Content Moderation in Presence of Fringe Platforms

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3rd Year Paper Presentation

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Motivation

- **Online** extreme/**unsafe content** bad *per se*, and:
  - e.g. Jiménez-Durán (2022) links online hate to **offline violence**
  - e.g. **20%** of terrorists radicalized **exclusively** online (Hamiz and Ariza, 2022)
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Broad question: consequences of **content moderation**?

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Platforms' competition model to analyze the **net effect** of

Content Moderation on the level of Content Unsafety

…while **allowing** for **Migration*** to a **fringe, unmoderated** platform

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Questions:

➡ How **users choice** is affected by **content moderation policies**

➡ How the **level of unsafe content** is determined by **users choice**

➡ What incentives do platforms have to self-regulate?

➡ **Characterize the optimal regulation to minimize unsafe content**

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1. More content moderation $\not\Rightarrow$ Less unsafety

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   Mainstream doesn’t internalizes what happens on the fringe

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- User i in platform j **reads** a random sample of the content, of avg type $\bar{\theta}_j$

$$\bar{\theta}_j = \int_{i \in j} \theta_i^C \mathrm{d}i$$

= average type of content in platform j

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Rk: No outside option!

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…platform (2) just exists with $K_2 = 1$

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3. Profits and payoffs are realized

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

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If policy lenient enough…



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

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Characterization of the Equilibrium



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

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

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

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

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III) As quality prem ↑, strictness ↑ for **platform** but ↓ for **regulator**

Policy


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to unsafe content (b)
Aligned
$K^{\pi} = K^{X} = 0$
Too much
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(0, 0)
1 / 4
$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{\Delta}{3}$
Network
Effects (α)

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

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

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

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Blue Area:
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Orange Area: such a policy wouldn't bind. Regulators would like to impose a maximal moderation policy to attract users from the fringe platform.

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Main Result:

Moderate content moderation can reduce (increase) offline violence

Users are attracted to safer platforms and converge to the safer content they find there

THANKS!

P.S. Working on a **Structural** Empirical Model

Feel free to reach out!