

00005320	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00005330	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00005340	32	00	30	00	31	00	31	00-20	00	52	00	65	00	63	00	2 0 1 1 R e c
00005350	72	00	75	00	69	00	74	00-6d	00	65	00	6e	00	74	00	r u i t m e n t l
00005360	20	00	70	00	6c	00	61	00-6e	00	2e	00	78	00	6c	00	p l a n . x l
00005370	73	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	s
00005380	2a	86	48	86	f7	14	03	0a-04	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	*aH&azwQ♦
00005390	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000053a0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000053b0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000053c0	61	00	70	00	70	00	6c	00-69	00	63	00	61	00	74	00	a p p l i c a t
000053d0	69	00	6f	00	6e	00	2f	00-76	00	6e	00	64	00	2e	00	i o n / u n d .
000053e0	6d	00	73	00	2d	00	65	00-78	00	63	00	65	00	6c	00	m s - e x c e l
000053f0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00005400	5f	00	5f	00	73	00	75	00-62	00	73	00	74	00	67	00	_ _ s u b s t g
00005410	31	00	2e	00	30	00	5f	00-30	00	46	00	46	00	39	00	1 . 0 _ 0 F F 9
00005420	30	00	31	00	30	00	32	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0 1 0 2
00005430	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00005440	2a	00	02	01	ff	ff	ff	ff-ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	* 00
00005450	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00005460	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00-00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	

# How RSA Was Breached

Timo Hirvonen 2013-06-18

# RSA?





## GSI SecurID Authentication

SecurID Username

PASSCODE

Authenticate

**This site is for GSI-issued tokens only. For AT&T tokens, contact GS HELPDESK.**

PASSCODE refers to a PIN followed by current TOKENCODE (the digits displayed on your token device). Remember, a PASSCODE can only be used once, you must wait for the tokencode to change before authenticating again.

The strength of security, broad application support, and variety of authentication methods offered by RSA SecurID authentication have made it the two-factor authentication solution of choice for more than 30,000 organizations and 40 million people worldwide.

RSA brand currently protects more than 250 million online identities



organization is the undisputed market leader with its SecurID family

# Attack Timeline

# 2011-03-14: Adobe Security Advisory

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Security bulletin

exploited in the wild

in targeted attacks

via a Flash (.swf) file embedded  
in Microsoft Excel (.xls) file

CVE-2011-0609

## 2011-03-17: Open Letter to Customers

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Arthur W. Coviello,  
Jr.

attack resulted in certain  
information being extracted

information is specifically  
related to RSA's SecurID



# 2011-03-21: Adobe Patch

## Security bulletin

### Security update available for Adobe Flash Player

**Release date:** March 21, 2011

**Vulnerability identifier:** APSB11-05

**CVE number:** CVE-2011-0609

**Platform:** All Platforms

#### SUMMARY

A critical vulnerability has been identified in Adobe Flash Player 10.2.154.18 and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh and Linux. This vulnerability, as described in [Security Advisory APSA11-01](#), could cause a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system. Reports that this vulnerability is being exploited in the wild are being investigated. This vulnerability is being exploited in a Microsoft Excel (.xls) file.

Adobe recommends users of Adobe Flash Player 10.2.154.18 and earlier versions for Chrome users) to update to Adobe Flash Player 10.2.156.12.

Adobe recommends users of Adobe Flash Player 10.1.106.16 and earlier versions for Android update to Adobe Flash Player 10.2.156.12. Adobe recommends users of Adobe AIR 2.5.1 and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh and Linux update to Adobe AIR 2.6.

## Security bulletin

### Security Advisory for Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Reader and Acrobat

**Release date:** March 14, 2011

**Last updated:** March 21, 2011

**Vulnerability identifier:** APSA11-01

**CVE number:** CVE-2011-0609

**Platform:** All Platforms

# 2011-04-01: RSA blog post Anatomy of an Attack



## Topics

[Authentication](#)

[Cloud Security](#)

[Compliance](#)

[Cybercrime and Fraud](#)

[Cyberwarfare](#)

## Anatomy of an Attack

Written on April 1, 2011 by Uri Rivner

 [Comments \(40\)](#)

I was on a tour in Asia Pacific when I first heard the [news](#) about the attack. The investigation into this attack continues but I'm eager to share some information with you about it.

Let's first make sure everyone is on the same page. The number of enterprises hit by APTs grows by the month; and the range of APT targets includes just about every industry. Unofficial tallies number dozens of mega corporations attacked; examples are in the press regularly, and some examples are [here](#), and [here](#).

# 2011-04-01: RSA blog post Anatomy of an Attack

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The attacker in this case sent two different phishing emails over a two-day period. The two emails were sent to two small groups of employees; you wouldn't consider these users particularly high profile or high value targets. The email subject line read "2011 Recruitment Plan."

# 2011-04-01: RSA blog post Anatomy of an Attack

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The email was crafted well enough to trick one of the employees to retrieve it from their Junk mail folder, and open the attached excel file. It was a spreadsheet titled “2011 Recruitment plan.xls”.

# 2011-04-01: RSA blog post Anatomy of an Attack

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The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit that installs a backdoor through an Adobe Flash vulnerability (CVE-2011-0609).

## 2011-04-01: RSA blog post Anatomy of an Attack

---

The exploit injects malicious code into the employee's PC, allowing full access into the machine. The attacker in this case installed a customized remote administration tool known as Poison Ivy RAT variant;

# 2011-05-27: Lockheed Martin Attacked



(Reuters) - Unknown hackers have broken into the security networks of Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) and several other U.S. military contractors, a source with direct knowledge of the attacks told Reuters.

## 2011-05-27: Lockheed Martin Attacked

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They breached security systems designed to keep out intruders by creating duplicates to "SecurID" electronic keys from EMC Corp's ([EMC.N](#)) RSA security division, said the person who was not authorized to publicly discuss the matter.



# 2011-05-27: Lockheed Martin Attacked

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The hackers learned how to copy the security keys with data stolen from RSA during a sophisticated attack that EMC disclosed in March, according to the source.

# 2011-05-27: Lockheed Martin Attacked

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Rick Moy, president of NSS Labs, an information security company, said the original attack on RSA was likely targeted at its customers, including military, financial, governmental and other organizations with critical intellectual property.

He said the initial RSA attack was followed by malware and phishing campaigns seeking specific data that would link tokens to end-users, which meant the current attacks may have been carried out by the same hackers.

# 2011-05-31: L-3 Communications targeted


---



“L-3 Communications has been actively targeted with penetration attacks leveraging the compromised information,” read an April 6 e-mail from an executive at L-3’s Stratus Group to the group’s 5,000 workers, one of whom shared the contents with Wired.com on condition of anonymity.

# 2011-06-01: Northrop Grumman

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On May 26, Northrop Grumman shut down remote access to its network without warning -- catching even senior managers by surprise and leading to speculation that a similar breach had occurred.

"We do not comment on whether or not Northrop Grumman is or has been a target for cyber intrusions,"

# 2011-06-06: RSA Admits SecurID Compromise

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[Home](#) > [Programs](#)

## Open Letter to RSA SecurID Customers



Arthur W. Coviello,  
Jr.

### To Our Customers:

On March 17, 2011, RSA publicly disclosed that it had detected a very sophisticated cyber attack on its systems, and that certain information related to the RSA SecurID® product had been extracted. We immediately published best practices and our prioritized remediation steps, and proactively reached out to thousands of customers to help them implement those steps. We remain convinced that customers who implement these steps can be confident in their continued security, and customers in all industries have given us positive feedback on our remediation steps.

Certain characteristics of the attack on RSA indicated that the perpetrator's most likely motive was to obtain an element of security information that could be used to target defense secrets and related IP, rather than financial gain, PII, or public embarrassment. For this reason, we worked with government agencies and companies in the defense sector to replace their tokens on an accelerated timetable as an additional precautionary measure. We will continue these efforts.

# 2011-06-06: RSA Admits SecurID Compromise

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Against this backdrop of increasingly frequent attacks, on Thursday, June 2, 2011, we were able to confirm that information taken from RSA in March had been used as an element of an attempted broader attack on Lockheed Martin, a major U.S. government defense contractor. Lockheed Martin has stated that this attack was thwarted.

# 2011-06-06: RSA Admits SecurID Compromise

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An offer to replace SecurID tokens for customers with concentrated user bases typically focused on protecting intellectual property and corporate networks.



# 2011-07-26: Cost of RSA Breach: \$66 Million

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The Washington Post *with* Bloomberg

**BUSINESS**

*Where Washington and Business Intersect*

Posted at 04:46 PM ET, 07/26/2011

## Cyber attack on RSA cost EMC \$66 million

By [Hayley Tsukayama](#)



The compromising of information on almost 40 million RSA security tokens, which protect sensitive military and financial networks, was a major cyber attack. (MICHAEL CARONNA)

vice president David Goluden.


In its [earnings call Tuesday](#), EMC disclosed that it spent \$66 million in its second quarter to deal with a cyber attack that compromised its RSA Security division.

“We incurred an accrued cost associated with investigating the attack, hardening our systems and working with customers to implement our remediation programs,” said EMC’s executive




## 2011-08-22: Email Discovered

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# 2011-08-22: Email Discovered



The screenshot shows a hex editor window titled "ht 2.0.18" with a menu bar (File, Edit, Windows, Help, Local-Hex) and a status bar (1:help 2:save 3:open 4:edit 5:goto 6:mode 7:search 8:resize 9:viewwin 0:quit). The main display shows a hex dump of an email header. A red box highlights the SMTP server address "PEMC.COM".

```
File Edit Windows Help Local-Hex 19:39 25.09.2011
[!] = ...les\cve-2011-0609\7ce177c42fa6e82c37c944916ae74818c4f6f70b.xls ==2==
000043b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000043c0 53 4d 54 50 3a
000043d0 40 45 4d 43 2e 43-4f 4d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000043e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000043f0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00004400 5f 00 5f 00 73 00 75 00-62 00 73 00 74 00 67 00
00004410 31 00 2e 00 30 00 5f 00-33 00 30 00 30 00 31 00
00004420 30 00 30 00 31 00 46 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00004430 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00004440 2a 00 02 01 2b 00 00 00-2e 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff
00004450 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00004460 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00004470 00 00 00 00 4c 00 00 00-1c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00004480 5f 00 5f 00 73 00 75 00-62 00 73 00 74 00 67 00
00004490 31 00 2e 00 30 00 5f 00-33 00 30 00 30 00 32 00
000044a0 30 00 30 00 31 00 46 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000044b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000044c0 2a 00 02 01 ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
000044d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000044e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
000044f0 00 00 00 00 4d 00 00 00-08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

SMTP:
PEMC.COM

- - s u b s t g
1 . 0 3 0 0 1
0 0 1 F
* @+ .
L L
- - s u b s t g
1 . 0 3 0 0 2
0 0 1 F
* @
M
```

# 2011-08-22: Email Discovered

C:\ ht 2.0.18

File Edit Windows Help Local-Hex 19:42 25.09.2011

[!] = ...les\cve-2011-0609\7ce177c42fa6e82c37c944916ae74818c4f6f70b.xls =2

00005320	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	2 0 1 1 R e c
00005330	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	r u i t m e n t
00005340	32 00 30 00 31 00 31 00 20 00 52 00 65 00 63 00	p l a n . x l
00005350	72 00 75 00 69 00 74 00 6d 00 65 00 6e 00 74 00	s
00005360	20 00 70 00 6c 00 61 00 6e 00 2e 00 78 00 6c 00	* a h a s s i v e
00005370	73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00005380	2a 86 48 86 f7 14 03 0a 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00005390	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
000053a0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
000053b0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
000053c0	61 00 70 00 70 00 6c 00 69 00 63 00 61 00 74 00	a p p l i c a t
000053d0	69 00 6f 00 6e 00 2f 00 76 00 6e 00 64 00 2e 00	i o n / v n d .
000053e0	6d 00 73 00 2d 00 65 00 78 00 63 00 65 00 6c 00	m s - e x c e l
000053f0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00005400	5f 00 5f 00 73 00 75 00 62 00 73 00 74 00 67 00	- s u b s t g
00005410	31 00 2e 00 30 00 5f 00 30 00 46 00 46 00 39 00	1 . 0 _ 0 F F 9
00005420	30 00 31 00 30 00 32 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0 i 0 2
00005430	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00005440	2a 00 02 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	* 00
00005450	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00005460	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	

view 5460h/21600

1help 2save 3open 4edit 5goto 6mode 7search 8resize 9viewin.0quit

# 2011-03-19: Email Uploaded to VirusTotal

0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is goodware. 2 VT Community user(s) with a total of 4 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is malware.

File name: **file-1994209\_msg**  
Submission date: **2011-03-19 18:02:08 (UTC)**  
Current status: **finished**  
Result: **18 /41 (43.9%)**

 [Compact](#)

[Print results](#) 

 There is a [more up-to-date report \(26/44\)](#) for this file.

Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
AhnLab-V3	2011.03.20.00	2011.03.19	–
AntiVir	7.11.5.1	2011.03.18	DR/CVE-2011-0609
Antiy-AVL	2.0.3.7	2011.03.19	Trojan/win32.agent
Avast	4.8.1351.0	2011.03.19	SWF:CVE-2011-0609-A
Avast5	5.0.677.0	2011.03.19	SWF:CVE-2011-0609-A
AVG	10.0.0.1190	2011.03.19	–

# 2011-03-04: Excel file uploaded to VirusTotal

0 VT Community user(s) with a total of 0 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is goodware. 1 VT Community user(s) with a total of 3 reputation credit(s) say(s) this sample is malware.

File name: **survey-questions\_2011.xls**  
Submission date: **2011-03-04 17:58:53 (UTC)**  
Current status: **finished**  
Result: **0 /42 (0.0%)**

 [Compact](#)

[Print results](#) 

 There is a [more up-to-date report](#) (33/44) for this file.

Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result
AhnLab-V3	2011.03.05.00	2011.03.04	–
AntiVir	7.11.4.71	2011.03.04	–
Antiy-AVL	2.0.3.7	2011.03.04	–
Avast	4.8.1351.0	2011.02.23	–
Avast5	5.0.677.0	2011.03.04	–
AVG	10.0.0.1190	2011.03.04	–

# Demo Time

# What Would Have Stopped the Infection?

# What Would Have Stopped the Infection?

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- Uninstalling Flash, or disabling Flash content in Microsoft Office
- Limited user account
- Office 2010
- Windows 7
- Microsoft EMET



# Thank You!

[timo.hirvonen@f-secure.com](mailto:timo.hirvonen@f-secure.com)

Protecting  
the  
irreplaceable