Evolution of group reciprocity

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Introduction

Humans reciprocate good actions for good and bad for bad [cites]. Rather than reciprocating back at the person who harmed or helped them, they may also pay it forward, passing on good or bad actions to a third party. To date, evolutionary theorists have concentrated on models of "generalized reciprocity," in which people who receive a good (bad) turn become nicer (nastier) to everyone in the population.

Evidence from many venues suggests that often, reciprocity is more narrowly focused than that. In civil wars, tit-for-tat conflicts take place between groups. Ethnic riots can be sparked by the bad behaviour (real or imagined) of an outgroup member; in revenge, the entire group is targeted. Institutions like the blood feud involve cycles of retaliation between different families or clans [cite boehm]. In all these cases, reciprocity is aimed at specific groups.

Theory

A single generation

There are G groups. Each group has N members. The set of groups is $\mathcal{G} = \{1...G\}$.

[XXX may need group sizes to vary due to evolution, in which case N is the group size above which the group splits/establishes new groups]

A single generation consists of T periods. In every period, each individual "acts" against one randomly selected member (the "target") from *each* group. That is, let P be the set of permutations $(p_1, ..., p_N)$ of $(1, ..., N)$ such that $p_i \neq i$ for all i. For each pair of groups i, j, a permutation p is drawn from the uniform distribution on P. Player m of group i acts against player p_m of group j. Thus each player acts against one member of each group, and is the target of one member from each group.

The acting player unilaterally chooses whether to "help" or "harm" the target. Helping costs 1 to the player and benefits the target by $b > 1$. Harming has zero cost and zero benefit. (Alternatively and equivalently, helping has zero cost and benefit, while harming gives 1 to the player and costs the target b.)

There are the following types of players:

- Selfish (s-) types always harm.
- Generalized reciprocity (r-) types harm if and only if they were harmed in the previous period.
- Group reciprocity (g-) types harm a target from group X, if and only if the last time somebody from group X acted against them, that person harmed them.

Let π_τ^i be the proportion of individuals of type $\tau \in \{s, r, g\}$ in group i. Let π_τ be the overall proportion of type τ in the population.

We denote by h_{ij}^t the probability that an individual from group i helps an individual from group j in period t.

We can calculate it as follows:

$$h_{ij}^{t+1} = \pi_s^i 0 + \pi_r^i \frac{1}{G} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}} h_{ki}^t + \pi_g^i h_{ji}^t \tag{1}$$

[XXX could we write the above in matrix form?]

Here, the first term reflects the fact that selfish types in group i never help. The second term gives the probability of a r-type helping. This is given by the overall probability that the r-type was helped by any one actor from the G individuals (one from each group) who targeted her in the previous period. The third term gives the probability that a group reciprocal g-type was previously helped by an actor from group j. We set $h_{ij}^0 = 1$ for all i, j, reflecting the assumption that non-selfish types start by cooperating (like in Tit-for-Tat).

Total payoffs are averaged over all periods and normalized by the number of groups G. When $T \to \infty$ the payoffs will be determined by the steady state such that $h_{ij}^{t+1} = h_{ij}^t \equiv h_{ij}$ for all $i, j \in \mathcal{G}$.

Denote by $X \subset \mathcal{G}$ the set of groups i that contain *only* group-reciprocators: $\pi_g^i = 1$.

Theorem. Depending on whether $\pi_s > 0$ or $\pi_s = 0$, there is a unique steady state. If $\pi_s > 0$ it is as follows:

- For all $i, j \in X$, $h_{ij} = 1$.
- For all $i \notin X$ and all $j \in \mathcal{G}$, $h_{ij} = h_{ji} = 0$.

If $\pi_s = 0$, the steady state is $h_{ij} = 1$ for all groups i, j.

Proof. To prove these values are steady states, plug them into the fixed point equations:

$$h_{ij} = \pi_s^i 0 + \pi_r^i \frac{1}{G} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{G}} h_{ki} + \pi_g^i h_{ji} \tag{2}$$

To prove they are the unique steady states: when $\pi_s = 0$, the second and third terms in (1) always sum to 1, by induction from the first period. (If nobody is selfish, then all players in all groups start by helping and never have a reason to stop.)

When $\pi_s > 0$, first note that if $i \in X$, $h_{ij} = h_{ji}$; furthermore, if $i, j \in X$, $h_{ij} = h_{ji} = 1$ again by using the initial condition.

Pick now i, j such that

$$h_{ij} = \bar{h} \equiv max_{k,l;k \notin X} h_{kl}, \tag{3}$$

and suppose by negation that $h_{ij} > 0$.

Fix an arbitrary group k. If $k \in X$ then $h_{ki} = h_{ik}$ as just noted and $h_{ik} \leq h_{ij}$ by (3); if $k \notin X$ then $h_{ki} \leq h_{ij}$ again by (3). In either case, then, $h_{ki} \leq h_{ij}$, for any k. Since (2) is a weighted sum of h_{ki}'s and 0, this immediately implies:

1. $\pi_s^i = 0$;
2. $h_{ki} = h_{ij} = \bar{h}$ for all groups k.

Now apply the above argument to any $i' \notin X$. This shows $\pi_s^{i'} = 0 \; \forall i' \notin X$. But for $i' \in X$, $\pi_s^{i'} = 0$ by definition. Thus $\pi_s = 0$, in contradiction to the assumption made. This shows $h_{ik} = 0$ for all $i \notin X$ and all $k \in \mathcal{G}$. Finally, if $i \in X$ and $k \notin X$, we get $h_{ik} = h_{ki} = 0$. QED.

[XXX: there might be a simpler "contraction mapping" argument to immediately prove the steady states are unique.]

Remark: if all groups have the same proportion of selfish types, then group and generalized reciprocators always behave identically. This can be shown by induction from period 1.

Payoffs

If T approaches infinity, the payoffs from the generation can be approximated by the steady state payoffs, since play is arbitrarily close to the steady state for an arbitrarily large number of periods.

The steady state payoffs for any member of group $i \notin X$ are 0 since these groups never help and are never helped. If I am a member of $i \in X$, my payoffs are $\frac{|X|}{G}(b-1)$; each period, a member of every group in X helps me, and I help a member of every such group.

In general, we can compute payoffs per period. Note that within a given group, g-types and r-types always get the same payoff. This is because they are helped equally often, and they do the same amount of helping (look at equation (1)).

Evolution of strategies

At the end of a generation, fitness is calculated according to payoffs and there is a selection process. . . .

Extensions/ideas

- Institutional evolution - i.e. the "types" exist at group level only, avoiding any within-group heterogeneity.
- Intra-group public goods
- Direct reciprocity types
- Doing the maths for finite T
- (Re)doing the simulations for finite T
- The "blood feud" institution in e.g. Boehm suggests there is a deterrent effect - if I plan to harm another clan, my cousins may dissuade me. Selfish types could be (slightly) strategic, e.g. only harming if there is not too much "comeback" in the following period.

Simulations

Conclusion