

Who is a “Migrant” in the Study of Migrant Incorporation?:

Broadening Our Understanding of Migrant Populations

Yuan-Ning Chu, Hyo Won Shin, Matthew S. Winters, and Cara Wong

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Abstract

The study of migrant populations involves difficult decisions about who to include or exclude in any given piece of research. With migrant incorporation as an outcome of interest, we develop a typology of individuals comprising and associated with migrant populations. We then discuss the prevalence of these different groups across a set of five case-study countries, including ones outside North America and Europe that are not typically the focus of studies of migrant incorporation. Enumerating the categories of individuals who traditionally have been more marginalized in these studies can guide researchers toward analytically informative comparisons to help reshape our theories and improve our evaluation of integration policies.

Keywords: immigration, incorporation, diaspora, refugee, typology

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I. Introduction

The number of individuals crossing international borders has significantly increased in recent decades. Accommodating the needs of these individuals for settlement, ensuring their

well-being during migration, and maintaining harmony in the migrant-receiving societies are a few of the challenges that both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries face. Scholars and policymakers alike have devoted significant energy to understanding the difficulties these migrants confront through studies of the drivers of migration (e.g., Hugo 1996, Joly 2003, Kofman 2007, Luthra et al 2018), the consequences of different migration and integration policies (e.g., Goodman 2014, Hoehne and Michalowski 2016, Salamońska and Unterreiner 2019), and the political effects of public attitudes toward migrants (e.g., Jaskulowski et al 2019, Kuntz et al 2017, Mughan and Paxton 2006, Pérez 2015).

In these studies of international migration, the term “migrant” is used in ways that include certain groups of individuals while excluding others who may also identify with the migrant population.¹ For instance, while many scholarly works about immigration focus on individuals who have experienced international migration (i.e., “first-generation immigrants”), descendants of these individuals who are born in the migrant-receiving countries (i.e., *n*-th generation immigrants) may also encounter similar forces as those that challenged their parents and grandparents, such as racial discrimination, social exclusion, or political marginalization (see Luthra & Waldinger 2018, Portes and Zhou 1993, Tran 2019, Zhou 1997).

A growing body of literature has compared the degree to which migrants integrate in receiving countries. Researchers across the social sciences have studied the role of immigration policies, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the attainment of citizenship on migrants’ social, political, and economic participation. “Migrants” in these studies fall generally into the category of persons who have come to live permanently in a foreign country, but empirical operationalizations vary across studies. “Migrants” have been understood as any foreign-born

¹ There is no single definition of “migrant” used by international migration scholars (FitzGerald 2014). Here, we use the definition proposed by the United Nations, which defines “migrants” as “any person who changes his/her country of usual residence” (United Nations 1998).

residents (Adida 2011; Kolbe and Crepaz 2016; Koopmans 2013; Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008; Waters and Jimenez 2005; Wright and Bloemraad 2012), any non-citizens (Dixon, Bessaha, and Post 2018; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantonio 2017; Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003), or non-citizen residents who have lived in a country for less than some period of time (Goodman and Wright 2015; Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020; Neureiter 2019). These different definitions all emphasize the foreignness of migrants, but the specific criteria by which scholars identify the population being studied varies.

The literature on migrant incorporation often focuses only on permanent migration, yet a sizeable number of international migrants today are guest workers or temporary migrants. Research about immigrant integration largely overlooks temporary migrants precisely because they are transitory: the assumption is that neither these sojourners nor their host countries think that their incorporation and participation in the host society is likely or important. Temporary migrants, however, contribute to the economic health of the host society and often rival permanent immigrants in number (OECD 2019). In addition, average citizens in the host society cannot distinguish between permanent and temporary migrants: temporary migrants do not look, speak, or dress differently than permanent migrants, and nativism is not neatly parsed to apply only to those who intend to stay in the country long term. Moreover, the boundary between temporary and permanent is unclear, as many temporary migrants stay long term, even if they never officially become “permanent residents” in the host country.

The migration experience not only influences migrants themselves, but also the descendents of migrants. In some contexts, such as the Turks in Germany or the *zainichi* Koreans in Japan, the descendents of migrants have become the population “in-between,” an identifiable ethnic community with limited opportunities in the country where its members were born and raised. In such contexts, these individuals, while never having experienced

migration, are not granted citizenship at birth and, therefore, are also barred from opportunities that might facilitate their full integration into the host society.

In this manuscript, we typologize temporary migrants and members of multi-generational migrant families alongside permanent international migrants. We argue that explicitly identifying the set of individuals who share “migrant-like” characteristics helps deepen our understanding of welfare and incorporation outcomes and the level of conflict that may arise in host societies. We use five general questions that are asked from the perspective of the host government to group individuals who are associated with the migrant population into twelve groups, focusing on birthplace, citizenship, authorization, length of stay, and the basis of their status (see Figure 1). Building on the existing international migration literature, which has highlighted and categorized nascent and salient sub-groups of migrants (Petersen 1978), our typology allows us to compare similar groups across different contexts in a systematic way and stimulates theoretical questions regarding the social and political life of the migrant population.

Our typology explicitly focuses on international migrants, as we are interested in understanding how host governments’ migration and integration policies affect their well-being.² We include non-migrants (e.g., second- and third-generation migrants born in the host country) into our population of interest as they, too, are affected by government migration policies.³ In countries without *jus soli*, descendants of non-naturalized migrants are likely born as non-citizens and, as a result, will also be influenced by the same policies that impact incorporation decisions and the quality of life of people who recently migrated. In *jus soli*

² That is, the scope of this paper does not include domestic migrants or internally displaced persons (IDPs).

³ We use the term “migrant” for those who have had the experience of international migration and “non-migrants” for those who have not. We include both in the migrant-connected population (for which we use the term “migrant population” interchangeably because the former is a bit unwieldy).

contexts, migration policies also are likely to show effects beyond the first generation, even among the non-migrant citizen population.

Through the application of our typology to a set of five case-study countries, we expand the range of countries that are typically included in studies of immigrant integration. The contextual scope of existing research is usually limited to migrants in more developed countries, mostly the United States and European countries. These studies advance our understanding of specific groups of migrants in these countries, often stratified by their countries of origins (see, for example, Bean et al. 2006; Bevelander & Vennman 2006; Phalet & Swyngedouw 2003). By focusing on these contexts, however, we are limiting our understanding of migration to observations that we can make based on groups that are present in large numbers in these particular types of countries.

With increasing international migration flows outside of North America and Europe, the question of identifying who should be included in the population being studied in scholarship on incorporation becomes critical. Our understanding of migrants and related outcomes may be biased toward European and North American models of settlement and towards patterns of migrant responses to the policies found in those countries. While existing immigration studies provide important knowledge, it is sometimes unclear whether the experiences of the groups being studied should be seen as unique, whether their particular situations derive from the context in which they reside, and how well we can generalize from the causes and consequences of their experiences of migration. By examining migrants in other parts of the world, we can rethink existing assumptions and theories of migration and integration that may be artifacts of the cases commonly chosen for study. Looking at migration in other parts of the world may also highlight groups that are small or nonexistent (and therefore ignored) in North America and Europe. We use the typology to draw attention to groups that have been overlooked in the migration literature due to their invisibility in the host society

(e.g., because of small group size, lack of legal status, or limited duration of stay). By focusing on immigrant integration beyond the “usual suspects,” we are forced to confront the question of who counts as a “migrant” in migrant incorporation. By shedding light on previously overlooked but now growing subgroups of the migrant population, we provide a structure for new comparisons that can challenge conventional understandings of immigration, citizenship, and national belonging.

The article is organized as follows: the next section presents a broad typology of the various groups in migrant populations across contexts. Then we give examples of these groups across five countries: Brazil, Germany, Japan, Thailand, and the United States. In the final section, we use the categorization of migrant groups to highlight avenues for studying three research questions.

II. A General Typology of Migrant and Migrant-Connected Populations

To have a more comprehensive understanding of migrant populations across different contexts, we develop a classification tree that uses five questions to categorize individuals into 12 groups. The five questions separate (a) foreign-born individuals from native-born individuals, (b) citizens from non-citizens, (c) individuals with and without a legal right to stay (including refugees and asylum seekers), (d) individuals, among those with a right to stay, who have the right to stay permanently versus only temporarily, as well as (e) migrants with different skill levels. Through these five criteria, we hope to categorize every relevant migrant and non-migrant individual across different contexts, including countries with and without birthright citizenship, countries that allow or do not allow dual citizenship, countries that rely on a large but transitory workforce, and countries with post-colonial migrants. Our framework allows for effective comparisons of migrant groups across different countries, helping scholars understand -- for any given screening criteria for a study -- who is being included and who is being left out.

A Host Government's Perspective

We approach the five criteria that we use in the classification tree from the host government's perspective. Instead of relying on potentially changing understandings that originate from the migrants themselves, we treat the host government's perspective as a more reliable – albeit not necessarily more accurate – measure of the migrants' situations *at the moment of study*. For instance, imagine an individual who enters the United States with an F-1 visa as an international student. This student may plan to find a job and apply for permanent residency upon graduation, but we are not sure whether things will go as planned. If we ask the student about their intention to stay, they could self-identify as a permanent migrant, even if objectively they do not yet have permanent status. Focusing on the perspective of migrant-hosting governments allows us to operationalize individual transitions between categories over time, while also facilitating classification using administrative data.

For a given individual who is part of a migrant population, we proceed through a series of classification questions represented in Figure 1. We first ask whether the person was born in the country where they now live. This is to ensure that we can pay attention to both native-born and foreign-born individuals who are part of the migrant population. Scholarly work in the U.S. context or any other context with birthright citizenship has focused on foreign-born migrants and typically refers to their native-born descendants as “*n*-th generation immigrants” despite the fact that they never personally migrated (Kasinitz et al. 2004, 2009; Levitt and Waters 2002).⁴ Furthermore, many countries around the world do not grant citizenship to all individuals born in the country, thus creating a group of native-born foreign residents. The well-being of native-born migrant offspring, in both countries with and without birthright

⁴ Studies about immigrant assimilation in the U.S. context, for instance, have emphasized the patterns of assimilation among different groups of immigrants across multiple generations (e.g., Gordon 1964; Alba & Nee 2003).

citizenship, is connected to their parents' migration experience and the integration policies where they live.

The second question asks whether the individual is a citizen of the country where they live. If an individual is a non-citizen, we then ask whether they are authorized to live in the country in which they reside. In many contexts, this means holding a visa granting legal recognition of the individual's presence in the country. The category of authorized migrants also includes refugees and asylum seekers protected by international law. Having a right to be in a country often offers more access to resources provided by the host government, such as social welfare benefits and medical care, and also offers freedom from worries of being deported with little or no warning.

If an individual is authorized to stay in the host country, we want to know if they can stay permanently. Research has shown that length of residency in a country is positively correlated to different measures of migrant integration (Cho 1999; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Yang 1994).

Finally, if an individual is an authorized migrant who can only stay temporarily in their country of residence, we are interested in their skill-level as workers. Temporary migrants not only make up a significant proportion of migrants overall, but they are also part of a group that often is the target of anti-immigrant sentiment or else are connected to mixed status families (as they may be parents of individuals who are citizens by virtue of birthright citizenship). Skill level is often how governments distinguish between migrants, with high-skilled migrants given superior treatment relative to low-skilled or non-working temporary migrants. We end up with 12 different migrant groups, which we describe in more detail next.

First Criterion: Place of Birth

Migrants

A migrant refers to “any person who changes his/her country of usual residence” (United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration Revision 1 1998). In this paper, we focus on international migrants as we are interested in examining the conditions under which non-native foreigners (and associated populations) are able to settle into the host society and how the host government’s migration and integration policies affect them.⁵

Non-Migrants

We define non-migrants as individuals whose parents or grandparents were migrants but who were themselves born in the host country (i.e., second- or third-generation immigrants). The number of generations for which a non-migrant continues to be connected to the migrant population will vary by context. In some places, a second-generation immigrant may feel much more connected to the “native” population than to the migrant population, whereas in other places, a third-generation non-migrant may nonetheless be more closely connected -- residentially and emotionally -- to members of the migrant community than to the broader national community.⁶

⁵ According to the IOM World Migration Report 2020, there were an estimated 740 million internal migrants across the world in 2009. This is almost three times the number of international migrants, but international migration has been increasing both numerically and proportionally more rapidly than what researchers had previously anticipated. While internally displaced migrants face similar issues of integrating into new communities, we focus on how government policies affect migrants who are considered foreigners, who arrive in a locale without citizenship or rights that come with membership in the national community.

⁶ When we refer to the “native” population, we mean residents whose ancestry dates back multiple generations in the host country. We drop the quotation marks, although authors at times use “native” to refer broadly to members of the ethnic majority group in a country..

Second Criterion: Citizenship Status

Migrant Citizens (Group 1)

Migrant citizens are non-natives who have moved from abroad and have been granted citizenship status by the host country government. These migrants naturalized after having lived in the host country for a certain period of time, and they usually enjoy the same set of rights and privileges as native citizens of the host country. Belonging to this group is often seen as the goal for incorporation. Naturalized migrants in Switzerland, for instance, have shown greater likelihood of long-term political participation compared to non-naturalized migrants (Hainmueller et al. 2015).

Non-Migrant Citizens (Group 2)

Non-migrant citizens are individuals who were born in the host country and were granted citizenship status, either at birth or later in life. Non-migrant citizens typically enjoy the same rights and privileges as native citizens. Contrary to expectations that non-migrant citizens will fare better than migrants in the host society, studies show that individuals in this category can have a difficult time prospering in the host society despite having the same access to rights and privileges as other natives (Silberman et al. 2007; Simon 2018). Examples of non-migrant citizens previously studied in the literature are French-born children of migrants from Algeria, Turkey, Morocco, and Portugal (Silberman et al. 2007; Simon 2018), U.S.-born Arab immigrants from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and other Middle Eastern countries (Wray-Lake et al 2008), and Latino and Asian American young adults in New York and California (Junn and Masuoka, 2008). Low levels of social, political, and economic participation among this group have been thought to result from a lack of opportunities due to different socialization experiences and discrimination on the part of the host society.

Third Criterion: Unauthorized Status

Unauthorized Migrants (Group 3)

Within the category of unauthorized migrants, we include individuals who have either crossed international borders without documents or who have overstayed their visas and are no longer legally allowed to reside in the host country. Common examples in this category are Global South migrants who enter the United States or Europe in search of employment. Unauthorized migrants are not formally recognized by the host country government and therefore cannot enjoy the rights and privileges granted to other groups of migrants and non-migrants; many face a constant threat of deportation. However, because many unauthorized migrants participate in economic or social activities, they nevertheless affect the host country's economy or society (Donato and Armenta 2011). Some of these individuals will live out the majority of their adult lives in the host country under their unofficial status, or else may at some point be offered legal status through policy change. Unauthorized migrants are also the most common target of anti-immigrant sentiment and nativism expressed by host societies, right-wing political parties, and populist elites.

Unauthorized Non-Migrants (Group 4)

Unauthorized non-migrants are individuals born in and residing in the host country but who lack proper documents. These non-migrants include children of unauthorized migrant parents, who were born in a host country without a birthright citizenship policy. Ethnic Vietnamese born in Cambodia or ethnic Burmese born in Thailand, groups who are regarded as stateless by the host governments, would fit into this category. Without documents authorizing their stay, they are greatly marginalized by the host country government. Like the previous group, however, they also take part in economic and social activities and therefore can have a significant impact on the host country's economy and society.

Fourth Criterion: Authorization to Stay

In the next level of the classification tree, we group authorized migrants and non-migrants according to whether their status permits them to stay in the country permanently or temporarily.

Permanent Migrants (Group 5)

Permanent migrants are allowed to reside in the host country for an indefinite period of time. They usually are granted extensive rights and privileges, and many have gained this status via family reunification laws, which provide additional social network benefits. These migrants' experiences, therefore, may be more similar to the migrant citizens' experiences than to those of the temporary or unauthorized migrants or non-migrant groups; they would likely fare better in terms of their integration into the host society.

Permanent Non-Migrants (Group 6)

Permanent non-migrants are born in a host country without a birthright citizenship policy but have permanent status. Like the previous group, they are also granted extensive rights and privileges compared to temporary migrants and non-migrants. An example of permanent non-migrants are the *zainichi Koreans*, who hold permanent residency status in Japan. Permanent non-migrants may help us understand the well-being of migrants in the host society because members of this group are possibly integrated in one dimension (e.g., linguistic or economic) but marginalized in another (e.g., political or social).

Temporary Non-Migrants (Group 7)

The category of temporary non-migrants includes offspring of migrants born in a host country without a birthright citizenship policy who have a temporary visa status. Unlike permanent non-migrants, temporary non-migrants are allowed to reside in the host country for a limited period of time. Once their residence term ends, they must seek a way to extend their visa, leave the host country, or else enter unauthorized status. Examples of temporary non-migrants include children of temporary migrant workers. This group of non-migrants should also be considered as part of the migrant community because their well-being may be strongly influenced by their migrant parents' well-being and the host country's immigration policies.

Asylum-Seeking Non-Migrants (Group 8)

Asylum-seeking non-migrants refer to children of asylum seekers who were born in a host country without birthright citizenship. The offspring of asylum seekers would still be labeled as asylum seekers if their parents have yet to be granted refugee status by the host country government. We include asylum seekers -- both parents and their children -- as part of the migrant population, as their well-being is of concern for host country governments and to natives residing near refugee camps or refugee communities. Asylum seekers and refugees are not typically included in the study of immigrant integration, as scholars deem them to be distinct from migrants in terms of the push-and-pull factors to which they are subject and the policies governing them (FitzGerald and Arar 2018). We have included them in the categorization tree, however, as the study of refugees can inform our understanding of immigrant integration, particularly with regard to public perceptions of this incorporation.

Fifth Criterion: Skill Level of Temporary Migrants

Temporary migrants are individuals granted short-term visas or work permits by the host-country government. These migrants can enjoy a limited set of rights and privileges, but this will vary by country and skill status. We divide temporary migrants into four groups: temporary high-skilled migrant workers, temporary low-skilled migrant workers, temporary non-working migrants, and asylum-seeking migrants.

Temporary High-Skilled Migrant Workers (Group 9)

Temporary high-skilled migrant workers have been granted entry into the host country based on their training and expertise (e.g., computer programmers working in the United States under H1-B visas). What constitutes a “high-skilled” migrant may differ from country to country, but according to the United Nations, high-skilled migrant workers “generally include highly qualified workers with post-secondary technical or professional education or job experience, especially with qualifications or skills in demand in the host country” (United Nations 2018, p. 13). This group of migrants differs from other temporary migrant groups, as they are usually given preferential treatment by the government, including greater work freedom (e.g., they can switch employment to hold jobs in other economic sectors), longer visa periods, easier access to permanent residency, fewer work limitations for spouses, and priority on entry and residence procedures. Their circumstances provide better prospects for settling down and integrating with the host society.

Temporary Low-Skilled Migrant Workers (Group 10)

Temporary low-skilled migrant workers, according to the United Nations, are those “with lower skills or lower levels of educational attainment.” They are easily replaceable and are typically granted a limited set of rights and privileges in a host country, including shorter-

stay visas and very limited work freedom. This group is often of interest to those studying the economic effects of remittances that migrants send back to their homeland (see Dustmann and Mestres 2010; Rahman and Fee 2012; Sana and Massey 2005). Furthermore, this group is relevant for the study of anti-immigrant attitudes and behaviors, as it tends to be the target of blame for low employment levels (Alesina et. al. 2018, Goldstein and Peters 2014, Gorodzeisky 2011, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Kunovich 2013), high tax rates (Citrin et al 1997, Meseguer and Kemmerling 2018), public health threats (Huang et. al. 2011, Navarrete et al 2007, Yamagata et al 2020), and social instability (Brader et. al. 2008, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018, Harell et. al. 2017). Nevertheless, they are rarely included in studies of immigrant incorporation.

Temporary Non-Working Migrants (Group 11)

Another group of temporary migrants are individuals residing in the host country for non-working purposes. This group includes spouses or family members of temporary migrants, as well as foreign retirees (also known as *lifestyle migrants* (Weidinger and Kordel 2015)). For example, retirees from Western Europe and Northeast Asia flock to Southeast Asian countries on short-term visas to spend their post-retirement days in warmer climates. Temporary non-working migrants are granted limited rights and privileges by host governments, including strict restrictions on working and shorter-stay visas. Although this group of migrants does not participate in the economic sector, they are relevant when thinking about the impact of migrants on social sectors like education, religion, and healthcare.

Asylum-Seeking Migrants (Group 12)

Lastly, asylum-seeking migrants are individuals who have “left their country of origin, have applied for recognition as a refugee in another country, and are awaiting a decision on

their application” (UNHCR 2017, p. 4). Asylum-seeking migrants have yet to be granted refugee status by the host country government. As a result, while they may be allowed to reside in the country, the rights and privileges they are able to enjoy are limited in comparison to those granted refugee status. For example, asylum seekers in most countries are not allowed to work or even volunteer. These migrants may also be barred from proper healthcare, including medical and psychological treatment.

III. Case Studies: Brazil, Germany, Japan, Thailand, and the U.S.

In order to provide concrete examples of the groups enumerated in the previous section, we present the distribution of migrants and non-migrant members of the migrant population for each of the groups identified above within a set of five countries chosen to show a range of migration histories and policies: Brazil, Germany, Japan, Thailand, and the United States. Germany and the United States are the world’s most popular immigration destinations and are home to many *nth*-generation non-migrants. In Brazil, Japan, and Thailand, a panoply of migrant and non-migrant groups belong to categories described above. In the case of Brazil, its post-colonial relationship with Portugal has attracted migrants from Portugal to work and settle in the country. Furthermore, the country has been a popular destination for economic migrants from Bolivia and Paraguay and for Venezuelan asylum-seekers and refugees. Japan is home to many members of the Korean and Chinese diasporas, a product, in part, of Japanese colonialism in East Asia. Japan is also a popular destination for labor migrants from Northeast and Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as the country struggles to strike a balance between a labor shortage due to its aging population and its ideal of an ethnically homogenous nation. Lastly, Thailand, due to its relatively rapid economic development, has attracted an influx of high-skilled “expats” from the East Asian region and low-skilled workers from bordering

countries. Furthermore, the political instability of bordering countries (specifically, Myanmar and Cambodia) has led to many individuals seeking asylum or refuge in Thailand.

Table 1 displays the distribution of migrant and non-migrant groups within each of the five countries. Seeing the distribution of individuals across group types helps us make three points. First, we can confirm the existence of groups identified above across different countries, even if some of groups have been largely ignored in previous research on incorporation. Second, we show the challenges to understanding migrants and non-migrants across countries, since governments tend to categorize these groups in dramatically different ways, which hinders easy comparisons. This also motivates us to promote a more consistent framework to examine migrants and associated non-migrant populations cross-nationally. Third, locating the different migrant and non-migrant groups in these countries gives us the opportunity to reconsider existing theories about immigration policies, anti-immigrant sentiment, or participation in the receiving society by members of the migrant community, since new comparisons are possible when we study all 12 groups in our conceptual tree. The tree serves as a useful guide for pointing out different migrant groups that have previously been ignored or conflated with other migrant categories in academic scholarship or government accounting.

To illustrate how different groups in these five countries fit into the categories described above, we selectively introduce a pair of prominent examples for each of the five countries. Studies of these groups in various contexts tend to be dispersed across different fields of study that do not always speak to each other, from anthropology to sociology to political science to diaspora studies. We aim to facilitate a conversation across these different literatures about how best to understand these potentially diverse migrant communities. The examples of migrant groups have been chosen on the basis of their relevance in the existing literature and their salience in policy debates in the host countries.

Brazil

Temporary, High-Skilled Migrants: Portuguese Migrants

Following the 2008 economic crisis, thousands of Portuguese migrated to Brazil in search of a better life. In recent years, the numbers have decreased due to rising political and economic instability in Brazil (Rosales and Machado 2019). A majority of these migrants are temporary, high-skilled migrants working in various sectors, including art, architecture, engineering, business, and finance (*ibid*). The Portuguese in Brazil, compared to high-skilled migrants in many other contexts, have the advantage of being able to adjust quickly to life in Brazil: they speak the national language and share similar cultural traits, a consequence of Brazil's colonization by the Portuguese empire. Despite these similarities, however, few Portuguese intend to permanently settle in Brazil. According to surveys conducted by Rosales and Machado (2019), Portuguese migrants living in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have no intentions of giving up their Portuguese citizenship and acquiring Brazilian citizenship. Furthermore, a majority of the respondents were planning on either returning to Portugal or eventually migrating to a new destination like the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, or Australia. This reluctance to naturalize (and perhaps integrate more generally) resembles that of Japanese temporary high-skilled workers in Thailand, for example, yet stands in stark contrast to similar culturally-integrated migrants in the United States, for whom permanent residency and citizenship is often their end goal.

Asylum Seeking Migrants: Venezuelan Migrants

In the aftermath of Venezuela's political and economic crisis, almost 900,000 Venezuelans crossed the border into Brazil and around 264,000 applied for asylum in 2018. Since then, the Brazilian government has granted asylum to over 21,000 Venezuelans and the number of asylum claims continues to grow (IOM and UNHCR 2019).

Brazil ranks number two (after Peru) as a destination for those fleeing Venezuela, perhaps because of its geographical proximity and benevolent migration policies. The Brazilian government has relocated Venezuelans from strained border areas in the north to other cities with better integration opportunities, such as São Paulo and Brasília. Furthermore, migrants in Brazil, once registered, are immediately allowed to work, and the Brazilian government, in collaboration with private companies, the UNHCR, and local partners, has worked to provide access to labor markets for Venezuelan refugees and migrants (Pachioni and Hugueney 2018). Registered refugees will be entitled to permanent resident status and have access to employment, public health care, education and other social services available to native Brazilians. The case of *asylum seekers* in Brazil can provide insight into the role of states in “shaping the flows and life chances of mobile persons” and serves as a valuable case for understanding the effects of different policies in the process of immigrant integration (FitzGerald and Arar 2018).

Germany

Permanent Non-Migrants: The Turkish Migrant Population

Turkish migrants came to Germany as temporary guest workers and asylum seekers during the post-war period (Chapin 1996). Many of them entered as temporary guest workers, but the Foreigners Act of 1965 allowed non-European workers to stay, contingent on “the interests of the Federal Republic” (*ibid.*, p. 280). The Act opened the door for long-term residence and access to the labor market, and many Turkish workers stayed and created transnational communities in German cities with a hybrid identity, dedicated advocacy groups and organizations, and strong contacts with Turkey (Mandel 2008). Some of them have been in the country for several generations, but before the 2000 revision of the German Nationality Law that made the country a hybrid system with both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, many of them

refrained from exploring naturalization (Chapin 1996). Germany also restricts dual citizenship and requires renunciation of foreign citizenship before applying for naturalization, making the acquisition of German citizenship a more challenging task compared to the acquisition of citizenship in other European countries. In 2019, Germany had the largest non-national population in Europe, and Turkish citizens constituted the largest proportion of that population (Statistical Office of the European Communities 2020, p. 10-13).

The permanent non-migrant Turkish population in Germany shares similar challenges with Turkish migrants: they show lower proficiency in German, suffer from poverty and unemployment, encounter high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, feel a sense of rejection from German society, and are reluctant to identify as Germans (Chapin 1996; Mandel 2008). They are not categorized as “migrants” by the U.N. definition, but it is undeniable that they are a part of the migrant population in Germany and that questions of integration also pertain to them. They may face similar challenges as other groups within the same category, such as the Korean diaspora in Japan.

Temporary High-Skilled Migrants: Intra-EU Migrants in Germany

Germany has been one of the main destination countries for EU-28 migrants, and the number of migrants from other EU countries to Germany has been increasing rapidly relative to other destination countries since 2016 (European Commission 2018, p. 25). These EU migrants, mostly from Poland, Italy, and Romania, constituted 46% of the foreign population in Germany (*ibid*, p. 26). Although they can become permanent residents after living in the country for five years as EU citizens, they remain temporary migrants from the German government’s perspective until they fulfill the residency criteria. A large majority of these temporary migrants from other EU countries are medium to high-skill workers (*ibid*, p. 63).

According to the EU in 2017, these intra-EU migrants are highly integrated economically. Nevertheless, many of these migrants were challenged by the language barrier after migration and reported that a lack of language proficiency was a greater obstacle to integrating into the host society than other social background characteristics, such as differences in religion (*ibid*, p. 15). As EU citizens, these temporary migrants' right to mobility allows them to re-migrate to another country within the European Union. Their potential mobility -- much like the Portuguese temporary workers in Brazil -- may alter their intent to stay and, consequently, their patterns of integration and incorporation.

Japan

Permanent Non-Migrants: Zainichi Koreans

The early waves of migration from Korea to Japan can be traced back to the Japanese colonial period between the 1910s and 1940s (Ryang 2009). Following WWII, many Koreans abroad chose not to return, becoming foreign residents in Japan (Ryang and Lie 2009, 3). They became part of the Korean diaspora -- *zainichi* Koreans -- a national group that lives outside of an imagined homeland (Faist 2010, p. 12). There are slightly fewer than 600,000 *zainichi* Koreans, who have been in Japan for multiple generations (Ryang & Lie, p. 3). Most of them are highly socially incorporated into Japanese society and can "pass" as Japanese in society (Lie 2009). They were born and raised in Japan and have largely lost ties with their extended family back in their homeland.

We classify *zainichi* Koreans who remain non-citizens as *permanent non-migrants*. Being born in Japan does not grant them citizenship, since Japan is governed by *jus sanguinis*. This classification allows us to make comparisons with other groups that have chosen to eschew naturalization despite meeting its requirements. Nevertheless, some Turks in Germany and

some *Zainichi* Koreans have naturalized, becoming non-migrant citizens in their respective countries.

Permanent Migrants: Japanese Returnees (Nikkeijin)

The Japanese government encouraged emigration to South America as a measure to deal with famine and overpopulation from the late 1890s to the early 1960s (Takenaka 2004, p. 78; Tsuda 2003, p. 55-56). Near the end of the 20th century, however, the direction of migration was reversed; increasing demand for low-skilled labor intersected with the national ideology of ethnic purity in Japan, and the Japanese government developed a policy to grant three years of unlimited access to the labor market for people of Japanese ancestry (*nikkeijin*) and their families starting from 1990 (Yamanaka 1993, p. 76; Yamanaka 1996, p. 75-77). Push factors in Brazil and Peru, combined with pull factors in Japan, stimulated an influx of *nikkeijin* from Brazil and Peru. The Revised Immigration Law also established a new visa category of “long-term resident” for the *nikkeijin* who have a Japanese parent or grandparent. And like their ancestors – but in the opposite direction – they arrived in Japan as short-term sojourners, transformed to long-term foreign residents.⁷

These co-ethnic returnees are categorized as *permanent migrants* - foreign-born, non-citizen migrants who had the experience of international migration but who have the right to stay in Japan permanently. In some ways the *nikkeijin* are like the ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) who migrated to Germany after WWII: the migrants have the same ethnicity as the host society, yet their social integration is difficult nevertheless.

Thailand

⁷ A lot of the *nikkeijin* do not have Japanese nationality since the citizenship policies in Japan required all parents to register foreign-born children at a Japanese Embassy or Consulate within fourteen days after birth (Yamanaka 1996, p. 74). Such a requirement was difficult for families in rural areas, and many children lost their Japanese citizenship permanently.

Temporary, High-Skilled Migrants: Japanese Expatriates

According to Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of 2018, Thailand has the fourth largest number of Japanese expatriates in the world after the United States, China, and Australia (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018, 14). Japanese migrants make up the largest group of expatriates in Thailand with a population of 72,754 in 2018 (Embassy of Japan in Thailand 2018). The majority of these Japanese migrants reside in Bangkok, have lived there for several decades, and work jobs that require high-skilled expertise (ADBI/OECD/ILO 2018).

Among the long-term stayers, many are eligible for naturalization, since Thailand's Nationality Act only requires a five-year residence. Many Japanese migrants and non-migrants, however, choose not to apply for citizenship. To apply for Thai citizenship, Japanese migrants would have to forfeit their Japanese citizenship, which may come with high costs connected to their identity and social, economic, and political benefits. The large, well-established Japanese community in Thailand may also act as a barrier to further integration into the host society and instead reinforce migrants' Japanese identity and desires to one day return to their homeland. The Japanese migrant population in Thailand challenges the common assumption that long-term residents want to permanently incorporate into their host country. In this aspect, Japanese migrants in Thailand are comparable to the high-skilled Portuguese migrants in Brazil.

Unauthorized Migrants and Non-Migrants: Stateless People on the Border

Near the Thai-Myanmar border, there is a sizable community of stateless individuals who have fled Myanmar to escape ethnic conflict and political repression. Although their exact number in Thailand is unknown, it is estimated to be around half a million (Cheva-Isarakul 2020). These *unauthorized migrants* and *non-migrants* (i.e., children of stateless migrants born in Thailand) are considered stateless because they are not recognized by either their country of origin or their host country. The lack of recognition from both governments makes them a vulnerable population with limited social, economic, and political rights. These limitations put

them at a greater risk of exploitation and trafficking (Rijken et al. 2015). To strive for a better life, many of the stateless individuals have applied for legal status in the country, but have met with limited success (Jedsadachaiyut and Al-jasem 2016). A wide array of documents -- including birth certificates, parents' identity papers, and the village head's testament that the individual is a member of the community -- is required for even temporary residency, and stateless individuals who often hurriedly escaped their country of origin are unlikely to have these documents at hand. Also, in contrast to unauthorized migrants in many other countries, they are residentially segregated in camps with limited access to basic human rights, including the right to movement and property ownership, and therefore are quite distinct from authorized migrants.

The United States

Non-Migrant Citizens: N-th Generation Immigrants

The most prominent theories of 'assimilation' derive from multigenerational studies of the migrant population in the U.S. context (see Alba and Nee 2003, Portes 1997, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Portes and Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997). By 'assimilation,' scholars usually mean the extent to which the boundaries between 'migrants' and native-born citizens with only distant migrant ancestors have become indistinguishable or the extent to which the norms, values, and behaviors of the two populations converge. The scholarly consensus is that the longer migrants stay in a country, the better integrated they become, although there may be some variation across different racial/ethnic groups (Alba and Nee 2003, Portes and Zhou 1993). Scholars also expect the descendants of migrants to be more incorporated compared to their ancestors, since they have spent more time in the country than their ancestors did and are born nationals.

These studies draw from the U.S. context with emphasis on the descendants of migrants, who are categorized as non-migrant citizens: they were born in the country, never

experienced international migration, and – since the U.S. has birthright citizenship – are automatically American citizens. Comparing *non-migrant citizens* in the U.S. and in Japan (e.g., *zainichi* Koreans who naturalized) can provide insights into how the host society's ethnic composition and naturalization process affect integration, including how important the conscious choice to naturalize affects incorporation.

Unauthorized Migrants: DACA Recipients and 'DREAMers'

The United States is estimated to have more than one million youth who arrived without legal authorization at very young ages (Batalova, Blizzard, and Bolter 2019). The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM) bill would have offered them a pathway to citizenship, and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program that started in 2012 granted them access to relief from deportation, renewable work permits, and temporary social security numbers (Gonzales et al. 2014). In our tree, the DREAMers are categorized as *unauthorized migrants*, and while populations of this type are found in countries around the world, rarely do they become the focus of incorporation policies like DACA.

III. Addressing Migration Research Questions through the Study of Diverse Migrant Populations

The categorization tree presented above aims to help us rethink and extend existing theories about migrant incorporation. In this section, we highlight how comparisons driven by this classification exercise might inform the study of three broad questions on migration and migrant incorporation: To what extent do temporary migrants integrate into a host society? Does dual citizenship facilitate or hinder integration? And, how does integration of citizen and non-citizen non-migrants compare?

Temporary Migrants: The Largely Ignored Migrant Population

Due to their short-term status, temporary migrants are often overlooked in studies of migrant incorporation. Contrary to the expectation that they are not motivated to integrate into society given their lack of permanence, temporary migrants often learn the local language and necessary skills to navigate that society (see Samuk 2019, Kindler and Szulecka 2013). Over their short periods of stay, temporary migrants can adjust to life in their host country, interact with their native neighbors and co-workers to develop social networks, and apply to remain in the country for a longer period of time. In doing so, they might continue as temporary migrants indefinitely, or they might also change categories and become permanent residents (see Nagy 2012 for the case of Japan, Khoo et. al. 2008 for the case of Australia) or unauthorized migrants (see Bean et. al. 2013 for the case of the United States). Moreover, the temporary nature of their stays in the host country challenges our understanding of the term integration: what counts as the “starting point” of integration? Is it when migrants arrive in the host country, when they are allowed to stay permanently, or both? Can we use the same approach to measure levels of integration for temporary and non-temporary migrants (see Désilets 2020, Luthra et. al. 2018, Hennebry 2012 for more discussion)?

Studying the integration of temporary migrants could help scholars rethink the role of the host government in the process of migrant integration (see Gross 2017). Scholars have debated the effectiveness of migrant integration policies in Europe and examined their effects on long-term migrants (e.g., Hebling et al. 2020, Helbling et al. 2016, Neureiter 2019, Goodman and Wright 2015). Temporary migrants might provide a useful comparison case for such studies: they have experienced similar processes of relocation but are less likely to have participated in integration programming and usually do not have the same rights and benefits in the host country as permanent migrant groups (see Horgan and Liinamaa 2017 for the case of seasonal agricultural workers in Canada). The extent to which temporary migrants integrate

into host society likely would be different from that of permanent residents (Hennebry 2012). Using the temporary migrants as a comparison to evaluate the effects of integration policies aimed at permanent migrants -- matching on arrival and skill levels, for instance -- we can better understand the impact of rights and programming oriented toward different migrant groups in terms of their incorporation into the host society.

Considering temporary migrants in studies of migrant integration can also help us gain a fuller understanding of intergroup relations and potential conflicts between the migrant population and the host society. Given that temporary migrants are often in more vulnerable positions, does their participation in the host society stimulate or ameliorate discrimination? Also, the host society may react to migrants -- temporary or permanent -- in the same way because they do not know or see the distinction. In short, temporary migrants should be the focus of greater scrutiny because of their numbers (relative to permanent residents), their possible shifts into other categories, and their salience in the public eye.

Dual Citizenship as a Means of Migrant Integration?

When thinking about ways to encourage integration among migrant populations, some scholars advocate dual citizenship as a potential solution. Studies on the effects of dual citizenship find positive effects on migrants' rate of naturalization and their employment and wage levels, and researchers therefore argue that dual citizenship facilitates migrants' participation in host societies (Jones-Correa 2018; Mazzolari 2009). Dual citizenship laws could encourage naturalization, especially when the majority of migrants who are eligible have remained foreign residents (Le et al. 2019), muting their voices in the host country's political system and stalling their incorporation.

Nevertheless, most studies about the relationship between dual citizenship and migrant integration have focused on first-generation migrants in Western contexts, where many

countries are governed by *jus soli*. Dual citizenship decreases the cost for migrants to acquire citizenship in another country, since they do not have to renounce their original nationality. However, questions about the impact of dual citizenship are not limited to first-generation migrants; non-migrants in *jus sanguinis* countries are born non-citizens if their parents or grandparents have chosen not to naturalize or are not able to do so. In other words, the availability of dual citizenship affects non-citizen non-migrants, too, since they also face the decision to naturalize or not. Comparisons of different migrant and non-migrant groups within and across countries governed by *jus sanguinis* can provide a fuller picture of whether and how dual citizenship facilitates migrant integration.

When facing the decision to naturalize in another country, do migrants and non-migrants make the decision in similar ways? Migrants who crossed an international border generally have a stronger connection or attachment to their home country compared to non-migrants who were born elsewhere; therefore, the option to retain their original nationality may be more important for migrants compared to non-migrants. If this is the case, when given the opportunity to keep their original citizenship, would migrants be more likely to naturalize compared to non-migrants, *ceteris paribus*? Non-citizen non-migrants, however, have been socialized in their country of residence, so would they be more eager to become citizens of their host country? Following this logic, for whom would dual citizenship be more effective to encourage integration – migrants or non-migrants?

Assimilation/Acculturation Across Generations: Comparison of Citizen and Non-Citizen Non-Migrants

A debate exists about the effect of citizenship on migrant integration. With a more structured understanding of the migrant population, there are at least two sets of comparisons we can make to think about the relationship between citizenship and migrant integration. First,

we can compare levels of integration between migrant citizens and non-migrant citizens in countries governed by *jus soli*. Both groups are citizens in their country of residence, but they acquired citizenship at different stages in their lives: migrant citizens went through an oftentimes arduous process, whereas non-migrant citizens obtained citizenship at birth and without conscious effort. While there are other differences between the two groups, comparing the levels of integration between them should still help us understand how the timing of citizenship affects integration, especially if individuals of similar ages, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status are compared.

Second, because socialization as well as timing of citizenship varies between migrant and non-migrant citizens, we can also examine different non-migrant groups in countries governed by *jus soli* and others governed only by *jus sanguinis*. Whereas non-migrants in countries with birthright citizenship are automatically citizens, those in countries governed by *jus sanguinis* need to apply for naturalization to become citizens. Would non-migrants in countries governed by *jus soli* be more integrated simply because they had been born citizens and had never been considered -- at least legally -- outsiders? Alternatively, would non-migrants in countries *without* birthright citizenship be more motivated to integrate if they had to go through the process of naturalization? Would their sense of national identity be greater because it had been the result of a conscious choice? For both cases, though, the non-migrants would have been socialized since birth in their country of residence.

Another way to think about the issue of birthright citizenship using the categorization tree is to consider the acquisition of citizenship and the desire to obtain citizenship as predictors of integration. Research has shown that citizenship is a catalyst for migrants' social and political participation in the host country (Hainmueller et al. 2015, 2017), and therefore how much migrants would want to acquire citizenship and the factors affecting such desire should also be crucial to understanding the wellbeing of migrants. More specifically, are there

differences between migrant and non-migrant citizens who have naturalized (in countries not governed by *jus soli*) in terms of their motivation to participate in the host society? Or, for non-migrants who were granted citizenship at birth, how do they think about their membership in their country, and are their perceptions of discrimination greater than those non-migrants who began as “outsiders” and had to apply to gain equal legal status as citizens?

It is also noteworthy that there are groups of eligible migrants and non-migrants who choose to forgo the chance to obtain citizenship in countries where they live. Not all migrants are interested in the idea of acquiring host-country citizenship, as seen in the cases of Portuguese migrants in Brazil, the *zainichi* Koreans in Japan, and the Japanese workers in Thailand. By comparing across cases, we can have a better understanding of the conditions under which people choose to accept the host country identity and when they refuse to do so. Acquiring citizenship has been considered one of the most important indicators of incorporation, but what does it mean if members of the migrant population simply are not interested in naturalizing despite scoring high on all other indicators of integration?

IV. Conclusion

For scholars of migrant incorporation, deciding who is to be studied can be a challenge, given (1) that heterogeneous individuals often are included together under a single category in empirical research or (2) that populations that have migrant-like characteristics have been overlooked in some research but are central in other studies. In this article, we have addressed how the existing literature has ranged in its conceptualization and operationalization of “migrant” and argued for the need to clarify the population of interest in studies of international migration and integration. Having a clearer definition of different groups belonging under the broad umbrella of the “migrant population” is crucial to understanding how to accommodate migrants’ needs for settlement, to ensure their well-being during and after migration, and to maintain peace and harmony in host societies.

To better understand and categorize migrant populations across different contexts, we developed a classification tree that uses five questions to categorize individuals into 12 groups. The intention of the tree is to create a framework for effective comparison of migrant groups across different contexts, including countries with and without birthright citizenship, countries that allow or do not allow dual citizenship, countries that rely on a large but transitory workforce, and countries with post-colonial migrants. The tree can guide scholars to be clearer about who is being included and who is being left out in their studies.

The categorization we propose can help us make better comparisons across different groups within the migrant population, to reconsider the role of some previously overlooked groups in the host society, and to think critically about existing understanding of the migrant population. We present three examples of how the categories revealed in the classification tree might inform research: (1) including temporary migrants in the studies of migrant integration can help us reexamine the effectiveness of integration policies and reconsider the ‘starting point’ of integration; (2) comparing migrants and non-migrants in different contexts can elucidate potential mechanisms for why dual citizenship facilitates migrant integration; and (3) by paying attention to heterogeneity within the non-migrant population, we will be better able to understand the role of socialization distinct from the naturalization process in migrant incorporation.

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Figure 1: Five Questions Categorizing Migrant Groups




Table 1: Distribution of Migrants and Non-migrants Across Five Countries

(Stock Figures)

Groups	Brazil	Germany	Japan	Thailand	U.S.
Migrant Citizens	431,319 (2010)	147,500	568,242 <i>(the number of naturalized individuals, including native-born foreigners, 2017)</i>	16,160 <i>(former stateless naturalized migrants, 2018)</i>	20M (2018)
Non-migrant Citizens	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	112,000 <i>(native-born migrants)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	19.7M <i>(second-gen) (2013)</i>
Unauthorized Migrants	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	700,000 (2016)	74,167 (2019)	800,000 (2019)	11.96M (2015)
Unauthorized Non-migrants	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (exists⁺, but no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	0 <i>(but an estimated 809,000 children of unauthorized migrants have become citizens, 2018)</i>
Permanent Migrants	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	104,000 (2018)	738,661 <i>(Permanent Residents, 2017)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	13.2M (2014)
Permanent Non-migrants	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available. usually granted German citizenship⁺)</i>	334,298 <i>(special PR, 2017)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>NA</i>
Temporary Non-migrants	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	60,000 (2018)	<i>NA</i>

Temporary High-skilled Migrants	30,619 (2018)	22,930 (2018)	219,357 (STEM, business, edu., medical professionals, 2017)	162,237 (2019)	419,637 (2018)
Temporary Low-skilled Migrants	59,729 (2011-2018)	3,095 (2011)	251,721 (interns, 2019)	3,897,598 (2019)	245,183 (2017)
Temporary Non-working Migrants	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	329,902 (family of Japanese citizens, PRs, and migrants, 2017)	230,932 (2019)	136,393 (2017)
Asylum-seeking Migrants	79,909 (2018)	185,853 (include non- migrants, 2019)	20,000 (2017)	6,000 (2018)	84,000 (2019)
Asylum-seeking Non-migrants	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	78,298 (minors, but no information about their birthplaces, 2019)	NA (almost non- existent, 2017)	<i>unknown (no data available)</i>	NA
Total Migrant Population	807,000 (2019)	13,132,100 (2019)	2,498,900 (2019)	4,898,461 (2018)	50,661,100 (2019)
Country Population	211,049,527 (2019)	83,132,799 (2019)	126,264,931 (2019)	69,625,582 (2019)	328,239,523 (2019)
Notes	<p>+ Foreigners born in Germany can only acquire citizenship if a parent is a German citizen or has a permanent residence permit or has been residing in Germany for at least 8 yrs. More general information about different paths to immigration in Germany (Federal Ministry of Interior, Building, and Community).</p> <p>Sources: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, Brookings, Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), The Guardian, Migration Policy Institute, International Migration Observatory (OBMigra), International Organization for Migration, Japan's Ministry of Justice, The Office of Immigration Statistics at Department of Homeland Security, Pew Research Center, United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), WorldData.info, The World Bank, and The World Vision Foundation of Thailand.</p>				