pares it with the packets in the buffer to see if there's a match. If there is, the packet has been forwarded and the watchdog removes the packet from the buffer. If a packet stays in the buffer for longer than a certain period, the watchdog increases a failure count for the node responsible for forwarding the packet. If the count exceeds a threshold value, the watchdog considers that node as misbehaving.

A path rater at a node maintains a rating for every other node that it knows in the network. To pick a route that is most likely to be reliable, it computes a path metric by averaging the rating of the nodes on the paths and chooses the path with the highest metric. It assigns misbehaving nodes a very low rating, and thus excludes them from routing.

Because of ad hoc networks' characteristics, the proposed

approaches can't accurately detect misbehaving nodes in situations such as packet collisions and collusion of malicious nodes.⁹

Evidence-based trust management

Eschenauer and his colleagues present a framework for trust management in ad hoc networks based on

evidence distribution.¹¹ They consider trust as a set of relationships established with the support of evidence. In their framework, evidence can be anything a policy requires to establish a trust relationship, such as public key, address, and identity. Any entity can generate evidence for itself and for other entities. Evidence can be obtained either online or offline, such as through physical contact.

One way to generate evidence is through public-key cryptography. An entity can create a piece of evidence, define its valid time, sign it with the entity's private key, and disseminate it to others. To verify this piece of evidence, other entities will need the originator's public key and certificate. In the Internet, entities can use X.509. However, in an ad hoc network, where there is no CA, PGP might be an option. An entity can invalidate its evidence by generating a revocation certificate at any time.

Eschenauer and colleagues' approach also lets an entity revoke other entities' evidence by generating and disseminating contradictory evidence. However, allowing such actions is open to attack. A malicious entity can distribute bogus evidence to invalidate other nodes' legitimate evidence, which can cause chaos in the network. A malicious entity might generate fake evidence for its own purposes—for example, to impersonate other nodes.

To prevent these attacks, Eschenauer and his colleagues proposed using redundant and independent evidence from various sources. However, they didn't discuss how to evaluate evidence, which is important for trust management. Also, because each node's trustworthiness

is not dynamically adjusted, the framework is mainly useful for authentication.

TRUST MANAGEMENT IN E-COMMERCE

Trust or reputation management is an important issue in e-commerce, where traders might have never met and know nothing about each other's trustworthiness. This lack of information about traders' reputations causes uncertainty and mistrust, which influences the e-market's economic efficiency.

Considerable research has explored trust and reputation management in e-commerce. One possibility is to build a centralized system, like a credit history agency, to manage users' reputations. However, this approach neglects personal preferences and standards.

Online auction and shopping sites, such as eBay and

Amazon.com, use reputation management. eBay assigns sellers a rating of 1, 0, or –1 for trustworthiness after one interaction, and computes a seller's reputation as the accumulation of all the ratings received within the past 180 days. New eBay users receive a reputation of 0. Amazon.com rates both sellers and buyers after each interaction. It cal-

culates reputation as the average of all the feedback ratings received during the system's use. A new Amazon.com user has no reputation value.

Users can easily misbehave in e-marketing. After cheating and obtaining a bad reputation, a user can simply discard a current identity, obtain a new one, and reenter the market. This kind of misbehavior causes low economic and system utilization efficiency. To solve this problem, Amazon.com and eBay apply pseudonyms. New users must register with some personal information so the system can trace their real identity. At the same time, pseudonyms provide anonymity.

Reputation management for the electronic community

Giorgos Zacharia⁴ proposed Sporas, a reputation mechanism for electronic community. Sporas has the following features:

- Reputation value is within the range of (0, 3000). A new user is assigned 0, the minimum value.
- A current user's reputation is always higher than a new user's.
- Two users can only rate each other once. If two users interact multiple times, Sporas only accepts the latest rating. This helps avoid the problem of two users intentionally increasing their reputation value by frequent interactions.
- It changes the reputation value of users with very high reputation values more slightly.