

Lecture 8

Competitive Equilibrium

One-Period Model

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Overview

After constructing both consumers' and firms' problem, we start to bring them together in one-period model: *let agents do their own thing*

■ Lecture 8: competitive equilibrium (CE)

- each agent solve their problems individually
- aggregate decision determines "prices" (wage, rent, etc.)

■ Lecture 9: social planner's problem (SPP)

- imaginary and benevolent social planner determines the allocation
- should be the most efficient outcome

■ Lecture 10: CE and SPP examples

policy: how to mitigate the distortion. \Rightarrow


$CE \neq SPP$
 \nearrow distortion created by friction

"friction"

search "friction"

★ labor

sorting



Q_1

Q_2

Q_3

↓


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J_1

J_2

J_3



J_1

Review: Structure of Macro Model: 4 elements

- ① **agent**: who is involved?
 - e.g. consumers, firms, government
- ② **preferences**: how and what is consumed/valued/invested?
 - consumers: monotone, convex, consumption + leisure normal
 - firms: profit maximization
 - government: passive (for now)
- ③ **resources**: availability and distribution
 - consumer: h unit of time endowment
 - firm: production technology $zF(K, N^d)$
- ④ **technology**: objective limitation at given period of time
 - CRS production function, government tax decision

Government and Budget Balance

Government provide G unit of gov. spending by imposing lump-sum tax T to representative consumer.

Assumptions:

① Gov. spending requires resources but with no benefit

- not public goods

② no transfers between consumers

③ **gov. budget balance:** $G = T$, must run balanced budget

- special case: $G = 0$ means no government!

$$\Downarrow$$


$$T = 0 \Rightarrow \text{Consumer } C \leq W(h - l) + \tau L \quad \underline{\underline{= 0}}$$

$$\textcircled{T} = \underline{\underline{G}}$$

→ throw to the ocean

Using a Macro Model

"Making use of the model is a process of **running experiments** to determine how changes in the **exogenous variables** change the **endogenous variables**." – Williamson, p.144



Exogenous variables: determined **outside** the model


- ① G : gov. spending
- ② K : firms' capital stock
- ③ z , h : TFP, consumer's time endowment

Endogenous variables: determined **inside** the model

- C , Y : consumption, output ✓
- N^s , N^d : labor supply & demand ✓
- T , w , π : tax level, wage rate, dividends ✓

Concept: Competitive Equilibrium \Rightarrow take prices as given.

- Agents in the economy behave for a given set of exogenous variables and parameters
- Both consumer and firm took the wage rate as given.
 price
- But this wage is endogenous! How is this wage determined?
- Solution: in competitive equilibrium,
 - prices are exogenous to agent ("taken as given"), but
 - endogenous to the model (NOT parameter and need to be solved)
- Market clear: "wage rate" is determined by $N^s = N^d$ ("endogenous")
 consumer *firm*
- other examples: dividend income, taxes



Analysis on Competitive Equilibrium

Structure

Competitive Equilibrium

relative to USD

$\$W$

\Rightarrow

$$w = \frac{\$W}{\$P}$$

$\$P$

\Rightarrow

relative to final goods

■ How many markets exist in this economy?

- There are 2 goods: consumption goods and leisure
- While there is only 1 market: leisure is traded for consumption with wage rate w

■ Walras' Law: with N goods, can only have $N - 1$ prices

- All prices are relative prices:
 - normalize price of consumption as 1, the relative price of leisure is w
- Trade consumption goods for consumption goods? \Rightarrow | \leftrightarrow |

Competitive Equilibrium in Words

A competitive equilibrium given *exogenous* levels of *government spending*, *TFP*, and *capital* is a set of *endogenous* quantities of *output*, *consumption*, *labor demand*, *labor supply*, *dividends*, and *taxes* and an *endogenous* *wage rate* such that the following properties are satisfied:

- ① the representative consumer chooses *consumption* and *labor supply* to make herself as well off as possible subject to her budget constraint, taking as *given* the *wage*, *taxes*, and *dividend income*.
- ② the representative firm chooses *labor demand* to maximize profits taking *capital*, *TFP*, and the *wage* as given.
- ③ output (profits) are total (net) revenues, determined “residually”
- ④ the government imposes the *taxes* required by its budget constraint
- ⑤ the *labor market clears*, i.e., the quantity of labor supplied by the consumer is equal to the quantity of labor demanded by the firm.

Competitive Equilibrium in Math

A competitive equilibrium given $\{G, z, K\}$ is a set of allocations $\{Y^*, C^*, l^*, N^{s*}, N^{d*}, \pi^*, T^*\}$ and prices $\{w^*\}$ such that

exogenous

- ① Taken prices w and π, T as given, representative consumer solves

$$\max_{C, l \in [0, h]} U(C, l) \quad \text{subject to} \quad C \leq w(h - l) + \pi - T \quad (1)$$

- ② Taken w as given, the representative firm solves

$$\max_{N^d \geq 0} zF(K, N^d) - wN^d \quad (2)$$

- ③ Government set taxes to balance budget: $T^* = G$

- ④ Labor market clears: w^* such that $N^{s*} = N^{d*}$

Does it All Add Up?

Revisiting the Income-Expenditure Identity

- **Expenditure approach:** $Y = C + I + G + NX$
- one period $\Rightarrow I = 0$; closed economy $\Rightarrow NX = 0 \Rightarrow Y = C + G$
- creation of final goods* (pointing to C) and *usage of final goods* (pointing to G)

■ **Income approach:**

- consumer budget constraint: $C = wN^s + \pi - T$
- government budget balance: $G = T \Rightarrow C = wN^s + \pi - G$
- profit: $\pi = zF(K, N^d) - wN^d = Y - wN^d \Rightarrow C = wN^s + Y - wN^d - G$
- labor market clear: $N^s = N^d \Rightarrow C = Y - G$

■ **Income-Expenditure Identity holds!**

Example

Assume

- ① no government: $\overset{\times}{G} = T = 0$
- ② utility function: $U(C, l) = \ln C + \ln l$
- ③ production function: $F(K, N) = K^\alpha N^{1-\alpha}$, where $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$
- ④ $z = K = 1$; $h = 1$

Consumer: $\max_{C, l} \ln C + \ln l$ subject to $C \leq w(h - l) + \pi$

$$\text{FOC} \quad \frac{C}{l} = w \quad \rightarrow \text{MRS}_{C,l} = w \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Binding budget constraint} \quad C = w(1 - l) + \pi \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Time constraint} \quad N^s = 1 - l \quad (5)$$

Example (Cont.)

Firm: $\max_{N^d} (N^d)^{\frac{1}{2}} - wN^d$

FOC $\frac{1}{2}(N^d)^{-\frac{1}{2}} = w$ (6)

\rightarrow $MPN = w$

Output definition $Y = (N^d)^{\frac{1}{2}}$ (7)

Profit definition $\pi = Y - wN^d$ (8)

Market clear:

$N^s = N^d$ (9)

7 equations ((3)-(9)), 7 unknowns ($C, l, N^s, N^d, Y, \pi, w$), can solve entirely!