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# BinGo: Cross-Architecture Cross-OS Binary Search

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## ABSTRACT

Binary code search has received much attention recently due to its impactful applications, e.g., plagiarism detection, malware detection and software vulnerability auditing. However, developing an effective binary code search tool is challenging due to the gigantic syntax and structural differences in binaries resulted from different compilers, architectures and OSs. In this paper, we propose BINGO—a scalable and robust binary search engine supporting various architectures and OSs. The key contribution is a selective inlining technique to capture the complete function semantics by inlining relevant library and user-defined functions. In addition, architecture and OS neutral function filtering is proposed to dramatically reduce the irrelevant target functions. Besides, we introduce length variant partial traces to model binary functions in a program structure agnostic fashion. The experimental results show that BINGO can find semantic similar functions across architecture and OS boundaries, even with the presence of program structure distortion, in a scalable manner. Using BINGO, we also discovered a zero-day vulnerability in Adobe PDF Reader, a COTS binary.

## CCS Concepts

•Theory of computation → Program analysis; •Security and privacy → Vulnerability scanners; •Social and professional topics → Software reverse engineering;

## Keywords

Binary Code Searching, Vulnerability Matching

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Recently, binary code searching has attracted much attention for its important applications in software engineering and security, e.g., software plagiarism detection [28], reverse engineering [8], semantic recovery [25], malware detection [30] and buggy (vulnerable) code identification [31, 11] in various software components where the source code is not available (e.g., legacy applications). We can even search for zero-day vulnerabilities in proprietary binary by matching the known vulnerability from open source software.

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Traditional source code search relies on the similarity analysis of some representations of source code, e.g., approaches based on token [24], abstract syntax tree (AST) [22] or program dependency graph (PDG) [18]. All these representations capture the structural information of the program, and yield accurate results for source code search. However, code search in binary is much more challenging due to many factors (e.g., architecture and OS choice, compiler type, optimization level or even obfuscation technique) and limited availability of high-level program information. These factors have a substantial influence on the assembly instructions and their final layout in the compiled binary executable.

In the literature, various approaches have been proposed to detect the similar binary code by using static or dynamic analysis. Static analysis [11, 35, 28, 31, 37] relies on the syntactical and structural information of binaries, especially control-flow structures (i.e., organization of basic blocks within a function) to perform the matching. For example, TRACY [11] is a syntax based function matching technique that uses similarity by decomposition, CoP [28] is a plagiarism detection tool that combines program semantics with longest common subsequence based fuzzy matching and [31] is a vulnerability matching tool that supports cross-architecture analysis via the invariants of vulnerability signatures. Most recently, DISCOVRE [37] is proposed to find bugs in binaries across-architectures in a scalable manner, where it uses two filters (numeric and structural) to quickly locate the functions that are similar to the signature function. Apart from static analysis, dynamic approaches [23, 36, 21, 15, 16] inspect the invariants of input-output or intermediate values of program at runtime to check the equivalence of binary programs. For example, BLEX [16] is the latest dynamic function matching tool that uses several semantic features obtained during function execution (e.g., values read from (written to) the program heap) in the matching process.

To better understand the existing approaches, we identify three desired properties for an accurate yet scalable cross-architecture and cross-OS binary search tool.

- **P1.** Resilient to the syntax and structural gaps introduced due to architecture, OS and compiler differences.
- **P2.** Accurate by considering the complete function semantics.
- **P3.** Scalable to large size real world binaries.

Unfortunately, none of the existing techniques can achieve all the desired properties above. The structural information used by the static approaches, e.g., basic-block structures used in [28, 31, 37] and fixed length tracelet in [11], fail P1. Most static analysis techniques [11, 31, 37] cannot satisfy P2 as they ignore the semantics of relevant library and user-defined function invocations in the matching process. Finally, scalability (P3) is a real challenge in semantic binary matching [31, 28, 16], where, for example, CoP took half a day to

find target functions in Firefox for a few signature functions [28]. The details are further elaborated in §2.2.

In this paper, we propose a binary search engine, named BINGO, which performs *semantic matching* by combining a set of key techniques to address the challenges above. Given a binary function, BINGO first inlines relevant libraries and user-defined functions in order to capture the complete semantics of the function (for P2), then shortlists the candidate target functions using an architecture and OS neutral filtering technique (for P3), and finally extracts length variant partial traces from the candidate target functions as function models (for P1) and performs function similarity matching using machine learning techniques.

Technically, first, to recover the complete semantics from the functions under investigation, we propose a *selective inlining* technique, where the callee (both libraries and user-defined) functions are inlined into the caller such that the complete function semantics are captured [38] (§3). To avoid code size explosion, we selectively inline the callee functions based on the invocation dependency patterns, which differs from the traditional compiler inlining optimization techniques for maximum speed or minimum size [10]. To our best knowledge, this work is the first attempt towards investigating selective inlining in recovering binary semantics.

Second, to improve the scalability of our approach, we propose an *architecture and OS neutral filtering* technique that narrows down the search space by shortlisting the candidate target functions for binary semantic matching (§4). Next, to overcome the challenges arise due to basic-block structure distortion (§5), we generate *function models*, which are agnostic to the underlying program structure, via the length variant partial traces<sup>1</sup>. To this end, for each function, partial traces of length 1 to  $k$  are extracted to form the function model such that it represents the function at various granularity levels. Here, we also take measure to minimize the effects of infeasible paths and compiler specific code in calculating the function similarity scores.

Finally, semantic features are extracted from the function models of candidate target functions, for function similarity scoring, where semantic features capture the machine state transitions in the form of input-output pairs (§5). We evaluate BINGO on a number of real-world binaries containing hundreds of thousands of functions. The experimental results show that BINGO can effectively perform cross-architecture and cross-OS binary code search on these binaries, where we demonstrate that BINGO outperforms the state-of-the-art binary matching tools such as BINDIFF [17] and TRACY [11]. Further, we also show that recent techniques, such as [31] and [37], fail in case of program structure distortion, while BINGO can handle such cases swiftly. Last but not least, using BINGO, we discovered a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2016-0933) in the Adobe PDF Reader.

**Key contributions.** This work makes the following contributions:

- We propose a selective inlining algorithm to capture the complete semantic of the binary functions.
- We introduce an architecture and OS neutral function filtering process that helps narrow down the target function search space.
- We leverage on length variant partial traces to model the function at various granularity levels that is agnostic to underlying program structures.
- We empirically demonstrate that BINGO outperforms the state-of-the-art binary function matching tools, and also report the zero-day vulnerability discovered from Adobe PDF Reader.

<sup>1</sup>A partial trace refers to a sequence of basic-blocks that lie along an execution path in the CFG [11].




Figure 1: Code segment responsible for Heartbleed vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160) appeared as in the binary (a) compiled with gcc, and (b) compiled with mingw

## 2. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

In this section, we provide a motivating example that emphasizes on the need for complete semantics analysis of functions and necessity to have a function model that is agnostic to underlying program structure. Then, we explain the basic idea of our proposed solution and sketch the system overview.

### 2.1 Motivating Example

A binary program consists of a number of functions, where each function is a (directed) graph of basic blocks, i.e., CFG (control-flow graph). The instructions in a function are systematically grouped into several basic blocks, which are considered as the building blocks of binary program and this representation is used by many static binary analysis tools.

Interestingly, the same source code may have different basic-block structures after compilation. Taking the infamous heartbleed vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160) for example, Fig. 1(a) and (b) show the basic-block structures of the same source code compiled with gcc and mingw, respectively<sup>2</sup>. Apparently, these two binary code segments share no identical basic-block structures — with gcc, the vulnerable code is represented as a single basic block; with mingw, represented as several basic blocks. A detailed inspection suggests that the library function `memcpy` is inlined in mingw version; while in gcc, it is not. The large syntactic and program structural differences between the two binaries pose the biggest challenge for the existing binary code search tools.

### 2.2 Challenges for Existing Approaches

Syntax is the most direct information usable for binary matching. Most of existing approaches rely on syntax information have attempted to use instruction patterns [20, 27, 35, 11]. As there is no consistent low-level syntax representation (i.e., assembly instructions) across architectures, these approaches fail for cross-architecture analysis. To make the matching resilient to syntax differences in binaries, semantics-based matching has been proposed [28, 31], in which the machine state transition represents the semantics of a binary. Still, three challenges are faced in semantics-based matching.

**C1: The challenge of using program structural properties.** Existing approaches [28, 31] assume that basic-block structure is pre-

<sup>2</sup>Ignore the contents of the basic-blocks, this diagram is to illustrate the program structure (CFG) distortion arise due to compilation.




Figure 2: BINGO system architecture

served across binaries, thus the matching should be basic-block centric. Based on this, semantic features extracted from the signature function at basic-block level are compared with the counterparts extracted from target functions in a pairwise way. In practise, the assumption is too restrictive to be applied for real-world cases. The following quote from [31] clearly sums up the problem in such assumption: *"Our metric is sensitive to the CFG and the segmentation of the basic block, which we found to be potentially problematic especially for smaller functions."* For example, the basic block in Fig. 1(a) needs to be matched with several basic blocks in Fig. 1(b).

### C2. The challenge of covering the complete function semantics.

Most of the existing static techniques consider functions in isolation, i.e., semantics of callee functions are not considered as part of the caller's semantics. This leads to partial semantics problem, especially when the programmer makes the most commonly used code segment as an independent function or implements her own version of the standard C library functions (e.g., Adobe Reader has its own `malloc` implementation). To address this, one can *blindly* inline all the callee functions (e.g., in [38], all the user-defined functions are inlined). Unfortunately, this approach does not work in practise due to two main reasons: (1) heavy inlining may lead to code size explosion [10], which is not scalable to real-world binary analysis, and (2) not all the callee functions are closely related to the caller function in-terms of functionality. For example, `memcpy` is not inlined in Fig. 1(a) but it is in Fig. 1(b). Thus, `memcpy` needs to be inlined for matching with other semantically relevant functions.

**C3. The challenge of scalable searching in large real-world binaries.** Syntax based techniques, in general, are scalable [11]. However, as discussed earlier, they fail on cross-architecture analysis. To address this problem, semantics based techniques are preferred, however, extracting semantic features incur heavy overhead and not scalable. Therefore, to facilitate scalable semantic matching, an *efficient*, and architecture, OS and compiler *neutral* function filtering step is required. However, existing approaches focus only on the efficiency aspect of the filter. For example, in [37], only program structural features, such as number of basic blocks, are used as filters to speed up. However, as shown in Fig. 1, such features are not robust enough for cross-architecture, OS and compiler analysis.

## 2.3 Proposed Solution and System Overview

We propose BINGO as a scalable binary search engine, where given a binary function, BINGO will return the functions from the target binary, ranked based on their semantic similarity.

Fig. 2 shows the work flow of BINGO. First, given a signature function, BINGO will pre-process the binaries, i.e., disassemble and build CFGs from the functions, for further analysis. Next, for each function, in the target binaries, closely related library and other user-defined functions are identified and inlined (§3). Then from these inlined target functions, a list of candidate functions that are similar to the signature function are shortlisted using three filters, which consider different aspects of the program semantics (§4). Next, from the signature and the shortlisted target functions, length variant partial traces are generated (§5.1), which are then

grouped to form the function models (§5.4). During the partial trace generation phase, trace pruning is conducted to remove the irrelevant and infeasible partial traces from the analysis (§5.3). After that, semantic features are extracted from the function models (§5.2), which are later used for semantic similarity matching (§5.4). Finally, based on the similarity scores obtained, BINGO returns the target functions that are semantically similar to the signature function in a ranked order.

To sum up, to address the syntax differences of instructions, we lift the low-level assembly instructions into a corresponding intermediate representation (IR) to facilitate cross-architecture analysis. To mitigate C1 (e.g., single basic-block in the signature function matching to several basic-blocks in the target function in Fig. 1), we borrow the idea of tracelet used in TRACY [11]. Different from the original approach that uses a fixed length of tracelet, we use length variant partial traces. Next, to overcome C2 (e.g., whether to inline `memcpy` in Fig. 1(a)), we propose a selective inlining strategy to strike a balance between the needed contextual semantics and the overheads due to inlining. Finally, to address C3, we adopt three filters considering different aspects of the semantics to identify similar functions.

## 3. SELECTIVE INLINING

Inlining is a compiler technique to optimize the binaries for maximum speed and/or minimum size [10]. This section presents our selective inlining technique, which has a different goal and strategy compared with compilation process.

### 3.1 Function Invocation Patterns

In order to inline relevant functions, we use the function invocation patterns to guide the inlining decision. Based on our study, six commonly-observed invocation patterns are identified and summarised in Fig. 3. Incoming (outgoing) edges in Fig. 3 represent the incoming (outgoing) calls to (from) the function. Here, we elaborate the six patterns as follows.

**Case 1:** Fig. 3(a) depicts the direct invocation of standard C library function(s) by the caller function under investigation. To recover the semantics, it is essential to understand the semantics of called library function(s), hence, the library function is inlined into the caller function. Currently, we only consider the most common standard C library functions from both Linux (`libc`) and Windows (`msvcrt`) for inlining.

**Case 2:** Fig. 3(b) depicts the case of a recursive relationship between the caller and the UD (user-defined) callee function  $f$ . Hence, we inline  $f$  into its caller. Note that the recursive functions are, unlike in compilers, inlined only once. For example, `gcc` has a default inlining depth of 8 for recursive functions.

**Case 3:** Fig. 3(c) depicts the common pattern of a *utility function* — e.g., the UD callee function  $f$  is called by many other UD functions, while  $f$  calls several *library functions* and a very few (or zero) UD functions. This suggests that  $f$  is behaving as a utility function, as  $f$  has some semantics that is commonly needed by other functions, and hence  $f$  is likely to be inlined.

**Case 4:** The UD callee function  $f$  in Fig. 3(d) is a variant of 3(c), where it has several references to library functions and *zero* reference to other UD functions. Such zero reference to UD functions makes  $f$  an ideal candidate for inlining. Note that  $f$  is inlined as the majority (50% or more) of its invoked library functions are not of termination type. Hence, we can safely assume that  $f$  is doing much more than just facilitating program termination. Here, termination type refers to the library functions that leads to exception or program




Figure 3: Commonly observed function invocation patterns, where ‘UD’ denotes user-defined callee function. Here, all the incoming and outgoing edges (or calls) represent user-defined functions, unless specified as *Libcall* or *Termination Libcall* next to them

#### Algorithm 1: Selective inlining algorithm

**Data:** caller  $\mathcal{F}$ , set of callee functions  $\mathcal{C}$ , set of termination lib. func.  $\mathcal{L}_t$ , set of inlining lib. func.  $\mathcal{L}_s$   
**Result:** inlined function  $\mathcal{F}^I$

```

1 Algorithm SelectiveInline( $\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{L}_s, \mathcal{L}_t$ )
2   foreach function  $f$  in  $\mathcal{C}$  do
3     // inline selected library functions
4     if  $f \in \mathcal{L}_s$  then
5        $\mathcal{F}^I \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.inline(f)$ 
6       return  $\mathcal{F}^I$ 
7     else if  $f \notin \mathcal{L}_s$  && isLibCall( $f$ ) then
8       return null
9     // for all other user-defined callee functions
10     $I_u^f \leftarrow getIncomingCalls(f)$ 
11     $O_u^f, O_l^f \leftarrow getOutgoingCalls(f)$ 
12     $O_u^f \leftarrow O_u^f \setminus \mathcal{F}$  // remove recursion
13    if  $|O_u^f| == 0$  &&  $(|O_l^f \cap \mathcal{L}_s| - |O_l^f \cap \mathcal{L}_t|) \leq 0$  then
14      return null
15    else
16       $\alpha = \lambda_e / (\lambda_e + \lambda_a)$  where  $\lambda_a = |I_u^f|$ ,  $\lambda_e = |O_u^f|$ 
17      // lower the  $\alpha$ , function  $f$  is likely to be inlined
18      if  $\alpha > \text{threshold } t$  && notRecursive( $\mathcal{F}, f$ ) then
19        return null
20      else
21         $\mathcal{F}^I \leftarrow \mathcal{F}.inline(f)$ 
22        if  $|O_u^f| > 0$  then
23          SelectiveInline( $f, O_u^f, \mathcal{L}_s, \mathcal{L}_t$ )
24        else
25          return  $\mathcal{F}^I$ 
26  return  $\mathcal{F}^I$ 

```

termination (e.g., `exit` and `abort`).

**Case 5:** In Fig. 3(e), The UD callee function  $f$  is a variant of 3(d), which has only references to library functions. However, all the invoked library functions in  $f$  are of termination type. Hence, we consider as a function that facilitates only program termination (or exception handling) and its semantics are of little interest to the caller, which should not be inlined.

**Case 6:** Fig 3(f) depicts the scenario of a *dispatcher* function where the UD function  $f$  is called by (i.e., incoming calls) many other UD functions and  $f$  itself calls many other UD and library functions. In this case,  $f$  appears to be a dispatcher function without much unique semantics, and hence, in most cases, not inlined.

### 3.2 Inline Decision Algorithm

From the discussions above, in Fig. 3 (a), (b), (d) and (e) there is a clear criteria in deciding whether a callee should be inlined or not. However, for Fig. 3 (c) and (f), the most commonly observed invocation patterns, a systematic decision making procedure is still needed. To identify the cases of commonly-used functions (i.e., utility functions) to be inlined, we borrow the *coupling* concept from the software quality and architecture recovery community. In software metrics, the coupling between two software packages is measured by the dependency between them, e.g., the software package instability metrics [29]. In this work, similarly, we measure the function coupling by the *function coupling score*.




Figure 4: Library function abstraction levels

**Definition 1. Function Coupling Score** refers to the complexity of the invocations involved in a function and is calculated as  $\alpha = \lambda_e / (\lambda_e + \lambda_a)$ , where  $\lambda_a$  represents the number of UD functions that refers to the callee, and  $\lambda_e$  represents the number of UD functions that is referred to by the callee.

The lower the value of  $\alpha$ , more likely the callee should be inlined. The rationale is that the low function coupling score implies the high independency of the functionality — the high possibility of being utility function. When calculating  $\lambda_e$ , we only consider the UD functions invoked by the callee, not the library functions. As mentioned in case 3 (Fig. 3(c)) and 6 (Fig. 3(f)), it is the invocations of UD functions that indicate the behavior of the callee as a dispatcher or a utility function, not the invocations of library functions.

The proposed selective inlining process is presented in Algorithm 1. As first, if the callee is one of the selected library functions (e.g., `memcpy` and `strlen` as in case 1), it is directly inlined into the caller (lines 3-5) and rest of the library functions are ignored. Next, the UD functions that refer to the callee is denoted as  $I_u^f$ ; while the library and UD functions referred to by the callee are identified and denoted as  $O_l^f$  and  $O_u^f$ , respectively at line 8-9. Callee that invokes only library functions that are of termination type is not inlined (lines 11-12). Finally, for the rest of the callee functions, the function coupling score is calculated and if it is below some threshold value  $t$ , the callee is inlined (lines 13-24). This recursive procedure is continued until all the related functions are analysed. In our preliminary study on `BusyBox` compiled for x86 32bit, we identify that 14 UD utility functions (Case 3) have more than 50 incoming calls with 1 outgoing call, while 12 UD dispatcher functions (Case 6) have more than 50 outgoing call with just 1 incoming call. Similarly, in `BusyBox` compiled for ARM, we identify 15 such UD utility functions but only 4 UD dispatcher functions. This clearly differentiates the function invocation patterns depicted in Fig. 3(c) (Case 3) and Fig. 3(f) (Case 6).

## 4. FUNCTION FILTERING

To deal with a huge number of target functions in real-world binaries, an effective filtering process can remove irrelevant target functions before the expensive matching step. `BINGO` leverages on three types of filters, starting from the specific one (fine-grained) to the most general one (coarse-grained), to shortlist the candidate target functions.

**Filter 1:** The first type of filters looks for identical library call invocations in the target functions that are present in the signature function. If such library function invocations are found, the corresponding targets functions are considered good candidates for



further processing. This is due to the fact that the library call invocations provide an important partial semantics of the function. However, this filter is OS dependent and fails to support library calls that have different names yet with similar functionality (e.g., `memcpy` and `memmove`). This limitation leads to our next filter.

**Filter 2:** To address the problem in exact library call matching, we consider the library call operation types, where we match the high-level functionality of the library calls. As shown in Fig. 4, there are several ways of abstracting the functionality of a library call. Abstraction level 0 gives the base operation type (e.g., *string* operation), while level 1 gives a more concrete but general abstraction supported across all OSs. For example, `strcpy` and `strcat` can be mapped to *string manipulation* operation. In this work, we adopt abstraction level 1 to summarize the library function behavior. Further, Filter 2 is OS neutral, where functions that perform similar task but with different names across OSs are mapped to the same operation type. For example, `malloc` (Windows/Linux) and `HeapAlloc` (Windows) are mapped to *memory allocation* operation type as shown in Fig. 4. Unfortunately, library calls can be inlined by the compiler or programmers might implement the same functionality in user-defined functions. Hence, relying on library call names or the operation types might not be sufficient to identify candidate target functions. To address this, we propose Filter 3.

**Filter 3:** The third filter is designed to capture the instruction type similarities between the signature and target functions. Here, instruction type refers to a high-level operation carried out by an instruction [26]. To this end, instructions are categorized into 14 and 8 instruction types for Intel and ARM architectures, respectively. For example, `mov` instruction is mapped to *data movement* instruction type while `push` is mapped to *stack operation*. In addition, instruction types also support cross-architecture function matching, where assembly instructions from ARM and Intel architectures are mapped to the same instruction type even though they are not identical at the instruction level, e.g., `call` (Intel) and `bl` (ARM) instructions are mapped to *function invocation* instruction type.

**Filtering Algorithm** Filter 1 is specific and OS dependent. Filter 2 and 3 are general and cross-OS and cross-architecture. Our filtering process is shown in Algorithm 2. At lines 7, 9 and 11, we use Jaccard distance [9] to measure the similarity between the signature and target functions in terms of each filter, i.e., their similarity in identical library calls, in library call operation types, and in instruction types. Following the design of applying the filters one by one from the most specific one to the general one, we set the weights ( $w_1 > w_2 > w_3 > 0$ ) to the similarities achieved by Filter 1 to 3. At line 12, we sort the candidate functions according to the overall similarity on three filters (calculated at line 10). Finally, at line 13, we get the top  $N$  of the sorting results and use them for function model matching. Note that our filtering process is performed after selective inlining step, hence we keep a mapping from the candidate function to its invoked libraries in order to apply the filters.

## 5. SCALABLE FUNCTION MATCHING

In BINGO, similarity matching is done at the granularity of function and/or sub-function levels. To this end, we propose function models consisting of length variant partial traces that are more flexible, in terms of comparison granularity, compared to basic-block centric function models [31, 28]. Then, from these partial traces we extract symbolic expressions and based on the I/O samples generated from these symbolic expressions, we match the partial traces inside two functions. To reduce the noise, we remove the partial traces

### Algorithm 2: Function Filtering Algorithm

---

**Data:** signature function  $f$ , set of target functions  $\mathcal{T}$   
**Result:** set of candidate target functions  $\mathcal{T}_c$

---

```

1 Algorithm FunFilter ()
2    $S \leftarrow \{\}$  // store similarity score
3   Get the set of library call names  $\mathcal{L}_f$ , library call operation types  $\mathcal{O}_f$ 
   and function instruction type  $\mathcal{I}_f$  from the signature function  $f$ .
4   foreach function  $t$  in  $\mathcal{T}$  do
5      $s^t \leftarrow 0$ 
6      $\mathcal{L}_t \leftarrow \text{getLibFuncNameList}(t)$  // Filter 1
7      $s^t \leftarrow w_1 * \text{getLibFuncNameJaccardSim}(\mathcal{L}_f, \mathcal{L}_t)$ 
8      $\mathcal{O}_t \leftarrow \text{getLibFuncOpType}(\mathcal{L}_t)$  // Filter 2
9      $s^t \leftarrow w_2 * \text{getLibFuncOpTypeJaccardSim}(\mathcal{O}_f, \mathcal{O}_t)$ 
10     $\mathcal{I}_t \leftarrow \text{getFuncInstrType}(t)$  // Filter 3
11     $s^t \leftarrow w_3 * \text{getFuncInstrTypeJaccardSim}(\mathcal{I}_f, \mathcal{I}_t)$ 
12     $S[t] = s^t$ 
13   $S^s \leftarrow \text{sortCanditTargetFunc}(S)$  // sort target functions
14   $\mathcal{T}_c \leftarrow \text{topNTargetFunc}(S^s, N)$ 
15  return  $\mathcal{T}_c$ 

```

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


Figure 5: A sample CFG (a) and the extracted length-3 (b) and length-2 (c) partial traces

that are infeasible to reach (via solving the symbolic expressions) or are specific to compilers. Lastly, we apply Jaccard containment similarity [3] to measure the similarity score of two function models.

### 5.1 Length Variant Partial Trace Extraction

Our partial trace extraction is based on the technique proposed by David *et al.* [11]. We omit the algorithm and explain the results using one example (please refer to [11] for more information on partial trace extraction). Fig. 5 depicts a sample CFG of a function and the extracted length-2 and length-3 partial traces. We can observe that the original control-flow instructions (`jnb`, and `jb`) are omitted as the flow of execution is already determined. Note that the feasibility of the flow of executions is not considered at this step. In §5.3.1, we show how the partial traces that are *infeasible* to reach are identified and pruned.

### 5.2 Semantic Feature Extraction

Similar to [31] and [28], a set of symbolic formulas (called, *symbolic expressions*) are extracted from each partial trace, where they capture the effects of executing the partial trace on the machine state. Here, machine state is characterized by a 3-tuple  $\langle mem, reg, flag \rangle$  denoting the memory *mem*, general-purpose registers *reg* and the condition-code flags *flag* [31, 28]. For example, if a machine state, before executing a partial trace, is given by  $\mathcal{X} = \langle mem, reg, flag \rangle$ , then the machine state immediately after execution is given by  $\mathcal{X}' = \langle mem', reg', flag' \rangle$ . Here,  $\mathcal{X}$  and  $\mathcal{X}'$  are referred to as *pre*- and *post*-state, respectively, and the symbolic expressions capture the relationship between these pre and post machine states.

In order to measure the similarity between a signature and a target function, one can use a constraint solver, such as Z3 [12], to calculate the semantic *equivalence* between the symbolic expressions extracted from the signature and target functions. However, using a constraint solver to measure semantic equivalence is very expensive [28] and not scalable for real-world cases, considering the complexity of pair-wise matching between the signature and a

```

mov  eax, gs : 20
mov  [ebp - 12], eax
xor  eax, eax
...
mov  eax, [ebp - 12]
xor  eax, gs : 20
jne  .L5

```

} compiler specific code in function prologue

} compiler specific code in function epilogue

Figure 6: Sample code generated by gcc to enable Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) compiler feature

possible huge number of target functions. To tackle the scalability issue, in [31], a machine learning technique is applied. Specifically, Input/Output (or I/O) samples are randomly generated from the symbolic expressions and are fed into the machine learning module to find semantically *similar* functions. Here, I/O samples are generated by assigning concrete values to the pre-state variables and obtaining the corresponding output values (concrete) for the post-state variables in the symbolic expressions.

One of the drawbacks in randomly generating I/O samples is that the dependency among symbolic expressions are ignored [31]. For example, consider the following two symbolic expressions extracted from a single partial trace:

$$zf' \equiv (edx < 2) \wedge (edx > 0) \quad (1)$$

$$ecx' \equiv edx + 4 \quad (2)$$

The symbolic expression in Eq. 1 has one pre-state (i.e.,  $edx$ ) and one post-state (i.e.,  $zf'$ ) variables, on the other hand, the symbolic expression in Eq. 2 has the same pre-state variable (i.e.,  $edx$ ) but a different post-state variable (i.e.,  $ecx'$ ). Therefore, we can conclude that these two symbolic expressions are mutually dependent through a common pre-state variable  $edx$ . However, in randomly generated I/O samples (as in [31]),  $edx$  can be assigned to two different values in each symbolic expression, which ignores the dependency and may lead to inaccurate semantics.

In the above example, to satisfy the symbolic expressions in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, the pre-state variable  $edx$  needs to be set to 1, which makes the post-state variables  $zf'$  to be true and  $ecx'$  to be 5. From this example, it is evident that constraint solving is required to find appropriate values for pre- and post-state variables, as it considers all the symbolic expressions from the same partial trace into consideration when arriving at the solution. To this end, we use Z3 constraint solver to generate the I/O samples. Generating I/O samples via Z3 is much more scalable than using it to prove the equivalence of two symbolic expressions — I/O sample generation is a one-time job for each partial trace, while equivalence checking (as in [28]) uses the constraint solver every single time a partial trace is compared with another one. In many cases, there are more than one concrete value for any pre- or post-state variable that satisfy all the symbolic expressions. Thus, we set an upper limit  $\mathcal{N}$  for possible values. According to the study in [16],  $\mathcal{N}$  is set to 3 in our design.

## 5.3 Trace Pruning

In BINGO, we adopt two trace pruning methods to reduce the noise in the results and also to speed up the matching process.

### 5.3.1 Infeasible Partial Trace Pruning

BINGO is a static analysis based tool and therefore, it is difficult (or even impossible) to identify all the infeasible partial traces in practice. In BINGO, we prune the obvious infeasible partial traces with the help of the constraint solver. That is, given the symbolic expressions, extracted from a partial trace, we rely on the constraint solver to determine whether all the constraints can be satisfied. As




Figure 7: A sample signature (a) and target (b) functions, where the lines indicate the matched partial traces and the nodes refer to the basic-blocks.

we use constraint solver to generate the I/O samples (§5.2), we need no additional effort to identify the infeasible partial traces — if the constraint solver is unable to find appropriate concrete values for the pre- and post-state variables, the relevant partial trace is considered infeasible.

We also observe that some partial traces, for which the solver is able to generate models (or I/O samples), might be infeasible during actual execution, as the feasibility of their paths depends on various other factors, such as global variables, values in the heap and other dynamic data, that are beyond the scope of our analysis. Further, in general, infeasible path elimination (or detection) by itself is a hard problem [5]. However, compared with the static analysis solutions proposed in the literature [11, 32, 31], this work makes an attempt to reduce the search candidates using a pruning technique.

### 5.3.2 Compiler Specific Code Pruning

Based on the compilation option selected, the compiler might include additional code (i.e., code that is not originally written by the programmer) into the compiled binary. For example, there are more than 150 compiler options available for both gcc and MS Visual Studio. Some of these options result in adding extra code into the binary (e.g., Stack Smashing Protector or SSP shown in Fig. 6). The code segments in the function prologue and epilogue in Fig. 6 ensure the stack integrity is not violated. These code segments are automatically included by the gcc compiler when stack smash protection is enabled.

In similarity matching between the signature and target functions, the additional compiler specific code can introduce noise by changing the code structures and diluting the similar parts, especially when the functions are small. Thus, it is necessary to identify and remove the compiler specific code from the partial traces. However, directly removing some code from a partial trace might lead to incorrect semantic features, as these features are very sensitive to the underlying code semantics. To this end, we propose a conservative approach to address this problem by generalizing the compiler specific code into some patterns and systematically pruning the partial traces that contain these patterns. That is, instead of removing the compiler specific code from a partial trace, which is error prone, we just remove the partial trace itself if the compiler specific code pattern accounts for the majority (50% or more) of the code.

## 5.4 Function Matching

In BINGO, we leverage on length variant partial traces to model the functions. We generate partial traces with three different lengths (i.e.,  $k = 1, 2$  and  $3$ ) from each function, all of which collectively constitute the function model. For example, the function models generated from the signature ( $\mathcal{M}_{sig}$ ) and target ( $\mathcal{M}_{tar}$ ) functions shown in Fig. 7 are as follows:

$$\mathcal{M}_{sig} : \{ \langle 1 \rangle, \langle 2 \rangle, \dots, \langle 1, 2 \rangle, \langle 2, 5 \rangle, \dots, \langle 1, 2, 4 \rangle, \langle 2, 4, 7 \rangle, \dots \}$$

$$\mathcal{M}_{tar} : \{\langle c \rangle, \langle b \rangle, \dots, \langle a, b \rangle, \langle b, c \rangle, \dots, \langle a, b, c \rangle, \langle b, c, f \rangle, \dots\}$$

In BINGO, we support function model similarity matching in terms of *n-to-m*, *l-to-n*, *n-to-l* and *l-to-l* partial trace matching across signature and target functions, mitigating the impact of program structural difference.

***n-to-m*** Partial traces of length- $n$  ( $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$ ) generated from the signature function are matched against the partial traces of length- $m$  ( $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$ ) generated from the target function. In Fig. 7, partial traces  $\langle 3, 6, 8 \rangle$  and  $\langle d, g \rangle$  are in *3-to-2* matching.

***l-to-n*** Basic-blocks (partial trace of length 1) in the signature function are matched against the partial traces of length- $n$  ( $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$ ) generated from the target function. In Fig. 7, partial traces  $\langle 1 \rangle$  and  $\langle 5 \rangle$  are matched with  $\langle a, b \rangle$  and  $\langle f, h, i \rangle$ , respectively.

***n-to-l*** Partial traces of length- $n$  ( $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$ ) generated from the signature function are matched against the basic-blocks in the target function. In Fig. 7, partial trace  $\langle 4, 7, 9 \rangle$  is matched with  $\langle e \rangle$ .

***l-to-l*** Basic-blocks in the signature function are matched against Basic-blocks in the target function. In Fig. 7, partial trace  $\langle 2 \rangle$  is matched with  $\langle c \rangle$ .

*l-to-n* matching addresses the issue of basic-block splitting — a single basic block in the signature function is split into several smaller basic blocks in the target function. Similarly, *n-to-l* matching addresses the basic-block merging problem. In tracelet modeling [11], authors recommended that both the signature and target should be of the same size (i.e.,  $k = 3$ ), and hence only *n-to-n* matching is performed. In [31] and [28], pairwise comparison of single basic-block (i.e., *l-to-l* matching) is performed as an initial step to shortlist the candidate target functions. In contrast, in BINGO, all the above 4 types of function matchings are performed to cover all possible basic-block structure variances that arise due to architecture, OS and compiler differences. Finally, considering the function model as a bag of partial traces, Jaccard containment similarity [3] is used to measure the similarity score between two different function models, and is defined below:

$$sim(\mathcal{M}_{sig}, \mathcal{M}_{tar}) = \frac{\mathcal{M}_{sig} \cap \mathcal{M}_{tar}}{\mathcal{M}_{sig}} \quad (3)$$

where  $\mathcal{M}_{sig}$  and  $\mathcal{M}_{tar}$  refer to function models generated from signature and target functions, respectively.

## 6. IMPLEMENTATION

In BINGO, we use IDA Pro [2] to disassemble and generate CFGs from the functions in the binaries. Partial traces are generated from the function CFGs, using an IDA Pro plugin, where they are of three different lengths (length-1, 2 and 3). Finally, to extract semantic features, similar to [31] and [28], we lift the low-level assembly instructions to an architecture and OS independent intermediate language, REIL [14]. Based on our initial experiments, we set the function coupling score  $\alpha$  to 0.01 in the selective inlining algorithm (Algorithm 1). Similarly, filter weights  $w_1$  (for Filter 1),  $w_2$  (for Filter 2) and  $w_3$  (for Filter 3) are set to 1.0, 0.8 and 0.5, respectively in Algorithm 2. All the experiments were conducted on a machine with Intel Core i7-4702MQ@2.2GHz with 32GB DDR3-RAM.

## 7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Through our experiments, we aim at answering four research questions (RQs) categorized into three major topics, namely *robustness* (RQ1 and RQ2), *application* (RQ3) and *scalability* (RQ4):




Figure 8: Cross-architecture function matching before/after selective inlining using `coreutils` binaries. Here, **C** and **G** represent compilers `clang` and `gcc`, respectively, and 32 and 64 denote x86 32-bit and 64-bit architectures, respectively.

**RQ1.** How robust is BINGO in detecting *semantically equivalent* functions across architectures and compilers with code optimization?

**RQ2.** How robust is BINGO in identifying *semantically similar* functions, across OS, in *wild* binary executables?

**RQ3.** What are the key real-world applications of BINGO?

**RQ4.** How scalable is BINGO?

In RQ1, we evaluate the selective inlining algorithm to show its effectiveness. In RQ2, we compare BINGO with BINDIFF [17] and TRACY [11], indirectly showing the merits of using length variant partial traces in modelling functions. In RQ3, we evaluate BINGO in finding real-world vulnerabilities and compare it against discovRE [37] and [31]. Finally, in RQ4, we demonstrate the performance of BINGO by the virtue of the proposed function filtering.

### 7.1 Robustness

The robustness of BINGO lies in (1) matching *semantically equivalent* functions, and (2) matching *semantically similar* functions. RQ1 falls under criteria one as we aim to match all functions in binary *A* to all the functions in binary *B*, where they both stem from the same source code (i.e., syntactically identical at the source code level) but compiled for different architectures using different compilers and code optimization options. RQ2 focuses more on finding semantically similar functions across binaries that do not stem from the same source code (i.e., syntactically different even at the source-code level with different programming style and coding conventions). Through answering RQ1 and RQ2, we evaluate how good for BINGO to be a search engine that find wild binary executables that share no source-code but perform semantically similar operations.

#### 7.1.1 Answer to RQ1: Cross-architecture analysis.

We conduct two experiments. First experiment is to match all functions in `coreutils` binaries compiled for one architecture (i.e., x86 32-bit, x86 64-bit and ARM) to the semantically equivalent functions in binaries compiled for another architecture. For example, binaries compiled for ARM are matched against the binaries compiled for x86 32-bit and x86 64-bit architectures, and *vice versa*. In all three architectures, the compilation uses `gcc` (v4.8.2) and `clang` (v3.0) with the optimization level `O2` (default settings in many Linux distributions).

Fig. 8 summarizes the average results (before and after selective inlining) obtained for `coreutils` binaries, where we report the percentage of functions ranked one (i.e., best match). In the plot, the bar G64-G32 (after inlining) should be read as, when functions compiled, using `gcc`, for x86 64-bit architecture are used as signature, around 55% of the functions compiled, using `gcc`, for x86



Table 1: Total no. of functions selectively inlined in `coreutils` binaries compiled using `gcc` and `clang` for ARM, x86 32-bit and 64-bit architectures.

	ARM	C64	G64	C32	G32
Total functions	27,820	23,782	24,489	24,002	24,792
Inlined functions	1,620	776	1,002	823	1,188

Table 2: Percentage of functions ranked #1 in intra-compiler (x86 32-bit) comparison. Here, **G** and **G'** represent `gcc` v4.8.3 and v4.6 compilers, respectively.

	G0	G1	G2	G3		G'0	G'1	G'2	G'3
G'0	0.43	0.36	0.36	0.27	G0	0.44	0.4	0.41	0.42
G'1	0.37	0.46	0.48	0.36	G1	0.38	0.47	0.48	0.45
G'2	0.4	0.44	0.52	0.41	G2	0.4	0.49	0.52	0.5
G'3	0.4	0.44	0.49	0.49	G3	0.32	0.39	0.43	0.52

32-bit architecture achieve rank one. It is observed that when ARM binary functions are used as signatures, the overall results considerably degrade — only 18% of the functions are ranked one compare to x86 32-bit and 64-bit architectures, where it is around 41%. We also notice that matches (after inlining) between binaries compiled for ARM and x86 64-bit yield higher ranking compared to ARM and x86 32-bit binaries. The rationale is that ARM and x86 64-bit architectures are register intensive compared to x86 32-bit, where there are only 8 general-purpose registers in x86 32-bit architecture while there are 16 in 64-bit.

Considering the fact that `coreutils` binaries are relatively small with around 250 functions (on average) per binary, we conduct the second experiment using `BusyBox` (v1.21.1) that contains 2,410 functions. We observe that the obtained results are comparable with the results of `coreutils` binaries — on average 41.3% of the functions are ranked one in `BusyBox` while it is 35% for `coreutils` binaries across 16 experiments shown in Fig. 8. This is an improvement of 27.5% over the accuracy achieved by [31] for `BusyBox`. However, for top 10 matches (i.e., ranks 1-10), `coreutils` binaries achieve better results than `BusyBox` (78.4% vs. 67%). This result might be due to the number of function comparisons performed in each binary — in `BusyBox`, a function needs to be compared against, on average, 3,250 functions, and in `coreutils` only around 250 functions need to be compared per binary.

As shown in Fig. 8, our selective inlining significantly improves the overall matching accuracy by, on average, 150%. In particular, when ARM architecture is used as target, selective inlining improves the total matching accuracy by, on average, 400%. Table 1 summarizes the total number of functions inlined for each architecture. We notice that `coreutils` compiled for ARM contains more functions (27,820 across 103 binaries) than that compiled for x86 32-bit (avg. 24,397) and x86 64-bit (avg. 24,136). From the second row of Table 1, it can be seen that 61% and 82% more functions are selectively inlined by BINGO in ARM than that in x86 32-bit and 64-bit architectures, respectively. In ARM binaries, the larger number of functions suggests that compiler inlining does not happen as frequently as it does in the other two architectures. Hence, our selective inlining technique is required to capture the complete function semantics, which in return improves the matching accuracy.

### 7.1.2 Answer to RQ1: Cross-compiler analysis

Table 3 summarizes the results obtained by BINGO for different compilers (`gcc` and `clang`) with various optimization levels (O0, O1, O2 and O3) for x86 32-bit architecture. Here, each row and column of the table represents the compiler (including the level of optimization) used to compile the signature and target functions,

Table 3: Percentage of functions ranked #1 in inter-compiler (x86 32-bit) comparison. Here, **C** and **G** represent `clang` and `gcc` compilers, respectively and 0-3 represents optimization O0-O3.

	C0	C1	C2	C3	G0	G1	G2	G3
C0	-	0.402	0.373	0.372	0.371	0.4	0.451	0.332
C1	0.392	-	0.456	0.455	0.396	0.429	0.503	0.388
C2	0.345	0.426	-	0.576	0.344	0.411	0.488	0.478
C3	0.344	0.425	0.575	-	0.343	0.41	0.488	0.477
G0	0.344	0.354	0.334	0.333	-	0.374	0.398	0.302
G1	0.37	0.409	0.41	0.409	0.376	-	0.517	0.395
G2	0.412	0.462	0.474	0.473	0.428	0.514	-	0.48
G3	0.326	0.372	0.438	0.439	0.331	0.42	0.5	-

respectively. For example, the cell denoted by the second row and fifth column (C1G0) represents the result for which signature functions are compiled using `clang` with optimization level O1 and the target functions are compiled using `gcc` with O0. From the table, we observe that BINGO is very robust as, on average, 41.5% of the functions achieve rank one across all the experiments, while 84% of the functions ranked within top 10. We observed similar behaviour in binaries compiled for x86 64-bit architecture and due to space constraints, the results are reported in our tool webpage [1]. Further, in [1], for each experiment, we also report the results obtained by each binary (e.g., `ls`, `true`, etc...) in the `coreutils` suite.

Interestingly, we find that regardless of the compiler type, matches between the binaries that are compiled with high code optimization levels (i.e., O2 and O3) yield better results compare to matches between binaries with no code optimization (i.e., O0). That is, high code optimization levels lead to the similar binary code even with different compilers, whereas without optimization the influence of compiler in the binary is very evident. This observation is consistent with [31]. Further, within one compiler type (e.g., `gcc`), the matching accuracy achieved by optimization level O2, across all other compiler types and optimization levels, is always better or consistent with the results obtained by O3 (relevant rows are shaded in light gray in Table 3). This behaviour is observed in x86 64-bit architecture too.

Further, we repeated the experiments across different versions of the same compiler (`gcc` v4.8.3 vs. `gcc` v4.6) and the results (for x86 32-bit architecture) are summarized in Table 2. As expected, the highest accuracy is achieved when the signature and target functions are of the same optimization level, except when the signature functions are compiled with optimization level O1, where on such occasions, target functions compiled with optimization level O2 yield better accuracy. The best results obtained for each signature binary is highlighted in light gray in Table 2. In addition, we also observe that the overall accuracy for intra-compiler analysis (42.7%) is slightly better than the inter-compiler analysis (41.5%). Finally, in intra-compiler analysis, on average, 76.3% functions ranked within top 5 positions, whereas it is only 68.5% for inter-compiler analysis, an 11.8% improvement. Details on the results of intra-compiler analysis for x86 64-bit architecture are reported in [1].

Complying with the results reported in Section 7.1.1, we observe that selective inlining improves the average matching accuracy by around 140% for cross-compiler analysis. Many functions are inlined when the binaries are compiled with the optimization level O0 compared to O3. In particular, on average, 1,473 functions (across `gcc` and `clang`) are inlined in for optimization level O0 compare to only 831 for O3.

### 7.1.3 Answer to RQ2: Cross-OS analysis

To evaluate BINGO as a search engine for binary programs (i.e., matching against wild binaries that do not share the same source

Table 4: Rankings (top 10 matches) obtained by BINGO for functions in `msvcrt` against `libc`

Rank	Library functions	#
1	<code>tolower</code> , <code>memset</code> , <code>wcschr</code> , <code>wcsncmp</code> , <code>toupper</code> , <code>memcpy</code> , <code>strspn</code> , <code>wcsrchr</code> , <code>memchr</code> , <code>strchr</code> , <code>strchr</code>	11
2-3	<code>westoul</code> , <code>westol</code> , <code>strtol</code> , <code>fopen</code> , <code>strncpy</code> , <code>strtol</code> , <code>itoa</code> , <code>wscmp</code> , <code>wscncat</code> , <code>itow</code> , <code>longjmp</code> , <code>strcsn</code> , <code>wscncpy</code> , <code>labs</code> , <code>strbrk</code> , <code>toupper</code> , <code>write</code> , <code>memcpy</code> , <code>memmove</code> , <code>tolower</code>	20
4-5	<code>mbtowc</code> , <code>wcstombs</code> , <code>strcat</code> , <code>remove</code> , <code>mbstowcs</code> , <code>wctomb</code>	6
6-10	<code>rename</code> , <code>strstr</code> , <code>wcsbrk</code> , <code>iswctype</code> , <code>strtok</code> , <code>wscoll</code> , <code>strcoll</code> , <code>setlocale</code> , <code>qsort</code> , <code>wcsspn</code> , <code>swprintf</code> , <code>wctod</code> , <code>strerror</code>	13

code base), we conduct an experiment with open-source and close-source binaries. In this experiment, we choose Windows `msvcrt` as the binary (closed-source) from which the search queries are obtained, and Linux `libc` as the target binary (open-source) to be searched on.

In conducting this experiment, we face a challenge in obtaining the ground truth. Ideally, for each function in `msvcrt`, we want to identify the corresponding semantically similar function in `libc`, so that we can faithfully evaluate BINGO. To reduce the bias in obtaining the ground truth through manual analysis, we rely on the function names and the high-level description provided in the official documentation, e.g., `strcpy` function in `msvcrt` is matched with `strcpy` (or its variants) from `libc`. Besides, several variants of the same function are grouped into one family<sup>3</sup>.

In total, we build the ground truth for 60 standard C library functions in `msvcrt` and Table 4 summarizes the results obtained by BINGO. Among these, 11 functions (18.3%) are ranked one, around 51.7% of the functions are within top 5 matches, while 83.3% of the functions are ranked within top 10 positions. The results demonstrate the robustness of BINGO in identifying functions that share no code base but with the similar semantics.

To compare BINGO with the state-of-the-art tools, we repeat the aforementioned experiment using BINDIFF [17], an industry standard binary comparison tool, and TRACY [11], a publicly available academic tool. BINDIFF (v4.1.0), somehow, is unable to correctly match any of the 60 functions in `msvcrt` to their counterparts in `libc`. Its failure roots back to heavily relying on the program structure and call-graph pattern, which is less likely to be preserved in binaries compiled from completely different source-code bases. On the other hand, TRACY matches only 27 functions (out of 60) within the top 50 positions. Among the 27 matches, 5 (8.3%) are ranked one (best matches), 23 (38.3%) are ranked within top 5 positions. However, when the binaries are compiled for different architectures, TRACY totally fails as it does not support cross-architecture binary matching.

## 7.2 Answer to RQ3: Applications

As part of the on-going research, we leveraged on BINGO to perform vulnerability extrapolation [32] — given a known vulnerable code, called *vulnerability signature*, using BINGO, we try to find semantically similar vulnerable code segments in the target binary. This line of work is receiving more attention recently from the academic research community [32, 31]. However, there is few evidence of using such technique to hunt real-world vulnerabilities. One reason could be these tools cannot handle large complex binaries. Due to the program structure agnostic function modeling and effective filtering, BINGO is capable of handling large binaries. Hence, we evaluate the practicality of our tool in hunting real-world vulnerabilities.

**Zero-day Vulnerability (CVE-2016-0933) Found:** In vulnerabil-

<sup>3</sup>For example, in `libc`, `memcpy` function has around 15 variants (e.g., `memcpy_ia32`, `memcpy_ssse3`, etc...).

ity extrapolation, we discovered a zero-day vulnerability in one of 3D libraries used in Adobe PDF Reader. At the high level, we discovered a network exploitable heap memory corruption vulnerability in an unspecified component of the latest version of Adobe PDF Reader. The root cause for this vulnerability is the lack of buffer size validation, which subsequently allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with a low access complexity. We use a previously known vulnerability, in input size handling code segment of the same 3D module, as the signature, where the signature function consists of more than 100 basic-blocks. We modelled the known vulnerable function and all other ‘unknown’ functions in the library using BINGO, then used the known vulnerable function model as the signature and searched for semantically similar functions. BINGO returned the ‘potential’ vulnerable function (ranked #1) in the suspected 3D library. With some additional manual effort, we were able to confirm the vulnerability. Later, Adobe confirmed and subsequently released a patch for it.

**Matching Known Vulnerabilities:** To evaluate whether BINGO is capable of finding vulnerabilities across-platform, we repeated the two experiments reported in [31]. First one is *libpurple* vulnerability (CVE-2013-6484), where this vulnerability appears in one of the Windows application (Pidgin) and its counterpart in Mac OSX (Adium). In [31], it is reported that without manually crafting the vulnerability signature, matching from Windows to Mac OSX and *vice versa*, achieved the ranks #165 and #33, respectively. In BINGO, we achieve rank #1 for both cases. Thanks to Filter 2 used in our filtering algorithm (i.e., library call abstraction technique), we identify four library calls (i.e., ‘string manipulation’: `strcpy`, ‘time’: `time`, ‘input/output’: `ioctl` and ‘internet address manipulation’: `inet_ntoa`) that match the vulnerable functions across OSs.

The second experiment is SSL/Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160), we compile the `openssl` library for Windows and Linux using Mingw and gcc, respectively (vulnerable code is shown in Fig. 1). The vulnerability is matched from Windows to Linux, using basic-block centric matching, similar to [31], we achieve the ranks #22 and #24 for `dtls1_process_heartbeat` and `tls1_process_heartbeat` functions, respectively. For Linux to Windows matching, we achieve rank #4 for both functions. This is due to the fact that Mingw significantly modifies the program structure through inlining, and hence the basic-block structure is not preserved across binaries. Binary compiled using Mingw contains 24,923 more basic blocks compared to the Linux binary. This observation confirms that the basic-block centric matching fails in such conditions, where the program structure is heavily distorted. However, using function model of length variant partial traces together with selective inlining, we are able to achieve rank #1 for both functions in Windows to Linux matching and *vice versa* with the average semantic similarity score of 0.62 and 0.59, respectively. DISCOVER tool [37] fails to identify any of the aforementioned vulnerable functions, as we observe that in Mingw version of `openssl`, the library functions (such as `memset`, `memcpy`, and `strtol`) are inlined in most cases, leading to program structure distortion that is not handled by DISCOVER.

## 7.3 Answer to RQ4: Scalability

BINGO has demonstrated its scalability through out the experiments. Its particular filtering process takes only few milliseconds for `coreutils` binaries to shortlist the candidate target functions. For example, in cross-architecture analysis, it takes, on average, 91.8 milliseconds to compare entire `coreutils` suite (in total, 103 binaries each containing, on average, 250 functions) compiled for one architecture against another, while it is reduced to 68.6 milliseconds for cross-compiler analysis. Besides, function filtering

reduces the search space dramatically. After filtering, for each signature function in `coreutils` binary, on average, 21 target functions are shortlisted in cross-architecture analysis and it is further reduced to 13 functions in cross-compiler analysis. For large binaries such as `BusyBox` (around 3,250 functions with 39,179 basic-blocks), it takes, on average, 6.16 seconds to filter the target functions and for each signature function, less than 40 target functions are shortlisted. Similarly, for `SSL/Heartbleed` vulnerability search in `openssl` (around 5,700 functions with more than 60K basic-blocks), filtering process takes 12.24 seconds, with only 53 functions shortlisted.

The major overhead in `BINGO` is the partial trace generation and semantic feature extraction operation. For example, it takes 4,469s to extract semantic features from 2,611 `libc` functions — on average, taking 1.7s to extract semantic features from a `libc` function, whereas, it takes only 1,123s to extract semantic features from 1,220 `msvcrt` functions (on average 0.9s per function). By virtue of our filtering technique, the time-consuming step of semantic feature extraction is not applied on all the functions in a binary. In practise, semantic feature extraction is a one time job that can be easily parallelized. Finally, in locating the vulnerable function in Adobe PDF Reader, it takes, in total, 88 seconds to filter and extract semantic features from the shortlisted target functions and an additional 2.7 seconds to do the semantic matching. This shows that using `BINGO`, it allows us to find a zero-day vulnerability in a real-world COTS binary within two minutes, provided a good vulnerability signature.

## 7.4 Threats to Validity

The major limitation in selective inlining is that we cannot inline functions that are invoked indirectly (i.e., indirect call). However, this limitation is not particular to `BINGO` but an inherent problem in all static analysis based techniques. Early in 2005, people have identified this problem and proposed solutions, such as VSA (value-set analysis) [4]. However, we did not incorporate VSA into `BINGO` as it involves heavyweight program analysis, which might leads to heavy performance cost. The other limitation in `BINGO` is that not all floating-point (FPU) instructions are currently handled by our IR language, `REIL`. However, in the future, we will be adding support for more FPU instructions. Finally, in our experiments, we use the following parameter setup to achieve the results, ( $\alpha = 0.01$ ,  $w_1 = 1.0$ ,  $w_2 = 0.8$ ,  $w_3 = 0.5$ ). In future, we will investigate the impact of different values in other case studies.

## 8. RELATED WORK

**Binary similarity analysis** Saebjornsen *et al.* [35] is one of the pioneers in binary code search, where they propose a binary code clone detection framework that leverage on normalized syntax (i.e., normalised operands) based function modelling technique. Jang *et al.* [20] propose to use  $n$ -gram models to get the complex lineage for binaries, and normalize the instruction mnemonics. Based on the  $n$ -gram features, the code search is done via checking symmetric distance. Binary control flow graphs are considered in similarity check. [7] aims to detect infected virus from executables via a CFG matching approach. [27] proposes a graphlet-based approach to identify malware, which generates connected  $k$ -subgraphs of the CFG and apply graph-coloring to detect common subgraphs between a malware sample and a suspicious one. Besides, [34] and [33] also adopt CFG in recovery of the information of compilers and even authors. Tracelet [11] is presented to capture syntax similarity of execution sequences and facilitate searching for similar functions. Concurrent to our work, Kamln0 [13] is proposed to solve the efficient subgraph search problem for assembly functions. Unfortunately, the aforementioned syntax based binary similarity matching techniques fail during cross-architecture analysis.

**Value based equivalence check** Input-output (I/O) and intermediate values can be leveraged for identification of semantic clones, regardless of the availability of source code. Jiang *et al.* [23] regard the problem of detecting semantic clones as a testing problem. They use random testing and then cluster the code fragments according to the I/O samples. [36] presents a method to compare x86 loop-free snippets for testing transformation correctness. The equivalence check is based on the selected inputs, outputs and states of the machine when the execution is complete. Note that intermediate values are not considered in [23][36]. Nevertheless, intermediate values are used to mitigate the problem of identifying I/O variables in binary code. In [21], Jhi *et al.* state the importance of some specific intermediate values that are unavoidable in various implementations of the same algorithm and thus qualify to be good candidates for fingerprinting. According to this assumption, the studies on plagiarism detection [40] and matching execution histories of program [41] are proposed.

**Diff based equivalence check** `BINDIFF` [17] builds CFGs of the two binaries and then adopts a heuristic to normalize and match the two CFGs. Essentially, `BINDIFF` resolves the NP-hard graph isomorphism problem (matching CFGs). `BINHUNT` [19], a tool that extends `BINDIFF`, is enhanced for binary diff at the two following aspects: considering matching CFGs as the Maximum Common Induced Subgraph Isomorphism problem, and applying symbolic execution and theorem proving to verify the equivalence of two basic code blocks. To address non-subgraph matching of CFGs, `BINSLAYER` [6] models the CFG matching problem as a bipartite graph matching problem. For these tools, the compiler optimization options may change the structure of CFGs and fail the graph-based matching. Recently, `BLEX` [15] is presented to tolerate such optimization and obfuscation differences. Basically, `BLEX` borrows the idea of [23] to execute functions of the two given binaries with the same inputs and compare the output behaviors.

**Bug Detection based on Binary Analysis** Dynamic analysis faces challenges from two aspects: the difficulty in setting up the execution environment, and the scalability issue that prevents large-scale detection. Pinpointed by Zaddach *et al.* [39], these dynamic approaches are far from practical application onto highly-customized hardware like mobile or embedded devices. Thus it is difficult for these approaches to conduct cross-architecture bug detection. To address this issue, Pewny *et al.* [31] and `DISCOVRE` [37] propose a static analysis technique with the aim to detect vulnerabilities inside multiple versions of the same program compiled for different architectures. Unfortunately, due to heavy dependence on the function CFG structure, their approach is good for finding clones of the same program but not suitable for finding semantic binary clones among applications that stem from completely different source code bases.

## 9. CONCLUSION

In this work, we propose the scalable solution of binary code search framework, `BINGO`, which aims to search similar binary code regardless of the differences in architectures and OS. At modelling aspect, `BINGO` leverages on the complete function semantics and length variant partial trace based function models to perform the similarity search. The promising experimental results deliver the claim of cross-architecture and cross-OS binary search. Further `BINGO` has outperformed the state-of-the-art binary matching tools like `TRACY` and `BINDIFF`. Finally, using `BINGO`, we also discovered a zero-day vulnerability in Adobe PDF Reader.

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