

FIGURE 3 | To what extent participants modified their initial art evaluation after treatment in Study 2 **(A)**. Attributions of agency, experience, moral status, art agency, and art experience to the AI system depending on the condition participants were assigned to in Study 2 **(B)**. Marginal mean evaluation across all ten images depending on treatment group **(C)**.

We expanded Study 2 to include a novel measure of perceived moral standing independent of an entity's perceived experience covered by the mind perception questionnaire. This was done because the social-relational approach to electronic agents' moral standing challenges perspectives that defend experience-related capacities as preconditions for moral status. Nevertheless, we did not find any significant difference between treatment conditions in both attributions of experience and our proposed moral standing measure. These results corroborate our findings from Study 1 by showing that interacting with AI-generated outputs should not influence people's ascription of moral standing.

Nudging people to think about the mind of an AI system did not necessarily influence how they valued AI-generated art in Study 2. Our results instead suggest that overvaluing AI-generated art could influence how people perceive it. We hypothesize that the treatment conditions' social influence mitigated any possible effect of considerations about an AI system's mind similar to those found in Study 1. Similar to how past auctions of AI-generated art were presented to the public (Cohn, 2018; Ives, 2021), overvaluing these outputs could influence how much people value them.

7 GENERAL DISCUSSION

Inspired by Gunkel's and Coeckelbergh's social-relational approaches to robots' moral standing, we conducted two studies to understand whether a similar perspective would influence people's ascription of moral status to a nonsocial automated agent, namely an AI-generative system. We first identified a set of ten AI-generated images that were used in subsequent studies. Study 1 inquired whether interacting with these images would influence people's ascription of moral agency and patiency to their creator—as suggested by Gunkel (2018b). Study 2 asked whether highlighting an AI system's extrinsic value by undervaluing or overvaluing its images affected participants' attribution of agency, experience, and moral status, as proposed by Coeckelbergh (2020b). The current research took a novel experimental approach to the normative debate of robot rights in the context of AI-generated art.

We employed a series of measures to quantify AI systems' perceived moral (and artistic) standing. Interacting with AI-generated art did not significantly impact how participants perceived the system's ability to create art, experience art, and the experience dimension of mind in both Studies 1 and 2. The latter was measured by a mind perception questionnaire, whose measure has been shown to correlate with the recognition of moral rights (Waytz et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2007). Study 2 also showed that interacting with AI-generated art did not influence the AI system's perceived moral standing in a novel measure of moral consideration independent of the system's experience.

Study 2's participants attributed lower levels of agency to AI systems after interacting with overvalued AI-generated art. This finding suggests that seeing others overvaluing AI systems' abilities could negatively influence their perceived agency. This finding may be contrary to what one would expect. Similar to Coeckelbergh's approach to AI systems' patiency, highlighting the system's creative value by overvaluing its generated images should, at first thought, increase their perceived (artistic) agency.

Finally, Study 1 suggests that nudging participants to think about an AI systems' mind could lead to a lower appreciation of AI-generated art. A possible interpretation is that machine creativity is not valued to the same extent as its human counterparts, particularly when AI systems' lack of humanness and mind becomes apparent. As argued by some scholars, AI-generated art may lack the meaning necessary to be considered art—such meaning can only emerge from human artistic communication (Elgammal, 2020). Another possible explanation is that art is also evaluated by the effort put into its creation. More realistic images in our Experimental Setting were often attributed to human artists, while abstractions were usually viewed as AI-generated. Participants might have judged