Lab9 Report

2021 04 21 16:25

Alex W 1003474

task4

```
___(dev® Kali)-[~/lab/lab9/Wireless Security part 1]

$ aircrack-ng -w word_list.txt wpa.full.cap
```

a. What is the difference between Monitor Mode and Promiscuous Mode

monitor mode allows user to use their wireless network interface card ot sniff packets that are transmitting through the air, without associating with any access point. whereas promiscuous mode requires the user to associate with an access point first.

b. If the WiFi traffic is on-going, how to crack the WiFi password?

for ongoing wifi traffic, attacker still need to capture the 4way handshake, that only happens when a new client connects

to AP. in this case, a deauthenticationn attack can be used to forcefully dessociate the client from AP, foring the client to do the 4way handshake again. in the process, attacker can use the opportunity to capture the 4way handshake packets. the captured pcap can be used with wordlist in aircrack-ng for bruteforcing the wifi password. if there is no clients around, Reaver can be used. it bruteforces WPS PIN (wifi protected setup), a 8 digit number that can also be used in place of normal wifi password. it's easy to bruteforce a 8 digit pin in typically 4-10 hours (https://tools.kali.org/wireless-attacks/reaver)

task5

```
___(dev� Kali)-[~/lab/lab9/Wireless Security part 2]

$ aircrack-ng WEP.cap
```

```
Aircrack-ng 1.6

[00:00:00] Tested 1514 keys (got 30566 IVs)

KB depth byte(vote)
0 0/ 9 1F(39680) 4E(38400) 14(37376) 5C(37376) 9D(37376) 00(37120) C3(37120) 36(36864) 3F(36864) 73(36352) 1 7/ 9 64(36608) 3E(36352) 34(36096) 46(36096) BA(36096) 20(35584) B5(35584) 3A(35328) D3(35328) 5E(35072) 2 0/ 1 1F(46592) 6E(38400) 81(37376) 79(36864) AD(36864) 38(36608) 2A(36352) 42(36352) A9(36352) EC(36352) 3 0/ 3 1F(40960) 15(38656) 7B(38400) BB(37888) 5C(37632) 4F(36608) 66(35840) 1B(35584) DE(35584) 10(35328) 4 0/ 7 1F(39168) 23(38144) 97(37120) 59(36608) 13(36352) 83(36352) F6(36352) 2E(36096) FD(36096) D7(35840)

KEY FOUND! [ 1F:1F:1F:1F]

Decrypted correctly: 100%
```

as shown, the decryption key is found: 1F1F1F1F

task6 rc4 implementation

```
import binascii
import struct

def KSA(key):
    S = list(range(256))
    j = 0
    for i in range(256):
        j = (j + S[i] + key[i % len(key)]) % 256
```

```
S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
    return S
def PRGA(5):
    K = 0
    i = 0
    j = 0
    while True:
        i = (i + 1) \% 256
        j = (j + S[i]) \% 256
        S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
        K = S[(S[i] + S[j]) \% 256]
        yield K
def RC4(key):
    S = KSA(key)
    return PRGA(S)
```

to verify the correctness of the implementation, the test cases provided in skeleton.py is converted to python unit tests and run accordingly:

running pytest in the terminal automatically runs all the test cases

here it shows that all three test cases are passed, verifying that the implementation of rc4 is correct

picking SN=2000
wireshark print out

```
0111 1101 0000 .... = Sequence number: 2000

▼ WEP parameters
    Initialization Vector: 0x46bcf4
    Key Index: 0
    WEP ICV: 0x8ba2536e (not verified)

Data (54 bytes)
    Data: 98999de0ce2db11eb2169a5d442143cdd0470a8832f6712745fb4ffacdcc9ff99681c1da...
[Length: 54]
```

copying the data into python code and run the decryption process using IV, and key that's decrypted from task5, to get the overall key by concatonating

the cipherdata is also a concatonation of data + encrypted ICV

to verify the correctness of decryption process, ICV is used first, the plaintext+icv is recovered last part of icv is extracted out from plaintext then, the same crc32 process is used to recalculate ICV the recalculated ICV should match that of recovered ICV

from the screenshot above, it is evident that CRC recovered and CRC calculated match, hence, the data is decrypted correctly

the plaindata is also printed in the terminal