




Peers, Teachers, and Schools: Understanding Youth Delinquency in China

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Introduction



“A Teacher for a Day is a Father for Life”

- Strict discipline and authoritarian teaching style

China / People & Culture

Is corporal punishment acceptable in Chinese schools? Government edict reopens debate

- Guangdong province leads move to clarify what is allowed with draft rule legalising some commonly used sanctions
- Forced standing and running could be permitted as parents and teachers debate where to draw the line

(South China Morning Post, 2019)



“A Teacher for a Day is a Father for Life”

- Emphasis on teacher ethics and teachers as “moral guardians”
 - Policies and laws regarding teacher ethics
 - e.g., the 2008 Code of Ethics for Primary and Middle School Teachers, the 2018 Ten Norms for Middle and Primary School Teachers in the New Era
 - A well-established teacher evaluation system
 - evaluation criteria: ideological and moral quality, professional ethics, professional knowledge, teaching capability, research achievements, physical and mental health, educational background, and teaching experience.





**Does Teacher Quality
Moderate The Negative
Influence of Affiliation
with Deviant Peers?**



Measure of Teacher Quality

- *Proportion of Accredited Senior Teachers at the School Level*
 - Professional rank: principal senior level (*zheng gaoji*), senior level (*fu gaoji*), level A (*yiji*), level B (*erji*), level C (*sanji*), and not rated
 - Teachers with a level A or higher were classified as accredited senior teachers (Park & Hannum, 2001)
 - School-Level Teacher Quality:
 - Teachers' multiple roles at school (e.g., Chief of a Class, Chief of a Grade, Dorm Supervisor)
 - Unequal distribution of educational resources (Range: [0.11, 0.99], Mean = 0.64, SD = 0.22)



Hypotheses

- **Hypothesis 1:**
 - A higher proportion of accredited senior teachers at the school level will be associated with lower rates of adolescent delinquent behavior.
- **Hypothesis 2:**
 - Deviant peer affiliation will increase adolescent delinquent behavior; whereas having no deviant friends will decrease adolescent delinquent behavior.
- **Hypothesis 3:**
 - The association between deviant peer affiliation and adolescent delinquent behavior will be weaker for adolescents who attend schools with more accredited senior teachers.




Data

- China Education Panel Survey
 - A final sample of 7,913 students
 - nested in 98 schools
- Independent Variables in 2013-2014 Baseline
 - school-level teacher quality; deviant peer affiliation
- Dependent Variable in 2014-2015 Follow-Up Survey:
 - delinquent behavior
- Control Variables:
 - School-level: school location, neighborhood delinquency, school funding
 - student-level: gender, migration, parental marriage status, parental-child relationship, parental discipline, boarding school, school attachment




Models

- Hierarchical Linear Models




Main Results

- Main Effects of Deviant Peer Affiliation and Teacher Quality on Youth Delinquency



Main Results

- Interaction Effects of Teacher Quality and Deviant Peer Affiliation on Youth Delinquency



Robust Analysis

- Listwise deletion ($N = 7,913$) versus multiple imputation ($N = 10,279$)
- Include outliers versus exclude outliers
- Control for neighborhood-level characteristics

→ The main findings remain stable.



Conclusion

- The HLM models yield supportive evidence for all our proposed theses – the schoolteacher quality thesis, the peer influence thesis, and the school moderation thesis.
- Our study adds to the literature on the effects of school context on youth delinquency and the research on moderators of peer influence on youth deviance.
- The teacher-peer interaction effect implies that teachers could play a critical role in supervising adolescent behavior, especially in a context where respect for teachers is highly valued, and authoritarian teaching style is a norm.
- Future research should adopt an integrated macro-micro perspective and consider the cultural and institutional context while interpreting individuals' deviant behaviors.





Thank You!

Questions & Comments
Welcomed

Appendix

Table 2
Hierarchical Linear Models Estimates of Delinquent Behavior

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
(Intercept)	53.06*** (2.15)	57.64*** (2.63)	57.49*** (2.63)	58.12*** (2.61)	57.35*** (2.62)	59.29*** (2.61)
Student-Level Variables						
Gender (Female = 1)	-6.73*** (0.46)	-6.73*** (0.46)	-6.72*** (0.46)	-6.73*** (0.46)	-6.72*** (0.46)	-6.70*** (0.46)
Migrant Status (Migrant = 1)	1.29* (0.65)	1.25 (0.65)	1.24 (0.65)	1.28* (0.65)	1.22 (0.65)	1.40* (0.64)
Parent-Child Relationship	-3.66*** (0.54)	-3.64*** (0.54)	-3.65*** (0.53)	-3.67*** (0.53)	-3.64*** (0.53)	-3.67*** (0.53)
Parental Discipline	-2.41*** (0.60)	-2.40*** (0.60)	-2.37*** (0.60)	-2.36*** (0.60)	-2.35*** (0.60)	-2.44*** (0.60)
Parent Marital Status (Divorced = 1)	3.11*** (0.89)	3.09*** (0.89)	3.11*** (0.89)	3.13*** (0.89)	3.12*** (0.89)	3.13*** (0.89)
Boarding School (Yes = 1)	3.50*** (0.71)	3.23*** (0.72)	3.23*** (0.72)	2.84*** (0.73)	3.21*** (0.71)	2.82*** (0.71)
School Attachment	-4.33*** (0.38)	-4.33*** (0.38)	-4.31*** (0.38)	-4.31*** (0.38)	-4.30*** (0.38)	-4.31*** (0.38)
Deviant Peer Affiliation (Having such friend(s) = 1)	7.59*** (0.84)	7.65*** (0.84)	15.53*** (2.34)	15.61*** (2.33)	15.59*** (2.34)	15.43*** (2.34)
School/Neighbourhood-Level Variables						
School Quality (Proportion of accredited senior teachers)		-7.10** (2.37)	-7.08** (2.37)	-6.42** (2.32)	-7.58** (2.36)	-5.55* (2.27)
School Location (Central urban area = 1)				-2.56* (1.02)		
Neighbourhood Delinquency (Always or often = 1)					1.94 (1.20)	
School Funding						-2.33*** (0.61)
Cross-Level Interactions						
Deviant Peer Affiliation × School Quality			-12.36*** (3.49)	-12.50*** (3.48)	-12.44*** (3.49)	-12.10*** (3.50)
AIC	69872.07	69866.39	69856.50	69852.33	69855.97	69844.82
BIC	69962.76	69964.05	69961.15	69963.95	69967.59	69956.44
Log Likelihood	-34923.03	-34919.19	-34913.25	-34910.17	-34911.98	-34906.41
Number of Observations	7913	7913	7913	7913	7913	7913
Number of Groups	98	98	98	98	98	98
School/Neighbourhood-Level Variance (Intercept)	18.17 (4.26)	16.07 (4.01)	16.09 (4.01)	14.83 (3.85)	15.42 (3.93)	13.49 (3.67)
Residual Variance	388.33 (19.71)	388.33 (19.71)	388.29 (19.71)	388.27 (19.70)	388.31 (19.71)	388.18 (19.70)
R ² , marginal (fixed effects only)	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14
R ² , conditional (entire model)	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. Entries show parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The slope for deviant peer affiliation is allowed to vary.

