

Lecture 13

Competitive Equilibrium in Two-Period Model

Hui-Jun Chen

National Tsing Hua University

October 23, 2025

Outline

1 Real Interest Rate \uparrow


2 Competitive Equilibrium

3 Ricardian Equivalence

Increase in Real Interest Rate

real interest rate r increase \Rightarrow budget line **rotate**


Figure: 9.12 An Increase in the Real Interest Rate



- Recall $we = y - t + \frac{y' - t'}{1 + r}$, $r \uparrow \Rightarrow we \downarrow$
- can do nothing: pivot around E
- similar to **wage increase** (slope \uparrow)
- income & substitution effects (change in relative price)
- income effect depends on the sign of saving s

Increase in Real Interest Rate: Effect on Lender ($s > 0$)

Figure: 9.13 An Increase in the Real Interest Rate for a Lender




Let initial bundle be A.

- **Substitution effect:** rotate from \overline{AE} to \overline{FG}
 - $\because r \uparrow$, **current consumption become more expensive** $\Rightarrow c_D < c_A, c'_D > c'_A$
- **Income effect:** shift from \overline{FG} to \overline{BE}
 - normality: $c_B > c_D, c'_B > c'_D$
 - $c' \uparrow, \because$ both effects aligned
 - c and $s = y - t - c$ are ambiguous, \because both effects contradict

Increase in Real Interest Rate: Effect on Borrower ($s < 0$)

Figure: 9.14 An Increase in the Real Interest Rate for a Borrower



Let initial bundle be A.

- Substitution effect: rotate from \overline{AE} to \overline{FG}
 - $\because r \uparrow$, **current consumption become more expensive** $\Rightarrow c_D < c_A, c'_D > c'_A$ [same as lender!]
- Income effect: shift from \overline{FG} to \overline{BE}
 - normality: $c_B < c_D, c'_B < c'_D$ [opposite to lender!]
 - $c, s \downarrow, \because$ both effects aligned
 - c' is ambiguous, \because both effects contradict

Summary

Both borrowers and lenders experience **intertemporal substitution**:

- $r \uparrow \Rightarrow \text{cost of current consumption} \uparrow \Rightarrow c \downarrow$
- aggregate effect depends on the **distribution** of borrowers and lenders
 - » \therefore both effects are in opposite directions
 - » important and active research topic in macro!
- tendency for confounding income effects on borrowers and lenders to roughly cancel out, still **effect on aggregate consumption** is not guaranteed.

Outline

1 Real Interest Rate \uparrow

2 Competitive Equilibrium

3 Ricardian Equivalence

Government in Two-Period Model

Impose **lump-sum tax** T and issue **government bond** B to finance **government spending** G in each period.

- › government purchase G unit of good today and G' tomorrow,
- › impose T and T' of lump-sum taxes to consumers, and
- › Issue B unit of bond today and pay back $(1 + r)B$ tomorrow.

Budget constraints:

$$\text{date 0 : } G = T + B \quad (1)$$

$$\text{date 1 : } G' + (1 + r)B = T' \quad (2)$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{lifetime budget constraint : } G + \frac{G'}{1 + r} = T + \frac{T'}{1 + r} \quad (3)$$

Budget deficit is allowed in one period, but **must be repaid** in the future.

Two-Period Competitive Equilibrium in Words

A competitive equilibrium given **government spending** and **consumers' endowment** is a set of **endogenous quantities and prices** of **current and future consumption**, **current and future lump-sum taxes**, **savings**, **government bond**, as well as the **real interest rate** such that

1. Taken the real interest rate and lump-sum taxes as given, **consumers** maximized their lifetime utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraints.
2. Taken the real interest rate as given, the intertemporal **government** budget constraint holds.
3. The credit market clears determines the equilibrium real interest rate.

Two-Period Competitive Equilibrium in Math

A competitive equilibrium given exogenous quantities $\{G, G', Y, Y'\}$, is a set of **endogenous quantities and prices** $\{C, C', S, T, T', B, r\}$

1. Taken r, T , and T' , consumers solve

$$\max_{C, C'} U(C, C') \quad \text{subject to} \quad C + \frac{C'}{1+r} = Y - T + \frac{Y' - T'}{1+r},$$

where solutions are C^* , C'^* , and $S^* = Y - T - C^*$.

2. The **present value** of government budget constraint holds:

$$G + \frac{G'}{1+r} = T + \frac{T'}{1+r},$$

where government bond B is determined by $B = G - T$.

3. The **credit market clears**: $S = B$ at the equilibrium interest rate r^* .

The Credit Market and GDP Accounting

In **one-period** model, firm and consumer interact in the **labor market**.

Here, government and consumer interact in the **credit market**.

- S is **private saving**, and $-B = S^g$ is **public saving**
- closed economy: national net saving must equals 0, so $S - B = 0$.

current consumer budget: $S = Y - T - C$

with current gov budget: $S = Y - (G - B) - C$

$$S = B : Y = C + G$$

future consumer budget: $(1 + r)S = C' + T' - Y'$

with future gov budget: $(1 + r)S = C' + (G' + (1 + r)B) - Y'$

$$S = B : Y' = C' + G'$$

An Example

Suppose $G = G' = T = T' = B = 0$, i.e., government is ignored, then

► **consumer:** let $U(C, C') = \ln C + \ln C'$, and $Y = Y' = 1$,

$$\max_{C, C'} \ln C + \ln C' \quad \text{subject to} \quad C + \frac{C'}{1+r} = 1 + \frac{1}{1+r}$$

► FOC:

$$\begin{aligned} MRS_{C, C'} = \frac{C'}{C} = 1+r &\Rightarrow C + \frac{(1+r)C}{1+r} = \frac{2+r}{1+r} \\ &\Rightarrow 2C = \frac{2+r}{1+r} \Rightarrow C^* = \frac{2+r}{2(1+r)} \end{aligned}$$

► **credit market clear:**

$$S = B = Y - T - C^* = 1 - 0 - \frac{2+r}{2(1+r)} = 0 \Rightarrow r^* = 0 \Rightarrow C = C' = 1$$

Outline

- 1 Real Interest Rate \uparrow
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Ricardian Equivalence

In this model, the timing of taxes is **neutral**: no effect on the real interest rate or on the consumption of individual consumers.

Recall consumer and government budget constraint:


$$\text{government : } G + \frac{G'}{1+r} = T + \frac{T'}{1+r}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{consumer : } C + \frac{C'}{1+r} &= Y + \frac{Y'}{1+r} - \left(T + \frac{T'}{1+r} \right) \\ &= Y + \frac{Y'}{1+r} - \left(G + \frac{G'}{1+r} \right)\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, for any tax scheme such that government budget constraint holds, there's no effect on r , C and C' .

Ricardian Equivalence in Graph

Figure: 9.16 Ricardian Equivalence with a Cut in Current Taxes for a Borrower



Suppose under tax scheme (T, T') , consumer:

- has endowment point E_1
- chooses optimal bundle A


If there's a tax cut scheme (\tilde{T}, \tilde{T}') such that (G, G') remain the same,

- lower current taxes $(\tilde{T} < T)$
- but higher future taxes $(\tilde{T}' > T')$

Then consumer has endowment E_2 , but still choose optimal bundle A .

Ricardian Equivalence and Credit Market

Figure: 9.17 Ricardian Equivalence and Credit Market Equilibrium



Following the tax cut in last slide,

- $T \downarrow \Rightarrow$ larger deficit today
- Recall $B = G - T$, $B \uparrow$, more bonds today (demand \uparrow)
- Recall $S = Y - T - C$, $S \uparrow$, more private saving today (supply \uparrow)
- Ricardian Equivalence: both shifts **exactly** offsets, $r_2 = r_1$
- Recall PIH: tax cut is 100% temporary!

When Will Ricardian Equivalence fail?

This is an extreme result! It provides a useful **benchmark** to consider richer settings. What can change to “undo” this result?

1. **distribution of tax burden:** consider a case of this model with N consumers, labeled $i = 1, \dots, N$. Assume that $T = \sum_{i=1}^N t_i$, and consumer i pays t_i .
 - » Everyone pays different t_i ! What if tax cut not apply to everyone?
2. **consumer lives the whole time:** government can “kick the can” until long in the future, when current generation is retired or dead.
 - » redistribution of wealth across generations, social security
3. **distorting taxes:** lump sum not feasible, but proportional distort
4. **imperfect credit market:** borrowing and lending is often “**frictional**”
 - » example: different rates on borrowing and saving, many others!