Cryptographic

Engineering

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L06:

Efficient and secure cryptographic implementations

Prof. Nele Mentens

Outline

- Implementation platforms and metrics
- Traditional public-key crypto algorithms:
 - RSA
 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
- Post-quantum crypto algorithms


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Implementation platforms


```
};
trim: b && !b.call("\ufer and metrics
    return null == e ? " = (e + "").replace(C; "")
};
mulcaloray: function(e, t) {
    var n = t || [];
    return null != e && (M(Object(e)) ? x.merge(n, "string" == typeof e ? (e) : e) : h.call(n, e)); n
};
informay: function(e, t, n) {
    var n;
    if (e) {
        if (m) neturn m.call(t, e, n);
        for (n = t.length, n = n ? 0 > n ? Neth.max(B, n + n) : n : 8; n > n; men)
        if (n in t && t[n] === e) neturn n
}
```

Implementation platforms




Platforms covered in this course

Implementation platforms




General-purpose microprocessor

architecture




- The CPU is the heart of a microprocessor and contains a.o.:
 - ALU (Arithmetic Logic Unit)
 - Register file
 - Program memory (Flash)
 - Data memory (SRAM)

General-purpose microprocessor



- The hardware architecture of a microprocessor is fixed
- The code describes what should be executed on the fixed hardware
- The instructions end up in the program memory


architecture




Basic components (Xilinx terminology):


- CLB = Configurable Logic Block
 - CLBs consist of slices
 - Slices consist of
 - Look-Up Tables (LUTs)
 - Multiplexers
 - Flip-Flops (FFs)
 - Carry logic
- SM = Switch Matrix
- IOB = Input/Output Block


Basic content of a slice (excluding carry logic):





Basic principle of a switch matrix:












Basic content of a slice (excluding carry logic) + configuration bits:





Α	В	С	D	Z ₀	Z ₁	Z ₂	Z ₃	•••	Z ₆₅₂₈₀	 Z ₆₅₅₃₅
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1		0	1
0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1		0	1
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		0	1
0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		0	1
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	1
0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0		0	1
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0		0	1
0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		0	1
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1	1
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		1	1
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		1	1
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		1	1
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		1	1
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0		1	1
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0		1	1
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		1	1

Why 16 configuration bits for a 4-to-1 LUT?


- 2¹⁶ possible output functions:
- \bullet $Z_0 = 0$
- $Z_1 = A'.B'.C'.D'$
- $Z_2 = A'.B'.C'.D$
- $Z_3 = A'.B'.C'$
- ...
- $Z_{65280} = A$
- ...
- $Z_{65535} = 1$

Note: modern FPGAs have 6-to-2 LUTs (which can be configured as one 6-to-1 LUT or two 5-to-1 LUTs with shared inputs)





Basic principle of a switch matrix + configuration bits:




design flow design entry schematic, HDL,... synthesis netlist mapping + place & route physical layout bitstream generation bitstream **FPGA** configuration

- The hardware architecture of an FPGA is configurable
- The code describes the hardware that we need
- The bitstream ends up in the configuration memory


1991: XC4000







1991: XC4000

1998: Virtex









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2002: Virtex-II Pro






technology node:


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2002: Virtex-II Pro

2004: Virtex-4





technology node:


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
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2006: Virtex-5





technology node:

|-----**|----|**

1991: XC4000


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
2002: Virtex-II Pro

2004: Virtex-4

2006: Virtex-5

2009: Virtex-6





technology node:

├-----**├----**

FPGA = Field-Programmable Gate Array

1991: XC4000

1998: Virtex


2002: Virtex-II Pro


2004: Virtex-4

2006: Virtex-5

2009: Virtex-6

2010: 7 Series





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
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
2006: Virtex-5

2009: Virtex-6

2010: 7 Series

2013: UltraScale





FPGA = Field-Programmable Gate Array

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
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
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
2010: 7 Series

2013: UltraScale

2015: UltraScale+







FPGA = Field-Programmable Gate Array

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
2010: 7 Series


2013: UltraScale

2015: UltraScale+

2019: Versal

technology node:






DCM (PLL) Al core rocket IO	DSP**	block RAM	configurable logic	block RAM	DSP**	DCM (PLL) Al core rocket
100G ETH	НВМ		ADC	НВМ		100G ETH

ASIC = Application-Specific Integrated Circuit

architecture




Basic components: standard cells from a standard cell library

Logic cells and sequential cells

ASIC = Application-Specific Integrated Circuit


design flow



- The hardware architecture of an ASIC is fixed
- The code describes the hardware that we need
- The GDSII file contains the physical information that goes to the foundry

Metrics

- Metrics = what we measure (on the physical implementation platform or through simulation) to determine the efficiency of an implementation
- We use different units for these metrics on different implementation platforms



Metrics

Resources (typically related to cost):

- Microprocessor:
 - Size of the ROM (Flash) needed to store the program (in bytes)
 - Size of the SRAM needed to store the (intermediate) data (in bytes)

Metrics


Resources (typically related to cost):

- FPGA:
 - Number of CLBs (or slices, or LUTs + flipflops)
 - Number of dedicated components (DSP slices, BRAM,...)

Metrics

Resources (typically related to cost):

- ASIC:
 - Number of equivalent NAND gates (Gate Equivalent = GE)
 - Area in µm²



Metrics

Delay:

- Cycle count (in number of cycles)
- Latency = how long it takes to execute an algorithm from start to end
 = number of cycles divided by the clock frequency (in seconds)
- Throughput = how many bits are processed per second (in bits per second)

Metrics

Energy consumption:

- E = energy, P = power, t = execution time, I = current, V = supply voltage
- E = P * t (in Joule)
 - Amount of energy to execute an algorithm, capacity of the battery
- P = V * I (in Watt)
 - Instantaneous quantity, important for cooling and peak performance
 - Static + dynamic power consumption


Outline


- Implementation platforms and metrics
- Traditional public-key crypto algorithms:
 - RSA
 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
- Post-quantum crypto algorithms

```
= t.apply(e[i], n), r === !1) break
           for (i in e)
               if (r = t.apply(e[i], n), r === [1) break
    } else if (a) {
       for (; o > i; i++)
           if (r = t.call(e[i], i, e[i]), r === |1) break
    ) else
       for (i in e)
           if (r = t.call(e[i], i, eRSA
    return e
trim: b && !b.call("\ufeff\u00a0") ?
   return null == e ? "" : b.call(e)
} : function(e) {
    return null == e ? "" : (e + "").replace(C, "")
makeArray: function(e, t) {
   return null != e && (M(Object(e)) ? x.merge(n, "string" == typeof e ? [e] : e) : h.call(n,
   mray: function(e, t, m) {
              neturn m.call(t, e, m);
                                  8 > n ? Math.max(8, r + n)
                 in t 88 ting === e) neturn n
```

Reminder

- RSA is a public-key algorithm → public + private key pair
- RSA is used for digital signatures and public-key encryption/decryption





Reminder

Key generation:

- Choose two different large primes (p and q) and compute n = p*q
- Compute λ(n)
 = lcm(p-1,q-1)
 = (p-1)*(q-1)/gcd(p-1,q-1)
 (lcm = least common multiple)
 (gcd = greatest common divider)
- Choose $e < \lambda(n)$ and relatively prime to $\lambda(n)$
- Calculate $d = e^{-1} \mod \lambda(n)$

```
Public key = (e,n)
Private key = (p,q) or d
```

Reminder

Key generation:

- Choose two different large primes (p and q) and compute n = p*q
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- Choose $e < \lambda(n)$ and relatively prime to $\lambda(n)$
- Calculate d = e⁻¹ mod λ(n)

```
Public key = (e,n)
Private key = (p,q) or d
```

Public-key encryption/decryption:

Encryption: $c = m^e \mod n$ Decryption: $m = c^d \mod n$ Digital signature generation/verification:

Signature generation: $s = [H(m)]^d \mod n$, then send $m \parallel s$

Signature verification: $H(m) = s^e \mod n$?

Efficient implementation of RSA

Key generation:

- Choose two different large primes (p and q) and compute n = p*q
- Compute λ(n)
 = lcm(p-1,q-1)
 = (p-1)*(q-1)/gcd(p-1,q-1)
 (lcm = least common multiple)
 (gcd = greatest common divider)
- Choose $e < \lambda(n)$ and relatively prime to $\lambda(n)$
- Calculate d = e⁻¹ mod λ(n)

```
Public key = (e,n)
Private key = (p,q) or d
```

Key generation only needs to be done once, and can be done offline

> Modular exponentiation is needed in each online step, and is a time- and energyconsuming operation

Public-key encryption/decryption:

Encryption: $c = m^e \mod n$

Decryption: $m = c^d \mod n$

Digital signature generation/verification:

Signature generation: $s = [H(m)]^d \mod n$, then send $m \parallel s$

Signature verification: $H(m) = s^e \mod n$?

Efficient modular exponentiation

Naive algorithm:

, G = finite group \rightarrow all operations are modular (mod n)

Algorithm Right-to-left binary exponentiation

INPUT: an element $g \in G$ and integer $e \ge 1$. OUTPUT: g^e .

- 1. $A \leftarrow 1$, $S \leftarrow g$.
- 2. While $e \neq 0$ do the following:
 - 2.1 If e is odd then $A \leftarrow A \cdot S$. \longrightarrow modular multiplication
 - $2.2 \ e \leftarrow \lfloor e/2 \rfloor$.
 - 2.3 If $e \neq 0$ then $S \leftarrow S \cdot S$. \longrightarrow modular squaring: more efficient than modular multiplication
- 3. Return(A).

Efficient modular exponentiation

Another naive algorithm:

Algorithm Left-to-right binary exponentiation

INPUT: $g \in G$ and a positive integer $e = (e_t e_{t-1} \cdots e_1 e_0)_2$. OUTPUT: g^e .

- 1. $A \leftarrow 1$.
- 2. For *i* from *t* down to 0 do the following:
 - $2.1 A \leftarrow A \cdot A$.
 - 2.2 If $e_i = 1$, then $A \leftarrow A \cdot g$.
- 3. Return(A).

Efficient modular exponentiation

First optimization: trading off memory for computational speed

Algorithm Left-to-right *k*-ary exponentiation

INPUT: g and $e = (e_t e_{t-1} \cdots e_1 e_0)_b$, where $b = 2^k$ for some $k \ge 1$. OUTPUT: g^e .

- 1. Precomputation.
 - 1.1 $q_0 \leftarrow 1$.
 - 1.2 For i from 1 to (2^k-1) do: $g_i \leftarrow g_{i-1} \cdot g$. (Thus, $g_i = g^i$.)
- $2. A \leftarrow 1.$
- 3. For *i* from *t* down to 0 do the following:
 - 3.1 $A \leftarrow A^{2^k}$. Multiple consecutive modular squarings in software or dedicated circuit to perform a modular exponentiation with fixed exponent 2^k in hardware
- 4. Return(A).

Exercises modular exponentiation

1) Assume: g = 2, e = 303, n = 5

Compute ge mod n with the right-to-left binary method, the left-to-right binary method, and the left-to-right 2-ary method

2) Assume: $e = 2^{2048} - 3$, $n = 2^{2203} - 1$

How many modular multiplications and modular squarings are needed for each of the three methods?

Solution exercise 1: right-to-left with g = 2, e = 303, n = 5

Algorithm Right-to-left binary exponentiation

INPUT: an element $g \in G$ and integer $e \ge 1$. OUTPUT: g^e .

- 1. $A \leftarrow 1$, $S \leftarrow g$.
- 2. While $e \neq 0$ do the following:
 - 2.1 If e is odd then $A \leftarrow A \cdot S$.
 - $2.2 \ e \leftarrow |e/2|$.
 - 2.3 If $e \neq 0$ then $S \leftarrow S \cdot S$.
- 3. Return(A).

Solution exercise 1: left-to-right with g = 2, e = 303, n = 5

$$A \leftarrow A.A = 4.4 = 1$$

 $e_3 = 1: A \leftarrow A.g = 1.2 = 2$
 $A \leftarrow A.A = 2.2 = 4$
 $e_2 = 1: A \leftarrow A.g = 4.2 = 3$
 $A \leftarrow A.A = 3.3 = 4$
 $e_1 = 1: A \leftarrow A.g = 4.2 = 3$

Algorithm Left-to-right binary exponentiation

INPUT: $g \in G$ and a positive integer $e = (e_t e_{t-1} \cdots e_1 e_0)_2$. OUTPUT: q^e .

- 1. $A \leftarrow 1$.
- 2. For i from t down to 0 do the following:
 - $2.1 A \leftarrow A \cdot A$.
 - 2.2 If $e_i = 1$, then $A \leftarrow A \cdot q$.
- 3. Return(A).

Solution exercise 1: k-ary with k = 2, g = 2, e = 303, n = 5

```
e = (303)_{10} = (100101111)_2 = (10233)_4 = (e_4 e_3 e_2 e_1 e_0)_4
```

Precomputation

$$g_0 \leftarrow 1$$

 $i = 1$: $g_1 \leftarrow g_0.g = 1.2 = 2$
 $i = 2$: $g_2 \leftarrow g_1.g = 2.2 = 4$
 $i = 3$: $g_3 \leftarrow g_2.g = 4.2 = 3$

A ← 1

i = 4:

$$A \leftarrow A^4 = 1^4 = 1$$

 $A \leftarrow A.g_1 = 1.2 = 2$

i = 3:

$$A \leftarrow A^4 = 2^4 = 1$$

 $A \leftarrow A.g_0 = 1.1 = 1$

i = 2:

$$A \leftarrow A^4 = 1^4 = 1$$

 $A \leftarrow A.g_2 = 1.4 = 4$

i = 1:

$$A \leftarrow A^4 = 4^4 = 1$$

 $A \leftarrow A.q_3 = 1.3 = 3$

i = 0:

$$A \leftarrow A^4 = 3^4 = 1$$

 $A \leftarrow A.g_3 = 1.3 = 3$

Return (3)

Algorithm Left-to-right k-ary exponentiation

INPUT: g and $e = (e_t e_{t-1} \cdots e_1 e_0)_b$, where $b = 2^k$ for some $k \ge 1$. OUTPUT: g^e .

- 1. Precomputation.
 - 1.1 $g_0 \leftarrow 1$.
 - 1.2 For i from 1 to $(2^k 1)$ do: $g_i \leftarrow g_{i-1} \cdot g$. (Thus, $g_i = g^i$.)
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 - 3.2 $A \leftarrow A \cdot g_{e_i}$.
- 4. Return(A).

Solution exercise 2: $e = 2^{2048} - 3$, $n = 2^{2203} - 1$

Right-to-left binary exponentiation and right-to-left binary exponentiation

$$e = 2^{2048} - 3 = (e_{2047}e_{2046 \dots} e_1e_0)_2$$

2048 modular squarings

$$2^{2048} - 1 = (1111 \dots 1111)_2$$
 (all ones) $2^{2048} - 3 = (1111 \dots 1101)_2$ (all ones but e1) \rightarrow 2047 ones \rightarrow **2047 modular multiplications**

2-ary modular exponentiation

$$e = 2^{2048} - 3 = (e_{1023}e_{1022...}e_1e_0)_4$$

Precomputation: 3 modular multiplications

Computation: 1024 times
$$A \leftarrow A^{2^k}$$
. = 1024 * 2 modular squarings $A \leftarrow A \cdot g_{e_i}$.

= 1024 modular multiplications

Total: 2048 modular squarings and 1027 modular multiplications

Modular exponentiation: further optimization

The Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) can be used for the modular exponentiation in RSA decryption and signature generation. It reduces the computation to modular exponentiations with exponents of half the size, taking into account that $n = p^*q$.

```
Precomputation: d_p = d \mod (p-1); d_q = d \mod (q-1); 3. \ q_{inv} = (1/q) \mod p, \text{ with } p > q.
```

```
Algorithm RSA decryption using the Chinese Remainder Theorem
```

```
Require: p, q, d_p, d_q, q_{inv}, c,

Ensure: c^d

1: m1 \leftarrow c^{d_p} \mod p

2: m2 \leftarrow c^{d_q} \mod q

3: h \leftarrow (q_{inv} \cdot (m1 - m2)) \mod p

4: m \leftarrow m2 + h \cdot q

5: Return m
```

Question: Why can't we use CRT for RSA encryption and signature verification?


Naive algorithm:

Algorithm Classical modular multiplication

c63

INPUT: two positive integers x, y and a modulus m, all in radix b representation. OUTPUT: $x \cdot y \mod m$.

- 1. Compute $x \cdot y \longrightarrow$ integer multiplication
- 2. Compute the remainder r when $x \cdot y$ is divided by $m \longrightarrow \text{integer division}$ (very
- 3. Return(r). compute-intensive)



c4 c3 c2 c1 c0

Multi-precision integer multiplication:

Montgomery multiplication:

(no integer division needed, but x^*y/R is calculated instead of x^*y , where R is a power of 2):

Algorithm Montgomery multiplication

INPUT: integers $m = (m_{n-1} \cdots m_1 m_0)_b, x = (x_{n-1} \cdots x_1 x_0)_b, y = (y_{n-1} \cdots y_1 y_0)_b$ with $0 \le x, y < m, R = b^n$ with gcd(m, b) = 1, and $m' = -m^{-1} \mod b$. OUTPUT: $xyR^{-1} \mod m$.

- 1. $A \leftarrow 0$. (Notation: $A = (a_n a_{n-1} \cdots a_1 a_0)_b$.)
- 2. For i from 0 to (n-1) do the following:
 - 2.1 $u_i \leftarrow (a_0 + x_i y_0) m' \mod b$. \longrightarrow When b is a power of 2, mod b simply means
 - $2.2 A \leftarrow (A + x_i y + u_i m)/b.$
- 3. If A > m then $A \leftarrow A m$.
- 4. Return(A).

cutting off the most-significant bits

When b is a power of 2, /b simply means shifting the bits to the right

Montgomery multiplication:

- If we use Montgomery multiplication directly on the input values x and y, we calculate x*y/R mod n instead of x*y mod n
- Therefore, all inputs need to be transformed to "Montgomery representation" first: $x_M = x^*R \mod n$, $y_M = x^*R \mod n$
- Transforming the inputs to Montgomery representation can be done by multiplying each input with R² using Montgomery multiplication: $x_M = MontMul(x, R^2) = x^*R^2/R \mod n = x^*R \mod n$, $y_M = MontMul(y, R^2) = y^*R^2/R \mod n = y^*R \mod n$
- The product will also be in Montgomery representation: $a_M = MontMul(x_M, y_M) = x_M^* y_M / R = x^* R^* y^* R / R = x^* y^* R$
- We stick to Montgomery representation until the entire modular exponentiation is completed. Only at the very end, a transformation is done from Montgomery representation back to normal representation. This can be done by multiplying the result of the modular exponentiation with 1 using Montgomery multiplication: MontMul(c_M, 1) = c_M*1/R = c*R*1/R = c


- Montgomery multiplication in software:
 - Several methods to process the data in smaller chunks
 - Follow the original algorithm (2 slides back) or optimizations first introduced in
 Koc et al., Analyzing and comparing Montgomery multiplication algorithms, in IEEE Micro 16(3), pp. 26-33, 1996.
- Montgomery multiplication in hardware:
 - It is possible to process the data in parallel
 - FPGA: use DSP slices (and dedicated shift registers)
 - ASIC: use multipliers in the standard cell library


Outline


- Implementation platforms and metrics
- Traditional public-key crypto algorithms:
 - RSA
 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
- Post-quantum crypto algorithms


```
return null == e ? "" : b.call(e)
} : function(e) {
    return null == e ? "" : (e + "").replace(C, "")
},
mulcArray: function(e, t) {
    var n = t || [];
    return null != e && (M(Object(e)) ? x.merge(n, "string" == typeof e ? [e] : e) : h.call(n, e)), n
},
intrray: function(e, t, n) {
    var n;
    if (a) neturn m.call(t, e, n);
    if (b) {
        if (a) neturn m.call(t, e, n);
        if (b) (n = t.length, n = n ? 8 > n ? Nath.max(8, c + n) : n : 8; c > n; now)
        if (n in t && t[n] === e) neturn n
```

- An elliptic curve is the set of solutions to the equation $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$
- The points on the elliptic curve together with the point at infinity form a group
- The group operation is point addition










Algorithm

- Elliptic curve point multiplication is used analogous to modular exponentiation
- Point mulplication multiplies a point on the curve with a scalar (an integer)
- Point multiplication can be done through consecutive point additions and point doublings (or k-ary point multiplication)

Left-to-right binary point multiplication (left) and right-to-left


binary point multiplication (right).	
Require: $P, \mathcal{O},$	Require: $P, \mathcal{O},$
$k = (k_{l-1}k_{l-2}\dots k_1k_0)_2$	$k = (k_{l-1}k_{l-2}\dots k_1k_0)_2$
Ensure: kP	Ensure: kP
1: $Q \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$	1: $Q \leftarrow \mathcal{O}, S \leftarrow P$
2: for i from $l-1$ to 0 do	2: for i from 0 to $l-1$ do
$3: Q \leftarrow 2Q$	3: if $k_i = 1$ then
4: if $k_i = 1$ then	4: $Q \leftarrow Q + S$
5: $Q \leftarrow Q + P$	5: end if
6: end if	6: $S \leftarrow 2S$
7: end for	7: end for
8: Return Q	8: Return Q

Point addition and point doubling are computed through modular additions, subtractions,
 multiplications and divisions (divisions can be avoided with special coordinate systems)



ECC (vs. RSA):

- Shorter parameters and signatures
- Security grows exponentially with length of parameters
- More efficient on most platforms



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	v	, ı

Protection	Symmetric	Factoring Modulus	Discrete Key	Logarithm Group	Elliptic Curve	Hash
Legacy standard level Should not be used in new systems	80	1024	160	1024	160	160
Near term protection Security for at least ten years (2018-2028)	128	3072	256	3072	256	256
Long-term protection Security for thirty to fifty years (2018-2068)	256	15360	512	15360	512	512

Outline

- Implementation platforms and metrics
- Traditional public-key crypto algorithms:
 - RSA
 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
- Post-quantum crypto algorithms

```
t.apply(e[i], n), r === !1) break
          for (i in e)
if (r = t.apply(e[i], n), r === [i] break
    } else if (a)
   Post-quantum crypto
    return e
trim: b && !b.call("\ufeff algorithms
}: function(e) {
    return null == e ? "" : (e + "").replace(C, "")
makeArray: function(e, t) {
              != e && (M(Object(e)) ? x.merge(n, "string" == typeof e ? [e] : e) : h.call(n,
     w: function(e, t, n) {
              eturn m.call(t, e, n);
                   t 88 t[n] wer e) neturn n
```

- When quantum computers become available, Shor's algorithm can be used to calculate discrete logarithms and to do integer factorization in polynomial time
- All algorithms that rely on the discrete logarithm problem or integer factorization (e.g., RSA) will become insecure
- That is why NIST issued a competition to search for new algorithms that do not rely on the discrete logarithm problem or integer factorization
- These algorithms are called post-quantum crypto algorithms
- Note: symmetric-key ciphers, like AES, will not become insecure when quantum computers become available, because they do not rely on the discrete logarithm problem or integer factorization


Two categories of algorithms:

- KEM/Encryption: Lattice, Code, Other
 (KEM = Key Encapsulation Mechanism: to enable the exchange of symmetric keys using public-key cryptography)
- Digital Signature: Lattice (Ring-LWE Signature, NTRU, BLISS), Hash/Symmetric,
 Multivariate (Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar), Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogeny

Implementation requirements:

- Lattice: based on finite field arithmetic
- Code: based on error correction codes
- Hash/Symmetric: based on symmetric-key crypto and hash functions
- Multivariate: based on finite field arithmetic
- Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogeny: based on elliptic curve operations


https://csrc.nist.gov/News/2022/pqc-candidates-to-be-standardized-and-round-4



The following candidate KEM algorithms will advance to the fourth round:



https://csrc.nist.gov/News/2022/pqc-candidates-to-be-standardized-and-round-4



BROKEN