

Lecture 10

Examples on Competitive Equilibrium and Social Planner's Problem

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Overview

After constructing both **consumers'** and **firms'** problem, we start to bring them together in **one-period model**:

- Lecture 8: **competitive equilibrium** (CE)
 - each agent solve their problems individually
 - aggregate decision determines “prices” (wage, rent, etc.)
- Lecture 9: **social planner's problem** (SPP)
 - imaginary and benevolent social planner determines the allocation
 - should be the most efficient outcome
- Lecture 10: CE and SPP examples

Two Dimensional Chain Rule

Suppose we have a utility function $U(C, l)$, where C is the consumption, and l is the leisure, and both $C = C(w)$ and $l = l(w)$ are the function of equilibrium wage w , then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dw}[U(C(w), l(w))] &= D_C U(C(w), l(w)) \times \frac{dC(w)}{dw} \\ &\quad + D_l U(C(w), l(w)) \times \frac{dl(w)}{dw} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

“Taken as Given”

Here is a good rule of thumb:

When you solve the problem of an agent who **chooses y taking x as given**, the answer should take the form of $y(x)$.

Example: the consumer maximizes utility by **choosing consumption, leisure, and labor supply**, **taking the wage and profits as given**. ($G = 0$)

$$\max_{C, l, N^s} U(C, l) \quad \text{subject to} \quad C = wN^s + \pi \quad \text{and} \quad l + N^s = h \quad (2)$$

- solution takes the form: $C(w, \pi), l(w, \pi), N^s(w, \pi)$
- why not h , or utility parameters? Not **endogenous to the model!**
- can repeat this idea for the firm to get $N^d(w), Y(w), \pi(w)$

“Endogenous to the Model”

What does equilibrium do? Figures out what level of “taken as given” but endogenous variables has to occur:

- consumer: $\pi = \pi(w)$ from firm's problem
- labor supply can be rewrite as: $N^s(w, \pi) = N^s(w, \pi(w)) = N^s(w)$
- labor market clearing: $N^d(w^*) = N^s(w^*)$, where w^* is eqm wage

Question: any of the “taken as given variables” show up in the SPP?

- Ans: NO! Social planner is **benevolent dictator!**

Model Environment

- Consumer: $U(C, l) = \frac{C^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d}$, where $b = 2$ and $d = \frac{3}{2}$.
 - b, d are parameters
 - $h = 1$ is time endowment to allocate between leisure and labor supply
 - owns the firm, subject to lump-sum tax $T \geq 0$
- Firm: $zF(K, N) = zK^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}$, where $K = 1$ and $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$ (param)
- Government: $T = G$
- Labor market: both consumer and firm take wage rate w as given

Experiments

- ① **Benchmark:** $z = 1$ and $G = 0$
- ② **Experiment 1:** $z = 1.2$ and $G = 0$
- ③ **Experiment 2:** $z = 1$ and $G = 0.5$

Solve Benchmark in Social Planner's Problem

■ PPF: $C + G = zN^{1-\alpha}$, where $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$

■ Time: $N = h - l$, where $h = 1$

■ Social Planner's Problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max_l \quad & U(C(l), l) = \frac{C(l)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & C = Y - G \\
 & Y = zN^{1-\alpha} \\
 & N = 1 - l \\
 \Rightarrow \max_l \quad & \frac{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Solve Benchmark in Social Planner's Problem (Cont.)

$$\max_l \frac{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \quad (4)$$

$$\text{FOC: } \underbrace{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{-b}}_{\frac{(\cdot)^{1-b}}{1-b}} \times \underbrace{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}}_{z(1-l)^{1-\alpha}} \times \underbrace{(-1)}_{-l} + l^{-d} = 0 \quad (5)$$

$$G = 0 : z^{-b}(1-l)^{-b(1-\alpha)} \times (1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha} = l^{-d} \quad (6)$$

$$(1-\alpha)z^{1-b}(1-l)^{-\alpha-b+\alpha b} = l^{-d} \quad (7)$$


$$\alpha = 1/2; \quad b = 2; \quad d = 3/2 \quad (8)$$

$$\text{Apply: } \frac{1}{2}z^{-1}(1-l)^{-\frac{3}{2}} = l^{-\frac{3}{2}} \Rightarrow \frac{1}{2z} = \left(\frac{1-l}{l}\right)^{\frac{3}{2}} \quad (9)$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1-l}{l} = \left(\frac{1}{2z}\right)^{\frac{2}{3}} \Rightarrow l(z, 0) = \frac{1}{1 + (2z)^{-\frac{2}{3}}} \quad (10)$$

$$z = 1 \Rightarrow l \approx 0.61, N \approx 0.39, Y = C \approx 0.62, w = \frac{z}{2}N^{-\frac{1}{2}} \approx 0.8 \quad (11)$$


Visualization: Benchmark in SPP



Indifference curve and PPF are tangent at optimal bundle

slope at tangency (C_0, l_0)
 = slope of IC $(-MRS_{l,C})$
 = slope of budget line $(-w)$
 = slope of PPF $(-MRT_{l,C})$
 = slope of production fcn $(-MPN)$

Solving with New TFP




Recall that we solved for the equilibrium quantity of leisure as a function of TFP:

$$l(z) = \frac{1}{1 + (2x)^{-\frac{2}{3}}} \quad (12)$$

So now we've solved for all possible “experiment 1’s”! Just plug in $z = 1.2$ to get $l \approx 0.642$, and plug in to get all the rest as well.

Visualization: Experiment 1



Tangency preserved, just **shifted**

slope at tangency (C_1, l_1)

= slope of $IC(-MRS_{l,C})$


= slope of budget line $(-w)$

= slope of $PPF(-MRT_{l,C})$

= slope of production fcn $(-MPN)$


Comparison: Experiment 1 and Benchmark

What's different?



- higher productivity means PPF shifts outward
- outward shift of PPF makes higher utility level (IC) attainable
- tangency is steeper: wage increases
- both consumption and leisure increase!

Experiment 1: Income and Substitution Effect




Recall wage increase case from the consumer problem:

- **substitution effect:** move along IC but reflect new wage (i.e, new budget or new PPF)
 - C increases, l decreases
- **income effect:** move up to new budget line / PPF
 - C and l both increase
- here, income effect wins and leisure increases

Comparison: Experiment 2 and Benchmark

Note: SPP harder to solve by hand with $G \neq 0$ [details](#). But, can still analyze with graphs!



- higher government spending shifts PPF **inward**
- inward shift of PPF lowers utility level (IC) attainable
- budget shallower: wage falls
- consumption, leisure fall (recall normal goods assumption)
- can show output increases

Response to Data


Effect of \uparrow in	TFP	G
Output	Increase	Increase
Consumption	Increase	Decrease
Employment	Ambiguous	Increase
Wage	Increase	Decrease

TFP is a overall
better match! **Real
Business Cycle** theory

- recall key **business cycle facts**: employment, consumption, real wage are all procyclical
- recall key **trend**: output has grown steadily for last century
- question: which model is more consistent with these facts?

Data: Government Spending from WWII

Figure 5.7 GDP, Consumption, and Government Expenditures



- large increase in G to finance war effort
- modest increase in Y
- slight decline in C
- consistent with our model!

Data: Solow Residual, $z = \frac{Y}{K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}}$

Figure 4.18 The Solow Residual for the United States





Figure 5.11 Deviations from Trend in GDP and the Solow Residual



Appendix

How to solve $G \neq 0$

Back

$$\max_l \quad \frac{(z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{1-b}}{1-b} + \frac{l^{1-d}}{1-d} \quad (13)$$

$$\text{FOC: } z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{-b} \times (1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha} = l^{-d} \quad (14)$$

$$\text{Divide: } (z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G)^{-b} = \frac{l^{-d}}{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}} \quad (15)$$

$$\text{power of } -\frac{1}{b}: \quad z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - G = \left[\frac{l^{-d}}{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{b}} \quad (16)$$

$$\text{Solve } G: \quad G = F(l) = z(1-l)^{1-\alpha} - \left[\frac{l^{-d}}{(1-\alpha)z(1-l)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{b}} \quad (17)$$

$$\iff l = F^{-1}(G) \quad (18)$$