

Security Review of

hvGNO

May 2022

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Files in scope

Following solidity files:

https://github.com/hundred-finance/hundred-dao/blob/7df827501282cb7de568cce9f2b05d9a0f0aa344/contracts/gnosisBonds/veGNO.sol

Current status

All issues have been fixed by the developer. There are no known issues in the relevant contracts in https://github.com/hundred-finance/hundred-dao/blob/4c9dc59b93739f25c3a718559d1143f3a7187e40/contracts/gnosisBonds/veGNO.sol

Issues

1. burnedBalances do not accumulate, leading to incorrect vesting schedule

type: incorrect implementation / severity: major

In redeem function statement burnedBalances[_msgSender()] = gnoAmount_; should be replaced by burnedBalances[_msgSender()] += gnoAmount_; otherwise the contract will "forget" the amount of tokens the user has already redeemed, allowing him to redeem the remaining balance faster.

status - fixed

Issue has been fixed and is no longer present in

 $\frac{https://github.com/hundred-finance/hundred-}{dao/blob/4c9dc59b93739f25c3a718559d1143f3a7187e40/contracts/gnosisBonds/veGNO.sol}$

Notes

- (endTime_ halfTime_) on line 65 can be simplified to just YEAR / 2
- Since endTime_ is effectively unused after simplification mentioned above and YEAR is always divided by 2, it might be better to store half a year as a constant
- unlockStartTime is only ever used to calculate halfTime_so halfTime_can be stored directly isntead
- gno and unlockStartTime can be stored as immutable to save gas
- whenNotPaused and whenPaused on pause and unPause respectively is redundant, since it's already on the internal functions that are called

 • rounding can lead to small burnedBalances losses on transfer, leading to slightly earlier withdrawals