "Well done!"
- "No flag for you :(

This indicated that the program was intentionally hiding a success condition.

so by going back to Screenshot 1 back to assembly code and Investigating the Conditional as showing in Screenshot 3

The screenshot shows the Immunity Debugger interface with the following details:

- Program Trees:** Shows the file structure of the program, including sections like .text, .data, .rsrc, and various .init sections.
- Symbol Tree:** Shows symbols such as `FUN_00101080`, `FUN_00101110`, `FUN_00101140`, `FUN_00101149`, `FUN_00101201`, `FUN_001012de`, `FUN_001013ff`, and `FUN_00101486`.
- Registers:** Registers shown include EIP, ECX, EDI, and EBX.
- Stack:** The stack shows local variables `local_10` through `local_38`.
- Registers pane:** Shows assembly code for the `chat()` function, including instructions like `MOV EDI, 0x0`, `MOV EAX, 0x0`, and `JMP LAB_0010154d`.
- Registers pane (bottom):** Shows assembly code for the `LAB_00101509` label, including `CMP dword ptr [RBP + local_24], 0x..`
- Memory dump pane:** Shows memory dump for address `00101500` to `00101550`, containing hex values and ASCII strings.
- Registers pane (right):** Shows assembly code for the `LAB_00101550` label, including `JNE LAB_00101570`.
- Registers pane (far right):** Shows assembly code for the `LAB_00101570` label, including `JMP _main`.
- Registers pane (far far right):** Shows assembly code for the `_main()` function, including `MOV RSP, RBP` and `RET`.

### Screenshot 3

Upon examining the assembly code, the following logic was identified:

CMP RAX, -1

JNZ LAB\_00101509

This comparison checks the return value of a system **call (ptrace)**. If the return value is **-1**, the program assumes it is being debugged and immediately prints “**Well done!!**” as a decoy.

If the check fails, execution continues to another comparison:

CMP [RBP + local\_24], 0x539

JZ LAB\_00101525

However, during analysis it was discovered that **local\_24** is never modified anywhere in the program. This means the condition can never evaluate to true during normal execution.

As a result, the program always prints:

“No flag for you : (“

Further inspection showed that the real flag is only printed if execution reaches a hidden code block located at:

LAB\_00101525 as showing in Screenshot 4

The screenshot shows the Immunity Debugger interface with the following details:

- Program Trees**: Shows the file structure of the challenge binary.
- Listing: chall**: The assembly listing window showing the assembly code for the challenge. The code includes calls to external functions like `puts` and `atoi`, and various memory operations involving local variables and stack frames.
- 3 Bytes: chall**: The registers window showing the current state of CPU registers.
- Symbol Tree**: Shows symbols defined in the binary, including function names like `FUN_001012de` and `FUN_001013ff`.
- Data Type Manager**: Shows built-in data types.

The assembly code from the Listing window is as follows:

```
00101510 74 13 JZ LAB_00101525
00101512 48 8d LEA RDI,[s_No_flag_for_you_:(.001...) = "No flag for you ..."]
00101513 3d 1e
00101514 b8 00
00101515 e8 72 CALL <EXTERNAL>::puts int puts(char * __s)
00101516 ff ff
0010151e b8 00 MOV EAX,0x0
0010151f 00 00
00101523 eb 28 JMP LAB_0010154d

LAB_00101525 XREF[1]...00101510(j)
00101525 48 8b MOV RDX,qword ptr [RBP + local_10]
00101526 55 f8
00101529 48 8b MOV RCX=>DAT_00102011,qword ptr [...] = D0h
0010152d 4d f8 MOV RAX,qword ptr [RBP + local_20]
00101531 45 e8
00101531 48 89 MOV RSI=>DAT_00102011,RCX = D0h
00101534 4c ce
00101534 48 89 MOV RDI=>s_2asdf-012:14_00102004,... = "2asdf-012=14"
00101537 e8 c3 CALL FUN_001013ff undefined FUN_001013...
00101538 ff ff
0010153c 48 8b MOV RAX,qword ptr [RBP + local_10]
00101540 45 f8
00101543 e8 48 CALL <EXTERNAL>::puts int puts(char * __s)
00101544 fb ff
00101548 b8 00 MOV EAX,0x0
```

## Screenshot 4

This block calls a function that decrypts and prints the actual flag string. However, due to the unreachable conditional check, this code path is never reached during normal execution.

## Bypassing The Condition



So to access the real flag, the conditional jump instruction was patched.

### Original instruction:

JZ LAB\_00101525

## Patched instruction:

This forces the program to always jump to the success branch, bypassing the failing



## Screenshot 5

## Final Result

After patching and executing the binary, the program printed the correct flag:

**HTB{y0u\_trac3\_m3\_g00d!!!}** As showing in Screenshot 6

```
- 0s o ./chal1_patched  
HTB{y0u_u_trac3_m3_g00d!!!}  
  
- 0s o |  
  
- 0s o |
```

## Screenshot 6