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Bindings for the OASIS Security

Assertion Markup Language (SAML)

4 V2.0 – Errata Composite

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Abstract:

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99 100 The SAML V2.0 Bindings specification defines protocol bindings for the use of SAML assertions and request-response messages in communications protocols and frameworks. This document, known as an "errata composite", combines corrections to reported errata with the original specification text. By design, the corrections are limited to clarifications of ambiguous or conflicting specification text. This document shows deletions from the original specification as struck-through text, and additions as colored underlined text. The "[Enn]" designations embedded in the text refer to particular errata and their dispositions.

Status:

This errata composite document is a **working draft** based on the original OASIS Standard document that had been produced by the Security Services Technical Committee and approved by the OASIS membership on 1 March 2005. While the errata corrections appearing here are non-normative, they reflect changes specified by the Approved Errata document (currently at Working Draft revision 02), which is on an OASIS standardization track. In case of any discrepancy between this document and the Approved Errata, the latter has precedence. See also the Errata Working Document (currently at revision 39), which provides background on the changes specified here.

This document includes corrections for errata E1, E2, E4, E19, E21, E24, E31, E57, and E59, and E74.

Committee members should submit comments and potential errata to the security-services@lists.oasis-open.org list. Others should submit them by following the instructions at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/comments/form.php?wg_abbrev=security.

For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights web page for the Security Services TC (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/ipr.php).

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1 Introduction

- This document specifies SAML protocol bindings for the use of SAML assertions and request-response messages in communications protocols and frameworks.
- 195 The SAML assertions and protocols specification [SAMLCore] defines the SAML assertions and request-
- response messages themselves, and the SAML profiles specification [SAMLProfile] defines specific
- usage patterns that reference both [SAMLCore] and bindings defined in this specification or elsewhere.
- 198 The SAML conformance document [SAMLConform] lists all of the specifications that comprise SAML
- 199 V2.0.

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1.1 Protocol Binding Concepts

- 201 Mappings of SAML request-response message exchanges onto standard messaging or communication
- 202 protocols are called SAML protocol bindings (or just bindings). An instance of mapping SAML request-
- 203 response message exchanges into a specific communication protocol <FOO> is termed a <FOO> binding
- 204 for SAML or a SAML <FOO> binding.
- 205 For example, a SAML SOAP binding describes how SAML request and response message exchanges
- are mapped into SOAP message exchanges.
- 207 The intent of this specification is to specify a selected set of bindings in sufficient detail to ensure that
- 208 independently implemented SAML-conforming software can interoperate when using standard messaging
- or communication protocols.
- 210 Unless otherwise specified, a binding should be understood to support the transmission of any SAML
- 211 protocol message derived from the samlp:RequestAbstractType and samlp:StatusResponseType
- types. Further, when a binding refers to "SAML requests and responses", it should be understood to mean
- 213 any protocol messages derived from those types.
- For other terms and concepts that are specific to SAML, refer to the SAML glossary [SAMLGloss].

1.2 Notation

- The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD"
- NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this specification are to be interpreted as
- 218 described in IETF RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
- 219 Listings of productions or other normative code appear like this.
- 220 Example code listings appear like this.
- Note: Notes like this are sometimes used to highlight non-normative commentary.
- Conventional XML namespace prefixes are used throughout this specification to stand for their respective namespaces as follows, whether or not a namespace declaration is present in the example:

| Prefix | XML Namespace | Comments | |
|--------|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| saml: | urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion | This is the SAML V2.0 assertion namespace [SAMLCore]. | |
| samlp: | urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol | This is the SAML V2.0 protocol namespace [SAMLCore]. | |
| ds: | http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig# | This namespace is defined in the XML Signature | |

| Prefix | XML Namespace | Comments |
|-----------|--|--|
| | | Syntax and Processing specification [XMLSig] and its governing schema. |
| SOAP-ENV: | http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope | This namespace is defined in SOAP V1.1 [SOAP11]. |

This specification uses the following typographical conventions in text: <ns:Element>, XMLAttribute, 224 225 **Datatype**, OtherKeyword. In some cases, angle brackets are used to indicate non-terminals, rather than XML elements; the intent will be clear from the context. 226

2 Guidelines for Specifying Additional Protocol Bindings

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This specification defines a selected set of protocol bindings, but others will possibly be developed in the future. It is not possible for the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC) to standardize all of these additional bindings for two reasons: it has limited resources and it does not own the standardization process for all of the technologies used. This section offers guidelines for third parties who wish to specify additional bindings.

- The SSTC welcomes submission of proposals from OASIS members for new protocol bindings. OASIS members may wish to submit these proposals for consideration by the SSTC in a future version of this specification. Other members may simply wish to inform the committee of their work related to SAML. Please refer to the SSTC web site [SSTCWeb] for further details on how to submit such proposals to the SSTC.
- Following is a checklist of issues that MUST be addressed by each protocol binding:
 - Specify three pieces of identifying information: a URI that uniquely identifies the protocol binding, postal or electronic contact information for the author, and a reference to previously defined bindings or profiles that the new binding updates or obsoletes.
 - Describe the set of interactions between parties involved in the binding. Any restrictions on applications used by each party and the protocols involved in each interaction must be explicitly called out.
 - 3. Identify the parties involved in each interaction, including how many parties are involved and whether intermediaries may be involved.
 - 4. Specify the method of authentication of parties involved in each interaction, including whether authentication is required and acceptable authentication types.
 - 5. Identify the level of support for message integrity, including the mechanisms used to ensure message integrity.
 - 6. Identify the level of support for confidentiality, including whether a third party may view the contents of SAML messages and assertions, whether the binding requires confidentiality, and the mechanisms recommended for achieving confidentiality.
 - 7. Identify the error states, including the error states at each participant, especially those that receive and process SAML assertions or messages.
 - Identify security considerations, including analysis of threats and description of countermeasures.
 - 9. Identify metadata considerations, such that support for a binding involving a particular communications protocol or used in a particular profile can be advertised in an efficient and interoperable way.

3 Protocol Bindings

The following sections define the protocol bindings that are specified as part of the SAML standard.

3.1 General Considerations

The following sections describe normative characteristics of all protocol bindings defined for SAML.

3.1.1 Use of RelayState

- Some bindings define a "RelayState" mechanism for preserving and conveying state information. When
- such a mechanism is used in conveying a request message as the initial step of a SAML protocol, it
- 268 places requirements on the selection and use of the binding subsequently used to convey the response.
- Namely, if a SAML request message is accompanied by RelayState data, then the SAML responder
- 270 MUST return its SAML protocol response using a binding that also supports a RelayState mechanism, and
- 271 it MUST place the exact RelayState data it received with the request into the corresponding RelayState
- 272 parameter in the response.

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3.1.2 Security

- 274 Unless stated otherwise, these security statements apply to all bindings. Bindings may also make
- 275 additional statements about these security features.

276 3.1.2.1 Use of SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0

- 277 Unless otherwise specified, in any SAML binding's use of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246], servers
- MUST authenticate to clients using a X.509 v3 certificate. The client MUST establish server identity based
- on contents of the certificate (typically through examination of the certificate's subject DN field,
- 280 subjectAltName attribute, etc.).

3.1.2.2 Data Origin Authentication

- 282 Authentication of both the SAML requester and the SAML responder associated with a message is
- 283 OPTIONAL and depends on the environment of use. Authentication mechanisms available at the SOAP
- 284 message exchange layer or from the underlying substrate protocol (for example in many bindings the
- SSL/TLS or HTTP protocol) MAY be utilized to provide data origin authentication.
- 286 Transport authentication will not meet end-end origin-authentication requirements in bindings where the
- 287 SAML protocol message passes through an intermediary in this case message authentication is
- 288 recommended.
- Note that SAML itself offers mechanisms for parties to authenticate to one another, but in addition SAML
- 290 may use other authentication mechanisms to provide security for SAML itself.

3.1.2.3 Message Integrity

- 292 Message integrity of both SAML requests and SAML responses is OPTIONAL and depends on the
- environment of use. The security layer in the underlying substrate protocol or a mechanism at the SOAP
- message exchange layer MAY be used to ensure message integrity.
- 295 Transport integrity will not meet end-end integrity requirements in bindings where the SAML protocol
- 296 message passes through an intermediary in this case message integrity is recommended.

297 3.1.2.4 Message Confidentiality

- 298 Message confidentiality of both SAML requests and SAML responses is OPTIONAL and depends on the
- environment of use. The security layer in the underlying substrate protocol or a mechanism at the SOAP
- 300 message exchange layer MAY be used to ensure message confidentiality.
- 301 Transport confidentiality will not meet end-end confidentiality requirements in bindings where the SAML
- protocol message passes through an intermediary.

3.1.2.5 Security Considerations

- 304 Before deployment, each combination of authentication, message integrity, and confidentiality
- 305 mechanisms SHOULD be analyzed for vulnerability in the context of the specific protocol exchange and
- the deployment environment. See specific protocol processing rules in [SAMLCore] and the SAML security
- 307 considerations document [SAMLSecure] for a detailed discussion.
- 308 IETF RFC 2617 [RFC2617] describes possible attacks in the HTTP environment when basic or message-
- 309 digest authentication schemes are used.
- 310 Special care should be given to the impact of possible caching on security.

3.2 SAML SOAP Binding

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- 312 SOAP is a lightweight protocol intended for exchanging structured information in a decentralized,
- distributed environment [SOAP11]. It uses XML technologies to define an extensible messaging
- framework providing a message construct that can be exchanged over a variety of underlying protocols.
- 315 The framework has been designed to be independent of any particular programming model and other
- 316 implementation specific semantics. Two major design goals for SOAP are simplicity and extensibility.
- 317 SOAP attempts to meet these goals by omitting, from the messaging framework, features that are often
- found in distributed systems. Such features include but are not limited to "reliability", "security",
- "correlation", "routing", and "Message Exchange Patterns" (MEPs).
- 320 A SOAP message is fundamentally a one-way transmission between SOAP nodes from a SOAP sender
- to a SOAP receiver, possibly routed through one or more SOAP intermediaries. SOAP messages are
- 322 expected to be combined by applications to implement more complex interaction patterns ranging from
- request/response to multiple, back-and-forth "conversational" exchanges [SOAP-PRIMER].
- 324 SOAP defines an XML message envelope that includes header and body sections, allowing data and
- control information to be transmitted. SOAP also defines processing rules associated with this envelope
- and an HTTP binding for SOAP message transmission.
- 327 The SAML SOAP binding defines how to use SOAP to send and receive SAML requests and responses.
- Like SAML, SOAP can be used over multiple underlying transports. This binding has protocol-independent
- aspects, but also calls out the use of SOAP over HTTP as REQUIRED (mandatory to implement).

3.2.1 Required Information

- 331 **Identification:** urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:SOAP
- 332 Contact information: security-services-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 333 **Description:** Given below.
- 334 Updates: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:bindings:SOAP-binding

3.2.2 Protocol-Independent Aspects of the SAML SOAP Binding

- 336 The following sections define aspects of the SAML SOAP binding that are independent of the underlying
- protocol, such as HTTP, on which the SOAP messages are transported. Note this binding only supports
- the use of SOAP 1.1.

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3.2.2.1 Basic Operation

- SOAP 1.1 messages consist of three elements: an envelope, header data, and a message body. SAML
- request-response protocol elements MUST be enclosed within the SOAP message body.
- 342 SOAP 1.1 also defines an optional data encoding system. This system is not used within the SAML SOAP
- binding. This means that SAML messages can be transported using SOAP without re-encoding from the
- "standard" SAML schema to one based on the SOAP encoding.
- The system model used for SAML conversations over SOAP is a simple request-response model.
 - A system entity acting as a SAML requester transmits a SAML request element within the body of a SOAP message to a system entity acting as a SAML responder. The SAML requester MUST NOT include more than one SAML request per SOAP message or include any additional XML elements in the SOAP body.
 - 2. The SAML responder [E19]SHOULDMUST return a SOAP message containing either a SAML response element in the body or a SOAP faulteither a SAML response element within the body of another SOAP message or generate a SOAP fault. The SAML responder MUST NOT include more than one SAML response per SOAP message or include any additional XML elements in the SOAP body. If a SAML responder cannot, for some reason, process a SAML request, it MUST generate a SOAP fault. SOAP fault codes SHOULDMUST NOT be sent for errors within the SAML problem domain, for example, inability to find an extension schema or as a signal that the subject is not authorized to access a resource in an authorization query. See Section 3.2.3.3 for more information about error handling. (SOAP 1.1 faults and fault codes are discussed in [SOAP11] Section 4.1.)
- On receiving a SAML response in a SOAP message, the SAML requester MUST NOT send a fault code or other error messages to the SAML responder. Since the format for the message interchange is a simple request-response pattern, adding additional items such as error conditions would needlessly complicate the protocol.
- [SOAP11] references an early draft of the XML Schema specification including an obsolete namespace.
- 365 SAML requesters SHOULD generate SOAP documents referencing only the final XML schema
- namespace. SAML responders MUST be able to process both the XML schema namespace used in
- 367 [SOAP11] as well as the final XML schema namespace.

3.2.2.2 SOAP Headers

- A SAML requester in a SAML conversation over SOAP MAY add arbitrary headers to the SOAP message.
 This binding does not define any additional SOAP headers.
- Note: The reason other headers need to be allowed is that some SOAP software and libraries might add headers to a SOAP message that are out of the control of the SAML-aware process. Also, some headers might be needed for underlying protocols that require routing of messages or by message security mechanisms.
- A SAML responder MUST NOT require any headers in the SOAP message in order to process the SAML message correctly itself, but MAY require additional headers that address underlying routing or message security requirements.
- Note: The rationale is that requiring extra headers will cause fragmentation of the SAML standard and will hurt interoperability.

3.2.3 Use of SOAP over HTTP

- 381 A SAML processor that claims conformance to the SAML SOAP binding MUST implement SAML over
- 382 SOAP over HTTP. This section describes certain specifics of using SOAP over HTTP, including HTTP
- 383 headers, caching, and error reporting.

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- The HTTP binding for SOAP is described in [SOAP11] Section 6.0. It requires the use of a SOAPAction
- 385 header as part of a SOAP HTTP request. A SAML responder MUST NOT depend on the value of this
- 386 header. A SAML requester MAY set the value of the SOAPAction header as follows:
 - http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security

3.2.3.1 HTTP Headers

- A SAML requester in a SAML conversation over SOAP over HTTP MAY add arbitrary headers to the HTTP request. This binding does not define any additional HTTP headers.
- Note: The reason other headers need to be allowed is that some HTTP software and libraries might add headers to an HTTP message that are out of the control of the SAML-aware process. Also, some headers might be needed for underlying protocols that require routing of messages or by message security mechanisms.
- A SAML responder MUST NOT require any headers in the HTTP request to correctly process the SAML message itself, but MAY require additional headers that address underlying routing or message security requirements.
 - **Note:** The rationale is that requiring extra headers will cause fragmentation of the SAML standard and will hurt interoperability.

400 **3.2.3.2 Caching**

- HTTP proxies should not cache SAML protocol messages. To ensure this, the following rules SHOULD be followed.
- When using HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616], requesters SHOULD:
- Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store".
 - Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
- 406 When using HTTP 1.1, responders SHOULD:
- Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, private".
- Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
- NOT include a Validator, such as a Last-Modified or ETag header.

411 3.2.3.3 Error Reporting

- 412 A SAML responder that refuses to perform a message exchange with the SAML requester SHOULD
- return a "403 Forbidden" response. In this case, the content of the HTTP body is not significant.
- 414 As described in [SOAP11] Section 6.2, in the case of a SOAP error while processing a SOAP request, the
- 415 SOAP HTTP server MUST return a "500 Internal Server Error" response and include a SOAP
- 416 message in the response with a SOAP < SOAP-ENV: fault> element. This type of error SHOULD be
- returned for SOAP-related errors detected before control is passed to the SAML processor, or when the
- SOAP processor reports an internal error (for example, the SOAP XML namespace is incorrect, the SAML
- schema cannot be located, the SAML processor throws an exception, and so on).

- 420 In the case of a SAML processing error, the SOAP HTTP server [E19]SHOULDMUST respond with "200
- 421 OK" and include a SAML-specified <samlp: Status> element in the SAML response within the SOAP
- 422 body. Note that the <samlp:Status> element does not appear by itself in the SOAP body, but only
- within a SAML response of some sort.
- 424 For more information about the use of SAML status codes, see the SAML assertions and protocols
- 425 specification [SAMLCore].

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3.2.3.4 Metadata Considerations

- 427 Support for the SOAP binding SHOULD be reflected by indicating either a URL endpoint at which requests
- 428 contained in SOAP messages for a particular protocol or profile are to be sent, or alternatively with a
- 429 WSDL port/endpoint definition.

430 3.2.3.5 Example SAML Message Exchange Using SOAP over HTTP

Following is an example of a query that asks for an assertion containing an attribute statement from a SAML attribute authority.

```
433
             POST /SamlService HTTP/1.1
434
             Host: www.example.com
435
             Content-Type: text/xml
436
            Content-Length: nnn
437
             SOAPAction: http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security
             <SOAP-ENV:Envelope
438
439
                 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
440
                 <SOAP-ENV:Body>
441
                     <samlp:AttributeQuery xmlns:samlp:="..."</pre>
442
             xmlns:saml="..." xmlns:ds="..." ID=" 6c3a4f8b9c2d" Version="2.0"
             IssueInstant="2004-03-27T08:41:0\overline{0}Z"
443
444
                          <ds:Signature> ... </ds:Signature>
445
                          <saml:Subject>
446
447
                          </saml:Subject>
448
                     </samlp:AttributeQuery>
449
                 </SOAP-ENV:Body>
450
             </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
```

Following is an example of the corresponding response, which supplies an assertion containing the attribute statement as requested.

```
453
            HTTP/1.1 200 OK
454
            Content-Type: text/xml
455
            Content-Length: nnnn
456
             <SOAP-ENV:Envelope
                 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
457
458
                 <SOAP-ENV:Body>
                     <samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="..." xmlns:saml="..." xmlns:ds="..."</pre>
459
            ID=" 6c3a4f8b9c2d" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2004-03-27T08:42:00Z">
460
461
                          <saml:Issuer>https://www.example.com/SAML</saml:Issuer>
462
                         <ds:Signature> ... </ds:Signature>
463
                          <Status>
464
                            <StatusCode Value="..."/>
465
                          </Status>
466
467
                          <saml:Assertion>
468
                              <saml:Subject>
469
470
                              </saml:Subject>
                              <saml:AttributeStatement>
471
472
473
                              </saml:AttributeStatement>
474
                          </saml:Assertion>
475
                     </samlp:Response>
476
                 </SOAP-Env:Body>
```

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3.3 Reverse SOAP (PAOS) Binding

- 479 This binding leverages the Reverse HTTP Binding for SOAP specification [PAOS]. Implementers MUST
- 480 comply with the general processing rules specified in [PAOS] in addition to those specified in this
- document. In case of conflict, [PAOS] is normative.

482 3.3.1 Required Information

- 483 **Identification:** urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:PAOS
- 484 Contact information: security-services-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 485 **Description:** Given below.
- 486 Updates: None.

487 3.3.2 Overview

- The reverse SOAP binding is a mechanism by which an HTTP requester can advertise the ability to act as
- a SOAP responder or a SOAP intermediary to a SAML requester. The HTTP requester is able to support
- a pattern where a SAML request is sent to it in a SOAP envelope in an HTTP response from the SAML
- requester, and the HTTP requester responds with a SAML response in a SOAP envelope in a subsequent
- HTTP request. This message exchange pattern supports the use case defined in the ECP SSO profile
- (described in the SAML profiles specification [SAMLProfile]), in which the HTTP requester is an
- intermediary in an authentication exchange.

3.3.3 Message Exchange

- The PAOS binding includes two component message exchange patterns:
 - 1. The HTTP requester sends an HTTP request to a SAML requester. The SAML requester responds with an HTTP response containing a SOAP envelope containing a SAML request message.
 - 2. Subsequently, the HTTP requester sends an HTTP request to the original SAML requester containing a SOAP envelope containing a SAML response message. The SAML requester responds with an HTTP response, possibly in response to the original service request in step 1.
- The ECP profile uses the PAOS binding to provide authentication of the client to the service provider before the service is provided. This occurs in the following steps, illustrated in Figure A:
 - The client requests a service using an HTTP request.
 - 2. The service provider responds with a SAML authentication request. This is sent using a SOAP request, carried in the HTTP response.
 - The client returns a SOAP response carrying a SAML authentication response. This is sent using a new HTTP request.
 - Assuming the service provider authentication and authorization is successful, the service provider may respond to the original service request in the HTTP response.




Figure 1: PAOS Binding Message Exchanges

The HTTP requester advertises the ability to handle this reverse SOAP binding in its HTTP requests using the HTTP headers defined by the PAOS specification. Specifically:

- The HTTP Accept Header field MUST indicate an ability to accept the "application/vnd.paos+xml" content type.
- The HTTP PAOS Header field MUST be present and specify the PAOS version with "urn:liberty:paos:2003-08"[E21] at a minimum.
- Additional PAOS headers such as the service value MAY be specified by profiles that use the PAOS binding. The HTTP requester MAY add arbitrary headers to the HTTP request.
- Note that this binding does not define a RelayState mechanism. Specific profiles that make use of this
- 520 binding must therefore define such a mechanism, if needed. The use of a SOAP header is suggested for
- 521 this purpose.

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522 The following sections provide more detail on the two steps of the message exchange.

3.3.3.1 HTTP Request, SAML Request in SOAP Response

- In response to an arbitrary HTTP request, the HTTP responder MAY return a SAML request message
- 525 using this binding by returning a SOAP 1.1 envelope in the HTTP response containing a single SAML
- 526 request message in the SOAP body, with no additional body content. The SOAP envelope MAY contain
- arbitrary SOAP headers defined by PAOS, SAML profiles, or additional specifications.
- Note that while the SAML request message is delivered to the HTTP requester, the actual intended

recipient MAY be another system entity, with the HTTP requester acting as an intermediary, as defined by

530 specific profiles.

3.3.3.2 SAML Response in SOAP Request, HTTP Response

- 532 When the HTTP requester delivers a SAML response message to the intended recipient using the PAOS
- binding, it places it as the only element in the SOAP body in a SOAP envelope in an HTTP request. The
- 534 HTTP requester may or may not be the originator of the SAML response. The SOAP envelope MAY
- contain arbitrary SOAP headers defined by PAOS, SAML profiles, or additional specifications. The SAML
- exchange is considered complete and the HTTP response is unspecified by this binding.
- 537 Profiles MAY define additional constraints on the HTTP content of non-SOAP responses during the
- exchanges covered by this binding.

539 **3.3.4 Caching**

- HTTP proxies should not cache SAML protocol messages. To ensure this, the following rules SHOULD be
- 541 followed.

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- 542 When using HTTP 1.1, requesters sending SAML protocol messages SHOULD:
- Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store".
- Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
- 545 When using HTTP 1.1, responders returning SAML protocol messages SHOULD:
- Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, private".
- Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
- NOT include a Validator, such as a Last-Modified or ETag header.

3.3.5 Security Considerations

- 551 The HTTP requester in the PAOS binding may act as a SOAP intermediary and when it does, transport
- 552 layer security for origin authentication, integrity and confidentiality may not meet end-end security
- requirements. In this case security at the SOAP message layer is [E31]recommendedRECOMMENDED.

554 3.3.5.1 Error Reporting

- 555 Standard HTTP and SOAP error conventions MUST be observed. Errors that occur during SAML
- 556 processing MUST NOT be signaled at the HTTP or SOAP layer and MUST be handled using SAML
- response messages with an error <samlp:Status> element.

3.3.5.2 Metadata Considerations

- 559 Support for the PAOS binding SHOULD be reflected by indicating a URL endpoint at which HTTP
- requests and/or SAML protocol messages contained in SOAP envelopes for a particular protocol or profile
- are to be sent. Either a single endpoint or distinct request and response endpoints MAY be supplied.

3.4 HTTP Redirect Binding

- 563 The HTTP Redirect binding defines a mechanism by which SAML protocol messages can be transmitted
- within URL parameters. Permissible URL length is theoretically infinite, but unpredictably limited in
- practice. Therefore, specialized encodings are needed to carry XML messages on a URL, and larger or

- more complex message content can be sent using the HTTP POST or Artifact bindings.
- 567 This binding MAY be composed with the HTTP POST binding (see Section 3.5) and the HTTP Artifact
- 568 binding (see Section 3.6) to transmit request and response messages in a single protocol exchange using
- two different bindings.
- 570 This binding involves the use of a message encoding. While the definition of this binding includes the
- 571 definition of one particular message encoding, others MAY be defined and used.

572 3.4.1 Required Information

- Identification: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect
- 574 Contact information: security-services-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 575 **Description:** Given below.
- 576 Updates: None.

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3.4.2 Overview

- 578 The HTTP Redirect binding is intended for cases in which the SAML requester and responder need to
- communicate using an HTTP user agent (as defined in HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616]) as an intermediary. This
- may be necessary, for example, if the communicating parties do not share a direct path of communication.
- It may also be needed if the responder requires an interaction with the user agent in order to fulfill the
- request, such as when the user agent must authenticate to it.
- Note that some HTTP user agents may have the capacity to play a more active role in the protocol
- exchange and may support other bindings that use HTTP, such as the SOAP and Reverse SOAP
- bindings. This binding assumes nothing apart from the capabilities of a common web browser.

3.4.3 RelayState

- 587 RelayState data MAY be included with a SAML protocol message transmitted with this binding. The value
- 588 MUST NOT exceed 80 bytes in length and SHOULD be integrity protected by the entity creating the
- message[E1], either via a digital signature (see Section 3.4.4.1) or by some independent means.
- 590 independent of any other protections that may or may not exist during message transmission. Signing is-
- not realistic given the space limitation, but because the value is exposed to third-party tampering, the
- 592 entity SHOULD ensure that the value has not been tampered with by using a checksum, a pseudo-
- 593 random value, or similar means.
- If a SAML request message is accompanied by RelayState data, then the SAML responder MUST return
- its SAML protocol response using a binding that also supports a RelayState mechanism, and it MUST
- 596 place the exact data it received with the request into the corresponding RelayState parameter in the
- 597 response.

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- 598 If no such value is included with a SAML request message, or if the SAML response message is being
- 599 generated without a corresponding request, then the SAML responder MAY include RelayState data to be
- interpreted by the recipient based on the use of a profile or prior agreement between the parties.

3.4.4 Message Encoding

- Messages are encoded for use with this binding using a URL encoding technique, and transmitted using
- the HTTP GET method. There are many possible ways to encode XML into a URL, depending on the
- constraints in effect. This specification defines one such method without precluding others. Binding
- endpoints SHOULD indicate which encodings they support using metadata, when appropriate. Particular
- encodings MUST be uniquely identified with a URI when defined. It is not a requirement that all possible
- SAML messages be encodable with a particular set of rules, but the rules MUST clearly indicate which

- 608 messages or content can or cannot be so encoded.
- A URL encoding MUST place the message entirely within the URL query string, and MUST reserve the rest of the URL for the endpoint of the message recipient.
- 611 A query string parameter named SAMLEncoding is reserved to identify the encoding mechanism used. If
- this parameter is omitted, then the value is assumed to be
- urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:URL-Encoding:DEFLATE.
- All endpoints that support this binding MUST support the DEFLATE encoding described in the following sub-section.

3.4.4.1 DEFLATE Encoding

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- 617 Identification: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:URL-Encoding:DEFLATE
- SAML protocol messages can be encoded into a URL via the DEFLATE compression method (see [RFC1951]). In such an encoding, the following procedure should be applied to the original SAML protocol message's XML serialization:
 - Any signature on the SAML protocol message, including the <ds:Signature> XML element itself, MUST be removed. Note that if the content of the message includes another signature, such as a signed SAML assertion, this embedded signature is not removed. However, the length of such a message after encoding essentially precludes using this mechanism. Thus SAML protocol messages that contain signed content SHOULD NOT be encoded using this mechanism.
 - 2. The DEFLATE compression mechanism, as specified in [RFC1951] is then applied to the entire remaining XML content of the original SAML protocol message.
 - 3. The compressed data is subsequently base64-encoded according to the rules specified in IETF RFC 2045 [RFC2045]. Linefeeds or other whitespace MUST be removed from the result.
 - 4. The base-64 encoded data is then URL-encoded, and added to the URL as a query string parameter which MUST be named SAMLRequest (if the message is a SAML request) or SAMLResponse (if the message is a SAML response).
 - 5. If RelayState data is to accompany the SAML protocol message, it MUST be URL-encoded and placed in an additional query string parameter named RelayState.
 - 6. If the original SAML protocol message was signed using an XML digital signature, a new signature covering the encoded data as specified above MUST be attached using the rules stated below.

XML digital signatures are not directly URL-encoded according to the above rules, due to space concerns. If the underlying SAML protocol message is signed with an XML signature [XMLSig], the URL-encoded form of the message MUST be signed as follows:

- 1. The signature algorithm identifier MUST be included as an additional query string parameter, named SigAlg. The value of this parameter MUST be a URI that identifies the algorithm used to sign the URL-encoded SAML protocol message, specified according to [XMLSig] or whatever specification governs the algorithm.
- 2. To construct the signature, a string consisting of the concatenation of the RelayState (if present), SigAlg, and SAMLRequest (or SAMLResponse) query string parameters (each one URLencoded) is constructed in one of the following ways (ordered as below):

```
SAMLRequest=value&RelayState=value&SigAlg=value
SAMLResponse=value&RelayState=value&SigAlg=value
```

- 3. The resulting string of bytes is the octet string to be fed into the signature algorithm. Any other content in the original query string is not included and not signed.
- 4. The signature value MUST be encoded using the base64 encoding (see RFC 2045 [RFC2045]) with any whitespace removed, and included as a query string parameter named Signature. Note that some characters in the base64-encoded signature value may themselves require URL-encoding

before being added.

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- 5. The following signature algorithms (see [XMLSig]) and their URI representations MUST be supported with this encoding mechanism:
 - DSAwithSHA1 http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1
 - RSAwithSHA1 http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1


Note that when verifying signatures, the order of the query string parameters on the resulting URL to be verified is not prescribed by this binding. The parameters may appear in any order. Before verifying a signature, if any, the relying party MUST ensure that the parameter values to be verified are ordered as required by the signing rules above.

Further, note that URL-encoding is not canonical; that is, there are multiple legal encodings for a given value. The relying party MUST therefore perform the verification step using the original URL-encoded values it received on the query string. It is not sufficient to re-encode the parameters after they have been processed by software because the resulting encoding may not match the signer's encoding.

Finally, note that if there is no RelayState value, the entire parameter should be omitted from the signature computation (and not included as an empty parameter name).

3.4.5 Message Exchange

The system model used for SAML conversations via this binding is a request-response model, but these messages are sent to the user agent in an HTTP response and delivered to the message recipient in an HTTP request. The HTTP interactions before, between, and after these exchanges take place is unspecified. Both the SAML requester and the SAML responder are assumed to be HTTP responders. See the following sequence diagram illustrating the messages exchanged.



- 1. Initially, the user agent makes an arbitrary HTTP request to a system entity. In the course of processing the request, the system entity decides to initiate a SAML protocol exchange.
- 2. The system entity acting as a SAML requester responds to the HTTP request from the user agent in

- step 1 by returning a SAML request. The SAML request is returned encoded into the HTTP response's Location header, and the HTTP status MUST be either 303 or 302. The SAML requester MAY include additional presentation and content in the HTTP response to facilitate the user agent's transmission of the message, as defined in HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616]. The user agent delivers the SAML request by issuing an HTTP GET request to the SAML responder.
 - 3. In general, the SAML responder MAY respond to the SAML request by immediately returning a SAML response or MAY return arbitrary content to facilitate subsequent interaction with the user agent necessary to fulfill the request. Specific protocols and profiles may include mechanisms to indicate the requester's level of willingness to permit this kind of interaction (for example, the IsPassive attribute in <samlp:AuthnRequest>).
 - 4. Eventually the responder SHOULD return a SAML response to the user agent to be returned to the SAML requester. The SAML response is returned in the same fashion as described for the SAML request in step 2.
- 5. Upon receiving the SAML response, the SAML requester returns an arbitrary HTTP response to the user agent.

3.4.5.1 HTTP and Caching Considerations

- HTTP proxies and the user agent intermediary should not cache SAML protocol messages. To ensure this, the following rules SHOULD be followed.
- 696 When returning SAML protocol messages using HTTP 1.1, HTTP responders SHOULD:
- Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store".
- Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
- There are no other restrictions on the use of HTTP headers.

3.4.5.2 Security Considerations

- The presence of the user agent intermediary means that the requester and responder cannot rely on the
- transport layer for end-end authentication, integrity and confidentiality. URL-encoded messages MAY be
- signed to provide origin authentication and integrity if the encoding method specifies a means for signing.
- 704 If the message is signed, the Destination XML attribute in the root SAML element of the protocol
- 705 message MUST contain the URL to which the sender has instructed the user agent to deliver the
- message. The recipient MUST then verify that the value matches the location at which the message has
- 707 been received.

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- 708 This binding SHOULD NOT be used if the content of the request or response should not be exposed to
- the user agent intermediary. Otherwise, confidentiality of both SAML requests and SAML responses is
- 710 OPTIONAL and depends on the environment of use. If confidentiality is necessary, SSL 3.0 [SSL3] or TLS
- 711 1.0 [RFC2246] SHOULD be used to protect the message in transit between the user agent and the SAML
- 712 requester and responder.
- 713 Note also that URL-encoded messages may be exposed in a variety of HTTP logs as well as the HTTP
- 714 "Referer" header.
- 715 Before deployment, each combination of authentication, message integrity, and confidentiality
- 716 mechanisms SHOULD be analyzed for vulnerability in the context of the specific protocol exchange, and
- 717 the deployment environment. See specific protocol processing rules in [SAMLCore], and the SAML
- security considerations document [SAMLSecure] for a detailed discussion.
- 719 In general, this binding relies on message-level authentication and integrity protection via signing and
- does not support confidentiality of messages from the user agent intermediary.

3.4.6 Error Reporting

- 722 A SAML responder that refuses to perform a message exchange with the SAML reguester SHOULD
- 723 return a SAML response message with a second-level <samlp:StatusCode> value of
- 724 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:RequestDenied.
- 725 HTTP interactions during the message exchange MUST NOT use HTTP error status codes to indicate
- failures in SAML processing, since the user agent is not a full party to the SAML protocol exchange.
- 727 For more information about SAML status codes, see the SAML assertions and protocols specification
- 728 [SAMLCore].

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3.4.7 Metadata Considerations

- 730 Support for the HTTP Redirect binding SHOULD be reflected by indicating URL endpoints at which
- requests and responses for a particular protocol or profile should be sent. Either a single endpoint or
- distinct request and response endpoints MAY be supplied.

733 3.4.8 Example SAML Message Exchange Using HTTP Redirect

- 734 In this example, a <LogoutRequest> and <LogoutResponse> message pair is exchanged using the 735 HTTP Redirect binding.
- 736 First, here are the actual SAML protocol messages being exchanged:

```
737
            <samlp:LoqoutRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"</pre>
738
            xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
739
                ID="d2b7c388cec36fa7c39c28fd298644a8" IssueInstant="2004-01-
740
            21T19:00:49Z" Version="2.0">
741
                <Issuer>https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
742
                <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-</pre>
743
            format:persistent">005a06e0-ad82-110d-a556-004005b13a2b</NameID>
744
                <samlp:SessionIndex>1</samlp:SessionIndex>
745
            </samlp:LogoutRequest>
746
            <samlp:LogoutResponse xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"</pre>
747
            xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
                ID="b0730d21b628110d8b7e004005b13a2b"
748
749
            InResponseTo="d2b7c388cec36fa7c39c28fd298644a8"
                IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:00:49Z" Version="2.0">
750
751
                <Issuer>https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
752
                <samlp:Status>
753
                    <samlp:StatusCode</pre>
754
            Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
755
                </samlp:Status>
756
            </samlp:LogoutResponse>
```

The initial HTTP request from the user agent in step 1 is not defined by this binding. To initiate the logout protocol exchange, the SAML requester returns the following HTTP response, containing a signed SAML request message. The SAMLRequest parameter value is actually derived from the request message above. The signature portion is only illustrative and not the result of an actual computation. Note that the line feeds in the HTTP Location header below are an artifact of the document, and there are no line feeds in the actual header value.

```
763 HTTP/1.1 302 Object Moved
764 Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:00:49 GMT
```

```
765
            Location: https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML/SLO/Browser?
766
            SAMLRequest=fVFdS8MwFH0f7D%2BUvGdNsq62oSsIQyhMESc%2B
767
            %2BJYlmRbWpObeyvz3puv2IMjyFM7HPedyK1DdsZdb%2F
            %2BEHfLFfgwVMTt3RgTwzazIEJ72CFqRTnQWJWu7uH7dSLJjsg0ev%2FZFMlttiBWADtt6R
768
            %2BSyJr9msiRH7O70sCm31Mj%2Bo%2BC
769
            %2B1KA5G1EWeZaogSOMw2MYBKodrIhjLKONU8FdeSsZkVr6T5M0GiHMjvWCkngZXZ2OoPxF7k
770
771
            GnaGOuwxZ%2Fn4L9bY8NC
772
            %2By4du1XpRXnxPcXizSZ58KFTeHujEWkNPZylsh9bAMYYUjO2Uiy3jCpTCMo5M1StVjmN9SO
773
            150s191U6RV2Dp0vsLIy7NM7YU82r9B90PrvCf85W%2FwL8zSVQzAEAAA%3D
            %3D&RelayState=0043bfc1bc45110dae17004005b13a2b&SigAlg=http%3A%2F
774
775
            %2Fwww.w3.org%2F200%2F09%2Fxmldsig%23rsa-
            shal&Signature=NOTAREALSIGNATUREBUTTHEREALONEWOULDGOHERE
776
777
            Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

After any unspecified interactions may have taken place, the SAML responder returns the HTTP response below containing the signed SAML response message. Again, the SAMLResponse parameter value is actually derived from the response message above. The signature portion is only illustrative and not the result of an actual computation.

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Object Moved
782
783
            Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:00:49 GMT
784
            Location: https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML/SLO/Response?
785
            SAMLResponse=fVFNa4QwEL0X%2Bh8k912TaDUGFUp7EbZQ6rKH3mKcbQVNJBOX
786
            %2FvxaXQ9tYec0vHlv3nzkqIZ%2BlAf7YSf
            %2FBjhagxB8Db1BuZQKMjkjrcIOpVEDoPRa1o8vB8n3VI7OeqttT1bJbbJCBOc7a8i9XTBH9V
787
788
            yQhqYRbTlrEi4Yo61oUqA0pvShYZHiDQkqs411tAVpeZPqSAgNOkrOas4zzcW55ZlI41iJrTX
789
            iBJVBr4wvCJ877ijbcXZkmaRUxtk7CU7gcB5mLu8pKVddvghd
790
            %2Ben9iDIMa3CXTsOrs5euBbfXdqh%2F9snDK%2FEqW69Ye%2BUnvGL%2F8CfbOnBS
            %2FQS3z4QLW9aT1oBIws0j%2FGOyAb9%2FV34Dw5k779IBAAA
791
            %3D&RelayState=0043bfc1bc45110dae17004005b13a2b&SigAlg=http%3A%2F
792
793
            %2Fwww.w3.org%2F200%2F09%2Fxmldsig%23rsa-
            sha1&Signature=NOTAREALSIGNATUREBUTTHEREALONEWOULDGOHERE
794
795
            Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

3.5 HTTP POST Binding

- The HTTP POST binding defines a mechanism by which SAML protocol messages may be transmitted within the base64-encoded content of an HTML form control.
- This binding MAY be composed with the HTTP Redirect binding (see Section 3.4) and the HTTP Artifact binding (see Section 3.6) to transmit request and response messages in a single protocol exchange using
- 801 two different bindings.

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802 3.5.1 Required Information

- 803 **Identification:** urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST
- 804 Contact information: security-services-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 805 **Description:** Given below.
- 806 **Updates:** Effectively replaces the binding aspects of the Browser/POST profile in SAML V1.1
- 807 [SAML11Bind].

808

3.5.2 Overview

- The HTTP POST binding is intended for cases in which the SAML requester and responder need to
- communicate using an HTTP user agent (as defined in HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616]) as an intermediary. This
- may be necessary, for example, if the communicating parties do not share a direct path of communication.
- 812 It may also be needed if the responder requires an interaction with the user agent in order to fulfill the
- request, such as when the user agent must authenticate to it.

- Note that some HTTP user agents may have the capacity to play a more active role in the protocol
- exchange and may support other bindings that use HTTP, such as the SOAP and Reverse SOAP
- 816 bindings. This binding assumes nothing apart from the capabilities of a common web browser.

3.5.3 RelayState

- 818 RelayState data MAY be included with a SAML protocol message transmitted with this binding. The value
- 819 MUST NOT exceed 80 bytes in length and SHOULD be integrity protected by the entity creating the
- message independent of any other protections that may or may not exist during message transmission.
- 821 Signing is not realistic given the space limitation, but because the value is exposed to third-party
- tampering, the entity SHOULD ensure that the value has not been tampered with by using a checksum, a
- pseudo-random value, or similar means.
- 824 If a SAML request message is accompanied by RelayState data, then the SAML responder MUST return
- its SAML protocol response using a binding that also supports a RelayState mechanism, and it MUST
- 826 place the exact data it received with the request into the corresponding RelayState parameter in the
- 827 response.

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
- 828 If no such [E31]RelayState datavalue is included with a SAML request message, or if the SAML response
- 829 message is being generated without a corresponding request, then the SAML responder MAY include
- 830 RelayState data to be interpreted by the recipient based on the use of a profile or prior agreement
- between the parties.

3.5.4 Message Encoding

- 833 Messages are encoded for use with this binding by encoding the XML into an HTML form control and are
- transmitted using the HTTP POST method. A SAML protocol message is form-encoded by applying the
- base-64 encoding rules to the XML representation of the message and placing the result in a hidden form
- control within a form as defined by [HTML401] Section 17. The HTML document MUST adhere to the
- 837 XHTML specification, [XHTML]. The base64-encoded value MAY be line-wrapped at a reasonable length
- in accordance with common practice.
- 839 If the message is a SAML request, then the form control MUST be named SAMLRequest. If the message
- is a SAML response, then the form control MUST be named SAMLResponse. Any additional form controls
- or presentation MAY be included but MUST NOT be required in order for the recipient to process the
- 842 message.
- lf a "RelayState" value is to accompany the SAML protocol message, it MUST be placed in an additional
- 844 hidden form control named RelayState within the same form with the SAML message.
- The action attribute of the form MUST be the recipient's HTTP endpoint for the protocol or profile using
- this binding to which the SAML message is to be delivered. The method attribute MUST be "POST".
- Any technique supported by the user agent MAY be used to cause the submission of the form, and any
- form content necessary to support this MAY be included, such as submit controls and client-side scripting
- commands. However, the recipient MUST be able to process the message without regard for the
- mechanism by which the form submission is initiated.
- 851 Note that any form control values included MUST be transformed so as to be safe to include in the
- 852 XHTML document. This includes transforming characters such as quotes into HTML entities, etc.

3.5.5 Message Exchange

- The system model used for SAML conversations via this binding is a request-response model, but these
- messages are sent to the user agent in an HTTP response and delivered to the message recipient in an
- 856 HTTP request. The HTTP interactions before, between, and after these exchanges take place is
- unspecified. Both the SAML requester and responder are assumed to be HTTP responders. See the
- following diagram illustrating the messages exchanged.



- 1. Initially, the user agent makes an arbitrary HTTP request to a system entity. In the course of processing the request, the system entity decides to initiate a SAML protocol exchange.
 - The system entity acting as a SAML requester responds to an HTTP request from the user agent by returning a SAML request. The request is returned in an XHTML document containing the form and content defined in Section 3.5.4. The user agent delivers the SAML request by issuing an HTTP POST request to the SAML responder.
 - 3. In general, the SAML responder MAY respond to the SAML request by immediately returning a SAML response or it MAY return arbitrary content to facilitate subsequent interaction with the user agent necessary to fulfill the request. Specific protocols and profiles may include mechanisms to indicate the requester's level of willingness to permit this kind of interaction (for example, the IsPassive attribute in <samlp:AuthnRequest>).
 - 4. Eventually the responder SHOULD return a SAML response to the user agent to be returned to the SAML requester. The SAML response is returned in the same fashion as described for the SAML request in step 2.
 - 5. Upon receiving the SAML response, the SAML requester returns an arbitrary HTTP response to the user agent.

3.5.5.1 HTTP and Caching Considerations

- HTTP proxies and the user agent intermediary should not cache SAML protocol messages. To ensure this, the following rules SHOULD be followed.
- 878 When returning SAML protocol messages using HTTP 1.1, HTTP responders SHOULD:
- Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store".

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- Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
- There are no other restrictions on the use of HTTP headers.

3.5.5.2 Security Considerations

- 883 The presence of the user agent intermediary means that the requester and responder cannot rely on the
- transport layer for end-end authentication, integrity or confidentiality protection and must authenticate the
- 885 messages received instead. SAML provides for a signature on protocol messages for authentication and
- integrity for such cases. Form-encoded messages MAY be signed before the base64 encoding is applied.
- 887 If the message is signed, the Destination XML attribute in the root SAML element of the protocol
- 888 message MUST contain the URL to which the sender has instructed the user agent to deliver the
- message. The recipient MUST then verify that the value matches the location at which the message has
- 890 been received.

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- This binding SHOULD NOT be used if the content of the request or response should not be exposed to
- the user agent intermediary. Otherwise, confidentiality of both SAML requests and SAML responses is
- 893 OPTIONAL and depends on the environment of use. If confidentiality is necessary, SSL 3.0 [SSL3] or TLS
- 1.0 [RFC2246] SHOULD be used to protect the message in transit between the user agent and the SAML
- requester and responder.
- 896 In general, this binding relies on message-level authentication and integrity protection via signing and
- does not support confidentiality of messages from the user agent intermediary.
- 898 Note also that there is no mechanism defined to protect the integrity of the relationship between the SAML
- protocol message and the "RelayState" value, if any. That is, an attacker can potentially recombine a pair
- 900 of valid HTTP responses by switching the "RelayState" values associated with each SAML protocol
- 901 message. The individual "RelayState" and SAML message values can be integrity protected, but not the
- 902 combination. As a result, the producer and consumer of "RelayState" information MUST take care not to
- 903 associate sensitive state information with the "RelayState" value without taking additional precautions
- 904 (such as based on the information in the SAML message).

905 3.5.6 Error Reporting

- 906 A SAML responder that refuses to perform a message exchange with the SAML requester SHOULD
- 907 return a response message with a second-level <samlp: StatusCode> value of
- 908 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:RequestDenied.
- 909 HTTP interactions during the message exchange MUST NOT use HTTP error status codes to indicate
- failures in SAML processing, since the user agent is not a full party to the SAML protocol exchange.
- 911 For more information about SAML status codes, see the SAML assertions and protocols specification
- 912 [SAMLCore].

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3.5.7 Metadata Considerations

- 914 Support for the HTTP POST binding SHOULD be reflected by indicating URL endpoints at which requests
- and responses for a particular protocol or profile should be sent. Either a single endpoint or distinct
- 916 request and response endpoints MAY be supplied.

3.5.8 Example SAML Message Exchange Using HTTP POST

- 918 In this example, a <LogoutRequest> and <LogoutResponse> message pair is exchanged using the
- 919 HTTP POST binding.
- 920 First, here are the actual SAML protocol messages being exchanged:

```
921
            <samlp:LogoutRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"</pre>
922
            xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
923
                ID="d2b7c388cec36fa7c39c28fd298644a8" IssueInstant="2004-01-
            21T19:00:49Z" Version="2.0">
924
925
                <Issuer>https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
                <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-</pre>
926
927
            format:persistent">005a06e0-ad82-110d-a556-004005b13a2b</NameID>
                <samlp:SessionIndex>1</samlp:SessionIndex>
928
929
            </samlp:LogoutRequest>
930
            <samlp:LogoutResponse xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"</pre>
            xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
931
                ID="b0730d21b628110d8b7e004005b13a2b"
932
            InResponseTo="d2b7c388cec36fa7c39c28fd298644a8"
933
934
                IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:00:49Z" Version="2.0">
935
                <Issuer>https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
936
                <samlp:Status>
937
                    <samlp:StatusCode</pre>
938
            Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
                </samlp:Status>
939
940
            </samlp:LogoutResponse>
```

The initial HTTP request from the user agent in step 1 is not defined by this binding. To initiate the logout protocol exchange, the SAML requester returns the following HTTP response, containing a SAML request message. The SAMLRequest parameter value is actually derived from the request message above.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
944
945
            Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:00:49 GMT
946
            Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
947
            <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
948
            <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN"</pre>
949
            "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml11/DTD/xhtml11.dtd">
950
            <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
951
            <body onload="document.forms[0].submit()">
952
            <noscript>
953
            <q>
954
            <strong>Note:</strong> Since your browser does not support JavaScript,
955
            you must press the Continue button once to proceed.
956
            957
            </noscript>
958
            <form action="https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML/SLO/Browser"</pre>
959
            method="post">
960
            <div>
961
            <input type="hidden" name="RelayState"</pre>
            value="0043bfc1bc45110dae17004005b13a2b"/>
962
963
            <input type="hidden" name="SAMLRequest"</pre>
964
            value="PHNhbWxwOkxvZ291dFJlcXVlc3QgeG1sbnM6c2FtbHA9InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW11
965
            czp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDpwcm90b2NvbCIgeG1sbnM9InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0
966
            YzpTQU1MOjIuMDphc3NlcnRpb24iDQogICAgSUQ9ImQyYjdjMzg4Y2VjMzZmYTdj
967
            MzljMjhmZDI5ODY0NGE4IiBJc3N1ZUluc3RhbnQ9IjIwMDQtMDEtMjFUMTk6MDA6
968
            NDlaIiBWZXJzaW9uPSIyLjAiPq0KICAqIDxJc3N1ZXI+aHR0cHM6Ly9JZGVudG10
969
            eVByb3ZpZGVyLmNvbS9TQU1MPC9Jc3N1ZXI+DQoqICAqPE5hbWVJRCBGb3JtYXQ9
970
            InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW11czp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDpuYW11aWQtZm9ybWF0OnBlcnNp
971
            c3RlbnQiPjAwNWEwNmUwLWFkODItMTEwZC1hNTU2LTAwNDAwNWIxM2EyYjwvTmFt
972
            ZU1EPg0KICAgIDxzYW1scDpTZXNzaW9uSW5kZXg+MTwvc2FtbHA6U2Vzc2lvbklu
973
            ZGV4Pq0KPC9zYW1scDpMb2dvdXRSZXF1ZXN0Pq=="/>
974
            </div>
975
            <noscript>
976
            <div>
977
            <input type="submit" value="Continue"/>
978
            </div>
979
            </noscript>
980
            </form>
981
            </body>
```

941

942 943 982 </html>

983

984

985

After any unspecified interactions may have taken place, the SAML responder returns the HTTP response below containing the SAML response message. Again, the SAMLResponse parameter value is actually derived from the response message above.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
986
987
             Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:00:49 GMT
988
             Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
             <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
989
990
             <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN"</pre>
             "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml11/DTD/xhtml11.dtd">
991
             <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
992
993
             <body onload="document.forms[0].submit()">
994
             <noscript>
995
             >
996
             <strong>Note:</strong> Since your browser does not support JavaScript,
997
             you must press the Continue button once to proceed.
998
             </noscript>
999
1000
             <form action="https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML/SLO/Response"</pre>
             method="post">
1001
1002
             <div>
1003
             <input type="hidden" name="RelayState"</pre>
1004
             value="0043bfc1bc45110dae17004005b13a2b"/>
             <input type="hidden" name="SAMLResponse"</pre>
1005
1006
             value="PHNhbWxwOkxvZ291dFJlc3BvbnNlIHhtbG5zOnNhbWxwPSJ1cm46b2FzaXM6bmFt
1007
             ZXM6dGM6U0FNTDoyLjA6cHJvdG9jb2wiIHhtbG5zPSJ1cm46b2FzaXM6bmFtZXM6
1008
             dGM6U0FNTDoyLjA6YXNzZXJ0aW9uIq0KICAqIE1EPSJiMDczMGQyMWI2MjqxMTBk
1009
             OGI3ZTAwNDAwNWIxM2EyYiIgSW5SZXNwb25zZVRvPSJkMmI3YzM4OGN1YzM2ZmE3
             YzM5YzI4ZmQyOTg2NDRhOCINCiAgICBJc3N1ZUluc3RhbnQ9IjIwMDQtMDEtMjFU
1010
1011
             MTk6MDA6NDlaIiBWZXJzaW9uPSIyLjAiPq0KICAqIDxJc3N1ZXI+aHR0cHM6Ly9T
             ZXJ2aWN1UHJvdmlkZXIuY29tL1NBTUw8L01zc3Vlcj4NCiAgICA8c2FtbHA6U3Rh
1012
1013
             dHVzPg0KICAgICAgICA8c2FtbHA6U3RhdHVzQ29kZSBWYWx1ZT0idXJuOm9hc2lz
1014
             Om5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOnN0YXR1czpTdWNjZXNzIi8+DQogICAgPC9zYW1s
             cDpTdGF0dXM+DQo8L3NhbWxwOkxvZ291dFJ1c3BvbnN1Pg=="/>
1015
1016
             </div>
1017
             <noscript>
1018
             <div>
1019
             <input type="submit" value="Continue"/>
1020
             </div>
             </noscript>
1021
1022
             </form>
1023
             </body>
1024
             </html>
```

3.6 HTTP Artifact Binding

- In the HTTP Artifact binding, the SAML request, the SAML response, or both are transmitted by reference using a small stand-in called an artifact. A separate, synchronous binding, such as the SAML SOAP binding, is used to exchange the artifact for the actual protocol message using the artifact resolution
- protocol defined in the SAML assertions and protocols specification [SAMLCore].
- This binding MAY be composed with the HTTP Redirect binding (see Section 3.4) and the HTTP POST binding (see Section 3.5) to transmit request and response messages in a single protocol exchange using
- 1032 two different bindings.

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3.6.1 Required Information

Identification: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Artifact

- 1035 Contact information: security-services-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 1036 **Description:** Given below.
- 1037 Updates: Effectively replaces the binding aspects of the Browser/Artifact profile in SAML V1.1
- 1038 [SAML11Bind].

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1039 **3.6.2 Overview**

- The HTTP Artifact binding is intended for cases in which the SAML requester and responder need to
- 1041 communicate using an HTTP user agent as an intermediary, but the intermediary's limitations preclude or
- discourage the transmission of an entire message (or message exchange) through it. This may be for
- technical reasons or because of a reluctance to expose the message content to the intermediary (and if
- the use of encryption is not practical).
- Note that because of the need to subsequently resolve the artifact using another synchronous binding,
- such as SOAP, a direct communication path must exist between the SAML message sender and recipient
- in the reverse direction of the artifact's transmission (the receiver of the message and artifact must be
- able to send a <samlp:ArtifactResolve> request back to the artifact issuer). The artifact issuer must
- also maintain state while the artifact is pending, which has implications for load-balanced environments.

3.6.3 Message Encoding

- There are two methods of encoding an artifact for use with this binding. One is to encode the artifact into a
- URL parameter and the other is to place the artifact in an HTML form control. When URL encoding is
- used, the HTTP GET method is used to deliver the message, while POST is used with form encoding. All
- endpoints that support this binding MUST support both techniques.

1055 **3.6.3.1 RelayState**

- 1056 RelayState data MAY be included with a SAML artifact transmitted with this binding. The value MUST
- NOT exceed 80 bytes in length and SHOULD be integrity protected by the entity creating the message
- independent of any other protections that may or may not exist during message transmission. Signing is
- not realistic given the space limitation, but because the value is exposed to third-party tampering, the
- entity SHOULD ensure that the value has not been tampered with by using a checksum, a pseudo-
- 1061 random value, or similar means.
- 1062 If an artifact that represents a SAML request is accompanied by RelayState data, then the SAML
- 1063 responder MUST return its SAML protocol response using a binding that also supports a RelayState
- mechanism, and it MUST place the exact data it received with the artifact into the corresponding
- 1065 RelayState parameter in the response.
- 1066 If no such value is included with an artifact representing a SAML request, or if the SAML response
- message is being generated without a corresponding request, then the SAML responder MAY include
- RelayState data to be interpreted by the recipient based on the use of a profile or prior agreement
- 1069 between the parties.

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3.6.3.2 URL Encoding

- To encode an artifact into a URL, the artifact value is URL-encoded and placed in a query string
- 1072 parameter named SAMLart.
- 1073 If a "RelayState" value is to accompany the SAML artifact, it MUST be URL-encoded and placed in an
- 1074 additional query string parameter named RelayState.

3.6.3.3 Form Encoding

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- 1076 A SAML artifact is form-encoded by placing it in a hidden form control within a form as defined by
- 1077 [HTML401], chapter 17. The HTML document MUST adhere to the XHTML specification, [XHTML]. The
- 1078 form control MUST be named SAMLart. Any additional form controls or presentation MAY be included but
- MUST NOT be required in order for the recipient to process the artifact.
- 1080 If a "RelayState" value is to accompany the SAML artifact, it MUST be placed in an additional hidden form
- 1081 control named RelayState, within the same form with the SAML message.
- 1082 The action attribute of the form MUST be the recipient's HTTP endpoint for the protocol or profile using
- this binding to which the artifact is to be delivered. The method attribute MUST be set to "POST".
- Any technique supported by the user agent MAY be used to cause the submission of the form, and any
- form content necessary to support this MAY be included, such as submit controls and client-side scripting
- 1086 commands. However, the recipient MUST be able to process the artifact without regard for the
- mechanism by which the form submission is initiated.
- Note that any form control values included MUST be transformed so as to be safe to include in the
- 1089 XHTML document. This includes transforming characters such as quotes into HTML entities, etc.

3.6.4 Artifact Format

- 1091 With respect to this binding, an artifact is a short, opaque string. Different types can be defined and used
- without affecting the binding. The important characteristics are the ability of an artifact receiver to identify
- the issuer of the artifact, resistance to tampering and forgery, uniqueness, and compactness.
- The general format of any artifact includes a mandatory two-byte artifact type code and a two-byte index value identifying a specific endpoint of the artifact resolution service of the issuer, as follows:

```
1096 SAML_artifact := B64(TypeCode EndpointIndex RemainingArtifact)
1097 TypeCode := Byte1Byte2
1098 EndpointIndex := Byte1Byte2
```

- 1099 The notation B64 (TypeCode EndpointIndex RemainingArtifact) stands for the application of
- the base64 [RFC2045] transformation to the catenation of the TypeCode, EndpointIndex, and
- 1101 RemainingArtifact.
- 1102 The following practices are RECOMMENDED for the creation of SAML artifacts:
 - Each issuer is assigned an identifying URI, also known as the issuer's entity (or provider) ID. See Section 8.3.6 of [SAMLCore] for a discussion of this kind of identifier.
 - The issuer constructs the SourceID component of the artifact by taking the SHA-1 hash of the identification URL. The hash value is NOT encoded into hexadecimal.
 - The MessageHandle value is constructed from a cryptographically strong random or pseudorandom number sequence [RFC1750] generated by the issuer. The sequence consists of values of at least 16 bytes in size. These values should be padded as needed to a total length of 20 bytes.
- 1111 The following describes the single artifact type defined by SAML V2.0. [E4]Although the general artifact
- 1112 structure resembles that used in prior versions of SAML and the type code of the single format described
- below does not conflict with previously defined formats, there is explicitly no correspondence between
- 1114 SAML V2.0 artifacts and those found in any previous specifications, and artifact formats not defined
- 1115 specifically for use with SAML V2.0 MUST NOT be used with this binding.

3.6.4.1 Required Information

1117 Identification: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:artifact-04

- 1118 Contact information: security-services-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 1119 **Description:** Given below.
- 1120 Updates: None.

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3.6.4.2 Format Details

1122 SAML V2.0 defines an artifact type of type code 0x0004. This artifact type is defined as follows:

```
TypeCode := 0x0004

1124 RemainingArtifact := SourceID MessageHandle

1125 SourceID := 20-byte_sequence

1126 MessageHandle := 20-byte sequence
```


- SourceID is a 20-byte sequence used by the artifact receiver to determine artifact issuer identity and the set of possible resolution endpoints.
- 1129 It is assumed that the destination site will maintain a table of SourceID values as well as one or more
- indexed URL endpoints (or addresses) for the corresponding SAML responder. The SAML metadata
- specification [SAMLMeta] MAY be used for this purpose. On receiving the SAML artifact, the receiver
- determines if the SourceID belongs to a known artifact issuer and obtains the location of the SAML
- 1134 to it

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- Any two artifact issuers with a common receiver MUST use distinct SourceID values. Construction of
- 1136 MessageHandle values is governed by the principle that they SHOULD have no predictable relationship
- to the contents of the referenced message at the issuing site and it MUST be infeasible to construct or
- guess the value of a valid, outstanding message handle.

3.6.5 Message Exchange

- 1140 The system model used for SAML conversations by means of this binding is a request-response model in
- which an artifact reference takes the place of the actual message content, and the artifact reference is
- sent to the user agent in an HTTP response and delivered to the message recipient in an HTTP request.
- The HTTP interactions before, between, and after these exchanges take place is unspecified. Both the
- 1144 SAML requester and responder are assumed to be HTTP responders.
- Additionally, it is assumed that on receipt of an artifact by way of the user agent, the recipient invokes a
- 1146 separate, direct exchange with the artifact issuer using the Artifact Resolution Protocol defined in
- 1147 [SAMLCore]. This exchange MUST use a binding that does not use the HTTP user agent as an
- intermediary, such as the SOAP binding. On the successful acquisition of a SAML protocol message, the
- artifact is discarded and the processing of the primary SAML protocol exchange resumes (or ends, if the
- 1150 message is a response).
- 1151 Issuing and delivering an artifact, along with the subsequent resolution step, constitutes half of the overall
- SAML protocol exchange. This binding can be used to deliver either or both halves of a SAML protocol
- exchange. A binding composable with it, such as the HTTP Redirect (see Section 3.4) or POST (see
- 1154 Section 3.5) binding, MAY be used to carry the other half of the exchange. The following sequence
- assumes that the artifact binding is used for both halves. See the diagram below illustrating the messages
- 1156 exchanged.



- 1. Initially, the user agent makes an arbitrary HTTP request to a system entity. In the course of processing the request, the system entity decides to initiate a SAML protocol exchange.
- 2. The system entity acting as a SAML requester responds to an HTTP request from the user agent by returning an artifact representing a SAML request.
 - If URL-encoded, the artifact is returned encoded into the HTTP response's Location header, and the HTTP status MUST be either 303 or 302. The SAML requester MAY include additional presentation and content in the HTTP response to facilitate the user agent's transmission of the message, as defined in HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616]. The user

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- agent delivers the artifact by issuing an HTTP GET request to the SAML responder.
- If form-encoded, then the artifact is returned in an XHTML document containing the form and content defined in Section 3.6.3.3. The user agent delivers the artifact by issuing an HTTP POST request to the SAML responder.
 - 3. The SAML responder determines the SAML requester by examining the artifact (the exact process depends on the type of artifact), and issues a <samlp:ArtifactResolve> request containing the artifact to the SAML requester using a direct SAML binding, temporarily reversing roles.
 - 4. Assuming the necessary conditions are met, the SAML requester returns a <samlp:ArtifactResponse> containing the original SAML request message it wishes the SAML responder to process.
 - 5. In general, the SAML responder MAY respond to the SAML request by immediately returning a SAML artifact or MAY return arbitrary content to facilitate subsequent interaction with the user agent necessary to fulfill the request. Specific protocols and profiles may include mechanisms to indicate the requester's level of willingness to permit this kind of interaction (for example, the IsPassive attribute in <samlp:AuthnRequest>).
 - 6. Eventually the responder SHOULD return a SAML artifact to the user agent to be returned to the SAML requester. The SAML response artifact is returned in the same fashion as described for the SAML request artifact in step 2. The SAML requester determines the SAML responder by examining the artifact, and issues a samlp:ArtifactResolve> request containing the artifact to the SAML responder using a [E31]synchronousdirect SAML binding, as in step 3.
 - 7. Assuming the necessary conditions are met, the SAML responder returns a <samlp:ArtifactResponse> containing the SAML response message it wishes the requester to process, as in step 4.
- 8. Upon receiving the SAML response, the SAML requester returns an arbitrary HTTP response to the user agent.

3.6.5.1 HTTP and Caching Considerations

- HTTP proxies and the user agent intermediary should not cache SAML artifacts. To ensure this, the following rules SHOULD be followed.
- 1193 When returning SAML artifacts using HTTP 1.1, HTTP responders SHOULD:
 - Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store".
- Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
- There are no other restrictions on the use of HTTP headers.

3.6.5.2 Security Considerations

- 1198 This binding uses a combination of indirect transmission of a message reference followed by a direct
- exchange to return the actual message. As a result, the message reference (artifact) need not itself be
- authenticated or integrity protected, but the callback request/response exchange that returns the actual
- message MAY be mutually authenticated and integrity protected, depending on the environment of use.
- 1202 If the actual SAML protocol message is intended for a specific recipient, then the artifact's issuer MUST
- 1203 authenticate the sender of the subsequent <samlp:ArtifactResolve> message before returning the
- 1204 actual message.

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- The transmission of an artifact to and from the user agent SHOULD be protected with confidentiality; SSL
- 1206 3.0 [SSL3] or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] SHOULD be used. The callback request/response exchange that
- returns the actual message MAY be protected, depending on the environment of use.
- 1208 In general, this binding relies on the artifact as a hard-to-forge short-term reference and applies other

- security measures to the callback request/response that returns the actual message. All artifacts MUST
- have a single-use semantic enforced by the artifact issuer.
- Furthermore, it is RECOMMENDED that artifact receivers also enforce a single-use semantic on the
- 1212 artifact values they receive, to prevent an attacker from interfering with the resolution of an artifact by a
- user agent and then resubmitting it to the artifact receiver. If an attempt to resolve an artifact does not
- complete successfully, the artifact SHOULD be placed into a blocked artifact list for a period of time that
- exceeds a reasonable acceptance period during which the artifact issuer would resolve the artifact.
- Note also that there is no mechanism defined to protect the integrity of the relationship between the
- artifact and the "RelayState" value, if any. That is, an attacker can potentially recombine a pair of valid
- HTTP responses by switching the "RelayState" values associated with each artifact. As a result, the
- producer/consumer of "RelayState" information MUST take care not to associate sensitive state
- 1220 information with the "RelayState" value without taking additional precautions (such as based on the
- 1221 | information in the SAML protocol message retrieved via artifact).
- 1222 | [E59]Finally, note that the use of the Destination attribute in the root SAML element of the protocol
- 1223 message is unspecified by this binding, because of the message indirection involved.

1224 3.6.6 Error Reporting

- 1225 A SAML responder that refuses to perform a message exchange with the SAML requester SHOULD
- 1226 return a response message with a second-level <samlp: StatusCode> value of
- 1227 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:RequestDenied.
- 1228 HTTP interactions during the message exchange MUST NOT use HTTP error status codes to indicate
- failures in SAML processing, since the user agent is not a full party to the SAML protocol exchange.
- 1230 If the issuer of an artifact receives a <samlp: ArtifactResolve > message that it can understand, it
- 1231 MUST return a <samlp:ArtifactResponse> with a <samlp:StatusCode> value of
- 1232 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success, even if it does not return the corresponding
- message (for example because the artifact requester is not authorized to receive the message or the
- 1234 artifact is no longer valid).
- 1235 For more information about SAML status codes, see the SAML assertions and protocols specification
- 1236 [SAMLCore].

1237

1245

3.6.7 Metadata Considerations

- 1238 | Support for [E2]receiving messages using the HTTP Artifact binding SHOULD be reflected by indicating
- 1239 URL endpoints at which requests and responses for a particular protocol or profile should be sent. Either a
- 1240 single endpoint or distinct request and response endpoints MAY be supplied. One or more indexed
- 1241 endpoints for processing <samlp:ArtifactResolve> messages SHOULD also be described.Support
- 1242 for sending messages using this binding SHOULD be accompanied by one or more indexed
- 1243 <md:ArtifactResolutionService> endpoints for processing <samlp:ArtifactResolve>
- 1244 <u>messages.</u>

3.6.8 Example SAML Message Exchange Using HTTP Artifact

- 1246 In this example, a <LogoutRequest> and <LogoutResponse> message pair is exchanged using the HTTP Artifact binding, with the artifact resolution taking place using the SOAP binding bound to HTTP.
- First, here are the actual SAML protocol messages being exchanged:

```
1254
                 <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-</pre>
1255
             format:persistent">005a06e0-ad82-110d-a556-004005b13a2b</NameID>
1256
                 <samlp:SessionIndex>1</samlp:SessionIndex>
1257
             </samlp:LogoutRequest>
1258
             <samlp:LogoutResponse xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"</pre>
             xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
1259
1260
                 ID="b0730d21b628110d8b7e004005b13a2b"
             InResponseTo="d2b7c388cec36fa7c39c28fd298644a8"
1261
1262
                 IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:00:49Z" Version="2.0">
1263
                 <Issuer>https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
                 <samlp:Status>
1264
1265
                     <samlp:StatusCode</pre>
             Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
1266
1267
                 </samlp:Status>
1268
             </samlp:LogoutResponse>
```

The initial HTTP request from the user agent in step 1 is not defined by this binding. To initiate the logout 1269 protocol exchange, the SAML requester returns the following HTTP response, containing a SAML artifact. 1270 Note that the line feeds in the HTTP Location header below are a result of document formatting, and 1271 there are no line feeds in the actual header value. 1272

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Object Moved
1273
             Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:00:49 GMT
1274
1275
             Location: https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML/SLO/Browser?
1276
             SAMLart=AAQAADWNEw5VT47wcO4zX%2FiEzMmFQvGknDfws2ZtqSGdkNSbsW1cmVR0bzU
             %3D&RelayState=0043bfc1bc45110dae17004005b13a2b
1277
1278
             Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

The SAML responder then resolves the artifact it received into the actual SAML request using the Artifact Resolution protocol and the SOAP binding in steps 3 and 4, as follows:

1281 Step 3:

1279

1280

```
1282
             POST /SAML/Artifact/Resolve HTTP/1.1
1283
             Host: IdentityProvider.com
1284
             Content-Type: text/xml
1285
             Content-Length: nnn
1286
             SOAPAction: http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security
1287
             <SOAP-ENV:Envelope
                 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
1288
1289
                 <SOAP-ENV:Body>
1290
                      <samlp:ArtifactResolve</pre>
1291
                           xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
                           xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
1292
1293
                           ID=" 6c3a4f8b9c2d" Version="2.0"
1294
                           IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:00:49Z">
1295
                           <Issuer>https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
1296
                           <Artifact>
1297
                           AAQAADWNEw5VT47wcO4zX/iEzMmFQvGknDfws2ZtqSGdkNSbsW1cmVR0bzU=
1298
                           </Artifact>
1299
                     </samlp:ArtifactResolve>
1300
                 </SOAP-ENV:Body>
1301
             </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
1302
```

Step 4:

```
1303
             HTTP/1.1 200 OK
1304
             Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:00:49 GMT
1305
             Content-Type: text/xml
1306
             Content-Length: nnnn
1307
             <SOAP-ENV:Envelope
1308
                 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
1309
                 <SOAP-ENV:Body>
1310
                      <samlp:ArtifactResponse</pre>
1311
                           xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
                           xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
1312
```

```
1313
                           ID=" FQvGknDfws2Z" Version="2.0"
1314
                            InResponseTo=" 6c3a4f8b9c2d"
                            IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:00:49Z">
1315
1316
                            <Issuer>https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
1317
                            <samlp:Status>
1318
                                   <samlp:StatusCode</pre>
1319
                           Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
1320
                           </samlp:Status>
1321
                            <samlp:LogoutRequest ID="d2b7c388cec36fa7c39c28fd298644a8"</pre>
                                   IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:00:49Z"
1322
                                   Version="2.0">
1323
                                   <Issuer>https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
1324
                                   <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-</pre>
1325
1326
             format:persistent">005a06e0-ad82-110d-a556-004005b13a2b</NameID>
1327
                                   <samlp:SessionIndex>1</samlp:SessionIndex>
1328
                           </samlp:LogoutRequest>
1329
                      </samlp:ArtifactResponse>
1330
                 </SOAP-ENV:Body>
1331
             </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
```

After any unspecified interactions may have taken place, the SAML responder returns a second SAML 1332 artifact in its HTTP response in step 6: 1333

```
1334
             HTTP/1.1 302 Object Moved
             Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:05:49 GMT
1335
             Location: https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML/SLO/Response?
1336
1337
             SAMLart=AAQAAFGIZXv5%2BQaBaE5qYurHWJO1nAgLAsqfnyiDHIggbFU0mlSGFTyQiPc
1338
             %3D&RelayState=0043bfc1bc45110dae17004005b13a2b
1339
             Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

The SAML responder then resolves the artifact it received into the actual SAML request using the Artifact 1340 Resolution protocol and the SOAP binding in steps 7 and 8, as follows: 1341

Step 7: 1342

```
1343
             POST /SAML/Artifact/Resolve HTTP/1.1
             Host: ServiceProvider.com
1344
1345
             Content-Type: text/xml
1346
             Content-Length: nnn
1347
             SOAPAction: http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security
1348
             <SOAP-ENV:Envelope
                 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
1349
1350
                 <SOAP-ENV:Body>
1351
                     <samlp:ArtifactResolve</pre>
                           xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
1352
1353
                           xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
                           ID=" ec36fa7c39" Version="2.0"
1354
                           IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:05:49Z">
1355
1356
                           <Issuer>https://IdentityProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
1357
                           <Artifact>
1358
                           AAQAAFGIZXv5+QaBaE5qYurHWJ01nAqLAsqfnyiDHIqqbFU0mlSGFTyQiPc=
1359
                           </Artifact>
                     </samlp:ArtifactResolve>
1360
1361
                 </SOAP-ENV:Body>
1362
             </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
1363
```

Step 8:

```
1364
             HTTP/1.1 200 OK
1365
             Date: 21 Jan 2004 07:05:49 GMT
1366
             Content-Type: text/xml
1367
             Content-Length: nnnn
1368
             <SOAP-ENV:Envelope
                 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
1369
1370
                 <SOAP-ENV:Body>
                      <samlp:ArtifactResponse</pre>
1371
1372
                           xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
1373
                           xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
```

```
ID=" FQvGknDfws2Z" Version="2.0"
1374
                            InResponseTo=" ec36fa7c39"
1375
                            IssueInstant="\overline{2}004-01-21T19:05:49Z">
1376
1377
                            <Issuer>https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
                            <samlp:Status>
1378
1379
                                   <samlp:StatusCode</pre>
1380
                            Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
1381
                            </samlp:Status>
1382
                            <samlp:LogoutResponse ID=" b0730d21b628110d8b7e004005b13a2b"</pre>
                                   InResponseTo=" d2b7c388cec36fa7c39c28fd298644a8"
1383
                                   IssueInstant="2004-01-21T19:05:49Z"
1384
                                   Version="2.0">
1385
1386
                                   <Issuer>https://ServiceProvider.com/SAML</Issuer>
1387
                                   <samlp:Status>
1388
                                           <samlp:StatusCode</pre>
1389
                            Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
1390
                                   </samlp:Status>
1391
                            </samlp:LogoutResponse>
1392
                      </samlp:ArtifactResponse>
                  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
1393
             </SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
1394
```

3.7 SAML URI Binding

- URIs are a protocol-independent means of referring to a resource. This binding is not a general SAML request/response binding, but rather supports the encapsulation of a <samlp:AssertionIDRequest> message with a single <saml:AssertionIDRef> into the resolution of a URI. The result of a successful
- request is a SAML <saml: Assertion > element (but not a complete SAML response).
- 1400 Like SOAP, URI resolution can occur over multiple underlying transports. This binding has
- 1401 [E24]protocoltransport-independent aspects, but also calls out as mandatory the implementation of HTTP
- 1402 URIsuse of HTTP with SSL 3.0 [SSL3] or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] as REQUIRED (mandatory to implement).

1403 3.7.1 Required Information

- 1404 **Identification:** urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:URI
- 1405 Contact information: security-services-comment@lists.oasis-open.org
- 1406 **Description:** Given below.
- 1407 Updates: None

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1408

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3.7.2 Protocol-Independent Aspects of the SAML URI Binding

- 1409 The following sections define aspects of the SAML URI binding that are independent of the underlying
- transport protocol of the URI resolution process.

3.7.2.1 Basic Operation

- 1412 A SAML URI reference identifies a specific SAML assertion. The result of resolving the URI MUST be a
- message containing the assertion, or a transport-specific error. The specific format of the message
- depends on the underlying transport protocol. If the transport protocol permits the returned content to be
- described, such as HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616], then the assertion MAY be encoded in whatever format is
- permitted. If not, the assertion MUST be returned in a form which can be unambiguously interpreted as or
- transformed into an XML serialization of the assertion.
- 1418 It MUST be the case that if the same URI reference is resolved in the future, then either the same SAML
- assertion, or an error, is returned. That is, the reference MAY be persistent but MUST consistently
- reference the same assertion, if any.

3.7.3 Security Considerations

- 1422 Indirect use of a SAML assertion presents dangers if the binding of the reference to the result is not
- secure. The particular threats and their severity depend on the use to which the assertion is being put. In
- general, the result of resolving a URI reference to a SAML assertion SHOULD only be trusted if the
- requester can be certain of the identity of the responder and that the contents have not been modified in
- 1426 transit.

1421

1435

- 1427 It is often not sufficient that the assertion itself be signed, because URI references are by their nature
- somewhat opaque to the requester. The requester SHOULD have independent means to ensure that the
- assertion returned is actually the one that is represented by the URI; this is accomplished by both
- authenticating the responder and relying on the integrity of the response.

1431 3.7.4 MIME Encapsulation

- 1432 For resolution protocols that support MIME as a content description and packaging mechanism, the
- resulting assertion SHOULD be returned as a MIME entity of type application/samlassertion+xml,
- as defined by [SAMLmime].

3.7.5 Use of HTTP URIS

- 1436 A SAML authority that claims conformance to the SAML URI binding MUST implement support for HTTP.
- This section describes certain specifics of using HTTP URIs, including URI syntax, HTTP headers, and
- 1438 error reporting.

1439 **3.7.5.1 URI Syntax**

- In general, there are no restrictions on the permissible syntax of a SAML URI reference as long as the
- SAML authority responsible for the reference creates the message containing it. However, authorities
- MUST support a URL endpoint at which an HTTP request can be sent with a single query string
- parameter named ID. There MUST be no query string in the endpoint URL itself independent of this
- 1444 parameter.
- 1445 For example, if the documented endpoint at an authority is "https://saml.example.edu/assertions", a
- request for an assertion with an ID of abcde can be sent to:
- 1447 https://saml.example.edu/assertions?ID=abcde
- Note that [E31]the URI syntax does not support the use of wildcards is not allowed foron such ID-queries.

1449 3.7.5.2 HTTP and Caching Considerations

- 1450 HTTP proxies MUST NOT cache SAML assertions. To ensure this, the following rules SHOULD be
- 1451 followed.

1455

- When returning SAML assertions using HTTP 1.1, HTTP responders SHOULD:
- Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-store".
- Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".

3.7.5.3 Security Considerations

- 1456 RFC 2617 [RFC2617] describes possible attacks in the HTTP environment when basic or message-digest
- authentication schemes are used.
- Use of SSL 3.0 [SSL3] or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED as a means of
- authentication, integrity protection, and confidentiality.

3.7.5.4 Error Reporting

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- 1461 As an HTTP protocol exchange, the appropriate HTTP status code SHOULD be used to indicate the result
- of a request. For example, a SAML responder that refuses to perform a message exchange with the
- SAML requester SHOULD return a "403 Forbidden" response. If the assertion specified is unknown to
- the responder, then a "404 Not Found" response SHOULD be returned. In these cases, the content of
- the HTTP body is not significant.

1466 3.7.5.5 Metadata Considerations

Support for the URI binding over HTTP SHOULD be reflected by indicating a URL endpoint at which

requests for arbitrary assertions are to be sent.

3.7.5.6 Example SAML Message Exchange Using an HTTP URI

1470 Following is an example of a request for an assertion.

```
1471 GET /SamlService?ID=abcde HTTP/1.1
1472 Host: www.example.com
```

1473 Following is an example of the corresponding response, which supplies the requested assertion.

4 References 1482 [HTML401] D. Raggett et al. HTML 4.01 Specification. World Wide Web Consortium 1483 Recommendation, December 1999. See http://www.w3.org/TR/html4. 1484 The Liberty Alliance Project. See http://www.projectliberty.org. [Liberty] 1485 R. Aarts. Liberty Reverse HTTP Binding for SOAP Specification Version 1.0. 1486 [PAOS] Liberty Alliance Project, 2003. See https://www.projectliberty.org/specs/liberty- 1487 paos-v1.0.pdf. 1488 1489 [RFC1750] D. Eastlake et al. Randomness Recommendations for Security. IETF RFC 1750. December 1994. See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1750.txt. 1490 1491 [RFC2045] N. Freed et al. Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies, IETF RFC 2045, November 1996. See 1492 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2045.txt. 1493 [RFC2119] S. Bradner. Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. IETF 1494 RFC 2119, March 1997. See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt. 1495 [RFC2246] T. Dierks et al. The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. IETF RFC 2246, January 1999. 1496 See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt. 1497 F. Yergeau. UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646. IETF RFC 2279, [RFC2279] 1498 January 1998. See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2279.txt. 1499 R. Fielding et al. Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP/1.1. IETF RFC 2616, June [RFC2616] 1500 1999. See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt. 1501 J. Franks et al. HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication. [RFC2617] 1502 IETF RFC 2617, June 1999. See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2617.txt. 1503 E. Maler et al. Bindings and Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup [SAML11Bind] 1504 Language (SAML). OASIS, September 2003. Document ID oasis-sstc-saml-1505 bindings-1.1. See http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. 1506 P. Mishra et al. Conformance Requirements for the OASIS Security Assertion [SAMLConform] 1507 Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. OASIS SSTC, March 2005. Document ID saml-1508 conformance-2.0-os. See http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. 1509 [SAMLCore] S. Cantor et al. Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion 1510 Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. OASIS SSTC, March 2005. Document ID saml-1511 core-2.0-os. See http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. 1512 [SAMLGloss] J. Hodges et al. Glossary for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language 1513 (SAML) V2.0. OASIS SSTC, March 2005. Document ID saml-glossary-2.0-os. 1514 See http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. 1515 S. Cantor et al. Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language [SAMLMeta] 1516 (SAML) V2.0. OASIS SSTC, March 2005. Document ID saml-metadata-2.0-os. 1517 See http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. 1518 [E57] application/saml+xml Media Type Registration, IETF Internet-Draft, [SAMLmime] 1519 http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-hodges-saml-mediatype-01.txt.OASIS 1520 Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC), "application/samlassertion+xml 1521 MIME Media Type Registration", IANA MIME Media Types Registry 1522 application/samlassertion+xml, December 2004. See 1523 http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/application/samlassertion+xml. 1524 S. Cantor et al. Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language [SAMLProfile] 1525 (SAML) V2.0. OASIS SSTC, March 2005, Document ID saml-profiles-2.0-os, See 1526 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. 1527

F. Hirsch et al. Security and Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security

[SAMLSecure]

1528

| 1529 1530 1531 | | Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0. OASIS SSTC, March 2005. Document ID saml-sec-consider-2.0-os. See http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. |
|----------------------|---------------|--|
| 1532 1533 1534 | [SOAP11] | D. Box et al. Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 1.1. World Wide Web Consortium Note, May 2000. See http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/NOTE-SOAP-20000508/. |
| 1535 1536 | [SOAP-PRIMER] | N. Mitra. SOAP Version 1.2 Part 0: Primer. World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation, June 2003. See http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part0/, |
| 1537 1538 | [SSL3] | A. Frier et al. <i>The SSL 3.0 Protocol</i> . Netscape Communications Corp, November 1996. |
| 1539 1540 | [SSTCWeb] | OASIS Security Services Technical Committee website, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security. |
| 1541 1542 1543 | [XHTML] | XHTML 1.0 The Extensible HyperText Markup Language (Second Edition). World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation, August 2002. See http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/ . |
| 1544 1545 1546 | [XMLSig] | D. Eastlake et al. <i>XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, [E74]Second Edition</i> . World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation, <u>June 2008February 2002</u> . See http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/ . |

Appendix A. Registration of MIME media type application/samlassertion+xml

1548

| 1549 | Introduction | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1550 1551 | This document defines a MIME media type application/samlassertion+xml for use with the XML serialization of SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) assertions. | |
| 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 | The SAML specification sets [SAMLv1.0], [SAMLv1.1], [SAMLv2.0] are work products of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee [SSTC]. The SAML specifications define XML-based constructs with which one may make, and convey, security assertions. Using SAML, one can assert that an authentication event pertaining to some subject has occured and convey said assertion to a relying party, for example. | |
| 1557 1558 | SAML assertions, which are explicitly versioned, are defined by [SAMLv1Core], [SAMLv11Core], and [SAMLv2Core]. | |
| 1559 | MIME media type name | |
| 1560 | application | |
| 1561 | MIME subtype name | |
| 1562 | samlassertion+xml | |
| 1563 | Required parameters | |
| 1564 | None | |
| 1565 | Optional parameters | |
| 1566 | charset | |
| 1567 | Same as charset parameter of application/xml [RFC3023]. | |
| 1568 | Encoding considerations | |
| 1569 | Same as for application/xml [RFC3023]. | |
| 1570 | Security considerations | |
| 1571 | Per their specification, samlassertion+xml-typed objects do not contain executable content. | |
| 1572 | However, SAML assertions are XML-based objects [XML]. As such, they have all of the general | |
| 1573 1574 | security considerations presented in Section 10 of [RFC3023], as well as additional ones, since they are explicit security objects. For example, samlassertion+xml-typed objects will often | |
| 1575 | contain data that may identify or pertain to a natural person, and may be used as a basis for | |
| 1576 | sessions and access control decisions. | |
| 1577 | To counter potential issues, samlassertion+xml-typed objects contain data that should be | |
| 1578 | signed appropriately by the sender. Any such signature must be verified by the recipient of the | |
| 1579 | data - both as a valid signature, and as being the signature of the sender. Issuers of | |
| 1580 1581 | samlassertion+xml-typed objects containing SAMLv2 assertions may also encrypt all, or portions of, the assertions (see [SAMLv2Core]). | |
| .001 | politicities of, the descriptions (000 [c. thill 1200/0]). | |

In addition, SAML profiles and protocol bindings specify use of secure channels as appropriate. 1582 [SAMLv2.0] incorporates various privacy-protection techniques in its design. For example: opaque 1583 handles, specific to interactions between specific system entities, may be assigned to subjects. 1584 The handles are mappable to wider-context identifiers (e.g. email addresses, account identifiers, 1585 etc) by only the specific parties. 1586 For a more detailed discussion of SAML security considerations and specific security-related 1587 design techniques, please refer to the SAML specifications listed in the below bibliography. The 1588 specifications containing security-specific information have been explicitly listed for each version 1589 of SAML. 1590 Interoperability considerations 1591 SAML assertions are explicitly versioned. Relying parties should ensure that they observe 1592 assertion version information and behave accordingly. See chapters on SAML Versioning in 1593 [SAMLv1Core], [SAMLv11Core], or [SAMLv2Core], as appropriate. 1594 Published specification 1595 [SAMLv2Bind] explicitly specifies use of the application/samlassertion+xml MIME media 1596 type. However, it is conceivable that non-SAMLv2 assertions (i.e., SAMLv1 and/or SAMLv1.1) 1597 might in practice be conveyed using SAMLv2 bindings. 1598 Applications which use this media type 1599 Potentially any application implementing SAML, as well as those applications implementing 1600 specifications based on SAML, e.g. those available from the Liberty Alliance [LAP]. 1601 Additional information 1602 Magic number(s) 1603 In general, the same as for application/xml [RFC3023]. In particular, the XML root element of the 1604 returned object will have a namespace-qualified name with: 1605 a local name of: Assertion 1606 a namespace URI of: one of the version-specific SAML assertion XML 1607 namespace URIs, as defined by the appropriate version-specific SAML "core" 1608 specification (see bibliography). 1609 With SAMLv2.0 specifically, the root element of the returned object may be either 1610 <saml:Assertion> or <saml:EncryptedAssertion>, where "saml" represents any XML 1611 namespace prefix that maps to the SAMLv2.0 assertion namespace URI: 1612 urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion 1613 File extension(s) 1614 None 1615 Macintosh File Type Code(s) 1616 None 1617

Person & email address to contact for further information

This registration is made on behalf of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC)
Please refer to the SSTC website for current information on committee chairperson(s) and their
contact addresses: http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/. Committee members should submit comments and potential errata to the security-services@lists.oasis-open.org list. Others should submit them by filling out the web form located at http://www.oasis-open.org/ list. Others

open.org/committees/comments/form.php?wg_abbrev=security.

Additionally, the SAML developer community email distribution list, saml-dev@lists.oasisopen.org, may be employed to discuss usage of the application/samlassertion+xml

MIME media type. The "saml-dev" mailing list is publicly archived here: http://lists.oasisopen.org/archives/saml-dev/. To post to the "saml-dev" mailing list, one must subscribe to it. To
subscribe, send a message with the single word "subscribe" in the message body, to: saml-devrequest@lists.oasis-open.org.

Intended usage

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Author/Change controller

The SAML specification sets are a work product of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC). OASIS and the SSTC have change control over the SAML specification sets.

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