

# Security+ Chapter 2

## Threat Actors

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# Who Am I?

- Former PSYOP Soldier
- Current Incident Response Analyst for a global food and beverage supplier
- Dad, husband and National Park enthusiast



# What's In It?

- Classifying Threats
- Hackers Hats
- Threat Actor Definitions
- Deep v. Dark v. Surface Web
- Threat Vectors
- Threat Intelligence






# Classifying Threats

## 4 Classifications

- Internal vs External
- Level of Sophistication
- Resources / Funding
- Intent / Motivation



# 1 Hat 2 Hat White Hat Grey Hat


- White Hat
  - Legal, authorized, employed, “good”
- Black Hat
  - Illegal, unauthorized, maybe employed, “bad”
- Grey Hat
  - Illegal, unauthorized, customer/outside, “good”, morally questionable in some instances.



# Threat Actors

## 6 Types of Threat Actors

- Script Kiddies
- Hacktivists
- Criminal Syndicates
- Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
- Insiders
- Competitors



# Threat Vectors

## 6 Types of Access


- Email/Social Media
- Direct Access
- Wireless Networks
- Removable Media (USB)
- Cloud
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Party





# Threat Data and Intelligence

- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
  - Community
  - Gov't
  - Vendor
  - Public
- Proprietary and Closed Source





# Vocabulary

Indicators of Compromise – fingerprints or telltale signs that a compromise has occurred.

e.g.; Hashes, file signatures, log patterns, and any other evidence left behind.

TTP's – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

# Assessing Threat Intel

- Is it timely?  
How old is this info?
- Is it accurate?  
How reliable is the source? Are there multiple sources?
- Is it relevant?  
Is it the right software? Platform? Industry?  
Etc...





# Admiralty Codes

- Quick way to Confidence Score Threat Intel
- Adopted by NATO for Threat Intelligence Scoring
- Works from two Factors
  - Reliability (A-F)
  - Credibility (1-6)
- A1 is the highest, F6 the lowest



# Admiralty Code – Reliability

A - Completely reliable: No doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of complete reliability

B - Usually reliable: Minor doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of valid information most of the time

C - Fairly reliable: Doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past

D - Not usually reliable: Significant doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past

E - Unreliable: Lacking in authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency; history of invalid information

F - Reliability cannot be judged: No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source




# Admiralty Code -Credibility

- 1 - Confirmed by other sources: Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; Consistent with other information on the subject
- 2 - Probably True: Not confirmed; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject
- 3 - Possibly True: Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; agrees with some other information on the subject
- 4 - Doubtful: Not confirmed; possible but not logical; no other information on the subject
- 5 - Improbable: Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicted by other information on the subject
- 6 - Truth cannot be judged: No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information

# Threat Indicator Management and Exchange

- The use of structured markup languages  
2 Major languages

STIX – Structured Threat Information eXpression  
OpenIOC – Open Indicator of Compromise





# STIX and Structured Data

```
{  
  "type": "threat-actor",  
  "created": "2019-10-20T19:17:05.000Z",  
  "modified": "2019-10-21T12:22:20.000Z",  
  "labels": [ "crime-syndicate"],  
  "name": "Evil Maid, Inc",  
  "description": "Threat actors with access to hotel rooms",  
  "aliases": ["Local USB threats"],  
  "goals": ["Gain physical access to devices", "Acquire data"],  
  "sophistication": "intermediate",  
  "resource:level": "government",  
  "primary_motivation": "organizational-gain"  
}
```

# TAXII & OpenIOC

*Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information* protocol – a protocol specifically for sharing and sending STIX data


OpenIOC – Similar to STIX, released by vendor Mandiant, not as well adopted



# Information Sharing and Analysis Centers

Public or Private

Specifically created to share information about threats and vulnerabilities in specific industries.



# Questions?

