


**International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)**

Background Guide



IAEA

Introduction to the International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established on July 29th, 1957. In its quest to maintain a safe and convenient world where nuclear energy is used sustainably and nuclear weapons are not used as a means of destruction the IAEA has consistently shown initiative in hopes to create a world that is free of heinous acts. Having 180 member states be a part of the international organization, the IAEA has sought to bring peace and stability to all nations of the world.

As such, the IAEA has taken several strides towards safeguarding the regions of the world. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty designates the IAEA as the ‘verification body’s meaning that it is responsible for monitoring and inspecting nations regarding their nuclear energy consumption. This is under (INFCIRC/153) which designates standard protocols and inspections that nations must be subdue by to ensure that the IAEA remains a body that maintains the peace, and mitigates any threats caused by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, hundreds of facilities have been placed by the IAEA to monitor the nuclear energy usage within nations solidifying the need for them not to be misused for activities that may break the brink of peace that the world stands behind. This is directly Article II of the IAEA ensuring that nuclear energy is not used for any military purpose. Article III demonstrates that the organization supplies materials to nations regarding their nuclear energy usage and gives aid to nations who need nuclear energy.

Taking all these details into account, the IAEA is a trusted partner of the UN tasked with maintaining nuclear peace within the countries that show negligence towards the laws of the world, creating a positive framework for stability and nuclear transparency.

I. Reinventing Nuclear Transparency: Should all Nations Accept Mandatory Inspections Ordered by the IAEA?

Background and historical information on the topic:

In a world where nuclear transparency should be taken as a top priority, nations still refuse to comply to the rigid laws enforced by the IAEA. Iraq, North Korea, and Iran are just some nations who have been hesitant to listen to the IAEA causing more than just political tensions, putting the world at

the brink of a third world war. In the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the IAEA requested to enter the nation in hopes of uncovering faulty nuclear energy usage to no avail. The nation's president Saddam Hussein refused entry citing that forced from the United States of America would corrupt the country. North Korea, a nation that has been a champion of independence and isolation from the outside world accepted inspection in 1992 but went on to reject special inspection in 1993 and has been hesitant to accept routine checks that have been influenced by the very organization that focuses on stability and safety. Iran's threat to the world, specifically their usage of Uranium led to the signing of the JCPOA on July 14th, 2015 having the P5 nations (The United States of America, The United Kingdom, France, The Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China,) and the European Union sign to contract so that Iran reduce the threat that they pose to the world. However, in 2025, Iran still refused IAEA inspections causing a '12 day-war' and over 1000 casualties all under the pretence of maintaining nuclear stability.

While nations disobey, Japan, Germany, Sweden, and South Korea have flipped the dynamic. Being championed for their resilience and loyalty to the IAEA, the mentioned nations have been made an example of how a nation should act regarding their energy usage. Of the 190 nations that have been inspected of regarding their nuclear energy minerals, only 75 have been found to be free of nuclear energy. Moreover, 75 states were found to be free of averting the laws that the IAEA had set forth towards their creation.

All in all, nuclear energy transparency has left political tensions between the nations who abide and for those who do not. Therefore, the IAEA had set the proper background on employing rigid nuclear energy facilities maintaining a legal framework that the nations of the world should comply with so that nuclear energy is not misused.

Past actions:

Past actions have shown that the IAEA has already moved the world toward "mandatory" nuclear transparency through global safeguards and crisis-driven, invasive inspections. By the year 2024, the Agency was applying safeguards in 190 countries and carried out more than 3,000 in-field

verification activities each year at more than 1,300 facilities and other locations, thus showing that routine inspections have become a regular, institutionalized responsibility for almost all countries with nuclear material. In legal terms, 182 states have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) in force, and out of these, 137 also implement the Additional Protocol (AP) which accounts for 73% of all the non-nuclear-armed states, thus giving the IAEA enlarged rights of access and information for the purpose of detecting undeclared activities and hence making this "gold standard" of more intrusive verification the emerging norm. By the year 2024, the Agency was applying safeguards in 190 countries and carried out more than 3,000 in-field verification activities each year at more than 1,300 facilities and other locations, thus showing that routine inspections have become a regular, institutionalized responsibility for almost all countries with nuclear material. In legal terms, 182 states have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) in force, and out of these, 137 also implement the Additional Protocol (AP) which accounts for 73% of all the non-nuclear-armed states, thus giving the IAEA enlarged rights of access and information for the purpose of detecting undeclared activities and hence making this "gold standard" of more intrusive verification the emerging norm.

Crisis cases did the trick and pushed the already established transparency far beyond what was desired and into a genuinely compulsory zone. The IAEA Board in four of the most important non-compliance cases—namely Iraq, the DPRK, Iran, and Syria determined that the state was in violation of its safeguards obligations and made the situation known to the UN Security Council, which then allowed for inspections that were much more intrusive than before and, in the case of Iraq, even for the destruction or removal of all infrastructure that could be used for weapon making. After the Gulf War in 1991, UN Security Council resolution 687 stated that Iraq had to give a full account of its nuclear weapon-related activities and put all materials that could be used for making weapons under the control of the IAEA, thus giving inspectors powers that went way beyond those in Iraq's original agreement and setting a strong precedent for enforced transparency. Iran relied on a combination of the NPT safeguards agreement, the Additional Protocol (when implemented), and the JCPOA, which, together with the strict IAEA surveillance, resulted in one of the world's most intensive inspection footprints: in 2016, the IAEA conducted 402 inspections in Iran, plus 25 'complementary access' visits this was the most frequent type of

access in any country, slightly ahead of Japan's 24. When the agreements were at their peak, inspectors spent more than 2,000 workdays a year in Iran, as compared to 751 workdays in a highly trusted country like Canada; this illustrates how mistrust and past infractions can turn into a need for much more intensive, almost obligatory transparency in certain countries. Most countries are already accepting inspection as an obligation in the case of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; when the IAEA safeguards fail, the Agency, along with the Security Council, has not been reluctant to impose inspection regimes that are far more demanding and mandatory.

Current situation:

The ongoing discussions surrounding nuclear transparency are taking place in a very strained geopolitical environment, characterized by an escalating rivalry among the superpowers, proliferation threats in certain areas, and the dismantling of arms control regimes that have been in place for many years. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandatory inspections are the major and controversial issue in this matter: they are absolutely necessary to confirm the non-use of nuclear materials in weapons, yet more and more states are claiming them as an infringement of their sovereignty, unequal treatment, and a source of security troubles. Countries have different opinions on how to handle IAEA powers: some consider the intrusive inspection as a cost of having access to nuclear technology and being seen as a legitimate state, while others are afraid that the stronger and uniform powers of IAEA might make them lose their secrets regarding military, industrial or subject matter and might even be used as a political tool selectively. This has resulted in the world having a global legal framework, while actual transparency is still very much dependent on the places.

Since the 1990s, the basic safeguards system has become much more extensive and powerful. Nearly all non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) now have Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in place, and a big part of them even use the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA more access and information than in the case of traditional agreements. On the other hand, some of the most important countries with considerable nuclear activities have either not accepted the Additional Protocol or are applying it only to a limited extent, thus creating a clear disparity between the verification "standard" as seen by the Agency and actual legal requirements. In politically sensitive situations, like those involving Iran, North Korea, and unreported activities in other

areas, the disputes over access, the extent of inspections, and the obligations under Security Council resolutions often escalate the technical verification issues into more significant diplomatic crises.

The international community's response has consisted of a mix of additional political commitments and norms along with the existing legal obligations. Nuclear supplier countries in general require that IAEA safeguards be recognized as a condition for cooperation, and many regional and global dialogues now consider strong verification as a condition for nuclear energy's proliferation and for nuclear-armed states' disarmament being unspoken. Civil society, along with many non-nuclear-weapon states suggest that the worldwide, uniform, and strong application of safeguards and the Additional Protocol would not only eliminate sirens of double standards but also make it practically impossible for any state to hide proliferation under the plea of "peaceful" programs. Nevertheless, some governments oppose this viewpoint, which they see as an infringement of sovereignty through the imposition of extensive and mandatory inspections, or they use the argument of asymmetries: nuclear-armed states are not subject to the same scrutiny levels, some advanced countries are granted high trust and reduced inspection intensity while others are subjected to very intrusive regimes.

Under such conditions, the question whether all countries should agree to mandatory inspections ordered by the IAEA has changed from a purely legal or technical matter to a global governance, equity, and trust test. Proponents maintain that a uniform, legally binding acceptance of strong inspections would deter secret programs, stabilize regional rivalries, and win the trust of the public towards the security and peaceful nature of nuclear power. On the other hand, opponents argue that without parallel disarmament and security guarantees for movements, the imposition of intrusive regimes on all states may only deepen North–South mistrust and might even push some countries to withdraw from or not to join the existing non-proliferation arrangements. We thus have a situation of partial progress and persistence fragmentation: the means to powerful, near-universal transparency exist, but whether these become genuinely mandatory for all will depend on political will, perceptions of fairness, and the ability to balance non-proliferation with states' legitimate security and sovereignty concerns.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer:

1. How should nations be held accountable if they do not abide by the mandatory inspections that the IAEA have enforced?
2. Should nations that abide by the IAEA can fund consequences that the IAEA sees fit towards the nations that do not abide by the organization?
3. Should the IAEA have the authority to punish nations that misuse nuclear weapons?
4. Regarding the NPT, should the nations of the world focus on refining the contract seeing as it has been criticized regarding its internal frameworks?
5. How should nations respond to a threat of nuclear weapons?
6. Should a threat of nuclear weapons be recognized as a crime by the world, and in correlation, be used to impose sanctions, and economic cuts towards the nation that makes these threats?
7. What determines whether a nation should be trusted with holding nuclear weapons?
8. Should there be a specific organization to be created that cites the nuclear energy that a nation uses? (This means that the IAEA must go into all nations so that they may fund this data)
9. Should a nation be exiled from the IAEA if they do not abide by the laws that it imposes onto its members?