CS7.405 Responsible & Safe AI Systems

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AI race: Solutions

Safety regulations: self regulation of companies, competitive advantage for safety oriented companies

Data documentation: transparency & accountability

Meaningful human oversight: human supervision

AI for cyber defense: anomaly detection

International coordination: standards for AI development, robust verification & enforcement

Public control of general-purpose AIs

Organizational risks



The Swiss cheese model shows how technical factors can improve organizational safety. Multiple layers of defense compensate for each other's individual weaknesses, leading to a low overall level of risk.

Organizational risks: Solutions

Red teaming

Prove safety

Deployment

Publication reviews

Response plans

Risk management: Employ a chief risk officer and an internal audit team for risk management.

Processes for important decisions: Make sure AI training or deployment decisions involve the chief risk officer and other key stakeholders, ensuring executive accountability.

Rouge AIs: Solutions

AIs should not be deployed in high-risk settings, such as by autonomously pursuing open-ended goals or overseeing critical infrastructure, unless proven safe.

Need to advance AI safety research in areas such as adversarial robustness, model honesty, transparency, and removing undesired capabilities.

Solutions to Mentioned Risks



People



Policy



Technology

What is an alignment problem?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWDUzNiWPJA

Misalignment?



https://www.ndtv.com/offbeat/ai-chatbot-goes-rogue-swears-at-customer-and-slams-company-in-uk-4900202
https://twitter.com/ashbeauchamp/status/1748034519104450874/

What is Interpretability?

Interpretability

AI Systems are black boxes

We don’t understand how they work

How can we understand (read it as interpret) model internals?

And can we use interpretability tools (algorithms, methods, etc.) to detect worst-case misalignments, e.g. models being dishonest or deceptive?

Can we use interpretability tools to understand what models are thinking, and why they are doing what they do?

Interpretability

New techniques and paradigms for turning model weights and activations into concepts that humans can understand







https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_network
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_neural_network

Interpretability: Mechanistic

Reverse-engineer neural networks

Explaining neurons and connected circuits



Interpretability: Top-down

Locate information in a model without full understanding of how it is processed

Lot more tractable than fully reverse engineering large models



	Mechanistic View	Representational View
Approach:	Bottom-up	Top-down
Algorithmic Level:	Node-to-node connections	Representational spaces
Implementational Level:	Neurons, pathways, circuits	Global activity of populations of neurons

Controlling Model Outputs by manipulating representations identified using interpretability



This Lecture

Any connections to class? Outside class?

Deception detection

Manipulation

Deceptive alignment – Model seems aligned in training, but in deployment it starts misbehaving



https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.05566.pdf

Deception detection

Manipulation

Deceptive alignment – Model seems aligned in training, but in deployment it starts misbehaving

Safety training done, still backdoor persists



https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.05566.pdf

Monitoring / Scalable oversight

RLHF is an early example

Anomaly detection

- Unusual input, weird/misbehaving output
- Examples?

We can maybe train another AI model for this oversight, but it has to be robust

If in the future models become more knowledgeable than humans in certain narrow domains, difficult to provide monitor

Machine Unlearning (MU)

What is it?

Machine Unlearning (MU)

Large pretrained models trained on low quality Internet corpora often have wrong / harmful data.

Can we remove it post-hoc?

Regulation requirements

Remove noise, biases (labels) etc. in image classifiers
Removing harmful knowledge from LLMs

Towards Adversarial Evaluations for Inexact Machine Unlearning

Shashwat Goel[*1], Ameya Prabhu[*2], Amartya Sanyal[3,4], Ser-Nam Lim[5], Philip Torr[2], and Ponnurangam Kumaraguru[1]

[1]IIIT Hyderabad, [2]University of Oxford, [3]ETH Zurich, [4]MPI-IS, [5]Meta AI

Abstract

Activity #5

Deadline: 23:59hrs, Jan 31

Fill this table with which solution addresses which risk? If there are examples you can think of, please add

	Malicious use	AI race	Organization risks	Rogue Ais
Interpretability				
Robustness				
Deception detection				
Monitoring				
Unlearning				

Robustness

Model to maintain the performance when faced with uncertainties or adversarial conditions

Model should generalize well and provide reliable predictions

Handling noisy data, distribution shifts, adversarial conditions

https://medium.com/@slavadubrov/understanding-machine-learning-robustness-why-it-matters-and-how-it-affects-your-models-5e2cb5838dab

Robustness

Transition from AI Risks to Robustness, through Risk Decomposition

Distribution Shifts

Black Swans

Methods to deal with distribution shifts and black swans

A Notional Decomposition of Risk

$$\text{Risk} \approx \text{Vulnerability} \times \text{Hazard Exposure} \times \text{Hazard}$$

Vulnerability: a factor or process that increases susceptibility to the damaging effects of hazards

Exposure: extent to which elements (e.g., people, property, systems) are subjected or exposed to hazards

Hazard: a source of danger with the potential to harm

A Notional Decomposition of Risk

$$\text{Risk} \approx \text{Vulnerability} \times \text{Hazard Exposure} \times \text{Hazard}$$

This is a risk corresponding to a specific hazard, not total risk

Here, “×” just denotes nonlinear interaction

Here, “Hazard” is a shorthand for hazard probability and severity

Example: Injury from Falling on a Wet Floor

$$\text{Risk} \approx \underbrace{\text{Vulnerability}}_{\text{Bodily Brittleness}} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard Exposure}}_{\text{Floor Utilization}} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard}}_{\text{Floor Slipperiness}}$$

Example: Injury from Falling on a Wet Floor

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Example: COVID

$$\text{Risk} \approx \underbrace{\text{Vulnerability}}_{\text{Old Age, Poor Health, etc.}} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard Exposure}}_{\text{Contact with Carriers}} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard}}_{\text{Prevalence and Severity}}$$

Example: COVID

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



Lets look at ML systems

The Disaster Risk Equation



$$\text{Risk} \approx \text{Vulnerability} \times \text{Hazard Exposure} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard}}_{\text{Alignment}}$$

Reduce the probability and severity of inherent model hazards

Agents Must Pursue Good Goals



The Disaster Risk Equation

$$\text{Risk} \approx \underbrace{\text{Vulnerability}}_{\text{Robustness}} \times \text{Hazard Exposure} \times \text{Hazard}$$

Withstand Hazards

Agents Must Withstand Hazards



Take a class pic

Agents Must Withstand Hazards



The Disaster Risk Equation



$$\text{Risk} \approx \text{Vulnerability} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard Exposure}}_{\text{Monitoring}} \times \text{Hazard}$$

Identify Hazards

Agents Must Identify and Avoid Hazards



The Disaster Risk Equation

$$\text{Risk} \approx \underbrace{\text{Vulnerability} \times \text{Hazard Exposure} \times \text{Hazard}}_{\text{Systemic Safety}}$$

Reduce systemic risks

Remove Hazards



Remove Hazards



Reducing Risk vs Estimating Risk

Risk ≈ Vulnerability × Hazard Exposure × Hazard

Errors in algorithms

Robot confuses man for a box of vegetables, pushes him to death in factory

A tragic factory accident in South Korea sees a man crushed to death by a robot, unable to differentiate him from a box of vegetables.

In a tragic incident, a robotics company worker in South Korea was killed after a robot failed to differentiate him from the boxes of vegetables it was handling. The incident took place when the man, an employee in a robotics company and in his 40s, was carrying out the inspection of the robot.

According to a report by the Korean news agency Yonhap, a man in his 40s was crushed to death by a robotic arm while inspecting it at a factory. The robotic arm, which was assigned to lift and place vegetable boxes on conveyor belts, apparently mistook the man for a box and grabbed him, pushing his body against the conveyor belt and crushing his face and chest. The man was rushed to the hospital but succumbed to his injuries.

https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/robot-confuses-man-for-a-box-of-vegetables-pushes-him-to-death-in-factory-2460977-2023-11-09

Example: Robot confuses man for veggies

$$\text{Risk} \approx \underbrace{\text{Vulnerability}}_{?????} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard Exposure}}_{?????} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard}}_{?????}$$

Example: Robot confuses man for veggies

$$\text{Risk} \approx \underbrace{\text{Vulnerability}}_{\substack{\text{Misclassifying}\\ \text{veggies to}\\ \text{humans}}} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard Exposure}}_{\substack{\text{Employees}\\ \text{\& Robot around}\\ \text{each other}}} \times \underbrace{\text{Hazard}}_{\text{Injury / Death}}$$

Other examples?

Project reviews

1. Was happy to see some good ideas being explored, discussed. There is scope for improvement for all projects.
2. I would say 5 - 7 projects (A) were really good, these projects can come out very well if the students stay focussed and put in efforts. Another 5 - 7 projects (B) were ok, would have liked to see a bit more concreteness in the project idea, scope, etc. Another 3 - 4 projects (C) is not clear about the goals. Our marks roughly will reflect this observation.
3. I recommend projects in category B & C (you will know when you get the marks) to meet with TAs to define the scope better, without which it is going to be hard for you to get a decent grade in the course.
4. Please keep the compute expectations in mind while scoping.
5. You will get the reviews with the marks soon, if you have not already received it
6. Wherever appropriate, feel free to write to the authors to get code, access to data, etc. Most authors will feel good about somebody reading their papers and asking for code / data :)
7. As informed in class, grading will be little harsher for this review, so please keep that in mind when you see your marks
8. Hope you saw the post by S Goel on Guest Lectures, these are going to be fantastic, I am super excited about these lectures.. hope all of you will attend and make it more interesting

Fail Fast

Good: Activities, real world examples, pace

Not-so-good / To change: Project ideas to be provided; programming; technical content & technical activity; more tutorials; have attendance; share slides before class; support for ML / AI topics; go slow in tutorials; more help with projects; industry students deadlines; class timing change;

Did not understand, please help to understand: Fun activities in class? Point about 5 teams per class;

Fail Fast: Changes

programming activities – discuss

technical content – designed from last class

more tutorials – already scheduled

have attendance – discuss

share slides before class – started

support for ML / AI topics – pls ask, come to office hours

go slow in tutorials – will plan

more help with projects - pls ask, come to office hours

Robustness

Transition from AI Risks to Robustness, through Risk Decomposition

Black Swans

Distribution Shifts

Methods to deal with distribution shifts and black swans

Black Swans

Black Swans
Long Tailed Distributions
Mediocristan and Extremistan
Unknown Unknowns



Black Swans

events that are outliers, lying outside typical expectations, and often carry extreme impact

Europeans widely assumed swans were only white, until explorers eventually discovered black-colored swans in Australia

While often ignored as outliers, Black Swans are costly to ignore since these events often matter the most

Black Swans

WAYMO

Black swans

Tilted, occluded, by lights, etc.

2008 financial crisis – I graduated (with PhD) around this ☹

COVID 19

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.13916.pdf

Long Tail Distributions

A tail of a distribution is the region that is far from the head or center of the distribution



Tails taper off gradually rather than drop off sharply

Pareto principle / 80-20 principle

Random variables X_i from long tailed distribution are often max-sum equivalent (largest events matter more than the other events combined)

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{X_1 + \cdots + X_n}{\max\{X_1, \ldots, X_n\}} = 1$$

Power Law Distributions are “Scale Free”

The Web’s Approximate Degree Distribution



Power Law Distributions are "Scale Free"

The Web's Approximate Degree Distribution



Long Tails Are Pervasive



Long Tails Are Pervasive

~0.1% of drugs generate a ~50% pharmaceutical industry sales

~0.2% of books account ~50% their sales

~1% of bands and solo artists earn ~77% of all revenue from recorded music

Nonlinear Interactions Generate Long Tails

$$X_t = \mathcal{E}_{t-1}\mathcal{E}_{t-2}\cdots\mathcal{E}_1\mathcal{E}_0, \qquad \mathcal{E}_i \geq 0$$

The result is a long-tailed, but it would be a thin-tailed Gaussian if variables were added instead of multiplied

Nonlinear interactions arise when parts are connected or interdependent

If the observation becomes zero when a part becomes zero → nonlinear interaction

Research output = Ideas X Time X Students X Resoruces

Mediocristan and Extremistan

Mediocristan

Thin tails
Total is determined by many small events
Typical member mediocre/average
Tyranny of the collective
Top few get small slice
Easy to predict
Impact nonscalable
Mild randomness

Extremistan

Long tails
Total is determined by a few large events
"Typical" member giant or dwarf
Tyranny of the accidental
Top few get large share
Hard to predict
Impact potentially scalable
Wild randomness

Unknown Unknowns

Known Knowns	**Unknown Knowns**
Things we are aware of and understand We know what we know Facts and requirements Recollection	Things we understand but are not aware of We don’t know that we (can) know Unaccounted facts / Tacit knowledge Self-analysis
Known Unknowns	**Unknown Unknowns**
Things we are aware of but don’t understand We know that we do not know these Known classic risks / Conscious ignorance Closed-ended Questions	Things we are not aware of nor understand We don’t know what we don’t know Unknown risks / Meta-ignorance Open-ended Exploration

Black Swans, Unknown Unknowns, and Long Tails

Often statistically characterized by long tailed distributions or cause long tail events

Because Black Swans dominate risk analysis, we discuss long tails to characterize these highly impactful events statistically

Events widely regarded as Black Swans may be known unknowns to a few in-the-know people, but they are typically unknown unknowns

Black Swans and Long-Term Safety

AI’s eventual impact on the world may be long-tailed

We want models that can withstand and detect Black Swans, which are more likely to arise in the future when the world is changing rapidly and unexpectedly

If we have multiple AI agents deployed in the future, and if the social power or command over resources is more long-tailed, the collective will be less able to rein in the most powerful agents; extremistan is relevant for future ML deployment dynamics

Other existential risks can be viewed as sufficiently extreme long tail events (e.g., biorisks and asteroids are long-tailed and pose x-risks)

Bibliography / Acknowledgements

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https://aisafetyfundamentals.com/

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Thank you
for attending
the class!!!