
Linux Containers

Basic Concepts



Lucian Carata FRESCO Talklet, 3 Oct 2014

Underlying kernel mechanisms

cgroups manage resources for groups of processes

namespaces per process resource isolation


seccomp limit available system calls

capabilities limit available privileges

CRIU checkpoint/restore (with kernel support)

cgroups - user space view

low-level filesystem interface similar to sysfs (/sys) and procfs (/proc) new filesystem type "cgroup", default location in /sys/fs/cgroup




cgroups - user space view


cgroup hierarchies

/sys/fs/cgroup

TL /cpu cpu cpuacct
 /high-priority
 /normal
 /experiment_1


TL /mem memory
 /opus
 /normal
 /experiment_1








cgroups - kernel space view



cgroups - kernel space view



cgroups - kernel space view

```
include / linux / cgroup_subsys.h

cgroup_subsys

int (*attach)(...)
void (*fork)(...)
void (*exit)(...)
void (*bind)(...)


...

const char* name;
cgroupfs_root *root;
cftype *base_cftypes
```

```
cgroup_subsys cpuset_subsys
    .base_cftypes = files
```

```
1819 static struct cftype files[] = {
1820 ▶-{
1821 ▶-▶-.name = "cpus",
1822 ▶-▶-.seq show = cpuset common seq show,
1823 ▶-▶-.write string = cpuset write resmask,
1824 ▶-▶-. max write len = (100U + 6 * NR CPUS),
1825 ▶-▶-.private = FILE CPULIST,
1826 ▶-},
1827
1828 ▶-{
1829 ▶-▶-.name = "mems",
1830 ▶-▶-.seq show = cpuset common seq show,
1831 ▶-▶-.write string = cpuset write resmask,
1832 ▶-▶-. max write len = (100U + 6 * MAX NUMNODES),
1833 ▶-▶-.private = FILE MEMLIST,
1834 ▶-}.
1835
1836 ▶-{
1837 ▶-▶-.name = "cpu exclusive",
1838 ▶-▶-. read u64 = cpuset read u64,
1839 ▶-▶-.write u64 = cpuset write u64,
1840 ▶-▶-.private = FILE CPU EXCLUSIVE,
1841 ▶-}.
1842
1843 ▶-{
1844 ▶-▶-.name = "mem exclusive",
1845 ▶-▶-.read u64 = cpuset read u64,
1846 ▶-▶-.write u64 = cpuset write u64,
1847 ▶-▶-.private = FILE MEM EXCLUSIVE,
1848 ▶-},
```

cgroups - summary



namespaces - user space view

Namespaces limit the scope of kernel-side <u>names</u> and <u>data structures</u> at process granularity

```
mnt(mount points, filesystems)CLONE_NEWNSpid(processes)CLONE_NEWPIDnet(network stack)CLONE_NEWNETipc(System V IPC)CLONE_NEWIPCuts(unix timesharing - domain name, etc)CLONE_NEWUTSuser(UIDs)CLONE_NEWUSER
```

namespaces - user space view

Namespaces limit the scope of kernel-side <u>names</u> and <u>data structures</u> at process granularity

Three system calls for management

```
clone() new process, new namespace, attach process to ns
unshare() new namespace, attach current process to it
setns(int fd, int nstype) join an existing namespace
```

namespaces - user space view

- each namespace is identified by an inode (unique)
- six_(?) entries (inodes) added to /proc/<pid>/ns/
- two processes are in the same namespace if they see the same inode for equivalent namespace types (mnt, net, user, ...)

User space utilities

- * IPROUTE (ip netns add, etc)
- * unshare, nsenter (part of util-linux)
- * shadow, shadow-utils (for user ns)

namespaces - kernel space view

```
struct nsproxy *nsproxy
struct cred *cred
```

```
include / linux / nsproxy.h

nsproxy

atomic_t count
struct uts_namespace *uts_ns
struct ipc_namespace *ipc_ns
struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns
struct pid_namespace *pid_ns_for_children
struct net *net_ns

include / linux / nsproxy.h

nsproxy* task_nsproxy(struct task_struct *tsk)
```

```
include / linux / cred.h


cred

...
struct user_namespace *user_ns
```

- For each namespace type, a default namespace exists (the global namespace)
- struct nsproxy is shared by all tasks with the same set of namespaces

namespaces - kernel space view


Example for uts namespace



- global access to hostname: system_utsname.nodename
- namespace-aware access to hostname: ¤t->nsproxy->uts_ns->name->nodename

namespaces - kernel space view

Example for **net** namespace



- a network device belongs to exactly one network namespace
- a socket belongs to exactly one network namespace
- a new network namespace only includes the loopback device
- communication between namespaces using veth or unix sockets

namespaces - summary

Namespaces limit the scope of kernel-side <u>names</u> and <u>data structures</u> at process granularity

```
mnt (mount points, filesystems)
pid (processes)
net (network stack)
ipc (System V IPC)
uts (unix timesharing - domain name, etc)
user (UIDs)
```


Containers

- A light form of resource virtualization based on kernel mechanisms
- A container is a *user-space* construct
- Multiple containers run on top of the same kernel

- illusion that they are the only one using resources

(cpu, memory, disk, network)

- some implementations offer support for
 - container templates
 - deployment / migration
 - union filesystems



Container solutions

Mainline

Google containers (Imctfy)

- uses cgroups only, offers CPU & memory isolation
- no isolation for: disk I/O, network, filesystem, checkpoint/restore
- adds some cgroup files: cpu.lat, cpuacct.histogram

LXC: user-space containerisation tools

Docker

systemd-nspawn

Forks

Vserver, OpenVZ

Container solutions - LXC

An LXC container is a userspace process created with the clone() system call

- with its own pid namespace
- with its own mnt namespace
- net namespace (configurable) lxc.network.type

Offers container templates /usr/share/lxc/templates


- shell scripts
- 1xc-create -t ubuntu -n containerName
 - also creates cgroup /sys/fs/cgroup/<controller>/lxc/containerName

Container solutions - Docker

A Linux container engine

- multiple backend drivers
- application rather than machine-centric
- app build tools
- diff-based deployment of updates (AUFS)
- versioning (git-like) and reuse

- links (tunnels) between containers



taken from the Docker documentation

Questions?

Thank you!

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More details

cgroups: http://media.wix.com/ugd/295986_d73d8d6087ed430c34c21f90b0b607fd.pdf

namespaces: http://lwn.net/Articles/531114/ (and series)