

Does the Size of the Signal Space Matter?*

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Abstract

This paper provides the first experimental evidence that information receivers consider the size of the signal space, which is the number of possible signals. When purchasing signals, the willingness to pay for the signal increases as the size of the signal space increases, even if the informativeness of the signal is fixed. The results also reveal the preference reversal phenomenon: when the signal is free, individuals no longer prefer larger signal space. Preference reversal suggests that the motivation for larger signal space is intrinsic, for instance, curiosity. The experimental findings of this paper have two main practical implications. First, when selling their services, information providers can make their services look more attractive by simply increasing the number of possible signals. Second, the preference for larger signal space challenges the commonly used assumption in the signaling environment of information economics, which is that signal space is equal to the action space. Leading theoretical frameworks cannot explain the experimental findings.

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1 Introduction

Signal transmission is an essential part of the literature on game theory, where a vast amount of research has been conducted both theoretically and empirically. However, the desirable size of the signal space in the literature has often been overlooked. In the context of information acquisition, the size of the signal space denotes the number of possible signals. When discussing the size of the signal space, in many cases, theorists assume that the signal space equals the action space. They have shown that assuming an equivalent between signal space and action space is sufficient to find the equilibrium; therefore, a larger signal space is unnecessary. This assumption has been taken for granted for decades, but it could be limited if the receiver prefers larger signal space. This paper investigates whether there exists a preference for the size of the signal space, independent of the informativeness of the signal.

Consider the example of an investor contemplating whether or not to invest in a company. State $\theta \in \{G, B\}$ represents the type of the company, where G and B stand for a good company and a bad company each. The investor does not know whether the company is good or bad, but she thinks the probability that the company is good is 0.5. She wants to invest only if the company is good. Without loss of generality, suppose she gets utility 1 for investing in the good company or not investing in the bad company and utility 0 for investing in the bad company or not investing in the good company.¹

To reduce uncertainty about the investment decision, she is considering hiring a financial advisor with more knowledge of the company. There are two advisors she is considering: Advisor A and Advisor B. They provide informative signals to the investor. Advisor A will send the investor one of the two signals with equal probability: “invest” or “not invest.” If his signal is “invest,” the probability that the company is good is 70% ($Pr(G|“invest”) = 0.7$). If his signal is “not invest,” the

¹Note that she will be as happy not to invest in a bad company as to invest in a good company, considering the opportunity cost.

probability that the company is good is 30% ($Pr(G|“not\ invest”) = 0.3$). Since the number of possible signals sent from Advisor A is 2, the size of his signal space is 2. Note that Advisor A is the commonly assumed sender by theorists: the action space (invest or not) is equal to the signal space.

On the other hand, Advisor B has a larger signal space. Advisor B will send the investor one of the five signals with equal probability: “strongly recommend,” “recommend,” “no opinion,” “not recommend,” “never recommend.” The probability that the company is good when each signal is received is 0.8, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2. The size of his signal space is 5.

The advisor’s signal informativeness is calculated by the expected probability of choosing the good company when receiving the signal from him. For example, if the investor hires Advisor A and follows his signal, her winning probability is 0.7 whether she receives “invest” or “not invest.” Hence, Advisor A’s signal informativeness is 0.7. In the same way, Advisor B’s signal informativeness is also 0.7.² If the informativeness of the signal is the only factor the investor cares about, she will be indifferent between hiring Advisor A or B. However, if she also cares about the size of the signal space, she will prefer one advisor to another.

This paper provides the first empirical evidence that the size of the signal space matters in information acquisition. In Study 1, subjects are asked to bet on four lotteries. Before betting, they have a chance to purchase a signal for each lottery. The signal of each lottery has the same informativeness but has a different signal space size, like Advisor A and Advisor B in the previous example. The result shows the willingness to pay for the signal increases as the size of the signal space increases, even though its informativeness does not change. It implies that people prefer Advisor B to Advisor A. Furthermore, the preference for larger signal space drives overpayment to Advisor B. When hiring Advisor B, the investor’s total earnings are lower than when hiring Advisor A.

²See Appendix [A.1.1](#) for detailed calculations.

However, in a separate study, I observed a pattern of preference reversal.³ Study 2 measured the values of four lotteries in Study 1. But in this case, there was no signal purchasing stage because the price for the signal was free. The result reveals that, surprisingly, subjects no longer preferred larger signal space; they were indifferent to the size of the signal space when the signals were free.⁴ If they valued signals with larger signal space when purchasing the signal, they should have also appreciated the larger signal space when the signal was free; but they did not.

Receiving a signal and playing a simple lottery based on the signal’s information can be perceived as a two-stage lottery. In this environment, the preference for larger signal space could be interpreted as a violation of the reduction of compound lottery axiom (ROCL). When a decision-maker can reduce compound lottery, there is no reason to pay more to signal with larger space under the same informativeness. Furthermore, [Segal \(1988\)](#) showed preference reversal phenomenon also violates the ROCL axiom. [Halevy \(2007\)](#) revealed ambiguity neutrality and reduction of compound lotteries are tightly associated. If his findings can be applied to this environment, the preference for larger signal space and preference reversal should also be correlated with ambiguity neutrality. To examine the correlation, I measured ambiguity attitudes after the information acquisition questions. The results report that ambiguity neutrality is not correlated with either of these two phenomena.

Among the possible explanations for the experimental findings, curiosity provides the most plausible interpretation. Curiosity indicates intrinsic motivation for seeking

³[Lichtenstein and Slovic \(1971\)](#) initially documented systemic inconsistencies between preferences of paired lotteries and their prices. After the initial report, the preference reversal phenomenon has been observed in numerous experimental studies for a few decades ([Grether and Plott, 1979](#); [Pommerehne et al., 1982](#); [Tversky and Thaler, 1990](#)). When subjects are asked to choose between a safer (high winning probability but small prize) or riskier lottery (low winning probability but high prize) with nearly the same expected values, most subjects prefer to play the safer one. However, when asked to state the minimum prices to sell each lottery when they own it, most subjects put higher prices on the riskier lottery.

⁴While this is technically a “preference reversal,” I view this phenomenon thematically differently from previous literature. [Tversky et al. \(1990\)](#) suggests that the primary reason for preference reversal is the failure of procedure invariance, especially the overpricing of high-payoff, low-probability bets. In this paper, however, the demand for greater knowledge without instrumental value suggests curiosity is behind it.

knowledge that might not have instrumental value. That implies that when purchasing signals, the receiver could have a more intrinsic inclination for having more possible signals, even if the size of the signal space does not matter after buying it. A more detailed discussion about explanations of the experimental results will be provided later in Section 5.

Does a smaller or larger signal space enable better decision-making? In some environments, limiting the size of the signal space might restrict the optimal outcome. For example, in most of the standard sender-receiver literature, a small size of signal space might lead to inefficient outcomes (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Heumann, 2020). In this case, a larger signal space allows better decision-making. However, in the experimental design of this paper, the size of the signal space is independent of the efficiency of the outcomes: each signal’s informativeness is the same. Therefore, there is no behavioral or theoretical reason to prefer a larger signal space.

On the other hand, a decision-maker might prefer a simpler environment—a smaller size of signal space—if signals are too complicated to understand. For example, a worker might want to receive direct instructions on whether or not to proceed with the current project rather than receive abstract signals from the boss and interpret the intent. This preference could be related to complexity aversion, which illustrates a preference for simpler lotteries over complex ones, even though the expected values are the same (Huck and Weizsäcker, 1999; Sonsino et al., 2002; Halevy, 2007; Moffatt et al., 2015). However, the experimental results of this paper did not find evidence for complexity aversion.

The empirical findings of this paper have practical implications. The first implication is for information providers. Information providers, such as financial advisors, medical test providers, or film critics, can make their services look more attractive by simply increasing the size of the signal space. For example, the result of this paper suggests that users are more attracted to a 5-star rating system than a binary suggestion, even if the two systems are equally informative. Hence, if a service provider

switches the recommendation system from a binary suggestion to a 5-star rating, demand for the service will increase, even without improving the informativeness of the system. This implication aligned with the experimental findings of [Jin et al. \(2022\)](#), called complex disclosure, suggesting senders get more benefits using complex reports than easier ones.

Another implication is the theoretical aspect of signal environments. Many signaling environments of information economics assume that the signal space is equal to the action space. For example, the Bayesian persuasion model of [Kamenica and Gentzkow \(2011\)](#) assumes a signal is “straightforward,” implying each signal is a form of recommended action. A good example is Advisor A in the investor case. Theorists elegantly proved that equilibrium could be achieved with this size of the signal space, implying that a larger signal space is not necessarily needed. However, the experimental results of this paper challenge the assumption: the receiver might be happier if the signal space is larger than the action space.

Section 3 provides theoretical predictions from various models, but none of them can explain the preference for larger signal space. The expected utility model predicts the same value for each signal. The recursive smooth ambiguity model of [Klibanoff et al. \(2005\)](#), Rank-dependent utility model ([Quiggin, 1982](#)), and Prospect theory ([Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1992](#)) suggest different values for different signals but do not predict the systemic preference for the size of the signal space. Also, none of these models predict preference reversal.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and procedure. Section 3 provides theoretical predictions of the results from various models. Section 4 reveals results and Section 5 concludes.

2 Experimental Design

Participants were assigned to one of two studies: Study 1 or Study 2. Each study consists of two parts: Part 1 measures the value of signals (Study 1) or lotteries (Study 2) under isomorphic environments, and part 2 measured ambiguity attitudes by [Ellsberg \(1961\)](#) questions.

2.1 Part 1: The Value of Signals/Lotteries

There are four lotteries in Part 1. Each lottery contains several boxes, each containing ten balls, either red or blue. In each lottery, the computer draws a ball through two stages. In the first stage, the computer randomly selects one of the boxes with an equal probability. In the second stage, the computer randomly draws a ball from the selected box. Between the first and the second stages, subjects predict the color of the ball which will be drawn. If their prediction is correct, they receive 100 points, where each point is equal to 0.01 USD. [Figure 1](#) illustrates the four lotteries.




Figure 1: Four lotteries

Each box is denoted by Box Xn , where $X \in \{R, B, G\}$ and $n \in \{5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10\}$. X and n each represent the majority of balls the box contains and their number. For example, Box R7 has more red balls than blue balls, and the number of red balls is 7.⁵

In Study 1, the information about which box is selected is unknown. However, subjects can “buy” the information. They are endowed with 100 points, and before the prediction, there is a chance to purchase a costly signal: it will tell which box is selected. The signal increases the winning probability, but it requires some cost whether the buyer wins or loses.

For example, in lottery 2, there are three boxes: Box R8, Box G5, and Box B8.

⁵In the actual experiment, boxes are represented as Box R, Box B, Box G, Box RR (in case there are two Box R in one lottery), and Box BB (in case there are two Box B in one lottery). The reason not to put numbers on the boxes is to provide an environment where subjects rely more on intuition.

Suppose Box R8 is randomly selected. Without the signal, subjects do not know which box is chosen. Their winning probability is 50% whether they bet on a red or blue ball because there is a total of 15 red balls and 15 blue balls in lottery 2. If they buy the signal, they know that Box R8 is selected and the ball will be drawn from Box R8. The signal “Box R8” increases the odds of winning to 80% because Box R8 contains 8 red and 2 blue balls.

One of the key features of the design is that the numbers of red and blue balls in each lottery are always the same. It implies that the winning probability is 50% for all lotteries without the signal. Another essential feature is that the signal informativeness of each lottery is the same. If subjects purchase the signal, the winning probability increases to 70% for all four lotteries. The only difference between them is the number of boxes, representing the possible number of signals.

Study 2 measures the values of four lotteries when the signals are free: before predicting the ball’s color, subjects can observe which box is selected without the signal purchasing process. Note that the information structures of both studies are isomorphic. Hence, if a subject has a preference over the size of the signal space in Study 1, she will also have the same preference in Study 2. To quantify the values of the lotteries, I measured the subjects’ willingness to pay to play each lottery.

To measure the willingness to pay, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism ([Becker et al., 1964](#)) was used. In Study 1, subjects submit the values of the signals, which are the maximum points they can pay for each lottery. After submitting values for four lotteries, one of them is randomly selected. Then, a random number is generated between 1 and 100. The random number represents the price for the signal for the selected question in the selected lottery. If a subject’s submitted value in the selected lottery is greater than the price, she can see the signal and pays the price. However, if the submitted value in the selected lottery is equal to or lower than the price, she does not receive the signal and pays nothing. After the signal is revealed or not revealed, subjects predict the color of the ball. [Figure 2](#) shows the

questions in the BDM.

Q#	Option A	Choices	Option B
1	Buying a Signal for 1 point		Not Buying a Signal
2	Buying a Signal for 2 points		Not Buying a Signal
3	Buying a Signal for 3 points		Not Buying a Signal
4	Buying a Signal for 4 points		Not Buying a Signal
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
97	Buying a Signal for 97 points		Not Buying a Signal
98	Buying a Signal for 98 points		Not Buying a Signal
99	Buying a Signal for 99 points		Not Buying a Signal
100	Buying a Signal for 100 points		Not Buying a Signal

Figure 2: The BDM mechanism in Study 1

The procedure of the BDM in Study 2 is similar to in Study 1 (See figure 3). Before playing the lotteries, I ask subjects the maximum number of points they are willing to pay for playing each lottery. After submitting four values for four lotteries, one of the lotteries is randomly selected. Then, a random number between 1 and 100, representing a substitute prize, is generated. If the submitted value in the selected lottery is greater than the prize, a subject plays the lottery. Otherwise, she receives the prize without playing the lottery. If they play the lottery, they see which box is selected and predict the color of the ball from the selected box.

Q#	Option A	Choices	Option B
1	Playing the lottery		Receiving 1 point
2	Playing the lottery		Receiving 2 points
3	Playing the lottery		Receiving 3 points
4	Playing the lottery		Receiving 4 points
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
97	Playing the lottery		Receiving 97 points
98	Playing the lottery		Receiving 98 points
99	Playing the lottery		Receiving 99 points
100	Playing the lottery		Receiving 100 points

Figure 3: The BDM mechanism in Study 2

The major issue of the BDM mechanism is its difficulty and the biased results in some environments.⁶ To minimize the confusion, subjects were asked to submit their maximum willingness to pay for the signal instead of deciding between Option A and B 100 times. Also, before subjects submit their actual values, an example was illustrated of how the mechanism works when a specific value is submitted.

Furthermore, even if the result is upward or downward biased, the biased result does not impair the primary purpose of the BDM mechanism, which is to compare preferences between signals and between lotteries, not to elicit their exact values.

There are two hypotheses to test. Study 1 measures the willingness to pay for the signal. If only the informativeness of signals matters, the demand for signals for four lotteries should be the same. When c_i indicates the price subjects are willing to pay for the signal of lottery i ,

$$c_1 = c_2 = c_3 = c_4. \quad (1)$$

Hypothesis 1. *The size of the signal space does not affect the demand for the signal.*

⁶See [Noussair et al. \(2004\)](#) and [Cason and Plott \(2014\)](#) for discussions about the biased results of the BDM.

When L_i denotes lottery i , let $V_i^{signal}(c)$ represent a value of L_i with the signal with the cost c . Then, Study 2 measures $V_i^{signal}(0)$ for four lotteries. Suppose a subject values the signal for lottery i is more than the signal for lottery j . If the motivation for the demand for the signal is instrumental, she will also value lottery i more than lottery j even when the signal is free: $c_i > c_j \implies V_i^{signal}(0) > V_j^{signal}(0)$. Then, the following hypothesis holds.

Hypothesis 2. *The order among c_i are identical to the order among $V_i(0)$.*

To avoid subjects focusing only on the size of the signal space, lotteries were presented in order of $L_1 - L_3 - L_2 - L_4$ in both studies.

2.2 Part 2: Ellsberg Questions

After the elicitation of the value of signals, subjects' ambiguity attitudes were measured by two questions from [Ellsberg \(1961\)](#). Ambiguity attitude is closely related to two-stage lotteries, especially to the ability to reduction of compound lotteries ([Halevy, 2007](#); [Seo, 2009](#)). [Halevy \(2007\)](#) shows the strong association between ambiguity neutrality and reduction of compound lotteries. Since preference for a larger/smaller signal space can be interpreted as a failure to reduce compound lotteries, this task helps to understand how ambiguity attitude is related to the preference for the size of the signal space.

The following statement describes the task.

Consider there is a bag containing 90 ping-pong balls. 30 balls are blue, and the remaining 60 balls are either red or yellow in unknown proportions. The computer will draw a ball from the bag. The balls are well mixed so that each ball is as likely to be drawn as any other. You will bet on the color that will be drawn from the bag.

Subjects are asked to choose their preferred options between A & B and between C & D. Table [1](#) illustrates the four options.

Options	
Option A	receiving 100 points if a blue ball is drawn.
Option B	receiving 100 points if a red ball is drawn.
Option C	receiving 100 points if a blue or yellow ball is drawn.
Option D	receiving 100 points if a red or yellow ball is drawn.

Table 1: Ellsberg questions

If a subject prefers A to B and D to C, there is no formulation of subjective probability that can rationalize the preference. This preference is interpreted to be a consequence of ambiguity aversion.

After rewards from Part 1 and Part 2 are determined, one of the parts is randomly selected. Subjects will get the points in the selected part. Each point is transferred to 0.01 USD.

2.3 Procedural Details

467 subjects participated in experiments through Prolific, an online platform for recruiting research participants.⁷ 179 and 158 subjects participated in studies 1 and 2 each. Also, another 130 subjects participated in a robustness study, which will be discussed later. On average, subjects spent 10 minutes and earned \$3.32, including \$2.20 of a base payment.

2.4 Robustness Study

In addition to the two studies, additional study was implemented to investigate the robustness of the results. The additional study provides evidence of whether subjects understood the procedure correctly.

⁷Gupta et al. (2021) shows Prolific can be a reliable source of high-quality data. About a subject pool about Prolific, see Palan and Schitter (2018). In both studies, only US subjects participated.




Figure 4: Lotteries in the robustness study

The procedure of this study is identical to part 1 in Study 1: subjects were asked to value signals in uncertain lotteries. To investigate subjects' understanding, values of signals for eight lotteries were measured. The signal of each lottery provides a different winning probability. If they understood this information acquisition framework correctly, they would be more willing to pay for a signal with a higher winning probability. Figure 4 illustrates lotteries of this study.

Table 2: Summary of lotteries in the robustness study

Questions	Signal Space Size	Winning Prob With Signals	Predictions
1	2	0.80	30
2	2	1.00	50
3	2	0.60	10
4	2	0.90	40
5	3	0.70	20
6	3	0.83	33.3
7	3	0.57	6.7
8	3	0.77	26.7

Table 2 summarizes the details of the lotteries. Lotteries 1-4 have two boxes, Box Rn and Box Bn, where $n \in \{5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10\}$. Hence, the size of the signal space is 2. Also, since lotteries 5-8 have three boxes, Box Rn, Box Gn, and Box Bn, the size of the signal space is 3 for these lotteries. The winning probability with the signal of each lottery is described in the third column. The fourth column shows the theoretical prediction when the decision-maker is a risk-neutral utility maximizer. If subjects understand the information framework of the signaling process, their demands for the signals will be in line with theoretical predictions.

3 Theoretical Predictions

Let L_i^{prior} denote lottery i without the signal. Also, $L_i^{signal}(p)$ is lottery i with the signal with the cost c . Suppose an individual's willingness to pay for the signal for lottery i is greater than or equal to the willingness to pay for the signal for lottery j : $c_i \geq c_j$, where c_i denotes the elicited price for the signal for lottery i . The values of c_i and c_j are determined by

$$V_i^{signal}(c_i) = V_i^{prior}, \quad (2)$$

$$V_j^{signal}(c_j) = V_j^{prior}, \quad (3)$$

where V_i denotes the value of lottery i .

Since $V_i^{prior} = V_j^{prior}$,

$$V_i^{signal}(c_i) = V_j^{signal}(c_j). \quad (4)$$

For simplicity of notation, denote $V_i(c)$ instead of $V_i^{signal}(c)$ from now on. Note that $L_i(x)$ is a decreasing function of x . Hence, under the equation 4,

$$c_i \geq c_j \implies V_i(c) \geq V_j(c), \quad (5)$$

where $0 \leq c \leq \max(c_i, c_j)$. For example, suppose a subject's willingness to pay for signal 1 (the signal in lottery 1) is 20, and signal 2 (the signal in lottery 2) is 30. Then, she will be happier to purchase signal 2 for the price of 15 than to purchase signal 1 for the price of 15. Hence, for calculation simplicity, I will compare $V_i(c)$ and $V_j(c)$ when the comparison between c_i and c_j is needed.

Studies 1 measured c_i for $i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Also, Study 2 elicited $L_i(0)$ for $i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ because the signal is free ($c = 0$). The remaining part of this section describes how different theories under uncertainty predict the two values in different lotteries.

3.1 Expected Utility

The expected utility of lottery i is given by

$$U_{EU}(L_i) = \sum_{s \in S} p(s)u(s). \quad (6)$$

The expected utility indicates that decision-makers are only interested in the expected values of lotteries but indifferent to the uncertainty resolution process. They do not care whether the lottery is a simple, compound, or a mean-preserving spread of the other lottery. Therefore, according to the expected utility model, subjects are

indifferent between signals for lotteries, as well as between values of lotteries after receiving signals.

$$c_1 = c_2 = c_3 = c_4, \tag{7}$$

$$V_1(0) = V_2(0) = V_3(0) = V_4(0).$$

3.2 Recursive Smooth Ambiguity Utility

The recursive smooth ambiguity model of [Klibanoff et al. \(2005\)](#) (KMM, hereafter) suggests a theoretical utility model involving a second-order belief. KMM assumes that the decision-makers have a subjective expected utility on the space of second-order compound lotteries. For each f , there exists a second-order belief μ such that

$$U_{KMM}(f) = \sum_{\Delta(S)} \phi\left(\sum_{s \in S} p(s)u(f(s))\right)\mu(p), \tag{8}$$

where μ is a second-order subject belief, Δ is the set of possible first-order objective lotteries, and ϕ is a monotone function evaluating expected utility associated with first-order beliefs.

For example, when purchasing a signal for L_1 , there are two possible outcomes in the first stage (second-order): R7 or B7. In the second stage (first-order), the expected utility is $0.7u(100 - c) + 0.3u(-c)$ for both cases. Therefore, the evaluation of L_1 is given by

$$\begin{aligned} U_{KMM}(L_1(c)) &= \frac{1}{2}\phi(0.7u(100 - c) + 0.3u(-c)) + \frac{1}{2}\phi(0.7u(100 - c) + 0.3u(-c)) \\ &= \phi(0.7u(100 - c) + 0.3u(-c)) \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, the values of lotteries are evaluated as

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{KMM}(L_2(c)) &= \frac{2}{3}\phi(0.8u(100 - c) + 0.2u(-c)) + \frac{1}{3}\phi(0.5u(100 - c) + 0.5u(-c)), \\
U_{KMM}(L_3(c)) &= \frac{1}{2}\phi(0.8u(100 - c) + 0.2u(-c)) + \frac{1}{2}\phi(0.6u(100 - c) + 0.4u(-c)), \\
U_{KMM}(L_4(c)) &= \frac{2}{5}\phi(0.8u(100 - c) + 0.2u(-c)) + \frac{2}{5}\phi(0.7u(100 - c) + 0.3u(-c)) \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{5}\phi(0.5u(100 - c) + 0.5u(-c)).
\end{aligned}$$

When μ is subjective, KMM explained ambiguity aversion by concavity of ϕ : If lottery Y is a mean-preserving spread of lottery X, then individuals prefer X to Y because of their second-order subjective probability (μ). Since $L_3(c)$ is a mean preserving spread of $L_1(c)$, decision maker prefer $L_1(c)$ to $L_3(c)$:

For easier computation, let's define $U(\alpha)$ as,

$$U(\alpha) \equiv \alpha u(100 - c) + (1 - \alpha)u(-c).$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{KMM}(L_1(c)) &= \phi(0.7u(100 - c) + 0.3u(-c)) \\
&= \phi(U(0.7)) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{1}{2}\phi(U(0.6)) \\
&= U_{KMM}(L_3(c)).
\end{aligned}$$

A few more steps of calculations (See Appendix [A.1](#) for details) show the following preferences hold.

$$c_1 \geq c_3 \geq c_2, \tag{9}$$

$$c_1 \geq c_4 \geq c_2.$$

Since $L_i(0)$ is a specific form of $L_i(c)$, the preference among $L_i(0)$ does not change. Hence, regardless of the ambiguity attitude, KMM does not predict preference reversal.

$$V_1(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_2(0), \quad (10)$$

$$V_1(0) \geq V_4(0) \geq V_2(0).$$

When ϕ is convex, implying ambiguity seeking, the opposite inequality holds.

$$c_2 \geq c_3 \geq c_1, \quad (11)$$

$$c_2 \geq c_4 \geq c_1,$$

$$V_2(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_1(0), \quad (12)$$

$$V_2(0) \geq V_4(0) \geq V_1(0).$$

3.3 Simulational Predictions from Other Models

3.3.1 Rank-Dependent Utility

Rank-dependent utility (RDU) model suggested a probability weighting approach based on the order of rank of the outcomes (Quiggin, 1982; Segal, 1987, 1990). According to the RDU model, the utility of a lottery paying x_i with probability p_i is described as

$$U_{RDU}(x_1, p_1; x_2, p_2; \dots; x_n, p_n) = u(x_1) + \sum_{i=2}^n [u(x_i) - u(x_{i-1})] f\left(\sum_{j=i}^n p_j\right), \quad (13)$$

where $x_1 \leq x_2 \leq x_3 \dots \leq x_n$, $f : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$, $f(0) = 0$ and $f(1) = 1$. For the simple lottery that gives 100 with probability p and 0 with probability $1 - p$,

$$U(100, p; 0, 1 - p) = u(100)f(p). \quad (14)$$

Suppose its certainty equivalent be $CE(p)$, then

$$CE(p) = CE(100, p; 0, 1 - p) = u^{-1}(u(100)f(p)). \quad (15)$$

Hence,

$$U_{RDU}(L_1(0)) = u(CE(0.7)) = u(100)f(0.7).$$

Similarly, values of four lotteries with signals are calculated as

$$\begin{aligned} U_{RDU}(L_1(0)) &= u(100)f(0.7), \\ U_{RDU}(L_2(0)) &= u(100)f(0.5) + [u(100)(f(0.8) - f(0.5))]f\left(\frac{2}{3}\right), \\ U_{RDU}(L_3(0)) &= u(100)f(0.6) + [u(100)(f(0.8) - f(0.6))]f\left(\frac{1}{2}\right), \\ U_{RDU}(L_4(0)) &= u(100)f(0.5) + [u(100)(f(0.7) - f(0.5))]f\left(\frac{4}{5}\right) \\ &\quad + [u(100)(f(0.8) - f(0.7))]f\left(\frac{2}{5}\right). \end{aligned}$$

Preferences between lotteries vary depending on the functional form of $f(p)$. Table 3 illustrates simulational predictions of the RDU model based on different concave functions.

Table 3: Theoretical predictions by RDU

$f(p)$	Preferences between c_i	Preferences between $V_i(0)$
$p^{0.1}$	$c_2 \geq c_4 \geq c_3 \geq c_1$	$V_2(0) \geq V_4(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_1(0)$
$p^{0.5}$	$c_2 \geq c_4 \geq c_3 \geq c_1$	$V_2(0) \geq V_4(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_1(0)$
$p^{0.8}$	$c_2 \geq c_4 \geq c_3 \geq c_1$	$V_2(0) \geq V_4(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_1(0)$
p	$c_1 = c_2 = c_3 = c_4$	$V_1(0) = V_2(0) = V_3(0) = V_4(0)$
$\log(p)$	$c_1 \geq c_3 \geq c_2 \geq c_4$	$V_1(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_2(0) \geq V_4(0)$
$\ln(p)$	$c_1 \geq c_3 \geq c_2 \geq c_4$	$V_1(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_2(0) \geq V_4(0)$

Simulation results show that the RDU models with various functional forms of

$f(p)$ do not predict the preference for larger signal space.

3.3.2 Prospect Theory

The first version of prospect theory was formulated by [Kahneman and Tversky \(1979\)](#), providing evidence of a systemic violation of the expected utility theory, and presenting an alternative theoretical model to explain the violation. [Kahneman and Tversky \(1992\)](#) (KT, henceforth) presented an extension of the original model, cumulative prospect theory, which adopted rank-dependence in probability weighting.

According to the cumulative prospect theory (CPT), the utility of a lottery paying x_i with probability p_i is described as

$$U_{CPT}(x_m, p_m; x_{m+1}, p_{m+1}; \dots; x_0, p_0; \dots; x_n, p_n) = \sum_{i=-m}^n \pi_i v(x_i), \quad (16)$$

where $v(\cdot)$ is a value function, which is an increasing function with $v(0) = 0$, and π is decision weight. KT defined the value function as follow.

$$v(x) = \begin{cases} x^\alpha & \text{if } x \geq 0, \\ -\lambda(-x)^\beta & \text{if } x < 0, \end{cases} \quad (17)$$

where λ is a loss aversion parameter.

Decision weights π are defined by:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_n^+ &= w^+(p_n), \\ \pi_{-m}^- &= w^-(p_{-m}), \\ \pi_i^+ &= w^+(p_i + \dots + p_n) - w^+(p_{i+1} + \dots + p_n), \quad 0 \leq i \leq n-1, \\ \pi_i^- &= w^-(p_{-m} + \dots + p_i) - w^-(p_m + \dots + p_{i-1}), \quad 1-m \leq i \leq 0, \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

where w^+ and w^- are the following functions.

$$w^+(p) = \frac{p^\gamma}{(p^\gamma + (1-p)^\gamma)^{1/\gamma}}, \quad w^-(p) = \frac{p^\delta}{(p^\delta + (1-p)^\delta)^{1/\delta}}. \quad (19)$$

To predict the preferences for c_i and $V_i(0)$ by CPT, I used the values of parameters from KT. They estimated the values from experimental data.

Table 4: Values of parameters from KT

Parameter	Meaning	Value
α	power for gains	0.88
β	power for losses	0.88
λ	loss aversion	2.25 ⁸
γ	probability weighting parameter for gains	0.61
δ	probability weighting parameter for losses	0.69

Also, I assume the cost of the signal is 20, which is the theoretically expected value when the decision-maker is a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer. Hence, preference between c_i is from simulational results from $L_i(20)$. With these values of the parameters, CPT predicts the following preferences:

$$c_1 \geq c_3 \geq c_4 \geq c_2, \quad (20)$$

$$V_1(0) \geq V_3(0) \geq V_4(0) \geq V_2(0).$$

Summarizing the theoretical predictions for the value of signals in Study 1, no model predicts the preference for larger signal space ($c_1 \geq c_2 \geq c_3 \geq c_4$).

Prediction 1. *Preference for larger signal space does not exist.*

This prediction is consistent with hypothesis 1. Also, no model predicts different preferences between c_i and $V_i(0)$, which is consistent with hypothesis 2.

⁸According to the meta-analysis from [Brown et al. \(2022\)](#), the mean of the loss aversion coefficient λ from numerous empirical estimates is 1.97. I found simulational results with $\lambda = 1.97$ do not change the preference between lotteries.

Prediction 2. *Preference reversal does not exist.*

To summarize, theoretical predictions are aligned with the hypotheses: no theoretical models predict the preference for larger signal space or preference reversal.

4 Results

4.1 Preference for Larger Signal Space

Table 5: Elicited values for c_i and $V_i(0)$ with different size of signal space.

Lottery	$ S $	Study 1		Study 2	
		c_i	Number	$V_i(0)$	Number
1	2	23.6	179	52.9	158
2	3	24.9	179	48.9	158
3	4	25.8	179	51.0	158
4	5	29.8	179	52.7	158

Table 5 shows the submitted value for each signal (c_i) and each lottery given the signal ($V_i(0)$) in points. $|S|$ represents the size of the signal space. For c_i , the theoretical predictions from the risk-neutral expected utility maximizer are 20 points for each lottery. Hence, overall, the demand for signals is greater than the theoretical predictions. The most notable feature of the willingness to pay for the signal is the preference for larger signal space: the demand for the signal increases as the size of the signal space increases.

Interestingly, in Study 2, evidence of the preference reversal is observed. The preference for larger signal space vanishes when subjects already have the signal. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Fisher’s exact test verify that there is no significant difference among the distributions of lotteries.⁹

I did not find evidence for complexity aversion in lottery choice. According to [Sonsino et al. \(2002\)](#), the complexity of a lottery is measured as the product of the

⁹P-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and fisher’s exact test are 1.000 and 1.000 for the difference between lottery 1 and others.

number of rows and the number of columns. Hence, in our environment, the number of boxes in the lottery indicates the complexity of the lottery. The results show when the signal is free, the number of boxes did not affect the values of playing lotteries.

To examine relationships formally, I consider OLS regressions of the form:

$$y_{in} = \beta_0 + \beta_1|S|_i + \beta_2 AmbNeutral_n + \epsilon_{in} \quad (21)$$

$y_{i,n}$ is the value of c_i or $V_i(0)$ by individual n , $|S|_i$ is size of the signal space of lottery i , and $AmbNeutral$ is a dummy variable whether individual n is ambiguity neutral or not.

Table 6: Determinants of the demand for signals and lotteries

	Dependent variable: c_i			Dependent variable: $V_i(0)$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Signal Space Size	1.934*** (0.3953)	1.934*** (0.3955)	1.934*** (0.3953)	0.160 (0.5021)	0.160 (0.5025)	0.160 (0.5021)
Ambiguity Neutrality		0.355 (2.9456)			-2.307 (2.5809)	
Constant	19.284*** (1.8731)	19.116*** (2.1920)	19.284*** (1.3834)	50.817*** (2.1789)	52.044*** (2.6221)	50.817*** (1.7574)
Subject fixed effect	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	716	716	716	632	632	632
R-squared	0.010	0.010	0.046	0.000	0.003	0.000
F-test p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.7502	0.7504	0.7502

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. Column (2) and (5) cannot include subject fixed effect because the ambiguity attitude is measured at the subject level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The first three columns in table 6 show that the signal space size significantly affects the value of signals. (F-test p-values < 0.0001 for these columns.) When the size of the signal space increase, the willingness to pay for the signal also increases.

Result 1. *Preference for Larger Signal Space:* *When purchasing signals, the willingness to pay for the signal increases as the signal space size increases.*

Result 1 rejects Hypothesis 1. Also, columns (4)-(6) show that the signal space

size no longer affects the value of lotteries when the signal is free. (F-test p-values are 0.7502, 0.7504, and 0.7502 for each column.) This result rejects Hypothesis 2.

Result 2. *Preference Reversal:* *When the signal is free, subjects no longer prefer larger signal space.*

Since no theoretical model predicts the preference for larger signal space, the result falsifies Prediction 1. Also, no model predicts preference reversal. Therefore, Predictions 1 and 2 are both falsified by the experimental results.

4.2 Ambiguity Attitudes

Table 7: Ambiguity attitudes

Ambiguity Attitude	Study 1		Study 2	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Averse	72	40.2%	55	34.8%
Neutral	85	47.5%	84	53.2%
Seeking	22	12.3%	19	12.0%
Total	179	100.0%	158	100.0%

Table 8: The submitted values of c_i and $V_i(0)$ with different ambiguity attitudes

Attitude	c_1	c_2	c_3	c_4	$V_1(0)$	$V_2(0)$	$V_3(0)$	$V_4(0)$
Averse	22.8	23.8	24.4	29.9	55.7	49.5	47.7	55.8
Neutral	23.8	26.9	24.9	29.2	50.7	50.8	48.7	50.8
Seeking	25.5	28.7	26.5	31.4	54.2	55.8	52.9	52.2
Total	23.6	25.9	24.9	29.8	52.9	51.0	48.9	52.7
F-test p-value	0.8142				0.5988			

Table 7 and 8 each describes ambiguity attitudes of subjects, and values of c_i and $V_i(0)$ conditional on different ambiguity attitudes. It can be easily noticed that the overall patterns between the WTP for signals and lotteries are consistent even though the attitude towards ambiguity changes. The p-values of F-tests provide evidence that there is no effect of ambiguity attitude on c_i or $V_i(0)$.

The second row of table 6 verifies that ambiguity neutrality is independent of the preference for the size of the signal space. In the previous literature from Halevy (2007), ambiguity neutrality is tightly related to the ability to reduce the compound lottery. However, the findings of this paper contradict his results.

Result 3. *Ambiguity neutrality is not related to the preference for the signal space size.*

4.3 Predictions with Signals

Table 9 illustrates subjects’ prediction decisions after the signal stage. The majority of subjects followed the signal when their signal was informative (Box R or Box B). It implies that the subjects understood the information structure of the experiments. In both studies, the chi-square test and Fisher’s exact test reject the null hypothesis that subjects randomly predict. (P-values < 0.001 for both studies.)

Table 9: Predictions with signals

	Predictions	Box R	Box B	Box G	No Signal
Study 1	Red	16 (94.1%)	3 (15.8%)	12 (85.7%)	85 (65.9%)
	Blue	1 (5.9%)	16 (84.2%)	2 (14.3%)	44 (34.1%)
Study 2	Red	37 (94.9%)	4 (11.1%)	8 (72.7%)	N/A
	Blue	2 (5.1%)	32 (88.9%)	3 (27.3%)	N/A
Chi-square test p-value = 0.000					

Did subjects make better decisions when receiving signals from smaller or larger signal spaces? Table 10 shows the correct decision rate with different signals. The correct decision is defined as whether the subject’s prediction is consistent with the signal suggested after receiving Box R or Box B as a signal. Results show that the correct decision rate and the signal space size are not correlated. (Chi-square test p-value and Fisher’s exact test p-value are approximately 0.513, 0.672 each.)

Table 10: Correct decision rate with each signal

Signal Received	s_1	s_2	s_3	s_4	Total
Correct	9 (81.8%)	3 (100.0%)	11 (84.6%)	9 (100.0%)	32 (88.9%)
Incorrect	2 (18.2%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (15.4%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (11.1%)
Total	11	3	13	9	36
Chi-square test p-value = 0.513					

4.4 Payoffs and the Size of the Signal Space

This section investigates whether the preference for larger signal space hurts information buyers. Table 11 shows subjects' payoffs in points from part 1 in both studies. Overall, profits were larger in Study 1 than in Study 2 because of the 100 points endowment in Study 1. In Study 1, subjects earned the highest profit on average when they played lottery 1, the simplest lottery. In other words, they earned less profit when they played lotteries with larger signal space. However, this pattern disappeared when signals were free.

Table 11: Payoffs from part 1

Lottery Selected	Signal Space Size	Study 1			Study 2		
		Payoff	Std. Error	Number	Payoff	Std. Error	Number
1	2	160.9	7.1	48	71.6	6.2	32
2	3	141.6	7.5	50	80.0	4.5	43
3	4	140.9	7.0	46	67.0	6.2	40
4	5	142.0	8.2	35	72.8	5.4	43
Total		146.7	3.7	179	73.1	2.8	158

Table 12 reports the regression results to clarify whether and when signal space size affects the payoffs. Columns (1) and (3) reveal the effect of the size on the payoffs. Results show that only Study 1 has a significant effect: Purchasing signals from larger signal space negatively affects payoffs. Columns (2) and (4) show the effect of playing the simplest lottery (lottery 1). If a subject played more complex lotteries (lotteries 2-4), her expected payoff was 19.4 points less than when playing lottery 1. (F-test

p-value is 0.0202.) The result of column (4) reveals this pattern vanishes when the signal is free.

Table 12: Determinants of the payoffs

	Dependent variable: Payoffs in Study 1		Dependent variable: Payoffs in Study 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Signal Space Size	−6.118* (3.3800)		−1.168 (2.5433)	
Simplest Lottery		19.438** (8.2933)		−1.788 (6.8568)
Constant	161.231*** (9.0026)	141.458*** (4.3261)	76.114*** (6.9543)	73.444*** (3.1359)
Observations	716	716	632	632
R-squared	0.017	0.030	0.001	0.000
F-test p-value	0.0720	0.0202	0.6466	0.7946

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Result 4. *Subjects earned less profit when purchasing signals from larger signal space.*

The implication of Result 4 is that people overvalue signals when the signal space is large. Therefore, they submitted overpriced values for these signals, resulting in fewer earnings.

4.5 Robustness Study

Results from the robustness study show subjects understood the entire information structure, especially the informativeness of each signal. Subjects' submitted values of each lottery are consistent with the expected utility model.

Table 13: Summary of results in the robustness study

Questions	Signal Space Size	Winning Prob With Signals	Predictions	WTP
1	2	0.80	30	24.1
2	2	1.00	50	38.0
3	2	0.60	10	24.8
4	2	0.90	40	37.8
5	3	0.70	20	28.4
6	3	0.83	33.3	34.7
7	3	0.57	6.7	23.7
8	3	0.77	26.7	30.8

Table 13 reveals the submitted values of the willingness to pay for the signal in each lottery. What stands out in this table is that subjects valued the signals consistent with the theoretical prediction. Also, compared to the WTP for signals in lotteries 1-4, subjects overpaid signals in lotteries 5-8 because of the effect of the signal space size. The chi-square test result rejects the null thesis that the willingness to pay for signals was randomly submitted (p-value < 0.001).

Table 14: Determinants of the demand for signals

	Dependent variable:			
	c_i			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Predictions	0.251*** (0.0646)	0.273*** (0.0672)	0.251*** (0.0646)	0.273*** (0.0672)
Signal Space Size		1.505 (1.0620)		1.505 (1.0620)
Constant	22.322*** (1.9820)	17.969*** (3.7191)	22.321*** (1.7506)	17.969*** (3.6133)
Subject fixed effect	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040
R-squared	0.020	0.020	0.045	0.047

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The results from table 14 support the claim that subjects understood the whole

information structure, including the meaning of the signal’s informativeness. Theoretical predictions from the risk-neutral expected utility model are significantly related to actual submitted values. The results from the second row indicate the signal space size has a positive effect on the demand for signals, but not significantly.

5 Conclusion

Economists have studied various environments with purchasing costly stochastic information. This article firstly examines the demand for the signal with different sizes of signal space. The results reveal the preference for larger signal space in the information acquisition process. Even when the informativeness of the signal was fixed, subjects preferred to receive a signal from a larger signal space. Also, a pattern of preference reversal was observed: after receiving the signal, the preference for the larger signal space vanished.

What is the behavioral reason for the desire for larger signal space? The first possible explanation is that subjects were confused and had a poor understanding of the informativeness of signals. This explanation is not plausible because the experimental design of this study allowed subjects to calculate the informativeness of each signal easily. Moreover, the result of the robustness study (see Section 4.5) rejects the argument that subjects were confused about understanding the informativeness of the signal.

Another explanation is that subjects mistakenly believed larger signal space implies higher informativeness. In many cases, the number of signals implies more information. Numerous theoretical and experimental studies have revealed the preference for frequent signals in various contexts.¹⁰ In a similar sense, even when the possible number of signals is independent of the informativeness of the signal, people

¹⁰For example, in [Edmond \(2013\)](#)’s model of information and political regime change, the number of informative signals helps overthrow the regime. [Lee and Niederle \(2015\)](#) shows more signals (virtual roses) increase the success rate of the date in the internet dating market.

might misbelieve the correlation. However, this argument cannot explain the pattern of preference reversal. If subjects believed signals from larger spaces were more informative, they should have also valued these signals even when they were free.

The third explanation is intrinsic, i.e., curiosity. Consider an example of two famous American TV series. *Breaking Bad*, a crime drama TV series, used cliffhangers exceptionally well, making viewers search online to find more about the next episode or season. On the other hand, *Modern Family*, a family sitcom, is not mainly based on these types of narrative devices. Hence, in the view of curiosity, viewers are more likely to be curious about *Breaking Bad* than *Modern Family* before knowing the whole story. However, it does not necessarily mean that they value *Breaking Bad* after watching both shows: they might have enjoyed both shows equally. This viewpoint aligns with the experimental findings. Before receiving information, the receiver has a more intrinsic preference for a specific type of information than another. However, after having all information, the intrinsic preference no longer exists.

A contemporary view of curiosity is the intrinsically motivated drive to seek information, even when it has no instrumental value (Loewenstein, 1994; Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Kidd and Hayden, 2015). Loewenstein (1994) and Golman and Loewenstein (2018) described curiosity as the information gap between what we know and what we want to know. Suppose “what we know” is defined as a measure of information, which is the probability of each outcome being realized. For example, when tossing a coin, the measure of information is 0.5 because the outcome is 50% head and 50% tail. Similarly, the measure of information of drawing a dice is $1/6$. In the same way, the measure of information (“what we know”) of Advisor A and Advisor B is 0.5 and 0.2 each. After receiving the signal, the information measures (“what we want to know”) will be 1 for both. Therefore, curiosity for signals of Advisors A and B, which is the gap between the measure of information before and after the signal, is 0.5 and 0.7 each. Hence, the preference for larger signal space is consistent with the view of curiosity.

Several questions remain unanswered at present. This paper discloses the preference for larger signal space when the signal space size is between 2 and 5. However, the result does not verify the optimal size of the signal space. Decision-makers might prefer larger space even when the signal space is extremely large enough. Or, maybe there exists the most preferred size somewhere.

Another question is whether the results can be generalized into a non-binary action space or even a continuous one. The experimental design of this paper restricts the action space to binary. In reality, however, actions are not necessarily binary. Hence, exploring whether the results of this paper still hold in a more generalized action space is also an interesting question. I hope future studies will answer these questions.

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A Appendix

A.1 Omitted Calculations

A.1.1 Investor Example

Suppose the investor gets a signal from Advisor A. The conditional probability that the company is good is given by

$$Pr(G|“invest”) = 0.7,$$

$$Pr(G|“not invest”) = 0.3.$$

Let *INVEST* or *NOT INVEST* denotes the investor’s action. When the signal is “invest”, then the investor will invest in the company, because $Pr(G|“invest”) = 0.7 >$

0.5. In this case, her expected utility is

$$\begin{aligned}
 &u(\text{signal}=\text{"invest"}) \\
 &= 0.7u(\text{INVEST}, G) + 0.3u(\text{INVEST}, B) \\
 &= 0.7 * 1 + 0.3 * 0 = 0.7.
 \end{aligned}$$

Otherwise, she will not invest because $Pr(G|\text{"not invest"}) = 0.3 < 0.5$. Her expected utility is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 &u(\text{signal}=\text{"not invest"}) \\
 &= 0.3u(\text{NOT INVEST}, G) + 0.7u(\text{NOT INVEST}, B) \\
 &= 0.3 * 0 + 0.7 * 1 = 0.7.
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the expected utility when receiving Advisor A's signal is

$$\begin{aligned}
 &0.5u(\text{signal}=\text{"invest"}) + 0.5u(\text{signal}=\text{"not invest"}) \\
 &= 0.5 * 0.7 + 0.5 * 0.7 = 0.7.
 \end{aligned}$$

Suppose the investor hires Advisor B. The conditional probability of the state is

$$\begin{aligned}
 &Pr(G|\text{"strongly recommend"}) = 0.8, \\
 &Pr(G|\text{"recommend"}) = 0.7, \\
 &Pr(G|\text{"no opinion"}) = 0.5, \\
 &Pr(G|\text{"not recommend"}) = 0.3, \\
 &Pr(G|\text{"never recommend"}) = 0.2.
 \end{aligned}$$

If the signal is "strongly recommend" or "recommend," then the investor will invest because $Pr(G|\text{"strongly recommend"}) = 0.8 > 0.5$ and $Pr(G|\text{"recommend"}) =$

0.7 > 0.5. If the signal is “no opinion,” then she is indifferent between investing or not because $Pr(G|“no opinion”) = 0.5$. She will not invest if the signal is “not recommend” or “never recommend” because $Pr(G|“not recommend”) = 0.3 < 0.5$ and $Pr(G|“never recommend”) = 0.2 < 0.5$.

Hence, when Advisor B’s signal is “strongly recommend”, the expected utility is

$$\begin{aligned} u(\text{signal} = “strongly recommend”) & \\ &= 0.8u(INVEST, G) + 0.2u(INVEST, B) \\ &= 0.8 * 1 + 0.2 * 0 = 0.8. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} u(\text{signal} = “recommend”) &= 0.7, \\ u(\text{signal} = “no opinion”) &= 0.5, \\ u(\text{signal} = “not recommend”) &= 0.7, \\ u(\text{signal} = “never recommend”) &= 0.8. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the expected utility of receiving a signal from Adviosr B is

$$\begin{aligned} &0.2u(\text{signal} = “strongly recommend”) + 0.2u(\text{signal} = “recommend”) + 0.2u(\text{signal} = “no opinion”) \\ &+ 0.2u(\text{signal} = “not recommend”) + 0.2u(\text{signal} = “never recommend”) \\ &= 0.2 * 0.8 + 0.2 * 0.7 + 0.2 * 0.5 + 0.2 * 0.7 + 0.2 * 0.8 = 0.7. \end{aligned}$$

A.1.2 Expected Utility

When the cost of the signal is c , the expected utility of each lottery is,

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{EU}(L_1(c)) &= 0.7u(100 - c) \\
U_{EU}(L_2(c)) &= \frac{2}{3}(0.8u(100 - c) + 0.2u(-c)) + \frac{1}{3}(0.5u(100 - c) + 0.5u(-c)), \\
U_{EU}(L_3(c)) &= \frac{1}{2}(0.8u(100 - c) + 0.2u(-c)) + \frac{1}{2}(0.6u(100 - c) + 0.6u(-c)), \\
U_{EU}(L_4(c)) &= \frac{2}{5}(0.8u(100 - c) + 0.2u(-c)) + \frac{2}{5}(0.7u(100 - c) + 0.3u(-c)) \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{5}(0.5u(100 - c) + 0.5u(-c)).
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{EU}(L_1(0)) &= 0.7u(100) \\
U_{EU}(L_2(0)) &= \frac{2}{3}(0.8u(100)) + \frac{1}{3}(0.5u(100)), \\
U_{EU}(L_3(0)) &= \frac{1}{2}(0.8u(100)) + \frac{1}{2}(0.6u(100)), \\
U_{EU}(L_4(0)) &= \frac{2}{5}(0.8u(100)) + \frac{2}{5}(0.7u(100)) + \frac{1}{5}(0.5u(100)).
\end{aligned}$$

A.1.3 Recursive Smooth Ambiguity Preference

$V_1(c) \geq V_4(c)$ can be derived by the following procedure:

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{KMM}(L_1(c)) &= \phi(U(0.7)) \\
&\geq \frac{2}{5}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{2}{5}\phi(U(0.7)) + \frac{1}{5}\phi(U(0.5)) \\
&= U_{KMM}(L_4(c)).
\end{aligned}$$

Also, $V_3(c) \geq V_2(c)$:

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{KMM}(L_3(c)) &= \frac{1}{2}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{1}{2}\phi(U(0.6)) \\
&= \frac{1}{2}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{1}{2}\phi\left(\frac{1}{3}U(0.8) + \frac{2}{3}U(0.5)\right) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{1}{6}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{1}{3}\phi(U(0.5)) \\
&\geq \frac{2}{3}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{1}{3}\phi(U(0.5)) \\
&= U_{KMM}(L_2(c)),
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly, $V_4(c) \geq V_2(c)$:

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{KMM}(L_4(c)) &= \frac{2}{5}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{2}{5}\phi(U(0.7)) + \frac{1}{5}\phi(U(0.5)) \\
&= \frac{2}{5}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{2}{5}\phi\left(\frac{2}{3}U(0.8) + \frac{1}{3}U(0.5)\right) + \frac{1}{5}\phi(U(0.5)) \\
&\geq \frac{2}{5}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{4}{15}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{2}{15}\phi(U(0.5)) + \frac{1}{5}\phi(U(0.5)) \\
&= \frac{2}{3}\phi(U(0.8)) + \frac{1}{3}\phi(U(0.5)) \\
&= U_{KMM}(L_2(c)),
\end{aligned}$$