

RSA[®]Conference2018

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BUILDING A DATA DRIVEN SECURITY STRATEGY

Gabriel Bassett

Senior Information Security Data Scientist
Verizon, Data Breach Investigations Report
@gdbassett



Agenda



1. Organization
2. Strategy
3. Measure
4. Data Driven Security Strategy
5. Example Strategies
6. Example Walkthrough
7. Application and Conclusion



WHAT IS A STRATEGY?

VMOSA



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C


Handoff



Organization
Security



SWOT Analysis



	Helpful to achieving the objective	Harmful to achieving the objective
Internal origin (attributes of the organization)	S Strengths	W Weaknesses
External origin (attributes of the environment)	O Opportunities	T Threats



**STRATEGY: THE ART OF DEVISING OR
EMPLOYING (ACTION) PLANS OR STRATAGEMS
TOWARD A GOAL (OBJECTIVE)**

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy>



**STRATEGY IS HOW YOU CHOOSE PLANS TO
MEET YOUR OBJECTIVES**

Risk Based Strategy



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
DATA DRIVEN SECURITY STRATEGY

○ Measures

1. What is my desired outcome?
2. Why is it the right outcome?
3. How do I know the measure predicts this outcome?



Measures




Observations in context
of desired Outcome

- VMOSA
- Factor from SWOT

Action Plan
(VMOSA)

Strategy
(VMOSA)

Measures



Observations in context
of desired Outcome

- VMOSA
- Factor from SWOT

Action Plan
(VMOSA)

Strategy
(VMOSA)

THE LESSER KNOWN
NOT-SO-GREAT WALL OF CHINA



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EXAMPLE STRATEGIES

Strategy: Reactive



Strategy: Support Infosec Ops



Strategy: Economic Engineering



Strategy: Reduce Infosec Risk



Strategy: Compliance



Strategy-ish: NIST Framework

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STRATEGY WALKTHROUGH

Economic Engineering Strategy

2017 DBIR Attack Surface Analysis

Attack graphs are the engine for the attack surface analysis. If this all looks very confusing and you're not sure where to start, [watch this quick, 10-minute tutorial video](#).

Choose your attack surface based on industry or pattern:

Section 11-15 Manufacturing

The 22mg pattern is explicitly not included as it inherently is not based on powerful action. NAICS Sector 22 is not included for lack of data. For more information on the correct NAICS code for your organization, visit http://www.fannectorbels.com/infocenter/naics_for.php

Choose what you are trying to protect:

Attack
Payment
Personnel
Control
Financial system
System
Device


In the graph to the right, attacks start at the "Start" node. They move through actions and artifacts until they finally conclude at the "End" node in the upper left. Depending on what entry you select, the graph will change to represent that subset of the data.

There are three options for analysis below:

- **All Actors Analysis:** This analysis provides a recommendation on what to do to protect against all the potential bad guys out there. It's like planning to handle all of your branches. Within the graph it is addressing all shortest paths from any actors to any artifacts.
- **Likely Actor Analysis:** This analysis provides a recommendation on how to deal with the single most likely attacker. It's like planning to handle the single, most likely branch. Within the graph it is addressing the shortest path from start to end. (This is the analysis used in the 2013 POC2000 and 2016 DBIR.)
- **Compare Mitigations:** This will allow choosing two sets of actions/artifacts to mitigate and comparing the improvement.

For all analysis, the attack difficulty or improvement is a relative score. While that means there are no absolute values, (like "dollars" or "time"), the values can be compared to each other. They can be thought of as the relative degree of difficulty of exploitation, cost of exploitation, or speed of exploitation compared to all other paths.

To learn more about the app, read the associated blog post: [A DBIR Attack Graph Web App!](#) or the in-depth blog post about the associated analysis: [The DBIR Attack Graph Basics!](#)



Analyze

All Actors

Likely Actor
Analysis

Compare
Mitigations

Analyze


Please click the 'analyze' button to analyze the graph.

Measure risks



Actions and Attributes to Mitigate

- Phishing
- Software Installation
- Footprinting
- Web Drive-by
- Use of stolen credentials




Map Risks to Plans



Actions and Attributes to Mitigate

Action Plans or Controls to employ



Map Plans to Risks



User Behavior Analytics

- Alter Behavior
- Privilege Abuse
- Illicit Content
- Unapproved Workaround
- Abuse of Functionality
- Use of Stolen Creds or Brute force

OS and App Sandboxing

- Phishing
- Malware
 - Web Drive-by
- Hacking (other than credential use)
 - Footprinting
- Software installation

Quantified Improvements



Mitigation Set 1

Alter behavior
Created account
Defacement
Fraudulent transaction
Hardware tampering
Log tampering
Misrepresentation
Modify configuration
Modify data
Modify privileges
Other
Repurpose
Software installation

Mitigation Set 1 removes 52% paths and increases the others by 1% over no mitigations.
Mitigation Set 1 increases the improvement against the most likely actor by 11%.

Analysis

	Mitigations	
	Set 1	Set 2
All Actors, Paths Denied:	52%	0%
All Actors, Improvement:	1%	0%
Likely Actor, Improvement:	11%	0%

Mitigation Set 1 is the clear choice to address all actors.
Mitigation Set 1 is the clear choice to address the most likely actor.

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DOING SOMETHING

Next Week



Next Month



The Future



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QUESTIONS?

gabriel.bassett@verizon.com

Twitter: [@gdbassett](https://twitter.com/gdbassett)

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BACKUP