


---

# Invisible Internet Project (I2P)

Tim de Boer and Vincent Breider



---

# Research question(s)

Is it possible for an entity that intercepts network traffic to fingerprint and positively identify hosts that are participating in the I2P network?

Sub-questions:

- How does the I2P network work, how does the protocol operate?
- Can traffic be identified as I2P during the bootstrapping/initialisation phase of the protocol?
- Can traffic be identified as I2P by scraping the netDb distributed hash table?
- Is fingerprinting of the protocol itself possible using statistical analysis based on connection meta-data?

---

## Related work

Bazli et al, investigated how forensic investigation into the I2P network could be conducted, by examining the forensic artefacts of the I2P installer.

Timpanaro et al, performed a study in which they design a distributed monitoring system for the I2P network.

Hjelmvik and John, looked closer on how statistical analysis can be used to identify network protocols.



# How does I2P work?



Like TOR it uses Onion Routing and communicates as a mixnet.

However it is decentralised and gathers information on other network participants via the Network Database (netDb) which is implemented as a distributed hash table.

Routers always relay each others traffic, build multi-hop tunnels for anonymity and participate in each others tunnels.

To make statistical analysis harder, routers collect and pack multiple messages in one packet, this is called garlic routing.



# How does I2P work? - Onion Routing




Source: <https://1technation.com/tech-savvy-dark-side-onion-router/>

Source: <https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/tech-intro>


# How does I2P work? - Tunnel Establishment




# How does I2P work? - Garlic Routing



Source: The Invisible Internet Project - Andrew Savchenko, FOSDEM 2018



(a) Onion routing



(b) Garlic routing

Source: [An Empirical Study of the I2P Anonymity Network and its Censorship Resistance - Nguyen et al.](#)

---


# Lab environment

Deployed using Infrastructure as Code with Ansible.

6 VMs with I2P routers participating in the live network.

After a router deployment, network traffic is automatically captured using tcpdump.

PCAPs are parsed to CSV using Bash. Statistics are extracted and anonymised using Python and R.



---

# Detectability of I2P

Sub-questions:

- Can traffic be identified as I2P by network analysis?
- Can traffic be identified as I2P by scraping the netDb distributed hash table?

i2p-initcapture.pcap

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

tcp.port == 443 Expression... +

i2p-initcapture.pcap

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

dns.a Expression... +

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2019-08-08 11:45:10.100000000	8.8.8.8	145.100.108.139	DNS	141	Standard query response 0xd046 A 1.us.pool.ntp.org A 44.190.6
2019-08-08 11:45:10.100000000	8.8.8.8	145.100.108.139	DNS	92	Standard query response 0xc64d A reseed.memcpy.io A 163.172.6
2019-08-08 11:45:10.100000000	8.8.8.8	145.100.108.139	DNS	97	Standard query response 0x6265 A reseed.i2p-projekt.de A 81.7
2019-08-08 11:45:10.100000000	8.8.8.8	145.100.108.139	DNS	89	Standard query response 0xd9b4 A netdb.i2p2.no A 193.150.121.1
2019-08-08 11:45:10.100000000	8.8.8.8	145.100.108.139	DNS	141	Standard query response 0x946 A 2.nl.pool.ntp.org A 174.138.1
2019-08-08 11:45:10.100000000	8.8.8.8	145.100.108.139	DNS	141	Standard query response 0xc87f A 0.nl.pool.ntp.org A 87.233.1

▼ validity

▼ subject: rdnSequence (0)

- ▶ rdnSequence: 7 items (pkcs-9-at-emailAddress=echelon@i2pmail.org, id-at-commonName=reseed.i2p-projekt.de,...)
  - ▶ RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-countryName=DE)
  - ▶ RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-stateOrProvinceName=Germany)
  - ▶ RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-localityName=Frankfurt)
  - ▶ RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-organizationName=I2P)
  - ▶ RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-organizationalUnitName=reseed)
  - ▶ RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-commonName=reseed.i2p-projekt.de)
  - ▶ RDNSequence item: 1 item (pkcs-9-at-emailAddress=echelon@i2pmail.org)
- ▶ subjectPublicKeyInfo
- ▶ extensions: 3 items

▶ algorithmIdentifier (sha256WithRSAEncryption)

Padding: 0

RDNSequence item (x509if.RDNSequence\_item), 30 bytes

Packets: 29266 · Displayed: 91 (0.3%)

Profile: Default

10


---

# Detectability of I2P


## Operational phase

- Packets are completely encrypted without detectable and identifiable constants
- netDb parser -> IDS rules -> every other minute -> not feasible..
- Interesting results with statistical analysis


**Distribution of TCP Destination Ports**




**Distribution of UDP Destination Ports**



**Distribution Message Length TCP**



**Scatterplot Message Length UDP**





# Conclusion

Is it possible for an entity that intercepts network traffic to fingerprint and positively identify hosts that are participating in the I2P network?

Initialisation phase -> Yes, under default circumstances this is trivial.

Operational phase -> Theoretically not, but potentially with use of statistical analysis or with a harvested historical netDb.



# Discussion

Current patterns are difficult for a traditional IDS:

- potentially possible over a longer period of time
- requires lots of resources for mapping these data
- quickly refreshing "static rules" with IP-Address/Port combinations from netDb entries



## Future research

To further investigate the message length, a follow-up study should compare our data:

- With traffic captured from a private I2P network setup, with fixed and known tunnel lengths.
- With traffic captured from other protocols that use Onion Routing, such as TOR.

Is it possible using active probing techniques to discover I2P routers?

Is it possible to exploit an I2P router, forcing it into reseeding?

---

# Questions?