

Drone Security and the Mysterious Case of DJI's DroneID

I. INTRODUCTION

In summary, our main contributions are Security Analysis, DroneID, Drone Fuzzing

II. PRIMER ON DJI DRONES

- A. Communication Interfaces and Protocols
 - USB
 - UART -- Universal Asynchronous ReceiverTransmitter
 - Wireless Physical Layer: Bluetooth, WiFi, and OcuSync
 - DUML -- DJI Universal Markup Language
 - DJI Fly / DJI Go 4 App
- B. Drone Firmware
 - Depending on their complexity, the drones we analyzed use different operating systems (OSes).
- C. Drone Hardware
 - Flight Controller
 - Video encoding & collision avoidance SoC
 - Remote Control
 - Transceiver
 - WiFi / Bluetooth Chip
 - Additional Sensors and Other Hardware
- D. Wireless Physical Layer

III. SECURITY ANALYSIS WITHOUT PHYSICAL ACCESS

- A. Threat Model 1: Passive Attacker
- B. Wireless Link
 - DroneID Receiver
 - Spectrum Analysis
 - Demodulation
 - Decoding
 - Performance
 - Performance

IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS WITH PHYSICAL ACCESS

- A. Threat Model 2: Active Attacker
- B. Overview
- C. Initial Manual Analysis and Interactive Access
 - Manual Static Analysis
 - a) S1 SoC Firmware Signature Verification Bypass:
 - b) SDRH File Delivery via Fastboot
 - c) Backdooring the Sparrow Transceiver Firmware
 - Hardware Analysis
- D. Dynamic Analysis – Fuzzing
 - a) Drone Fuzzer Design
 - DUML Protocol
 - UI Oracle
 - Input Blocks
 - Fuzzing Loop
 - b) Implementation
 - c) Experiment Setup
 - d) Results
 - e) Case Studies
 - (1) Arbitrary Command Execution (#14).
 - (2) Arbitrary Serial Number (#15)
 - (3) Unlocking ADB Root shell (#1).
 - f) Roadblocks and Limitations of Fuzzing

V. DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED

- a) Current State of Drone Security
- b) EU and US Regulations for Drone Identification
- c) Active Attacker without Physical Access
- d) Data Integrity
- e) Applicability to Other Vendors
- f) Ethical Considerations and Research Artifacts
- g) Lessons Learned

VI. RELATED WORK

- a) Drone Research
- b) Fuzzing

VII. CONCLUSION