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title: Same-Site Cookies docname: draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site-latest date: 2017 category: std updates: 6265

ipr: trust200902 area: Applications and Real-Time workgroup: HTTP keyword: Internet-Draft keyword: Cookie

stand_alone: yes pi: [toc, tocindent, sortrefs, symrefs, compact, subcompact, comments, inline]


ins: M. West name: Mike West organization: Google, Inc email:


ins: M. Goodwin name: Mark Goodwin organization: Mozilla email: uri:

normative: FETCH: target: title: Fetch author: - ins: A. van Kesteren name: Anne van Kesteren organization: Mozilla HTML: target: title: HTML author: - ins: I. Hickson name: Ian Hickson organization: Google, Inc. - ins: S. Pieters name: Simon Pieters organization: Opera - ins: A. van Kesteren name: Anne van Kesteren organization: Mozilla - ins: P. Jägenstedt name: Philip Jägenstedt organization: Opera - ins: D. Denicola name: Domenic Denicola organization: Google, Inc. SERVICE-WORKERS: target: title: Service Workers author: - ins: A. Russell name: Alex Russell - ins: J. Song name: Jungkee Song - ins: J. Archibald name: Jake Archibald PSL: target: title: "Public Suffix List" RFC2119: RFC4790: RFC5234: RFC6265: RFC6454: RFC7231: RFC7258:

informative: RFC7034: samedomain-cookies: target: title: SameDomain Cookie Flag author: - ins: M. Goodwin name: Mark Goodwin - ins: J. Walker name: Joe Walker date: 2011 pixel-perfect: target: title: Pixel Perfect Timing Attacks with HTML5 author: - ins: P. Stone name: Paul Stone app-isolation: target: title: App Isolation - Get the Security of Multiple Browsers with Just One author: - ins: E. Chen name: Eric Y. Chen - ins: J. Bau name: Jason Bau - ins: C. Reis name: Charles Reis - ins: A. Barth name: Adam Barth - ins: C. Jackson name: Collin Jackson date: 2011 prerendering: target: title: Chrome Prerendering author: - ins: C. Bentzel name: Chris Bentzel secure-contexts: target: title: Secure Contexts author: - ins: M. West name: Mike West

--- abstract

This document updates RFC6265 by defining a SameSite attribute which allows servers to assert that a cookie ought not to be sent along with cross-site requests. This assertion allows user agents to mitigate the risk of cross-origin information leakage, and provides some protection against cross-site request forgery attacks.

--- note_Note_to_Readers

Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group mailing list (, which is archived at

Working Group information can be found at; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at

--- middle


Section 8.2 of {{RFC6265}} eloquently notes that cookies may be employed as a form of ambient authority, attached by default to requests the user agent sends on a user's behalf. Even when an attacker doesn't know the contents of a user's cookies, she can still execute commands on the user's behalf (and with the user's authority) by asking the user agent to send HTTP requests to unwary servers. These malicious requests will include any of the user's previously-set cookies, and therefore can be difficult to distinguish from benign requests on the user's behalf.

Here, we update {{RFC6265}} with a simple mitigation strategy that allows servers to declare certain cookies as "same-site", meaning they should not be attached to "cross-site" requests (as defined in section 2.1 of this specification).

Note that the mechanism outlined here is backwards compatible with the existing cookie syntax. Servers may serve these cookies to all user agents; those that do not support the SameSite attribute will simply store a cookie which is attached to all relevant requests, just as they do today.


Same-site cookies are intended to provide a solid layer of defense-in-depth against attacks which require embedding an authenticated request into an attacker-controlled context:

  1. Timing attacks which yield cross-origin information leakage (such as those detailed in {{pixel-perfect}}) can be substantially mitigated by setting the SameSite attribute on authentication cookies. The attacker will only be able to embed unauthenticated resources, as embedding mechanisms such as <iframe> will yield cross-site requests.

  2. Cross-site script inclusion (XSSI) attacks are likewise mitigated by setting the SameSite attribute on authentication cookies. The attacker will not be able to include authenticated resources via <script> or <link>, as these embedding mechanisms will likewise yield cross-site requests.

  3. Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks which rely on top-level navigation (HTML <form> POSTs, for instance) can also be mitigated by treating these navigational requests as "cross-site".

  4. Same-site cookies have some marginal value for policy or regulatory purposes, as cookies which are not delivered with cross-site requests cannot be directly used for tracking purposes. It may be valuable for an origin to assert that its cookies should not be sent along with cross-site requests in order to limit its exposure to non-technical risk.


Same-site cookies are set via the SameSite attribute in the Set-Cookie header field. That is, given a server's response to a user agent which contains the following header field:

Set-Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; SameSite=Strict

Subsequent requests from that user agent can be expected to contain the following header field if and only if both the requested resource and the resource in the top-level browsing context match the cookie.

Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42

Terminology and notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in {{RFC2119}}.

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of {{RFC5234}}.

Two sequences of octets are said to case-insensitively match each other if and only if they are equivalent under the i;ascii-casemap collation defined in {{RFC4790}}.

The terms "active document", "ancestor browsing context", "browsing context", "dedicated worker", "Document", "WorkerGlobalScope", "sandboxed origin browsing context flag", "parent browsing context", "shared worker", "the worker's Documents", "nested browsing context", and "top-level browsing context" are defined in {{HTML}}.

"Service Workers" are defined in the Service Workers specification {{SERVICE-WORKERS}}.

The term "origin", the mechanism of deriving an origin from a URI, and the "the same" matching algorithm for origins are defined in {{RFC6454}}.

"Safe" HTTP methods include GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and TRACE, as defined in Section 4.2.1 of {{RFC7231}}.

The term "public suffix" is defined in a note in Section 5.3 of {{RFC6265}} as "a domain that is controlled by a public registry", and are also know as "effective top-level domains" (eTLDs). For example,'s public suffix is com. User agents SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix list, such as the one maintained by Mozilla at {{PSL}}.

An origin's "registered domain" is the origin's host's public suffix plus the label to its left. That is, for, the public suffix is com, and the registered domain is This concept is defined more rigorously in {{PSL}}, and is also know as "effective top-level domain plus one" (eTLD+1).

The term "request", as well as a request's "client", "current url", "method", and "target browsing context", are defined in {{FETCH}}.

"Same-site" and "cross-site" Requests {#same-site-requests}

A request is "same-site" if its target's URI's origin's registered domain is an exact match for the request's client's "site for cookies" or if the request has no client, and "cross-site" otherwise. To be more precise, for a given request ("request"), the following algorithm returns same-site or cross-site:

  1. If request's client is null, return same-site.

  2. Let site be request's client's "site for cookies" (as defined in the following sections).

  3. Let target be the registered domain of request's current url.

  4. If site is an exact match for target, return same-site.

  5. Return cross-site.

Document-based requests {#document-requests}

The URI displayed in a user agent's address bar is the only security context directly exposed to users, and therefore the only signal users can reasonably rely upon to determine whether or not they trust a particular website. The registered domain of that URI's origin represents the context in which a user most likely believes themselves to be interacting. We'll label this domain the "top-level site".

For a document displayed in a top-level browsing context, we can stop here: the document's "site for cookies" is the top-level site.

For documents which are displayed in nested browsing contexts, we need to audit the origins of each of a document's ancestor browsing contexts' active documents in order to account for the "multiple-nested scenarios" described in Section 4 of {{RFC7034}}. These document's "site for cookies" is the top-level site if and only if the document and each of its ancestor documents' origins have the same registered domain as the top-level site. Otherwise its "site for cookies" is the empty string.

Given a Document (document), the following algorithm returns its "site for cookies" (either a registered domain, or the empty string):

  1. Let top-document be the active document in document's browsing context's top-level browsing context.

  2. Let top-origin be the origin of top-document's URI if top-document's sandboxed origin browsing context flag is set, and top-document's origin otherwise.

  3. Let documents be a list containing document and each of document's ancestor browsing contexts' active documents.

  4. For each item in documents:

    1. Let origin be the origin of item's URI if item's sandboxed origin browsing context flag is set, and item's origin otherwise.

    2. If origin's host's registered domain is not an exact match for top-origin's host's registered domain, return the empty string.

  5. Return top-site.

Worker-based requests {#worker-requests}

Worker-driven requests aren't as clear-cut as document-driven requests, as there isn't a clear link between a top-level browsing context and a worker. This is especially true for Service Workers {{SERVICE-WORKERS}}, which may execute code in the background, without any document visible at all.

Note: The descriptions below assume that workers must be same-origin with the documents that instantiate them. If this invariant changes, we'll need to take the worker's script's URI into account when determining their status.

Dedicated and Shared Workers {#dedicated-and-shared-requests}

Dedicated workers are simple, as each dedicated worker is bound to one and only one document. Requests generated from a dedicated worker (via importScripts, XMLHttpRequest, fetch(), etc) define their "site for cookies" as that document's "site for cookies".

Shared workers may be bound to multiple documents at once. As it is quite possible for those documents to have distinct "site for cookie" values, the worker's "site for cookies" will be the empty string in cases where the values diverge, and the shared value in cases where the values agree.

Given a WorkerGlobalScope (worker), the following algorithm returns its "site for cookies" (either a registered domain, or the empty string):

  1. Let site be worker's origin's host's registered domain.

  2. For each document in worker's Documents:

    1. Let document-site be document's "site for cookies" (as defined in {{document-requests}}).

    2. If document-site is not an exact match for site, return the empty string.

  3. Return site.

Service Workers

Service Workers are more complicated, as they act as a completely separate execution context with only tangential relationship to the Document which registered them.

Requests which simply pass through a service worker will be handled as described above: the request's client will be the Document or Worker which initiated the request, and its "site for cookies" will be those defined in {{document-requests}} and {{dedicated-and-shared-requests}}

Requests which are initiated by the Service Worker itself (via a direct call to fetch(), for instance), on the other hand, will have a client which is a ServiceWorkerGlobalScope. Its "site for cookies" will be the registered domain of the Service Worker's URI.

Given a ServiceWorkerGlobalScope (worker), the following algorithm returns its "site for cookies" (either a registered domain, or the empty string):

  1. Return worker's origin's host's registered domain.

Server Requirements

This section describes extensions to {{RFC6265}} necessary to implement the server-side requirements of the SameSite attribute.


Add SameSite to the list of accepted attributes in the Set-Cookie header field's value by replacing the cookie-av token definition in Section 4.1.1 of {{RFC6265}} with the following ABNF grammar:

cookie-av      = expires-av / max-age-av / domain-av /
                 path-av / secure-av / httponly-av /
                 samesite-av / extension-av
samesite-av    = "SameSite=" samesite-value
samesite-value = "Strict" / "Lax"

Semantics of the "SameSite" Attribute (Non-Normative)

The "SameSite" attribute limits the scope of the cookie such that it will only be attached to requests if those requests are same-site, as defined by the algorithm in {{same-site-requests}}. For example, requests for will attach same-site cookies if and only if initiated from a context whose "site for cookies" is "".

If the "SameSite" attribute's value is "Strict", the cookie will only be sent along with "same-site" requests. If the value is "Lax", the cookie will be sent with same-site requests, and with "cross-site" top-level navigations, as described in {{strict-lax}}. If the "SameSite" attribute's value is neither of these, the cookie will be ignored.

The changes to the Cookie header field suggested in {{cookie-header}} provide additional detail.

User Agent Requirements

This section describes extensions to {{RFC6265}} necessary in order to implement the client-side requirements of the SameSite attribute.

The "SameSite" attribute

The following attribute definition should be considered part of the the Set-Cookie algorithm as described in Section 5.2 of {{RFC6265}}:

If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string "SameSite", the user agent MUST process the cookie-av as follows:

  1. If cookie-av's attribute-value is not a case-insensitive match for "Strict" or "Lax", ignore the cookie-av.

  2. Let enforcement be "Lax" if cookie-av's attribute-value is a case-insensitive match for "Lax", and "Strict" otherwise.

  3. Append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of "SameSite" and an attribute-value of enforcement.

"Strict" and "Lax" enforcement {#strict-lax}

Same-site cookies in "Strict" enforcement mode will not be sent along with top-level navigations which are triggered from a cross-site document context. As discussed in {{top-level-navigations}}, this might or might not be compatible with existing session management systems. In the interests of providing a drop-in mechanism that mitigates the risk of CSRF attacks, developers may set the SameSite attribute in a "Lax" enforcement mode that carves out an exception which sends same-site cookies along with cross-site requests if and only if they are top-level navigations which use a "safe" (in the {{RFC7231}} sense) HTTP method.

Lax enforcement provides reasonable defense in depth against CSRF attacks that rely on unsafe HTTP methods (like POST), but does not offer a robust defense against CSRF as a general category of attack:

  1. Attackers can still pop up new windows or trigger top-level navigations in order to create a "same-site" request (as described in section 2.1), which is only a speedbump along the road to exploitation.

  2. Features like <link rel='prerender'> {{prerendering}} can be exploited to create "same-site" requests without the risk of user detection.

When possible, developers should use a session management mechanism such as that described in {{top-level-navigations}} to mitigate the risk of CSRF more completely.

Monkey-patching the Storage Model

Note: There's got to be a better way to specify this. Until I figure out what that is, monkey-patching!

Alter Section 5.3 of {{RFC6265}} as follows:

  1. Add samesite-flag to the list of each cookie's fields defined in the first paragraph. Note: this field's value is one of "None", "Strict", or "Lax".

  2. Before step 11 of the current algorithm, add the following:

    1. If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of "SameSite", set the cookie's samesite-flag to attribute-value ("Strict" or "Lax"). Otherwise, set the cookie's samesite-flag to "None".

    2. If the cookie's samesite-flag is not "None", and the request which generated the cookie's client's "site for cookies" is not an exact match for request-uri's host's registered domain, then abort these steps and ignore the newly created cookie entirely.

Monkey-patching the "Cookie" header {#cookie-header}

Note: There's got to be a better way to specify this. Until I figure out what that is, monkey-patching!

Alter Section 5.4 of {{RFC6265}} as follows:

  1. Add the following requirement to the end of the bulleted list in step 1:

    • If the cookie's samesite-flag is not "None", and the HTTP request is cross-site (as defined in {{same-site-requests}}) then exclude the cookie unless all of the following statements hold:

      1. samesite-flag is "Lax"

      2. The HTTP request's method is "safe".

      3. The HTTP request's target browsing context is a top-level browsing context.

Note that the modifications suggested here concern themselves only with the "site for cookies" of the request's client, and the registered domain of the resource being requested. The cookie's domain, path, and secure attributes do not come into play for these comparisons.

Authoring Considerations

Defense in depth

"SameSite" cookies offer a robust defense against CSRF attack when deployed in strict mode, and when supported by the client. It is, however, prudent to ensure that this designation is not the extent of a site's defense against CSRF, as same-site navigations and submissions can certainly be executed in conjunction with other attack vectors such as cross-site scripting.

Developers are strongly encouraged to deploy the usual server-side defenses (CSRF tokens, ensuring that "safe" HTTP methods are idempotent, etc) to mitigate the risk more fully.

Additionally, client-side techniques such as those described in {{app-isolation}} may also prove effective against CSRF, and are certainly worth exploring in combination with "SameSite" cookies.

Top-level Navigations {#top-level-navigations}

Setting the SameSite attribute in "strict" mode provides robust defense in depth against CSRF attacks, but has the potential to confuse users unless sites' developers carefully ensure that their cookie-based session management systems deal reasonably well with top-level navigations.

Consider the scenario in which a user reads their email at MegaCorp Inc's webmail provider They might expect that clicking on an emailed link to would show them the secret project that they're authorized to see, but if has marked their session cookies as SameSite, then this cross-site navigation won't send them along with the request. will render a 404 error to avoid leaking secret information, and the user will be quite confused.

Developers can avoid this confusion by adopting a session management system that relies on not one, but two cookies: one conceptually granting "read" access, another granting "write" access. The latter could be marked as SameSite, and its absence would prompt a reauthentication step before executing any non-idempotent action. The former could drop the SameSite attribute entirely, or choose the "Lax" version of enforcement, in order to allow users access to data via top-level navigation.

Mashups and Widgets

The SameSite attribute is inappropriate for some important use-cases. In particular, note that content intended for embedding in a cross-site contexts (social networking widgets or commenting services, for instance) will not have access to same-site cookies. Cookies may be required for requests triggered in these cross-site contexts in order to provide seamless functionality that relies on a user's state.

Likewise, some forms of Single-Sign-On might require cookie-based authentication in a cross-site context; these mechanisms will not function as intended with same-site cookies.

Privacy Considerations


Same-site cookies in and of themselves don't do anything to address the general privacy concerns outlined in Section 7.1 of {{RFC6265}}. The SameSite attribute is set by the server, and serves to mitigate the risk of certain kinds of attacks that the server is worried about. The user is not involved in this decision. Moreover, a number of side-channels exist which could allow a server to link distinct requests even in the absence of cookies. Connection and/or socket pooling, Token Binding, and Channel ID all offer explicit methods of identification that servers could take advantage of.

Pervasive Monitoring

As outlined in {{RFC7258}}, pervasive monitoring is an attack. Cookies play a large part in enabling such monitoring, as they are responsible for maintaining state in HTTP connections. We considered restricting same-site cookies to secure contexts {{secure-contexts}} as a mitigation but decided against doing so, as same-site cookies should result in a strict reduction in the number of cookies floating around in cross-site contexts. That is, even if embeds a resource from, that resource will not be "same-site", and's cookies simply cannot be used to correlate user behavior across distinct origins.

--- back

Changes since draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site-00

  1. Cookies whose "SameSite" attribute's value is neither "Strict" nor "Lax" are ignored.


The same-site cookie concept documented here is indebited to Mark Goodwin's and Joe Walker's {{samedomain-cookies}}. Michal Zalewski, Artur Janc, Ryan Sleevi, Adam Barth, and Jeff Hodges provided particularly valuable feedback on this document.