



# Mobile Token-Based Authentication

## On a Budget

Hristo Bojinov   Dan Boneh  
Stanford Computer Security Lab

# The future of keys?



## Motivation #1



# Versatility of smartphones



## Motivation #2



# Smartphones vs. keys



\$100

arbitrary apps

use all day

palm-size

fragile

# Smartphones vs. keys



\$100

arbitrary apps

use all day

palm-size

fragile

\$1

unlock doors

a few times daily

tiny

tough



# Talk overview



**General theme: Unlocking smartphones**



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## Part I: About this work

- ▶ **Compass as a receiver**
- ▶ **Microphone as a receiver**
- ▶ **Cost and power**



General theme: Unlocking smartphones

## Part I: About this work


- ▶ **Compass as a receiver**
- ▶ **Microphone as a receiver**
- ▶ **Cost and power**

## Part 2: On-going and future work




# Compass

# Permanent magnets




# Permanent magnets (*continued*)




Poor resolution:  
distance to magnets is  
too great!


# Magkey prototype



# Magkey circuit




# MagLock app



up to ~5 baud (NI)  
about 1 inch range


# MagLock app






# Microphone


# Mickey prototype



# Mickey circuit




*Magkey, minus the coil, plus:*



# MicLock app




01001 11.69029219268588



Scale 1:100

01001 19.977471429378834



Scale 1:10

up to ~100 baud (N1)  
about 1 foot range

# MicLock app





# Cost and Power

# Cost



Component	Unit cost	Magkey	Mickey
Timer IC	\$0.20	\$0.20	\$0.40
Shift Register IC	\$0.25	\$0.50	\$0.50
Discrete	varies	\$0.37	\$0.38
Total (Prototype)		\$1.07	\$1.28
PIC IC	\$0.38	\$0.38	\$0.38
<i>Total (PIC)</i>		\$0.75	\$0.76

# Current and longevity



<b>Current</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>Magkey</b>	<b>Mickey</b>
Average		6.91mA	0.23mA
Peak		16.00mA	0.25mA
	Continuous	210 hrs	6500 hrs
	On-demand	>5 yrs	>10 yrs



# What's Next?

# Low-power wireless



## Contactless cards (e.g. NFC)

- ▶ No batteries required in token
- ▶ Off-the-shelf tokens: today
- ▶ Short practical range

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## Bluetooth 4.0 (Low-energy)

- ▶ Might be more pervasive than NFC: laptops, PCs
- ▶ Designed for long-term, synchronous operation
- ▶ A decent alternative we might consider

# So, what is next?



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- ▶ Analyze more [proprietary] technologies
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## Develop end-to-end token authentication theme

- ▶ Authentication on the web, multi-tenant tokens
- ▶ PC authentication... keychains, PAM, Windows?



# Conclusion

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**Massive opportunity to redo user authentication:**

- ▶ Phones are the most versatile computers to date
  - ★ *Rapid, on-going evolution, diverse inputs*
- ▶ Momentum to standardize light-weight wireless
- ▶ Threats are more abundant than ever before

**Address local, mobile app, and web authentication.**

**Drive the security agenda into standards efforts.**



# Time for Q&A.

<http://seclab.stanford.edu>