

The Role of Firms and Job Mobility in the Assimilation of Immigrants: Former Soviet Union Jews in Israel 1990–2019*

Jaime Arellano-Bover[†] and Shmuel San[‡]

August 8, 2023

Abstract

This paper studies how job mobility, firms, and the climbing of the firm ladder shape immigrants' labor market success and convergence with natives. Our context is the mass migration of former Soviet Union Jews to Israel during the 1990s. This setting presents unique institutional features and data availability allowing us to gain an unusually deep understanding of immigrants' labor market experiences. First, we can study *unconstrained assimilation*—i.e., free of migration regulations barriers—thanks to these immigrants becoming Israeli citizens on arrival. Second, push factors unrelated to labor market outcomes result in little immigrant self-selection and out-migration. Third, we use population-level administrative data that accurately record immigration dates, cover immigrants immediately since arrival, and follow them for up to 29 years. We find that differential sorting across firms and differential pay-setting within firms both explain important shares of the initially large immigrant-native wage gap and its subsequent narrowing. In this setting of unrestricted labor mobility, immigrants are persistently more mobile than natives and faster at climbing the firm ladder, which explains the gradual closing of an initially large immigrant-native gap in firm pay premiums. Lastly, we document a novel immigrant-native utility gap, stemming from immigrants' employment in firms with worse non-wage amenities, even when keeping pay fixed. The channels we uncover represent an interpretation of immigrant wage gaps as partly driven by search frictions and firm choices in imperfectly competitive labor markets, as opposed to purely explained by workers' productive abilities.

*This paper previously circulated under the title *The Role of Firms in the Assimilation of Immigrants*. We thank Michael Amior, Dany Bahar, Stéphane Bonhomme, David Card, Oren Danieli, Christian Dustmann, Salvatore Lo Bello, Alan Manning, Léa Marchal, Maor Milgrom, Daniele Paserman, Giovanni Peri, Uta Schönberg, Isaac Sorkin, Jan Stuhler, and seminar participants at Yale, SEA conference, Economics of Migration Junior Seminar, NYU, EBRD-King's College London Workshop, Migration and Organizations conference, IZA Migration meeting, ESPE conference, McGill University, Bank of Lithuania, SOLE conference, EALE conference, CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Bank of Italy-EIEF workshop, Tor Vergata, CReAM-UCL, Hebrew University, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, CEMFI, BSE Summer Forum, Israeli Economic Association conference, and CESifo Labor conference for useful comments. Jaime Arellano-Bover gratefully acknowledges financial support from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research through an Early Career Research Award. Carolina Bussotti and Ori Oberman have provided excellent research assistance.

[†]Yale University and IZA. Email: jaime.arellano-bover@yale.edu

[‡]Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Email: muly.san@mail.huji.ac.il

1 Introduction

The integration of immigrants is a matter of much debate and importance across developed economies, especially so over the last few decades of growing international migration. Immigrants' labor market success is a crucial dimension of integration—it gauges the degree to which new arrivals contribute to aggregate productivity and has direct implications for fiscal and social insurance policies. Understanding if and under which conditions immigrants prosper is thus a key topic of study. Accordingly, a vast literature documents immigrants' labor market outcomes, their evolution over time, and convergence with natives (e.g., [Chiswick, 1978](#); [Lubotsky, 2007](#); [Abramitzky et al., 2014](#)). However, many important aspects of immigrants' labor market experiences and their potential for long-term prosperity have proved elusive to document, mainly due to the limitations imposed by data and institutional environments.

A key set of questions that are not yet well understood have to do with the role that heterogeneous firms can play in immigrants' career growth and assimilation with natives. This is in spite of the fact that, over the last 25 years, mounting evidence has shown that *where* someone works—i.e., which firm—matters a great deal; due to firms' pay policies ([Abowd et al., 1999](#); [Card et al., 2018](#)), but also for outcomes beyond contemporaneous wages.¹ One of the main contributions of this paper is to understand how much of immigrant-native wage gaps and convergence can be mediated by firms and by immigrants' climbing of the firm ladder.

We study a migration episode with unique institutional features and data availability, offering an opportunity to learn about immigrants' labor market trajectories with unusual detail and scope. Our context is the mass migration of nearly one million former Soviet Union (FSU) Jews to Israel during the 1990s, following the unexpected lifting of Soviet emigration restrictions. This context presents three main advantages. First, these immigrants were granted Israeli citizenship upon arrival and, as such, faced no differential regulatory restrictions compared to natives. We can then study what we call *unconstrained assimilation*—i.e., identify “deep” immigrant-native convergence parameters that are not distorted by regulations limiting immigrants' choices. Second, immigrant self-selection based on labor market prospects was not prevalent—especially among the earlier arrival cohorts—due to push factors related to the desire to escape Soviet persecution and political turmoil. Lessons from this setting thus allow us, also, to get at convergence parameters not driven by self-selection and can speak to policy-relevant current and future large migration waves driven by, e.g., conflict or climate change.² Third, the availability of population-level administrative records featuring unusually good properties to track immigrants. These matched

¹E.g., human capital accumulation ([Jarosch et al., 2021](#); [Arellano-Bover and Saltiel, 2021](#)), intergenerational labor market outcomes ([San, 2021](#)), unemployment duration ([Cingano and Rosolia, 2012](#)), or non-pay amenities ([Sorkin, 2018](#)).

²For instance, the ongoing war in Ukraine has currently displaced about 17% of the Ukrainian population to other European countries ([CReAM, 2022](#)). In the medium term, climate change could trigger the movement of millions in large-scale migration events ([Cattaneo and Peri, 2016](#)). Future potential European Union expansions, like those currently discussed for Ukraine and other Eastern Europe countries, could also lead to large waves of relatively unrestricted migration.

employer-employee data cover immigrants immediately since arrival, follow them for up to 29 years, and accurately record individuals' date of immigration to Israel.

Leveraging the strengths of the data and setting, we carry out a series of novel analyses. We provide a detailed view into immigrants' job mobility dynamics and climbing of the firm ladder over the course of three decades. We characterize the firms that disproportionately employ immigrants, showing how such *differential sorting*, combined with firm-specific pay premiums (Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2018), contributes to the immigrant-native wage gap and assimilation. Additionally, the numerosity of the migration wave allows us to precisely estimate immigrant- and native-specific firm pay premiums—i.e., quantify how within-firm, *differential pay-setting policies* shape immigrant-native gaps. Beyond wages, we provide a holistic characterization of immigrant-native *utility* differentials, estimating gaps in a revealed-preference measure of employer desirability that accounts for non-wage amenities. Lastly, the large sample size allows us to accurately estimate analyses for relevant subgroups, assessing the differential experiences of immigrant men vs. women, early vs. late arrivals, and those who migrate older vs. younger.

We begin our empirical analysis documenting patterns of *employment assimilation*, which is typically hard to quantify in administrative datasets. We identify employment assimilation—the immigrant-native employment gap as a function of immigrants' time since arrival in Israel—thanks to the accurate recording of arrival dates, unusually good coverage of FSU immigrants' early employment experiences, and low levels of out-migration. Male immigrants found jobs shortly after arrival and one year after arrival were *more* likely than natives to be employed. Female FSU immigrants, in contrast, experienced a substantial employment gap compared to natives for about five years, after which they converge to native female employment levels.

FSU immigrants—who were more educated than natives but faced language and skill portability barriers—experienced large monthly wage gaps on arrival. Compared to natives of similar age, male immigrants earned 57% less on arrival, while the equivalent gap for women was 47%. In spite of these large gaps, the *wage assimilation* process was steep and FSU immigrants steadily narrow the gap with natives as years go by. Yet it is not until the end of our sample, 27–29 years after arrival, that the immigrant-native gap is fully closed.³ Introducing firm fixed effects to the simple immigrant-native wage comparison reduces initial gaps by over 29%, yet this approach does not truly get at the role of firms because it confounds firm effects with worker selection. This challenge motivates our two-way fixed effect method.

We lay out an estimate a framework for wages that, building upon the AKM tradition of Abowd et al. (1999) and Card et al. (2018), allows for group-specific (i.e., immigrant- and native-specific) firm pay premiums in addition to unrestricted year-since-arrival effects

³Our 29-year panel implies that overall wage assimilation patterns are driven by within-person wage growth and changing immigrant composition in the labor market. E.g., immigrants who arrived in Israel above a certain age are no longer in the labor force 29 years after arrival. We tease apart these two components with detailed heterogeneity analyses by groups of immigrants according to their year of arrival and age at arrival in Israel. We also show that, in this setting, out-migration was not a relevant phenomenon and does not influence assimilation estimates.

for immigrants. The group-specific AKM framework represents the backbone of the main contributions of the paper—understanding how job mobility, heterogeneity in firms’ pay policies, and the climbing of the firm ladder shape immigrants’ labor market outcomes and convergence with natives. We can accurately estimate the parameters of this model, separately for men and women, thanks to the large number of immigrants in our data, their high degree of job mobility, and a long panel dimension of 29 years.

Following the estimation of the group-specific AKM model, we recover firm pay premiums for immigrants and natives. We are interested in *firm pay premiums assimilation*—the time-varying gap in the average pay premium received by immigrants vs. natives. This is a conceptually relevant object since it carries implications for our understanding of the roots of immigrant-native wage gaps (e.g., the relative importance of frictions and imperfect competition vs. skill differences). Importantly, we show that the gap in firm pay premiums can be decomposed into a *differential sorting* component—the part of the gap explained by immigrants and natives being employed in different firms—and a *differential pay-setting* component—capturing within-firm differences in pay generosity for immigrants vs. natives. Understanding how much of the gap in firm pay premiums is accounted by each of these two channels is relevant; e.g., while differential-sorting gaps can be closed through job mobility alone, closing gaps in differential pay setting would further require changes in firms’ compensation schemes.

Immigrants receive significantly lower firm pay premiums than natives, with the gap on arrival being equal to 0.17 log points for men and 0.08 for women. These are sizable gaps, accounting for 12–20 percent of the arrival wage gap. Over time, the pay premium gap narrows, it is eventually overturned for women, and almost closed for men. The pay premium gap decomposition reveals that differential sorting and differential pay setting are *both* quantitatively important and present distinct dynamics. That is, the pay premium gap arises not only because of immigrants and natives employment across distinct firms but, also, because *within* firms, pay premiums awarded to immigrants are lower than those awarded to natives. The quantitative importance of the differential pay-setting channel is particularly meaningful—it stands in contrast with other works estimating group-specific AKM models (Card et al., 2016; Gerard et al., 2018; Dostie et al., 2021), and has implications for many labor market models assuming common pay premiums within the firm.

Next, we provide a granular set of analyses illustrating the mechanisms behind immigrants’ growth in firm pay premiums. As opposed to wage assimilation, firm pay premiums assimilation can *only* occur through *firm-to-firm mobility*. That is, pay premium convergence must be sustained by immigrants changing jobs more often than natives and/or, conditional on changing jobs, taking greater steps up the firm ladder. Mobility is key for young labor market entrants’ wage growth (Topel and Ward, 1992), making it plausibly important too for immigrants entering a new labor market. However, immigrants’ job mobility is commonly limited by regulations, making it difficult to quantify its potential relevance.⁴ In

⁴Examples of regulatory-driven hindered mobility for immigrants include unauthorized immigrants, employment requirements for citizenship, or employer-sponsored visas that constrain job mobility. E.g., H-1B in the US, 457 in Australia, Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada, or the 2008 Swedish migration reform.

this regard, our setting is uniquely well suited to study immigrants' job mobility, as *unconstrained assimilation* implies that FSU immigrants faced no regulatory barriers limiting their job search and job mobility.⁵

We find that firm pay premiums assimilation was driven by immigrants' ability to climb the job ladder often and in large steps. First, compared to natives, immigrants changed employers at greater rates. This was especially true shortly after arrival—consistent with initially low search capital—but the positive job mobility differential is persistent and present in the long run. That is, in terms of their job search and job mobility behavior, FSU immigrants do not fully assimilate. Second, immigrants experienced large wage returns to mobility. Conditional on changing jobs, immigrants took greater steps up the firm ladder, with an immigrant-native gap in the difference between origin-destination firm pay premiums ranging between 0.05 and 0.01 log points for at least 18 years since arrival. Lastly, we document that there was no positive immigrant worker-firm assortative matching on arrival—i.e., high and low ability immigrants found initial jobs at similar firms. However, immigrant assortative matching grows sharply, reaching and even surpassing that of natives. This finding implies that labor market forces eventually matched high ability immigrants with high-paying firms.

We then uncover evidence of previously undocumented *immigrant-native utility gaps*, which go beyond wages, by estimating assimilation patterns in a revealed-preference employer desirability measure constructed from observed worker flows (Sorkin, 2018). Using two versions of this measure—one combining wages and non-wage amenities, another one isolating non-wage amenities—we conclude that initial firm desirability gaps are large and, even when keeping pay constant, immigrants are initially employed in firms providing lower utility in the form of non-wage amenities. This utility gap is particularly acute for immigrant women, who take up to 29 years to close the desirability gap with their native counterparts.

Contribution to the literature. An extensive literature studies how immigrants fare in the labor markets of their destination countries and the degree of convergence with natives (e.g., Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985; Lubotsky, 2007; Cohen-Goldner et al., 2012; Abramitzky et al., 2014; Dustmann and Görlach, 2015; Rho and Sanders, 2021; Albert et al., 2021; Adda et al., 2022). We bring in a unique combination of data and institutional-historical context. Our data are first in the literature to combine i) decades-long panel data on all immigrant arrivals regardless of length of stay, ii) population-level coverage, iii) precise date of immigration to the country, iv) knowledge of immigration status (citizenship on arrival), and v) immediately good coverage of immigrants' labor market outcomes. The institutional setting is especially well suited to study the role of job mobility across firms thanks to *un-*

For evidence on mobility constraints see Naidu et al. (2016), Wang (2021), Hunt and Xie (2019), and Depew et al. (2017).

⁵Throughout the paper, we do not mean to imply that FSU immigrants faced no labor market constraints or barriers whatsoever. Instead, when discussing *unconstrained* choices or assimilation, we refer to a particular, yet important type of constraints which are those set by regulation and applying differentially to individuals on the basis of their citizenship or immigration status.

constrained assimilation, while the historical circumstances result in low out-migration and low levels of self-selection.

Leveraging these strengths, we contribute to this literature on several fronts. First, underscoring the importance of job mobility for immigrants' success in a setting where immigration regulation did not interfere with root economic forces. While there exists work on immigrants' occupational mobility (e.g., [Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein, 2008](#)) and evidence on the importance of geographic mobility for immigrants' success ([Abramitzky et al., 2021](#)), firm-to-firm mobility—known to be a key source of wage growth ([Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002](#))—has so far been relatively unexplored for immigrants.

Second, we bring to light the important role that firms and firms' pay policies can have in immigrants' labor market assimilation.⁶ While two prior papers have used AKM frameworks to study immigrant-native gaps ([Damas de Matos, 2017](#); [Dostie et al., 2021](#)), none of them share the unique institutional and data advantages of our setting, which allow us to extend the scope and detail of the AKM-related analyses. Our findings also offer different insights: [Dostie et al. \(2021\)](#), who study immigrants in Canada after obtaining permanent residency, find—as opposed to us—little importance of immigrant-native within-firm gaps.⁷

Third, we document a novel and conceptually relevant immigrant-native gap: the *utility gap* arising from differences in the overall desirability and non-wage amenities of firms employing immigrants compared to natives. The fact that, keeping pay constant, employers of immigrants provide fewer non-wage amenities has important implications for the integration of immigrants and for our understanding of inequalities between immigrants and natives.

A different, related literature studies the interplay between imperfect labor market competition and migration ([Naidu et al., 2016](#); [Dustmann et al., 2021](#); [Amior and Manning, 2021](#); [Amior and Stuhler, 2022](#)). Our analysis of group-specific firm pay premiums and the *differential pay setting* channel speaks to the extent to which firms are able to wage-discriminate between immigrants and natives, which is relevant for theoretical models in this literature. Moreover, understanding how much of the immigrant-native wage gap is explained by firm premiums—typically thought to arise through labor market imperfections—directly speaks to the impact of imperfect competition on immigrants' labor market outcomes. Other recent papers illustrate how firms' outcomes are impacted by immigration ([Beerli et al., 2021](#)) and, combined with relocation into productive firms, how aggregate output is impacted ([Brinatti and Morales, 2021](#)). The *differential sorting* dynamics we document illustrate in detail how, in a setting with no job mobility barriers, the absorption of a large number of immigrants resulted into a mass reallocation of employment into more productive firms.

⁶[Aydemir and Skuterud \(2008\)](#) and [Pendakur and Woodcock \(2010\)](#) document differential sorting of immigrants into employers with lower pay premiums using Canadian survey data. [Carneiro et al. \(2012\)](#) and [Barth et al. \(2012\)](#) find similar patterns in Portugal and Norway, respectively. However, all these studies (most of which lack panel data) consider firm premiums that, unlike the AKM framework, do not account for unobserved worker characteristics. Other work emphasizes the role of search gains in the assimilation process, but relies on employer observables instead of firm-specific pay policies ([Lehmer and Ludsteck, 2015](#)).

⁷The AKM framework in [Damas de Matos \(2017\)](#) assumes away the differential pay setting channel, imposing common firm pay premiums for immigrants and natives.

Lastly, we contribute to the literature documenting the contribution of firms to wage inequality (e.g., [Abowd et al., 1999](#); [Card et al., 2013, 2018](#); [Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2017](#); [Song et al., 2019](#); [Di Addario et al., 2023](#)), and its subset that has used group-specific AKM models to study gender and racial gaps ([Card et al., 2016](#); [Sorkin, 2017](#); [Gerard et al., 2021](#)). Relative to the static gender and racial gaps, the rich *dynamics* as function of time since arrival we document are a novel feature of the immigrant-native wage gap. Moreover, the sizable role we find for the *differential pay setting* channel suggests that the standard AKM assumption of common pay premiums does not hold well in the context of immigrants and natives. As such, it might not be suitable either for other groups of workers, suggesting important implications to how we model labor markets.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the historical context of Jewish FSU migration to Israel and related literature. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 introduces the wage framework and the assimilation statistics that build upon it. Section 5 contains our main empirical results. Section 6 provides additional discussion and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.

2 FSU Migration to Israel: Historical Context and Literature

In 1989 the USSR relaxed emigration restrictions and Soviet Jews, fleeing antisemitism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, started to leave the country in massive numbers. Israel accepted FSU Jews unconditionally and granted them citizenship. Between 1989–1999, around 840,000 FSU Jews migrated to Israel, which in 1989 had a population of 4.5 million.⁸ Between 1989–1991 alone, 345,000 FSU immigrants arrived in Israel, 7.7% of the total 1989 Israeli population. As a comparison, only around 16,000 Soviet immigrants had arrived in Israel between 1980–1988. Figure 1 plots the number of FSU yearly arrivals to Israel between 1948–2019. Peak migration in 1990–1991 was followed by sustained levels of around 60,000 annual arrivals until 1999, with a steady decline starting thereafter. Figure A1 shows that during 1990–1999, between 80–90% of all immigrants arriving to Israel did so from the FSU.⁹


The Israeli government encouraged the immigration of FSU Jews, who were granted citizenship on arrival in accordance with the Law of Return. This implied that, compared to natives, FSU immigrants did not face any additional regulatory hurdles in the labor market. Additionally, FSU immigrants received full access to social benefits and had freedom over residential and labor market choices ([Buchinsky et al., 2014](#)). The government offered assistance settling in, initially subsidizing rent and mortgages, and providing Hebrew language classes (which most immigrants did not speak). Even though assistance was comprehen-

⁸Migration options outside of Israel were less accessible. The US, for instance, stopped granting refugee status to Soviet Jews in October 1989. Germany, which admitted the greatest number of FSU Jews after Israel and the US, started granting asylum visas in 1990 but didn't offer citizenship as Israel did ([Remennick, 2007](#)).

⁹Migration to Israel from FSU countries started growing again in 2014—the year Russia annexed Crimea—and dropped sharply due to the Covid pandemic in 2020–2021 (not shown in figure). In 2022, immigration to Israel from Ukraine and Russia sharply increased as a result of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine: according to the Israeli Ministry of Immigration, in 2022 there were 15,037 arrivals from Ukraine and 43,584 from Russia.

sive and covered many dimensions, its monetary amount was modest and immigrants had to find complementary income sources very early on after arriving in Israel (Remennick, 2007).

Figure 1: Former Soviet Union (FSU) Immigration to Israel



Notes: Source is the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Number of immigrants arriving in Israel from the former Soviet Union, by year.

FSU immigrants were highly educated relative to the Israeli population. Out of those who arrived in 1990–1991, 30% of prime-age males had a college degree compared to 17% of prime-age male Israelis at the time; 70% of migrants had held middle- or high-skilled occupations in the FSU compared to 30% of Israelis (Cohen-Goldner et al., 2012). Immigrants typically found employment quickly but initial occupational downgrading with respect to previous FSU jobs was prevalent, with the job prospects of many hindered by lacking language skills or limited portability of human capital acquired in the FSU (Friedberg, 2000; Weiss et al., 2003; Remennick, 2007).¹⁰ Over time, FSU immigrants climbed the occupational ladder and experienced rapid rates of wage growth (Eckstein and Weiss, 2004). Using survey data, Cohen-Goldner et al. (2012) provide a detailed study of FSU immigrants’ integration in the Israeli labor market. They estimate that college-educated FSU immigrants who arrived in 1990–1991 initially earned 58% of what comparable natives earned, 68% after five years, and 90% after 20 years. However, Cohen-Goldner et al. (2012) lacked employer-employee data and did not study assimilation through heterogeneous firms or the role of firm-specific pay premiums.

¹⁰Existing studies find that any negative effects of the migration wave on natives’ wages and employment were either absent or modest and short-lived (Friedberg, 2001; Cohen-Goldner and Paserman, 2011; Cohen-Goldner et al., 2012). Capital accumulation and technology responses have been put forward as explanations for the absence of large impacts on natives’ wages (Gandal et al., 2004; Cohen-Goldner et al., 2012).

We complement the literature on FSU immigrants in Israel by being the first to study this remarkable historical episode using administrative matched employer-employee population data. This allows us to document new facts and provide new evidence, relative to the role of firms and job mobility, on the long-term evolution of FSU immigrants' labor market outcomes and assimilation.

Wage setting in Israel. Israel has a historical tradition of collectivism and centrality of the labor movement. However, starting before our period of study, the prevalence of wage determination via collective bargaining and union density experienced steep declines. Starting in the 1990s, there has been a substantial rise in the number and proportion of agreements signed by narrower bases of unionization—occupational and local unions—at the expense of agreements signed by industrial unions, allowing for intra-industry differential pay between firms (Cohen et al., 2003). Along with decentralization, bargaining agreements have become more liberalized, in the sense that they more often allow for employer flexibility in setting wages, often allowing for within-firm and occupation differences in pay. These agreements also provide employers the flexibility to transfer workers from one job to another suitable one.

3 Data and Summary Statistics

The data we use are uniquely well suited to study immigrants' progress in the labor market since arrival to the host country. Relative to existing literature, this dataset is the first to combine the following features: i) decades-long panel data on all immigrant arrivals regardless of length of stay, ii) population-level coverage, iii) precise date of arrival to the country, iv) knowledge of immigration status (citizenship on arrival), and v) immediately good coverage of immigrants' labor market outcomes.

The dataset is constructed from newly available matched employer-employee administrative records from Israel. These data span 1985-2019 and contain information about the entire Israeli workforce collected from tax records. The dataset includes person identifiers, firm identifiers, monthly indicators for each firm where a person worked, the yearly salary received from each employer in a year, and firms' industry and location.

The employment tax records are merged with the Israeli Population Registry. This dataset covers the full population of Israel and includes demographic information such as date of birth, sex, residence status, ethnic group, country of birth, and date of arrival in Israel.

Crucially, country of birth and date of arrival in Israel allow us to identify FSU immigrants and the amount of time they have lived in Israel at any point in time. Arrival date records allow us to infer the actual length of time an immigrant has spent in Israel without relying on proxies used in other studies of immigrants' labor market outcomes using administrative data, such as the timing of the first appearance in employment records in Germany (Dustmann et al., 2021) or the timing of application for a Social Security Number in

the US (Rho and Sanders, 2021). Typically, administrative records will miss the early years of a significant number of immigrants who are unauthorized, hold visas that do not allow them to work, and/or hold informal jobs. Since the immigrants we study were granted citizenship on arrival, this is a lesser concern in our setting. All in all, compared to existing work using administrative data, we argue that our data have unusually good coverage of immigrants’ early arrival experiences.

3.1 Sample Selection

Our sample includes (i) FSU-born immigrants who arrived in Israel between 1990–1999 (henceforth labeled as “immigrants”), and (ii) Jewish, non-ultra-Orthodox Israeli natives (henceforth labeled as “natives”).¹¹ The time span of our analysis sample is 1991–2019 (from the first year after the full start of the migration wave until the latest year of available data), and we include in our dataset people between ages 25–59. We exclude from our sample worker-year observations with earnings less than 25% the national average monthly wage.¹²

In most analyses, we restrict attention to observations belonging to the largest *dual-connected* set of firms. A connected set of firms, linked by worker movements, is required to identify models with worker and firm fixed effects. As we estimate separate models for natives and immigrants, we need a connected set in each sample. The observations belonging to the largest connected set of firms in both the natives and immigrants samples comprise our analysis sample, which we call the “dual-connected sample” following Card et al. (2016).

Our analysis sample is a panel dataset at the annual frequency, assigning each person-year observation to the firm where that person was employed during the month of November. We calculate the monthly wage by dividing the yearly salary in a firm by the number of months worked at that firm. If someone was employed at more than one firm during November, we follow previous literature and assign them to the firm that paid the greatest monthly wage.

3.2 Summary Statistics

Tables 1 (males) and 2 (females) show sample sizes and sample means, separately for natives and immigrants, for the full sample and the dual-connected sample. The dual-connected samples for each gender—our main analysis samples—each have over 12 million worker-year observations encompassing over 1 million workers and 68,000–78,000 firms.

¹¹That is, the baseline sample does not include other immigrants, nor Arab natives, nor ultra-Orthodox natives. We make this choice in order to compare the outcomes of FSU immigrants to those of the dominant group in the Israeli labor market. In any case, we later show that the key takeaways from the main results are unchanged if we instead estimate FSU immigrants’ assimilation relative to a more expansive comparison group that includes all Israeli workers.

¹²The minimum wage in 2015 was 48.8% of the average wage in that year. This ratio fluctuated between 40%–50% in 1990–2019. Therefore, we exclude workers who earn approximately 50% or less the minimum wage.


The dual-connected sample represents a very high coverage of the overall sample. This arises thanks to the combination of a very large number of immigrants together with a long panel dimension of 29 years. Specifically, the dual-connected sample covers 85–88% of total employment (worker-years) and 94% of total FSU-immigrant employment. The coverage is not complete due to small firms that are not present in the dual-connected set. These firms are numerous but small, as evidenced by a higher average firm size in the dual-connected sample and the high coverage in terms of employment.

FSU immigrants comprise about 19 percent of workers in the full samples and about 20 percent of the dual-connected samples. Immigrants are, on average, about two years older than natives. The average monthly salary for native males is around 17,000 Shekels (2019 prices), while that of FSU immigrant males is around 11,000 Shekels—a 35% raw differential when averaging over the whole sample period. The equivalent differential for females is smaller, equal to 21%.

The summary statistics suggest that immigrants and natives are sorted into different types of firms. Natives are employed in significantly larger firms. In the dual-connected sample, for males, the native-worker-weighted average firm size is about 4,000 employees, whilst the immigrant-worker-weighted average firm size is about 2,200 employees. The differential sorting of immigrants into firms is also reflected in firms' immigrant employee share. On average, a male FSU immigrant works in a firm where 26% of its employees are other FSU immigrants. On average, an Israeli male native works in a firm where 11% of its employees are FSU immigrants.

Arrival in Israel and time to first job. Figure 2 uses the information on date of arrival in Israel to plot, among those who arrived in working age, the distribution of months spanned since arrival to the first job (Figure A2 plots the distribution of age at arrival). The left panel shows that men found jobs soon after arrival—80 percent of men had started their first job in Israel by the sixth month, and 90 percent by the tenth month. FSU women took longer to start their first job: 60 percent of them had started their first job by the sixth month, and 75 percent by the first year. The right panel in Figure 2 shows age-at-arrival and year-of-arrival patterns in average months since arrival to first job. Across groups of men, average time to first job is quite stable, equal to between six and four months. Women instead display marked age-at-arrival patterns, with younger women taking on average as much as 13 months, and older women between six and eight. Later arrival cohorts of women took less time on average to start their first job compared to earlier arrivals.

Figure 2: Months Since Arrival in Israel to First Job



Notes: Distribution of months passed since date of arrival in Israel to beginning of first job. Sample: FSU immigrants who arrive in Israel between ages 25–58 and who are eventually employed at some point.

Table 1: Summary Statistics, Males

| | Full Sample | | | Separate Connected Sample | | | Dual Connected Sample | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|---------------------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|-----------|------------|
| | All | Natives | Immigrants | All | Natives | Immigrants | All | Natives | Immigrants |
| Worker-years | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 14,184,464 | 11,473,932 | 2,710,532 | 14,049,132 | 11,357,729 | 2,691,403 | 12,004,116 | 9,450,027 | 2,554,089 |
| Salary (2019 Shekels) | 15,425 | 16,464 | 11,026 | 15,468 | 16,515 | 11,048 | 15,943 | 17,217 | 11,229 |
| Age | 39.41 | 38.96 | 41.29 | 39.40 | 38.94 | 41.31 | 39.43 | 38.93 | 41.30 |
| Years since arrival | - | - | 13.77 | - | - | 13.76 | - | - | 13.72 |
| Immigration year | - | - | 1993.08 | - | - | 1993.08 | - | - | 1993.06 |
| Birth year | 1968.02 | 1968.60 | 1965.56 | 1968.03 | 1968.62 | 1965.54 | 1967.82 | 1968.45 | 1965.48 |
| Firm: Size | 3110.48 | 3346.94 | 2109.51 | 3140.40 | 3381.15 | 2124.44 | 3673.36 | 4061.23 | 2238.26 |
| Firm: Age | 13.31 | 13.38 | 13.02 | 13.35 | 13.42 | 13.05 | 14.31 | 14.53 | 13.47 |
| Firm: Immigrant share | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.29 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.26 |
| Workers | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 1,248,506 | 1,005,521 | 242,985 | 1,225,820 | 987,031 | 238,789 | 1,144,119 | 909,032 | 235,087 |
| Years observed | 11.36 | 11.41 | 11.16 | 11.46 | 11.51 | 11.27 | 10.49 | 10.40 | 10.86 |
| Immigration year | - | - | 1993.27 | - | - | 1993.27 | - | - | 1993.26 |
| Birth year | 1971.13 | 1972.32 | 1966.21 | 1971.11 | 1972.31 | 1966.11 | 1970.96 | 1972.21 | 1966.12 |
| Firms | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 335,945 | - | - | 317,220 | - | - | 78,597 | - | - |
| Years observed | 6.40 | - | - | 6.43 | - | - | 10.95 | - | - |
| Immigrant share | 0.13 | - | - | 0.13 | - | - | 0.21 | - | - |
| Avge. salary (2019 Shekels) | 10,280 | - | - | 10,347 | - | - | 11,427 | - | - |
| Firm size | 14.33 | - | - | 15.01 | - | - | 44.89 | - | - |
| Firm age | 5.28 | - | - | 5.26 | - | - | 7.39 | - | - |

Notes: Number of observations and sample means for worker-years, workers, and firms. “Immigrants” refers to those born in the FSU and arrived in Israel between 1990–1999. “Natives” refers to those who are Israel-born and non-ultra-Orthodox Jews. Firm characteristics are computed using workers’ population data before implementing sample restrictions. Firm age is computed using the year in which it first appears in tax records, which is truncated at 1985.

Table 2: Summary Statistics, Females

| | Full Sample | | | Separate Connected Sample | | | Dual Connected Sample | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|---------------------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|-----------|------------|
| | All | Natives | Immigrants | All | Natives | Immigrants | All | Natives | Immigrants |
| Worker-years | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 14,126,360 | 11,469,601 | 2,656,759 | 14,032,200 | 11,399,939 | 2,632,261 | 12,493,944 | 9,993,273 | 2,500,671 |
| Salary (2019 Shekels) | 9,600 | 9,969 | 8,004 | 9,619 | 9,988 | 8,022 | 9,859 | 10,288 | 8,146 |
| Age | 39.61 | 39.14 | 41.61 | 39.59 | 39.12 | 41.63 | 39.71 | 39.23 | 41.63 |
| Years since arrival | - | - | 14.37 | - | - | 14.36 | - | - | 14.36 |
| Immigration year | - | - | 1993.07 | - | - | 1993.07 | - | - | 1993.04 |
| Birth year | 1967.96 | 1968.46 | 1965.83 | 1967.97 | 1968.47 | 1965.80 | 1967.77 | 1968.27 | 1965.77 |
| Firm: Size | 12190.00 | 13657.58 | 5854.24 | 12271.76 | 13741.01 | 5908.65 | 13781.09 | 15673.36 | 6219.13 |
| Firm: Age | 15.13 | 15.36 | 14.15 | 15.17 | 15.39 | 14.19 | 15.99 | 16.34 | 14.60 |
| Firm: Immigrant share | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.23 |
| Workers | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 1,233,509 | 998,316 | 235,193 | 1,215,521 | 985,208 | 230,313 | 1,163,015 | 936,391 | 226,624 |
| Years observed | 11.45 | 11.49 | 11.30 | 11.54 | 11.57 | 11.43 | 10.74 | 10.67 | 11.03 |
| Immigration year | - | - | 1993.33 | - | - | 1993.32 | - | - | 1993.32 |
| Birth year | 1971.41 | 1972.44 | 1967.03 | 1971.40 | 1972.44 | 1966.93 | 1971.32 | 1972.37 | 1967.00 |
| Firms | | | | | | | | | |
| N | 278,889 | - | - | 263,988 | - | - | 68,221 | - | - |
| Years observed | 6.39 | - | - | 6.45 | - | - | 11.24 | - | - |
| Immigrant share | 0.14 | - | - | 0.14 | - | - | 0.19 | - | - |
| Avge. salary (2019 Shekels) | 6,844 | - | - | 6,891 | - | - | 7,590 | - | - |
| Firm size | 16.87 | - | - | 17.59 | - | - | 50.63 | - | - |
| Firm age | 5.83 | - | - | 5.83 | - | - | 8.18 | - | - |

Notes: Number of observations and sample means for worker-years, workers, and firms. "Immigrants" refers to those born in the FSU and arrived in Israel between 1990–1999. "Natives" refers to those who are Israel-born and non-ultra-Orthodox Jews. Firm characteristics are computed using workers' population data before implementing sample restrictions. Firm age is computed using the year in which it first appears in tax records, which is truncated at 1985.

4 Framework: Wage Model and Assimilation Statistics

4.1 Native- and Immigrant-Specific Job Ladder Wage Model

Building upon the AKM tradition (Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2018) and its more flexible refinements (Card et al., 2016; Gerard et al., 2021), we interpret our assimilation analyses through the lens of a job ladder wage model featuring years-since-arrival effects and group-specific firm pay premiums:

$$\ln w_{it} = \theta_{A_{it}} + \alpha_i + \psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where $\ln w_{it}$ is the log monthly wage of worker i in year t , $g(i)$ indexes the group g person i belongs to, $\theta_{A_{it}}$ is a function of years since arrival in Israel (only applicable to immigrants), α_i is a person fixed effect, $J(i, t)$ indexes the firm J person i is employed at during year t , ψ_J^g is the pay premium firm J pays to workers of group g , X_{it} are time-varying controls (age and time effects), and ε_{it} is an error term.

There are two groups g : natives and immigrants. That is, $g \in \{N, M\}$. Additionally, all the empirical analysis is carried out separately for men and women. The wage equation (1) can be micro-founded through a rent-sharing wage setting model (Card et al., 2016) or a monopsonistic wage setting model (Gerard et al., 2021). According to these models, between-firm variation in pay premiums arises from channels related to firm productivity. Instead, within firms, immigrants and natives could face different pay premiums if they have differential bargaining power, outside options, or lower firm-specific labor supply elasticities. These and related mechanisms are emphasized in recent work on imperfect labor market competition and migration (Dustmann et al., 2021; Adda et al., 2022).

The model above assumes that ψ_J^g , the premium firm J pays to workers of group g , is constant throughout our sample period 1991–2019. We view this as a reasonable assumption based on recent evidence showing that firm effects are highly persistent (Lachowska et al., 2020).¹³ Moreover, works that documents changes in the dispersion of firm pay premiums over time—in Germany (Card et al., 2013) and in the US (Sorkin and Wallskog, 2023)—find that rising dispersion is largely driven by cohort effects (i.e., changing *composition* of firms), rather than changes in the wage policies of existing firms. This channel is accommodated in our framework that naturally allows firm entry and exit. To the extent that the FSU migration wave was followed by a change in the composition of firms, and new firms had different wage policies from old firms, our wage model would flexibly capture this channel.

Identification assumptions. Consistent estimation of the parameters in equation (1) using OLS requires a conditionally exogenous mobility assumption to hold (see Card et al., 2016,

¹³In any case, we later show that our main result on firm pay premiums assimilation is robust to using a more flexible model that allows time variation in pay premiums. The downside of this more flexible model is that the normalization of firm effects that is needed to compare group-specific premiums (see discussion below) has to be carried out period by period. This procedure could introduce noise and also require additional assumptions about the relative ranking of the restaurant sector over time.

for a detailed discussion). This assumption amounts to ε_{it} to be conditionally independent of employer transitions. Card et al. (2013), Card et al. (2016), Macis and Schivardi (2016), Gerard et al. (2021), and Song et al. (2019) carry out a variety of tests indicating that, reassuringly, administrative data from Germany, Portugal, Italy, Brazil, and US are consistent with the exogenous mobility assumption.¹⁴ In Section 5.2 below, we provide evidence on similar tests—following Card et al. (2013)—applied to our dataset and group-specific model.

Note that the gradual sorting of migrants into higher-paying firms as their time in Israel increases does not pose a threat to identification since we explicitly condition on time since arrival to Israel. Similarly, sorting based on time-invariant worker characteristics (e.g., higher-ability workers matching with high-paying firms) does not pose a threat thanks to the inclusion of worker and firm fixed effects.

Age, year, and time-since arrival effects. In models that feature person and year fixed effects, age effects cannot be identified without restrictions due to the well-known cohort-age-time identification problem. We thus follow Card et al. (2013) and allow for a wage profile that flattens at age 40.¹⁵ In our setting we face the additional challenge of identifying years-since-arrival effects, $\theta_{A_{it}}$, for immigrants. We are able to estimate unrestricted years-since-arrival effects by assuming common time and age effects for immigrants and natives. I.e., we assume in equation (1) that the parameter β is common for immigrants and natives as opposed to being group-specific.

Normalization of firm effects. The firm fixed effects for natives and immigrants in equation (1) are not comparable to each other without a normalization. We follow the literature that estimates group-specific pay premiums and assume that the average pay premium in the restaurant industry is equal to zero for both immigrants and natives in each sex (Card et al., 2016; Gerard et al., 2021). The logic behind this assumption is that the restaurant sector is low-paying, and pay premiums there, whether for natives or immigrants, cannot be too high.¹⁶

4.2 Assimilation Statistics

We now interpret through the lens of the wage model (1) a series of assimilation statistics that we later estimate. This analysis provides a systematic way of interpreting the components of different assimilation statistics and how they differ from each other.

¹⁴Moreover, Bonhomme et al. (2019) show that, in the context of a more flexible model, modeling firm and worker heterogeneity in a log-additive way is a good approximation.

¹⁵That is, the age variables we include in the regression are $(age - 40)^2$ and $(age - 40)^3$.

¹⁶Figure A4 shows the distribution of industry-level averages of our estimated firm pay premiums for natives and, indeed, the restaurant sector is at the bottom of the distribution. This is also true for the immigrants' distribution (see Figure A8).

4.2.1 Overall Wage Gap

The first assimilation statistic compares immigrants' wages to those of natives as a function of immigrants' time spent in Israel, simply adjusting for age and calendar year effects. This assimilation statistic, capturing the overall wage gap, is defined as:

$$G_A^w \equiv \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it} | M_i, A_{it}, X_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it} | N_i, X_{it}), \quad (2)$$

where M_i and N_i identify immigrants and natives, respectively. Based on equation (1), omitting age and year effects X_{it} for notational simplicity, G_A^w maps into:

$$G_A^w = \underbrace{\theta_{A_{it}}}_{\text{non-firm assimilation}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\alpha_i | M_i, A_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\alpha_i | N_i)}_{\text{baseline differences}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(it)}^M | M_i, A_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(it)}^N | N_i)}_{\text{firm assimilation: pay setting and sorting}}. \quad (3)$$

The first term in (3), $\theta_{A_{it}}$, captures the time-since-arrival wage effects for immigrants other than those related to the climbing of the firm ladder (e.g., learning Hebrew). The second term, labeled "baseline differences," captures observed and unobserved time-constant differences in wages potential between immigrants and natives. We call the third term—to which we devote much of our subsequent analyses—"firm assimilation." It captures the difference in the average pay premium received by immigrants and natives, as a function of immigrants' time since arrival in Israel. This term captures both the *differential sorting* and *differential pay setting* channels.

We quantify the overall immigrant-native gap, G_A^w , by estimating the following regression:

$$\ln w_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4)$$

where w_{it} is the monthly wage, M_i is a dummy equal to one for FSU immigrants, $\mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\}$ are years-since-arrival fixed effects spanning 1–29, and X'_{it} includes time and age effects. The set of parameters β_a represent our estimate of G_A^w .

4.2.2 Within-Firm Wage Gap

The next statistic compares immigrants' wages to those of natives as a function of time spent in Israel, additionally controlling for employers' identity. This assimilation statistic, capturing the *within-firm* wage gap, is defined as:

$$G_{A|J}^w \equiv \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it} | M_i, A_{it}, X_{it}, J(i, t)) - \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it} | N_i, X_{it}, J(it)), \quad (5)$$

where all variables are defined as before and $J(i, t)$ represents the identity of the firm where worker i is employed in year t . Based on equation (1) and abstracting from X_{it} , $G_{A|J}^w$ maps into:

$$G_{A|J}^w = \underbrace{\theta_{A_{it}}}_{\text{non-firm assimilation}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\alpha_i|M, A_{it}, J(i, t)) - \mathbb{E}(\alpha_i|N, J(i, t))}_{\text{within-firm baseline differences}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^M|M, A_{it}, J(i, t)) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N|N, J(i, t))}_{\text{firm assimilation: pay setting only}} \quad (6)$$

Compared to G_A^w above, differences in person fixed effects in $G_{A|J}^w$ (i.e., “within-firm baseline differences”) are defined between immigrants and natives who, in addition to sharing age and year, *also work at the same firm*. To the extent that there is assortative matching between workers and firms, we expect within-firm baseline differences to be smaller than baseline differences. Moreover, the firm assimilation component in $G_{A|J}^w$, relative to that in G_A^w , does not include differential sorting, but only differential pay setting. As such, we expect the gap $G_{A|J}^w$ to be narrower than G_A^w due to these two channels.

Note that $G_{A|J}^w$ corresponds to wage gaps documented by previous works that do not account for person fixed effects nor group-specific firm effects (Aydemir and Skuterud, 2008; Pendakur and Woodcock, 2010; Carneiro et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2012). The contrast between equations (3) and (6) illustrates what it is exactly—through the lens of model (1)—that these papers are capturing when comparing their own estimates of G_A^w vs. $G_{A|J}^w$. I.e., the difference between G_A^w and $G_{A|J}^w$ does not isolate “the effect of firms” but, instead, it delivers a composite of i) differential firm pay setting, and ii) the difference between unconditional and conditional native-immigrant unobserved heterogeneity differentials.

We estimate $G_{A|J}^w$ with the following regression:

$$\ln w_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \phi_{J(i,t)} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (7)$$

where $\phi_{J(i,t)}$ are firm fixed effects (common for immigrants and natives), and the set of parameters β_a represent our estimate of $G_{A|J}^w$.

4.2.3 Firm Pay Premium Gap

The following statistic explicitly focuses on the time-varying difference between firm pay premiums received by natives and those received by immigrants, that is, the “firm assimilation” component present in G_A^w :

$$G_A^\psi = \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(it)}^M|M, A_{it}, X_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(it)}^N|N, X_{i,t}). \quad (8)$$

We estimate G_A^ψ in two steps. In a first step, we estimate the group-specific AKM model in equation (1) and recover immigrant- and native-specific firm fixed effects. In a second step,

we use the estimated firm effects as an outcome variable in the following regression:

$$\hat{\psi}_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (9)$$

where the set of parameters β_a represent our estimate of G_A^ψ .

Decomposition: differential pay setting and differential sorting. We gain a better understanding of the immigrant-native firm pay premium gap by estimating its decomposition into two components: differential pay setting (within firm) and differential sorting (between firms). Abstracting from X_{it} for notational simplicity:

$$\underbrace{G_A^\psi}_{\text{firm pay premium gap}} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^M - \psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it})}_{\text{differential pay setting (within)}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | N)}_{\text{differential sorting (between)}}. \quad (10)$$

The *differential pay setting* term captures the average within-firm difference in immigrant- vs. native-specific pay premiums, weighted by time-since-arrival-specific immigrant employment. It reflects how different are firm pay policies for immigrants compared to natives and how immigrants, over time, move across firms with varying gaps. The *differential sorting* term captures the time-varying average generosity—when using as common metric the native-specific firm premiums—of firms employing immigrants compared to firms employing natives. It reflects immigrants’ movements across the firm ladder as they spend more time in Israel.

Understanding how much of the gap in firm pay premiums is accounted by each of these two channels is important since they present different root causes, consequences, and potential policy implications. For instance, while differential-sorting gaps can be closed through job-to-job mobility alone, closing gaps in differential pay setting further requires changes in firms’ compensation schemes.¹⁷

5 Results


5.1 Employment and Wages

Employment assimilation. Figure 3 shows estimates of *employment* assimilation. Specifically it displays, separately for males and females, estimates of β_a from a regression equa-

¹⁷One might argue for differential pay setting comparisons that account for occupations. That is, if higher-skilled occupations were to enjoy greater firm pay premiums, differences in ψ_j^N and ψ_j^M could be partly explained by differential occupational sorting within the firm. Our data does not record occupation, preventing us from estimating occupation-specific firm effects and keeping constant occupation when comparing immigrants’ and natives’ pay premiums. In any case, we argue that this approach would not be desirable due to occupational mismatch. FSU immigrants were more educated than natives and experienced substantial occupational downgrading. If, when faced with equally high-skilled immigrants and natives, some firms assign immigrants to lower-skill occupations while others do not, that is a source of variation that we wish to capture under differential pay setting. I.e., widespread occupational mismatch, which could plausibly vary across firms, is likely a channel through which differential pay setting *manifests itself*, rather than something to control for.

tion like (4) when the outcome variable, rather than wages, is a dummy equal to one if a person i is employed in year t . We are able to estimate employment assimilation thanks to the unusual fact that our administrative data record immigrants' date of arrival in Israel independently from employment status.

Figure 3: Employment Assimilation



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation

$$employed_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $employed_{it}$ is a dummy equal to one if a person i is employed in year t and remaining variables are defined as in equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Baseline employment probabilities: $Pr(\text{employment} = 1 | \text{native males}) = 0.652$ and $Pr(\text{employment} = 1 | \text{native females}) = 0.657$.


These results align with the months-to-first-job distribution documented in Figure 2 and further confirm, for males, the historical narrative on FSU immigrants' being compelled to find jobs in Israel immediately after arrival (Remennick, 2007). Figure 3 shows that during their first nine years in Israel, FSU males were slightly more likely than native males to be employed. Over time the differential decreases and turns slightly negative between years 16–29, possibly due to out-migration.

For women, instead, Figure 3 shows that the first few years since arrival featured strong selection into employment. Compared to native females, FSU females' probability of employment was around 0.2 lower one year after arrival. These selection patterns in the earlier years should be kept in mind when interpreting all other results from the paper that are conditional on employment.

Wage assimilation. Immigrant-native wage gap convergence estimates are shown in Figure 4. The overall wage gap is captured by the estimates of β_a in equation (4), while the

within-firm wage gap is captured by the corresponding estimates from equation (7). The overall gap among males shows that, on arrival, FSU immigrants earned 57% less than comparative natives (i.e., .85 log points). This sizable gap steadily shrinks over time, reaching 43% (.57 log points) after five years and 19% (.21 log points) after twenty years. It is only after 29 years since arrival that the gap closes.¹⁸ For females, the initial gap is also sizable but smaller than males' (.64 log points, equivalent to 47% less than natives). The convergence rate instead is flatter for women, as the female gap is closed roughly around the same time as males' in spite of the smaller initial gap. Figure A3 shows that the key takeaways from these results are very similar when using a more expansive comparison group that includes all Israelis.¹⁹

Figure 4: Wage Assimilation



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equations (4) and (7). Standard errors clustered at the person level.

The within-firm gap profile reports our estimates of the statistic $G_{A|J}^w$. Once we condition on employers' identity, the wage gap between immigrants and natives is considerably reduced—by as much as 26–30% for males and 41–53% for females during the first ten years. Our analysis in Section 4.2 interprets this reduction as the combination of two forces. First, immigrant-native differences in person effects are likely larger unconditionally than within firm. Second, the overall gap in firm pay premiums (driven by sorting and pay-setting)

¹⁸Evidently, given the limits in the length of our panel and of working life, the immigrant-native wage gap 29 years after arrival is only identified through FSU immigrants who arrive in 1990 at an age of 30 years or younger. As such, the wage convergence documented in Figure 4 is a combination of (within-person) wage growth and changes in the composition of immigrants. To precisely quantify this distinction, in Section 6, we present estimates of wage convergence that are estimated separately for different groups of immigrants, according to their year of arrival and their age at arrival.

¹⁹That is, adding Arabs, ultra-Orthodox, and (other) foreign-born to the baseline comparison group that is comprised of Jewish non-ultra-Orthodox Israeli natives.

is greater than the pay-setting component alone. Below, we precisely quantify the relative importance of the sorting and pay-setting channels.

5.2 Native- and Immigrant-Specific AKM Estimation

We now present several results related to the estimation of the group-specific AKM wage model in equation (1).²⁰

Wage inequality decomposition. Table A1 presents a decomposition of the variance of log wages into components attributable to person effects, firm effects, covariates, and their covariances.²¹ Firm effects explain a larger share of the variance for FSU immigrants (17–21 percent) relative to natives (16–19 percent). The flipside is that person effects explain a greater share of wage inequality among natives (57–61 percent) than among FSU immigrants (37–44 percent), which could be due to the barriers to skill portability that highly educated FSU immigrants faced. The correlation between person and firm effects is about 0.22 for FSU immigrants and equal to 0.09 for natives. These figures lie between the values of 0.03–0.25 reported by Card et al. (2013) for West Germany between 1985–2009.

Wage changes for job movers and mean residuals. Following Card et al. (2013), we present a check for the identification assumptions underlying equation (1). Figure 5 presents a series of event studies of the wage effects of job changes. Event studies are characterized by the origin and destination firms' wages—Figure 5 uses average coworkers' wage, while Figure A5 shows similar results using instead firm pay premiums estimated in equation (1). In both cases, we assign firms to quartiles and analyze the evolution of wages around the time of a job change, separately for each origin and destination quartile. Figure 5 shows results for workers leaving firms with the lowest-paid (quartile 1) and highest-paid (quartile 4) coworkers. Since our model features group-specific firm pay premiums, we carry out this check separately for immigrants and natives. The group-specific AKM model would indicate that, separately for each group, those who move to a firm with poorly paid coworkers will systematically experience a wage decrease, while those that move to a firm with highly paid coworkers will experience systematic wage increases.

The evidence in Figure 5 supports our AKM specification in (1) and the exogenous mobility assumption.²² Within each of the four groups of workers, moves within a firm quar-

²⁰Appendix B presents results for a standard AKM model estimated among all the Israeli workforce (i.e., a model with common firm pay premiums). This exercise allows to compare the variance decomposition of the standard AKM model in Israel (previously undocumented in the literature) with equivalent ones carried out in administrative datasets from other countries.

²¹Plug-in estimators of variance components of AKM parameters suffer from bias due to estimation error (e.g., Kline et al., 2020; Bonhomme et al., 2023). However, note that the main results from this paper—those related to firm pay premiums assimilation and the climbing of the firm ladder—do not suffer from this issue since we compute differences in means instead of quadratic components. Instead, when applicable for other results in this section, we correct for bias in various ways we specify accordingly. We do report plug-in estimates of variance components in the wage variance decomposition in Table A1, yet to the extent that our data feature a long panel and population-level coverage we expect any resulting bias to be small (Bonhomme et al., 2023).


²²This is also the case for Figure A5, which shows similar results.

tile feature rather flat wage profiles, moves from the first quartile to upper quartiles feature systematic wage increases, and moves from the fourth quartile to lower quartiles feature systematic wage decreases.²³ The largest wage increases are experienced by those who move from a firm in quartile 1 to one in quartile 4, while the largest wage decreases are experienced by those doing the opposite move. Moreover, wage trends are flat when not changing jobs, and the wage effects around the job change are symmetric—i.e., the gains from moving from quartile 1 to 4 are approximately similar to the losses from moving from quartile 4 to 1 (see Figure A6 for additional evidence on symmetry). The fact that these patterns also hold for immigrants suggests that the separately additive years-since-arrival effects in equation (1) are a reasonable modeling approach.

Figure A7 presents results from another common AKM diagnostic check, plotting the average wage residual in each of 100 cells of firms and workers deciles according to the firm effects and person effects in equation (1). For each of the four groups of workers, the 100 averages are very small, all of them well below 1%. This is typically interpreted as evidence in favor of the separability assumption of worker and firm effects.

²³We residualized the log wages from year, age, and years since arrival effects, using the estimates from equation (1), before classifying the firms into quartiles and calculating the average wage by group and period.


Figure 5: Wage Changes for Job Movers, by Coworkers' Average Wage Quartile



Notes: Event studies showing the wage effects of job changes. For any given worker, firms are categorized into quartiles based on the average wage of coworkers. Each point in the figure is the average wage by period, origin, and destination firm quartile, restricting the sample to workers who are employed for at least two years in both the origin and destination firms. This figure shows event studies for workers leaving firms with the lowest-paid (quartile 1) and highest-paid (quartile 4) coworkers. Wages are regression-adjusted using year, age, and years since arrival effects, using the estimates from equation (1), before classifying the firms into quartiles and before computing the average wages that enter event studies.

Immigrant-specific and native-specific firm pay premiums. Figure 6 plots the relationship between $\hat{\psi}_j^M$ and $\hat{\psi}_j^N$, i.e., immigrant- and native-specific pay premiums estimated in equation (1). The horizontal axis groups firms into 100 equally sized bins, according to the value of $\hat{\psi}_j^N$. For each bin, on the vertical axis, the figure plots the average value of $\hat{\psi}_j^M$. Pay premiums for immigrants and natives are highly correlated, but this correlation is far from one. The OLS slope is around 0.7 for both males and females. This implies that if an immigrant moves to a better-paying firm (according to natives' pay), on average, they will only benefit from 70% of the (native) pay premium rise. Moreover, pay premiums for immigrants are typically lower than those for natives, as evidenced by most points being below the 45-degree line. We turn back to these patterns in more detail below, when we decompose the firm pay premium gap into differential pay setting and differential sorting.

Figure 6: Correlation Between Immigrant-Specific and Native-Specific Firm Pay Premiums



Notes: Correlation between immigrant-specific and native-specific firm fixed effects. The 100 bins (with an equal number of native person-years) of firm pay premiums are based on native firm effects. Estimated slope and standard error are estimated via OLS using the 100 bin aggregates.

Figure A8 plots the correlation between the two sets of fixed effects grouping firms according to their industry, weighting industry bins proportionally to the number of worker-year observations. The main takeaways are the same as before, although the industry-based correlation is slightly lower for females compared to males.

Group-specific pay premiums and time since arrival. We now explore how the correlation between immigrant- and native-specific firm effects documented above varies as a function of immigrants' years since arrival in Israel, due to immigrants' job mobility. We do so by estimating the following equation using data on FSU immigrants:

$$\hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^M = \pi \cdot \hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^N + X_{it}'\beta + \nu_{it}, \quad (11)$$

where $\hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^M$ and $\hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^N$ are recovered from estimating equation (1) and π captures the strength of the within-firm similarity of pay premiums. We estimate equation (11) for the pooled sample of FSU immigrants and separately by years since arrival. We account for measurement error by using a split-sample IV approach.²⁴ Figure A9 shows that the pooled IV estimate of π is close to 0.85 for both men and women (the OLS estimates instead are equal to 0.64–0.67). When π is allowed to vary as a function of years since arrival, we see an increasing gradient, both for men and women. Estimates of π one year after arrival are close to 0.7, and they stabilize at around 0.9 for both men and women around 20 years after arrival. This implies that, over time, immigrants move towards firms with pay premiums that are more similar for immigrants and natives. That is, there is evidence of dynamic sorting of immigrants towards firms with lower *gaps* in pay premiums. We present additional evidence on this finding in Section 5.3 below, when we decompose the firm pay premium gap into sorting and pay-setting components.

Immigrant self-selection and cohort effects through the lens of worker fixed effects. There is a long tradition of studies aiming to understand patterns of immigrant selection and cohort effects in terms of their ability (Borjas, 1987, 1985). Typically, education or raw wages are used as measures of ability. We innovate on this space by documenting selection and arrival-cohort patterns, using worker fixed effects as a measure of unobserved ability. This approach exploits the richness of our panel data and the flexibility of the group-specific AKM model, enabling us to distill an accurate and relevant measure of worker unobserved ability. Figure A10 plots the average $\hat{\alpha}_i$, recovered from equation (1), separately for different groups of FSU immigrants according to their arrival year and age at arrival.

We reach two conclusions from Figure A10. First, there is a negative relationship between year of arrival and average worker fixed effects. This result aligns with the historical narrative that earlier arrivals were of higher ability, more educated, and more likely to originate from large cities in the FSU (Remennick, 2007; Abramitzky et al., 2022).²⁵ Second, we argue that the age-at arrival patterns in Figure A10 are consistent with earlier arrival cohorts featuring less self-selection, relative to labor market prospects, about the timing of migration (being driven instead by the timing of the Soviet policy decision to allow emigration and subsequent USSR collapse).²⁶ We reach this conclusion noting that the age-at-arrival profiles of average worker fixed effects for the earlier arrival cohort are rather flat or monotonic. Instead, for the later arrival cohorts, there is a trough in average $\hat{\alpha}_i$ for those who arrived between ages 19–21. This trough could be explained by highly educated FSU immigrants choosing to migrate either before or after completing higher education, but not during, potentially to avoid disruption.

²⁴Specifically, we randomly split the sample of natives into two groups and estimate an AKM model for each group separately. This results in two different set of estimates $\hat{\psi}_j^N$. To estimate equation (11), we use the estimated firm pay premium using one group of natives as an instrument for the firm pay premium of the second group.


²⁵We confirm similar results for wages in Section 6.

²⁶This notion is in line with Abramitzky et al. (2022) who refer to migrants who left the FSU up until 1992 as refugees, and those who left in or after 1993 as economic migrants.

5.3 Firm Pay Premiums

Figure 7 shows the firm pay premium assimilation results arising from the estimation of equation (9), following the two-step procedure outlined above. One year after arrival and relative to comparable natives, FSU immigrants received pay premiums that were smaller by .17 log points for males (20 percent of the overall immigrant-native wage gap) and by 0.08 log points for females (12 percent of the overall immigrant-native wage gap). Gradually, immigrants close the firm pay premium gap with natives. Compared to women, immigrant men face a larger initial gap but greater convergence rates, resulting in gaps closing in comparable time periods: women close the gap 27 years after arrival while males' is almost closed 29 years after arrival.²⁷ Figure A11 shows equivalent results when using a more expansive comparison group that includes all Israelis—there are some differences in magnitudes (levels for males and convergence rate for females) but the main takeaway is similar. Figure A12 shows that, if firm fixed effects are assumed to be common for immigrants and natives—instead of group-specific—firm pay premium gaps are cut in half and one would conclude that immigrants surpass natives after 14 years in Israel.²⁸

Figure 7: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (9). Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A13 illustrates what happens to convergence in firm pay premiums when we relax the assumption of constant firm fixed effects over time.²⁹ Figure A13 shows that firm pay

²⁷As we do for wage convergence, in Section 6 we present estimates of firm pay premiums assimilation that are estimated separately for different groups of immigrants, according to their year of arrival and their age at arrival.

²⁸This difference in magnitudes with our baseline, richer model is the first indication of the importance of the differential pay-setting channel which we precisely quantify in the next section.

²⁹In particular, we depart from equation (1) by splitting the data into overlapping decades: 1991–2000, 1996–

premium assimilation results using time-varying fixed effects are very similar to baseline ones. This is especially true for males, for whom the convergence profiles closely overlap. For females, there is almost perfect overlap in the second half of the profile, while the pay premium gaps are somewhat narrower during the initial years in Israel.³⁰

5.4 Mechanisms: Unpacking the Firm Pay Premium Gap and Convergence

Differential pay setting and differential sorting. Figure 8 shows results from decomposing the firm pay premium gap into a differential pay setting and a differential sorting components, following equation (10).³¹ The key takeaway is that *both* within- and between-firm gaps play an important role in shaping the magnitudes and dynamics of the total immigrant-native gap in pay premiums. On arrival, for males, differential pay setting accounts for 54 percent of the total gap and differential sorting for the remaining 45 percent. For females, on arrival, differential pay setting accounts for the vast majority of the total pay premium gap, 89 percent, while differential sorting accounts for the remaining 11 percent.

The steady convergence in firm pay premiums is driven by different components across time. For males, during the first ten years, differential sorting and pay setting shrink at similar rates, contributing both somewhat equally to the reduction in the total gap. From 11 years in Israel onward, however, differential pay setting flattens out at about 0.06 log points, while sorting convergence accelerates and fully explains the dynamics in the total pay premium gap. In other words, during the initial years, male immigrants gradually access firms that have more equitable pay policies between immigrants and natives *and* pay more overall. In the later years, male immigrants continue to climb the firm ladder as defined by native pay premiums and reap the benefits of these higher premiums, yet at a persistent discount compared to their native coworkers.


For females, the vast majority of the pay premium gap is explained by differential pay setting. The differential sorting gap is very small and constant during the first ten years (possibly due in part to the employment selection documented in Figure 3). During these initial ten years, the shrinking of the female pay premium gap is exclusively driven by the reduction in differential pay setting. From 11 years onward, both sorting and pay setting contribute to the closing of the total pay premium gap.

2005, 2001–2010, 2006–2015, and 2011–2019, and estimate equation (1) separately for each decade. That gives us five different fixed effects for each firm and group (natives/immigrants), which we normalize as before, separately for each decade and group. The firm premium assigned to each worker-year observation in Figure A13 is a weighted average of time-varying pay premiums of the decades that include that year according to the formula $1 - (|t - D_m| + 0.5)/6$, where t is the calendar year and D_m is the middle point of the decade. E.g., the pay premium assigned to an immigrant worker employed in firm j in the year 2002 is equal to $\frac{2}{3} \cdot \hat{\psi}_j^{M,96-05} + \frac{1}{3} \cdot \hat{\psi}_j^{M,01-10}$. This approach smooths out firm fixed effects transitions from one year to the next, rather than assuming that they change abruptly with each new decade.

³⁰While the time-varying approach is more flexible, we still use as baseline constant firm fixed effects due to the normalization procedure described in Section 4.1—implementing the time-varying fixed effects requires one normalization per decade and group, which could lead to noisy comparisons and would require additional assumptions regarding the stability of pay generosity in the restaurant sector over time.

³¹For consistency with the overall pay premium gap in Figure 7, the decomposition is carried out residualizing each of its components using the estimates of γ from equation (9).

Figure 8: Firm Pay Gap Decomposition: Differential Wage Setting vs. Differential Sorting



Notes: Decomposition of the overall immigrant-native gap in firm pay premiums into a differential pay setting (within) and differential sorting (between) components, as detailed in equation (10). Each component is residualized using the estimates of γ from equation (9).

Overall, in contrast to prior work using AKM frameworks to study wage gaps (Card et al., 2016; Gerard et al., 2021; Dostie et al., 2021), we find an important role for differential pay setting. Moreover, the relative importance of the two channels are nuanced and change over time. This implies that gradual access to better firms, without changes in firms' pay policies, would not close the immigrant-native pay premium gap.

Based on the importance of differential pay setting, we check what firm characteristics are correlated with the within-firm gap in pay premiums. Table A2 presents results from multivariate regressions where the outcome variable is either ψ_j^N or $\psi_j^N - \psi_j^M$, and explanatory variables are a dummy equal to one if the firm was born in 1990 or later, log firm size, distance to Tel Aviv, a dummy equal one if the workforce is more than 50% FSU immigrants, and a firm desirability index (Sorkin, 2018).³² Overall, Table A2 suggests there are

³²We study the firm desirability index in more detail in Section 5.5.


no strong correlates of $\psi_j^N - \psi_j^M$ that are robust across genders, other than the fact that firms with greater gaps are less desirable and smaller.

Job search and firm ladder climbing assimilation. As opposed to wage assimilation, assimilation in firms' pay premiums can only arise through job search and job mobility. That is, the convergence patterns documented in Figures 7 and 8 must be a combination of immigrants changing jobs more frequently than natives and/or taking larger steps up on the job ladder conditional on moving. We now turn to examine these immigrant job mobility patterns which in our setting are (i) uniquely unrestricted thanks to the institutional context, and (ii) uniquely well recorded immediately since arrival.

Figure 9 shows the roles played by (i) job switching, and (ii) firm ladder climbing conditional on switching jobs. The left panel shows estimates of $\hat{\beta}_a$ from a regression equation like (4) when the outcome variable, rather than wages, is a dummy equal to one if a person i changes employers between $t - 1$ and t . FSU immigrants are much more mobile than comparable natives and persistently so. In their second year in Israel, the probability that an immigrant changes employers is 0.16–0.19 higher than that of a comparable native. This differential drops quickly during the first years but it remains positive throughout and equals 0.02–0.03 even 29 years after arrival.

Immigrants experience large wage returns to mobility. The right panel in Figure 9 shows assimilation estimates when the outcome variable is period-to-period jumps in the job ladder. That is, the outcome of interest is equal to $\hat{\psi}_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} - \hat{\psi}_{J(i,t-1)}^{g(i)}$. Importantly, these profiles are estimated *conditional* on changing employers—that is, restricting the sample to worker-years observations that are firm switchers. Even conditional on changing jobs, immigrants take greater steps up the job ladder than comparable natives. The magnitudes of the differential average firm pay premium jump are quantitatively important, ranging between 0.01–0.05 log points during the first 19 years. These differentials persist up until 19 years since arrival for men and 28 years since arrival for women.

Figure 9: Job Search and Firm Ladder Climbing Assimilation



Notes: Left panel: point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation

$$\text{ChangedEmployer}_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $\text{ChangedEmployer}_{it}$ is a dummy equal to one if a person i changed employers between years $t - 1$ and t , and remaining variables are defined as in equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Baseline employer change probabilities: $\Pr(\text{change} = 1 | \text{native males}) = 0.13$ and $\Pr(\text{change} = 1 | \text{native females}) = 0.10$. Right panel: point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation

$$\left(\hat{\psi}_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} - \hat{\psi}_{J(i,t-1)}^{g(i)} \right) = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it},$$

estimated among the sample of worker-years for whom $\text{ChangedEmployer}_{it}$ is equal to one. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure 9 illustrates how immigrants are more likely to change jobs than natives and, even conditional on changing jobs, climb the firm ladder faster. Figure A14 shows the combination of these two channels by estimating unconditional differences in pay premium jumps (i.e., for movers and stayers combined). That is, Figure A14 reports the interaction of the forces in the left and right panels in Figure 9. Relative to natives, FSU men are more likely to change jobs than women yet, conditional on changing jobs, women take greater steps in the job ladder. These two things combined result in a differential expected firm ladder climb that is similar for both genders, as seen in Figure A14.

Assortative matching and time since arrival. Two-way fixed effects wage models such as equation (1) imply that assortative matching—the observed covariance between person effects and firm effects—is a key statistic to consider when aiming to understand wage inequality (Card et al., 2013). How does assortative matching evolve for immigrants as they


spend more time in Israel and climb the firm ladder? How does the degree of immigrants' assortative matching compare to natives'? We estimate the following equation:

$$\hat{\alpha}_i = \theta \cdot \hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\gamma + \eta_{it}, \quad (12)$$

where $\hat{\alpha}_i$ and $\hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^{g(i)}$ are recovered from equation (1) and θ captures the degree of assortative matching—it provides the expected change in the person effect associated with an increase in the firm fixed effect. We estimate equation (12) separately for natives vs. immigrants, further separately for immigrants by time since arrival. We follow Gerard et al. (2021) and account for measurement error by instrumenting $\hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^M$ with $\hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^N$ and vice-versa.

Figure 10 shows IV estimates of θ for natives and for immigrants as a function of time since arrival. For immigrant men, there is little assortative matching on arrival, being even slightly negative. This is consistent with low search capital and the hasty acceptance of whatever job was available on arrival. Assortative matching then sharply grows surpassing the natives' level after eight years in Israel and stabilizing at around 0.4 after ten years in Israel. This implies that the firm ladder climbing patterns highlighted above are more pronounced for higher ability immigrants. Female immigrants display negative assortative matching on arrival, which becomes positive after seven years and steadily grows until it catches up with natives' level only after 29 years.³³

Figure 10: Worker-Firm Assortative Matching: Immigrants and Natives



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameter θ in equation (12). The equation is estimated separately for natives and for immigrants for each year since arrival. IV estimates which instrument each group's firm pay premium with that corresponding to the other group. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

³³Selection into employment for female immigrants during the early years since arrival could result into negative assortative matching if, shortly after arrival, high α_i women accept any available job while low α_i women only do so if an opportunity at a good firm arises.

5.5 Employer Desirability

We have shown that immigrants gradually access better-paying firms as their time in Israel increases. Evidently, workers put value on non-pay employer characteristics (Maestas et al., 2023). How does the sorting into better-paying firms map into overall firm desirability? We estimate and analyze the Sorkin (2018) index of employer desirability to assess the level and convergence patterns of the *immigrant-native gap in employer desirability*.

The Sorkin (2018) index is based on a revealed preferences logic. It assigns greater desirability values to firms that poach larger number of workers, with even greater desirability attached to destination firms that attract workers from origin firms that are desirable themselves.³⁴ We estimate Sorkin (2018) desirability values in our data assuming common preferences for immigrants and natives. Figure 11 shows the immigrant-native gap in employer desirability, as a function of immigrants' time since arrival in Israel, for two variants of the Sorkin (2018) index. The left panel considers overall desirability, which combines pay and non-pay values. The right panel nets out firm pay premiums from overall desirability, which results in a measure of firms' non-pay amenities.


The left panel in Figure 11 shows a sizeable initial immigrant-native gap in employer desirability which gradually shrinks and eventually closes after 16 (for men) and 29 (for women) years in Israel. The initial gap for males is equal to 0.35, which corresponds to 0.42 of a natives' standard deviation. Female immigrants experience a much larger desirability gap, which is even more noteworthy given that the pay premium gap among women is smaller than among men. On arrival, the desirability gap for females is equal to 0.76, which corresponds to one natives' standard deviation.

The right panel in Figure 11 shows that, for males, on arrival, the firm desirability gap that keeps pay premiums fixed is equal to 0.21—equivalent to 0.26 native standard deviations—and it closes 23 years after arrival. For women, the initial gap is equal to 0.74—equivalent to 0.97 native standard deviations—and it is almost closed after 29 years in Israel. Overall, even when firm pay premiums are held constant, there remains an important immigrant-native gap in this measure of non-pay amenities that workers arguably care much about. These gaps are quantitatively meaningful and especially so for immigrant women.³⁵

³⁴Desirability for all firms is estimated in an internally consistent manner.

³⁵Appendix C documents immigrant-native gaps and convergence patterns for a series of employer observable characteristics: employer size, age, distance to Tel Aviv, and employment segregation. On arrival and compared to natives, immigrants are employed in smaller, newer, more peripheral, and more segregated firms. Eventually, immigrants close the firm size, new firm, and employer distance to Tel Aviv gaps (this last one is only closed for females).

Figure 11: Employer Desirability Assimilation



Notes: Left panel: point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation

$$Sorkin_{J(i,t)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $Sorkin_{J(i,t)}$ is the Sorkin (2018) firm desirability index (described in the text) of the firm where worker i is employed in year t , and remaining variables are defined as in equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Baseline firm desirability standard deviations: $SD(Sorkin | \text{native males}) = 0.84$ and $SD(Sorkin | \text{native females}) = 0.76$. Right panel: point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation

$$\widetilde{Sorkin}_{J(i,t)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $\widetilde{Sorkin}_{J(i,t)}$ is the Sorkin (2018) firm desirability index residualized of firm pay premiums, and remaining variables are defined as in equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Baseline firm desirability standard deviations: $SD(\widetilde{Sorkin} | \text{native males}) = 0.81$ and $SD(\widetilde{Sorkin} | \text{native females}) = 0.76$.

6 Discussion: Out-Migration, Immigrant Cohort Effects, and Age-at-Arrival Effects

We now discuss how our results speak to three common themes arising in the literature studying the career paths of immigrants, namely, the role of out-migration, changes in quality across immigrant arrival cohorts, and age-at-arrival effects.

Out-migration. The baseline wage and firm pay premium assimilation profiles in Figures 4 and 7 pool all FSU immigrants who arrive in Israel between 1990–1999, regardless of length of stay in the country. In principle, part of the observed convergence with natives could be due to negatively selected out-migration (Lubotsky, 2007; Dustmann and Görlach, 2015). Yet in practice, the immigrant population we study was characterized by low levels of out-

migration since the vast majority of them settled in Israel for good.

Exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data, we follow an approach similar to those in [Dustmann and Görlach \(2015\)](#) and [Abramitzky et al. \(2014\)](#), estimating assimilation profiles among the subset of immigrants who were present in Israel 20 years after arrival. We use two different definitions to characterize the subsample of FSU immigrants who are in Israel 20 years after arrival. The first definition includes FSU immigrants who are *residing* in Israel 20 years after arrival. The percentage of FSU immigrants who categorize as stayers according to this definition is 95% for males and 98% for females. The second definition includes FSU immigrants who are *employed* in Israel during their 20th year after arrival.³⁶ The percentage of FSU immigrants who categorize as stayers according to this definition is 65% for males and 67% for females (these fractions are similar to the fraction of people who are employed in any given year, reported in Figure 3).

Figures A15 and A16 show wage and firm pay premium assimilation estimates for the two samples of stayers, based on the residence and employment definitions. Convergence profiles for this samples are either indistinguishable from (in the case of ‘residence stayers’) or very similar to (in the case of ‘employment stayers’) the baseline estimates. These findings reinforce the notion that, in this context, negatively selected out-migration plays no role in the observed immigrant career profiles.

Immigrant arrival cohort effects. It has long been recognized that changes in the skill composition of immigrants across arrival cohorts can be a key factor underlying observed assimilation profiles ([Borjas, 1985](#); [Abramitzky et al., 2014](#)). We first follow [Abramitzky et al. \(2014\)](#) and estimate assimilation profiles that add year-of-arrival fixed effects to equations (4) and (9).³⁷ Results from this exercise are shown in Figures A17 and A18. The inclusion of year-of-arrival fixed effects narrows the immigrant-native gaps in wages and pay premiums. For wages, the new profile in Figure A17 represents a slight upwards parallel shift relative to baseline. This upward shift follows the same direction, although with a smaller magnitude, as findings in [Abramitzky et al. \(2014\)](#). For firm pay premiums, Figure A18 shows there is a level and slope difference in the assimilation profile when including year-of-arrival fixed effects, especially so for women.

Our population data and large number of immigrants allow us to go beyond year-of-arrival fixed effects and estimate richer patterns of immigrant arrival cohort heterogeneity that, in addition to cohort-specific intercepts, allow for cohort-specific slopes. Figures A19 and A20 show *arrival cohort-specific* wage and firm pay premium assimilation profiles. The earlier cohorts, 1990 especially, have better outcomes compared to later ones. This is consistent with the notion that, among this migration wave, earlier arrival cohorts were more likely to hold a higher education degree or originate from a large FSU city ([Remennick, 2007](#); [Abramitzky et al., 2022](#)).

³⁶This second definition constraints potential stayers to those who arrived in Israel between ages 5–39, so we compare results from this stayers’ sample to baseline results that also restrict attention to immigrants arrived between ages 5–39.

³⁷We are able to identify these added fixed effects thanks to our assumption of common year and age effects for immigrants and natives.

Age-at-arrival effects. We now consider the importance of immigrants' age-at-arrival effects (Friedberg, 1992; Alexander and Ward, 2018). Immigrants who arrive before labor market entry could face similar outcomes as natives, especially if they carry out a large fraction of their education in Israel. Immigrants who arrive as young adults, around labor market entry age, share with their native counterparts low levels of experience and search capital. Mature immigrant workers are, instead, very different from their native counterparts in terms of accumulated experience in the Israeli labor market. Understanding age-at-arrival effects is also important in our long-panel setting—evidently, our estimates of immigrant-native gaps 29 years since arrival are identified only through immigrants who arrive in Israel young enough to be working 29 years later.

Figures A21 and A22 display estimates of wage and firm pay premium assimilation profiles, separately for immigrants grouped by their age at arrival in Israel. Figure A21 shows that age at arrival is a key determinant of wage assimilation patterns, as initial gaps grow and subsequent slopes become steeper as a function of age at arrival. For instance, among males, wages upon labor market entry of immigrants who arrived between 0–9 years of age are persistently indistinguishable from natives; in contrast, those who arrived between ages 50–59 earn on arrival 70 percent less than comparable natives, and this gap is reduced to 55 percent nine years later (i.e., gap goes from -1.2 to -0.8 log points).

Figure A22 shows that age-at-arrival effects are not very meaningful for firm pay premiums assimilation profiles. However, the temporary lack of convergence for males who arrived between ages 10–29 during their first 5–6 years is noteworthy. This could be due to the fact that comparable natives for this group are also labor market entrants experiencing substantial job mobility during those years (Topel and Ward, 1992). After that initial period, however, these young arrival immigrant groups also climb the firm ladder at faster rates than natives and gradually close the firm pay premium gap.

7 Conclusion

We have argued that the mass migration of FSU Jews to Israel is a valuable opportunity to gain insights into immigrants' career dynamics that are typically hard to uncover. The opportunity arises thanks to the unique combination of the prevailing historical-institutional context and availability of high-quality administrative data.

Immigrants' labor market choices are typically restricted by law in a myriad ways relative to natives'. From undocumented immigrants, to employment requirements, to high- or low-skill visas that are linked to employers, a variety of immigrants globally face regulatory barriers constraining their job search, employment, and employer choice decisions. In these contexts, even if job mobility were accurately observed, such regulatory barriers would prevent the researcher from identifying the root economic forces and preferences driving immigrants' careers. In our context, we are able to observe immigrants' *unconstrained* labor market choices, uncover “deep” parameters regarding their labor market assimilation, and

do so using unusually good data.

Our key finding is that firms and the climbing of the firm ladder can be a key source of immigrants' labor market integration and success. The degree of wage gains we document in our setting could not have been achieved without immigrants' recurrent employer changes. These patterns could, in this and other related settings, have important aggregate implications—one way to conceptualize the mobility patterns we document is as a gradual relocation of a massive amount of labor towards more productive firms (see [Bilal et al., 2022](#)).

With regards to labor markets more broadly, our findings on the importance of the *differential pay setting* channel are a relevant addition to the question of how much firms can differentiate their wage policies across different groups of workers. Existing research suggests that the inability to discriminate leads to firms to outsource ([Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2017](#)), yet our results suggest that differentiating between immigrants and natives might be feasible to some degree (which is conceptually consistent with immigrants' having less bargaining power and worse outside options). Reaching a precise understanding of when, how much, and for whom do firms differentiate wage policies is an important question for future research.

References

- Abowd, J. M., F. Kramarz, and D. N. Margolis (1999). High wage workers and high wage firms. *Econometrica* 67(2), 251–333.
- Abramitzky, R., T. Baseler, and I. Sin (2022). Persecution and migrant self-selection: Evidence from the collapse of the Communist Bloc. Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Abramitzky, R., L. Boustan, E. Jácome, and S. Pérez (2021). Intergenerational mobility of immigrants in the United States over two centuries. *American Economic Review* 111(2), 580–608.
- Abramitzky, R., L. P. Boustan, and K. Eriksson (2014). A nation of immigrants: Assimilation and economic outcomes in the age of mass migration. *Journal of Political Economy* 122(3), 467–506.
- Adda, J., C. Dustmann, and J.-S. Görlach (2022). The dynamics of return migration, human capital accumulation, and wage assimilation. *The Review of Economic Studies* 89(6), 2841–2871.
- Albert, C., A. Glitz, and J. Llull (2021). Labor market competition and the assimilation of immigrants. Mimeo, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Alexander, R. and Z. Ward (2018). Age at arrival and assimilation during the age of mass migration. *The Journal of Economic History* 78(3), 904–937.
- Amior, M. and A. Manning (2021). Monopsony and the wage effects of migration. Discussion Paper 1690, Centre for Economic Performance.

- Amior, M. and J. Stuhler (2022). Immigration and monopsony: Evidence across the distribution of firms. Mimeo, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Arellano-Bover, J. and F. Saltiel (2021). Differences in on-the-job learning across firms. Discussion Paper 14473, IZA Institute of Labor Economics.
- Aydemir, A. and M. Skuterud (2008). The immigrant wage differential within and across establishments. *ILR Review* 61(3), 334–352.
- Babet, D., O. Godechot, and M. G. Palladino (2022). In the land of AKM: Explaining the dynamics of wage inequality in France. Mimeo, INSEE and Sciences Po.
- Barth, E., B. Bratsberg, and O. Raaum (2012). Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments. *Labour Economics* 19(4), 541–556.
- Beerli, A., J. Ruffner, M. Siegenthaler, and G. Peri (2021). The abolition of immigration restrictions and the performance of firms and workers: Evidence from Switzerland. *American Economic Review* 111(3), 976–1012.
- Bilal, A., N. Engbom, S. Mongey, and G. L. Violante (2022). Firm and worker dynamics in a frictional labor market. *Econometrica* 90(4), 1425–1462.
- Bonhomme, S., K. Holzheu, T. Lamadon, E. Manresa, M. Mogstad, and B. Setzler (2023). How much should we trust estimates of firm effects and worker sorting? *Journal of Labor Economics* 41(2), 291–322.
- Bonhomme, S., T. Lamadon, and E. Manresa (2019). A distributional framework for matched employer employee data. *Econometrica* 87(3), 699–739.
- Borjas, G. J. (1985). Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of immigrants. *Journal of Labor Economics* 3(4), 463–489.
- Borjas, G. J. (1987). Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants. *The American Economic Review* 77(4), 531–553.
- Brinatti, A. and N. Morales (2021). Firm heterogeneity and the impact of immigration: Evidence from German establishments. Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Buchinsky, M., C. Gotlibovski, and O. Lifshitz (2014). Residential location, work location, and labor market outcomes of immigrants in Israel. *Econometrica* 82(3), 995–1054.
- Card, D., A. R. Cardoso, J. Heining, and P. Kline (2018). Firms and labor market inequality: Evidence and some theory. *Journal of Labor Economics* 36(S1), S13–S70.
- Card, D., A. R. Cardoso, and P. Kline (2016). Bargaining, sorting, and the gender wage gap: Quantifying the impact of firms on the relative pay of women. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131(2), 633–686.
- Card, D., J. Heining, and P. Kline (2013). Workplace heterogeneity and the rise of West German wage inequality. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(3), 967–1015.
- Carneiro, A., N. Fortuna, and J. Varejão (2012). Immigrants at new destinations: how they fare and why. *Journal of Population Economics* 25(3), 1165–1185.
- Cattaneo, C. and G. Peri (2016). The migration response to increasing temperatures. *Journal of development economics* 122, 127–146.

- Chiswick, B. R. (1978). The effect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born men. *Journal of Political Economy* 86(5), 897–921.
- Cingano, F. and A. Rosolia (2012). People I know: Job search and social networks. *Journal of Labor Economics* 30(2), 291–332.
- Cohen, Y., Y. Haberfeld, G. Mundlak, and I. Saporta (2003). Unpacking union density: membership and coverage in the transformation of the Israeli ir system. *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society* 42(4), 692–711.
- Cohen-Goldner, S. and Z. Eckstein (2008). Labor mobility of immigrants: Training, experience, language, and opportunities. *International Economic Review* 49(3), 837–872.
- Cohen-Goldner, S., Z. Eckstein, and Y. Weiss (2012). *Immigration and Labor Market Mobility in Israel, 1990 to 2009*. MIT Press.
- Cohen-Goldner, S. and M. D. Paserman (2011). The dynamic impact of immigration on natives' labor market outcomes: Evidence from Israel. *European Economic Review* 55(8), 1027–1045.
- CRaM (2022). Ukrainian migration information hub, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration. <https://cream-migration.org/ukraine-hub.htm>.
- Damas de Matos, A. (2017). Firm heterogeneity and immigrant wage assimilation. *Applied Economics Letters* 24(9), 653–657.
- De La Roca, J. and D. Puga (2017). Learning by working in big cities. *The Review of Economic Studies* 84(1), 106–142.
- Depew, B., P. Norlander, and T. A. Sørensen (2017). Inter-firm mobility and return migration patterns of skilled guest workers. *Journal of Population Economics* 30(2), 681–721.
- Di Addario, S., P. Kline, R. Saggio, and M. Sølvssten (2023). It ain't where you're from, it's where you're at: hiring origins, firm heterogeneity, and wages. *Journal of Econometrics* 233(2), 340–374.
- Dostie, B., J. Li, D. Card, and D. Parent (2021). Employer policies and the immigrant–native earnings gap. *forthcoming in Journal of Econometrics*.
- Dustmann, C. and J.-S. Görlach (2015). Selective out-migration and the estimation of immigrants' earnings profiles. In *Handbook of the Economics of International Migration*, Volume 1, pp. 489–533. Elsevier.
- Dustmann, C., H. Ku, and T. Surovtseva (2021). Real exchange rates and the earnings of immigrants. Discussion Paper 10/21, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration.
- Eckstein, Z. and Y. Weiss (2004). On the wage growth of immigrants: Israel, 1990–2000. *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2(4), 665–695.
- Eliason, M., L. Hensvik, F. Kramarz, and O. N. Skans (2019). Social connections and the sorting of workers to firms. Discussion paper, IZA Institute of Labor Economics.
- Friedberg, R. M. (1992). The labor market assimilation of immigrants in the United States: The role of age at arrival. Mimeo, Brown University.
- Friedberg, R. M. (2000). You can't take it with you? Immigrant assimilation and the portability of human capital. *Journal of Labor Economics* 18(2), 221–251.

- Friedberg, R. M. (2001). The impact of mass migration on the Israeli labor market. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116(4), 1373–1408.
- Gandal, N., G. H. Hanson, and M. J. Slaughter (2004). Technology, trade, and adjustment to immigration in Israel. *European Economic Review* 48(2), 403–428.
- Gerard, F., L. Lagos, E. Severnini, and D. Card (2018). Assortative matching or exclusionary hiring? The impact of firm policies on racial wage differences in Brazil. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Gerard, F., L. Lagos, E. Severnini, and D. Card (2021). Assortative matching or exclusionary hiring? The impact of employment and pay policies on racial wage differences in Brazil. *American Economic Review* 111(10), 3418–57.
- Goldschmidt, D. and J. F. Schmieder (2017). The rise of domestic outsourcing and the evolution of the German wage structure. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 132(3), 1165–1217.
- Hunt, J. and B. Xie (2019). How restricted is the job mobility of skilled temporary work visa holders? *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 38(1), 41–64.
- Jarosch, G., E. Oberfield, and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2021). Learning from coworkers. *Econometrica* 89(2), 647–676.
- Kline, P., R. Saggio, and M. Sølvsten (2020). Leave-out estimation of variance components. *Econometrica* 88(5), 1859–1898.
- Lachowska, M., A. Mas, R. D. Saggio, and S. A. Woodbury (2020). Do firm effects drift? Evidence from Washington administrative data. Working Paper 26653, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Lehmer, F. and J. Ludsteck (2015). Wage assimilation of foreigners: Which factors close the gap? Evidence from Germany. *Review of Income and Wealth* 61(4), 677–701.
- Lubotsky, D. (2007). Chutes or ladders? A longitudinal analysis of immigrant earnings. *Journal of Political Economy* 115(5), 820–867.
- Macis, M. and F. Schivardi (2016). Exports and wages: Rent sharing, workforce composition, or returns to skills? *Journal of Labor Economics* 34(4), 945–978.
- Maestas, N., K. J. Mullen, D. Powell, T. von Wachter, and J. B. Wenger (2023). The value of working conditions in the United States and the implications for the structure of wages. *American Economic Review* 113(7), 2007–47.
- Naidu, S., Y. Nyarko, and S.-Y. Wang (2016). Monopsony power in migrant labor markets: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates. *Journal of Political Economy* 124(6), 1735–1792.
- Pendakur, K. and S. Woodcock (2010). Glass ceilings or glass doors? wage disparity within and between firms. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* 28(1), 181–189.
- Porcher, C., H. Rubinton, and C. Santamaría (2022). The role of establishment size in the city-size earnings premium. Mimeo, Georgetown University, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Postel-Vinay, F. and J.-M. Robin (2002). Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity. *Econometrica* 70(6), 2295–2350.

- Remennick, L. (2007). *Russian Jews on Three Continents. Identity, Integration, and Conflict*. Transaction Publishers.
- Rho, D. and S. Sanders (2021). Immigrant earnings assimilation in the United States: A panel analysis. *Journal of Labor Economics* 39(1), 37–78.
- San, S. (2021). Who works where and why? Parental networks and the labor market. Mimeo, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
- Song, J., D. J. Price, F. Guvenen, N. Bloom, and T. von Wachter (2019). Firming up inequality. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 134(1), 1–50.
- Sorkin, I. (2017). The role of firms in gender earnings inequality: Evidence from the United States. *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings* 107(5), 384–87.
- Sorkin, I. (2018). Ranking firms using revealed preference. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133(3), 1331–1393.
- Sorkin, I. and M. Wallskog (2023). The slow diffusion of earnings inequality. Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Topel, R. H. and M. P. Ward (1992). Job mobility and the careers of young men. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107(2), 439–479.
- Wang, X. (2021). US permanent residency, job mobility, and earnings. *Journal of Labor Economics* 39(3), 639–671.
- Weiss, Y., R. M. Sauer, and M. Gotlibovski (2003). Immigration, search, and loss of skill. *Journal of Labor Economics* 21(3), 557–591.

- SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDICES - For Online Publication

- **Appendix A:** Additional Tables and Figures p. **A2**
- **Appendix B:** AKM decomposition for the Israeli economy p. **A22**
- **Appendix C:** Assimilation in Other Employer Characteristics p. **A23**

A Additional Tables and Figures

Table A1: Summary of Estimated Group-Specific AKM Models

| | FSU Males | FSU Females | Native Males | Native Females |
|--|-----------|-------------|--------------|----------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| SD of log wages | 0.586 | 0.567 | 0.707 | 0.608 |
| SD of person effects | 0.358 | 0.376 | 0.533 | 0.475 |
| SD of firm effects | 0.265 | 0.236 | 0.304 | 0.243 |
| SD of covariates | 0.242 | 0.250 | 0.265 | 0.282 |
| Correlation of person/firm effects | 0.220 | 0.217 | 0.090 | 0.090 |
| Percentage of log wages variance due to: | | | | |
| Person effect | 37.3 | 43.9 | 56.9 | 61.1 |
| Firm effect | 20.5 | 17.4 | 18.5 | 16.0 |
| Covariance person/firm effect | 12.1 | 12.0 | 5.8 | 5.6 |
| Firm effect + cov. person/firm | 32.6 | 29.4 | 24.3 | 21.6 |
| <i>N</i> person-year observations | 2,554,089 | 2,500,671 | 9,450,027 | 9,993,273 |


Notes: Log wage variance decomposition of estimated group-specific two-way fixed effects outlined in equation (1).

Table A2: Firm Characteristics and Group-Specific Pay Premiums

| | Males | | Females | |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | ψ_j^N | $\psi_j^N - \psi_j^M$ | ψ_j^N | $\psi_j^N - \psi_j^M$ |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| =1 if firm birth year > 1989 _{<i>j</i>} | -0.021 (0.015) | 0.001 (0.007) | 0.009 (0.015) | -0.012 (0.019) |
| Log firm size _{<i>jt</i>} | 0.004 (0.006) | -0.007** (0.003) | -0.001 (0.006) | -0.010* (0.006) |
| Distance to Tel Aviv _{<i>j</i>} | -0.000* (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.001*** (0.000) | -0.000*** (0.000) |
| =1 if FSU worker share > 0.5 _{<i>jt</i>} | -0.001 (0.009) | 0.018*** (0.007) | 0.102*** (0.021) | 0.015 (0.009) |
| Desirability index _{<i>j</i>} | 0.158*** (0.009) | -0.009** (0.004) | 0.029*** (0.009) | -0.056*** (0.006) |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.152 | 0.015 | 0.032 | 0.093 |
| <i>N</i> person-year observations | 9,086,605 | 9,086,605 | 8,752,016 | 8,752,016 |


Notes: Worker-year-weighted multivariate regressions where the outcome variable is either the native firm pay premium or the within-firm difference in pay premiums for natives and immigrants. The explanatory variables are a dummy equal to one if the firm was born on or after 1990 (time invariant), log firm size as measured by number of employees (time varying), distance to Tel Aviv measured in km. (time invariant), dummy equal to one if more than 50% of the workforce is composed of FSU immigrants, and the [Sorkin \(2018\)](#) desirability index. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A1: Immigration to Israel: 1948–2019




Notes: Source is the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Total number of immigrants arriving to Israel, and those arriving from the former Soviet Union, by year. Dashed line is the fraction of total immigrants who are FSU immigrants.

Figure A2: FSU Immigrants' Age at Arrival to Israel




Notes: Number of persons in our sample by age at arrival in Israel.

Figure A3: Wage Assimilation: All-Israel Comparison Group



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Computed separately among two different samples: (i) Baseline sample, equivalent to Figure 4 in main text, and (ii) all-Israel comparison group, which incorporates all Israelis in the comparison group (i.e., adding Arabs, ultra-Orthodox, and foreign-born to the comparison group, relative to the baseline comparison group).


Figure A4: CDF of Industry-Level Average Firm Pay Premiums




Notes: CDF of industry-level averages of firm fixed effects for natives. Pay premiums are normalized such that the average for the restaurant industry is equal to zero.

Figure A5: Wage Changes for Job Movers, by Firm Pay Premium Quartile

(a) Males.




(b) Females.




Notes: Event studies showing the wage effects of job changes. Firms are categorized into quartiles based on firm fixed effects recovered from equation (1). Event studies are estimated separately for each origin and destination firm quartile, restricting the sample to workers who are employed for at least two years in both the origin and destination firms. This figure shows event studies for workers leaving the lowest-paying (quartile 1) and highest-paying (quartile 4) firms. Wages are regression-adjusted using year, age, and years since arrival effects, using the estimates from equation (1), before classifying the firms into quartiles and before computing the average wages that enter event studies.

Figure A6: Wage Changes for Job Movers, by Coworkers' Average Wage Quartile: Test for Symmetry




Notes: Test for symmetry of wage effects of movements across coworker wage quartiles, presented in Figure 5. The figure plots regression-adjusted (using year, age, and years since arrival effects estimated in equation (1)) mean wage changes over a 4-year interval for job switchers who move across distinct coworker wage quartile groups. That is, any given point displays, on the horizontal axis, the average wage change from moving from firm quartile q to q' , where $q' > q$; the vertical axis displays the equivalent average wage change from moving from q' to q . Mean wage changes are computed as the difference between the average of periods -2 and -1, and that of periods 0 and 1, in Figure 5. The dashed line represents perfectly symmetric changes for upward and downward movers.

Figure A7: Group-Specific AKM Residuals Plot




Notes: This figure assigns firms to one of ten deciles as a function of their pay premium estimated in equation (1) and workers to one of ten deciles as a function of their person fixed effect estimated in equation (1). For each of the 100 combinations of firm-worker deciles, this figure plots the average residual wage following the estimation of equation (1).

Figure A8: Correlation Between Immigrant-Specific and Native-Specific Firm Pay Premiums: Industry Averages



Notes: Correlation between immigrant-specific and native-specific firm fixed effects. Industry averages (weighted by person-year observations of natives).


Figure A9: Correlation Between Group-Specific Premiums by Time Since Arrival




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameter π in equation (11). The equation is estimated for FSU immigrants, for the pooled sample and separately by year since arrival. IV estimates which instrument each group's firm pay premium with that corresponding to the other group. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A10: Immigrant Self-Selection and Cohort Effects Through the Lens of AKM Worker Fixed Effects

(a) Males.




(b) Females.




Notes: Average worker fixed effects $\hat{\alpha}_i$ among FSU immigrants, recovered from equation (1), grouping individuals based on their year of arrival and age at arrival in Israel.

Figure A11: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation: All-Israel Comparison Group




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (9). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Computed separately among two different samples: (i) Baseline sample, equivalent to Figure 7 in main text, and (ii) all-Israel comparison group, which incorporates all Israelis in the comparison group (i.e., adding Arabs, Ultra-Orthodox, and foreign-born to the comparison group, relative to the baseline comparison group)..

Figure A12: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation: Comparison of Common and Group-Specific Firm Effects




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (9), using two different sets of firm fixed effects. Baseline corresponds to the group-specific firm fixed effects described in equation (1) and results shown on Figure 7. The Common firm fixed effects estimates use firm fixed effects estimated from a version of equation (1) that imposes firm effects to be the same for immigrants and natives. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A13: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation: Robustness to Time-Varying Pay Premiums



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (9), using two different sets of firm fixed effects. Baseline corresponds to the firm fixed effects described in equation (1) and results shown on Figure 7. The Decade-specific firm FE estimates use firm fixed effects that are allowed to vary over time. Specifically, we split the data into overlapping decades: 1991–2000, 1996–2005, 2001–2010, 2006–2015, and 2011–2019, and estimate equation (1) separately for each decade. That results in five different fixed effects for each firm and group (natives/immigrants), which we then normalize as before, separately for each decade and group. The firm premium assigned to each worker-year observation is a weighted average of time-varying pay premiums of the decades that include that year according to the formula $1 - (|t - D_m| + 0.5)/6$, where t is the calendar year and D_m is the middle point of the decade. E.g., the pay premium assigned to an immigrant worker employed in firm j in the year 2002 is equal to $\frac{2}{3} \cdot \hat{\psi}_j^{M,96-05} + \frac{1}{3} \cdot \hat{\psi}_j^{M,01-10}$. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A14: Job Search Assimilation: Jump in Pay Premiums



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation

$$\left(\hat{\psi}_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} - \hat{\psi}_{J(i,t-1)}^{g(i)} \right) = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it},$$

estimated in the full sample (stayers and movers). Explanatory variables are defined as in equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A15: Wage Assimilation: Robustness to Out-Migration

(a) Males.



(b) Females.




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Left panels show estimates from the sample of FSU immigrant sample who are residing in Israel 20 years after arrival. Right panels shows estimates from the sample of FSU immigrants who are employed in Israel during their 20th year after arrival. All estimates in right panel only include FSU immigrants who arrived in Israel between the ages of 5–39.

Figure A16: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation: Robustness to Out-Migration

(a) Males.




(b) Females.




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (9). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Left panels show estimates from the sample of FSU immigrant sample who are residing in Israel 20 years after arrival. Right panels shows estimates from the sample of FSU immigrants who are employed in Israel during their 20th year after arrival. All estimates in right panel only include FSU immigrants who arrived in Israel between the ages of 5–39.

Figure A17: Wage Assimilation: Year-of-Arrival Fixed Effects



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in different versions of regression equation (4). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Baseline specification corresponds to equation (4), to which year-of-arrival fixed effects are added in the second specification.


Figure A18: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation: Year-of-Arrival Fixed Effects




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in different versions of regression equation (9). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Baseline specification corresponds to equation (9), to which year-of-arrival fixed effects are added in the second specification.

Figure A19: Wage Assimilation: Arrival Cohort Heterogeneity

(a) Males.




(b) Females.




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (4), estimated separately for different year-of-arrival groups. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A20: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation: Arrival Cohort Heterogeneity

(a) Males.




(b) Females.




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (9), estimated separately for different year-of-arrival groups. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A21: Wage Assimilation: Arrival Age Heterogeneity

(a) Males.




(b) Females.




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (4), estimated separately for different age-at-arrival groups. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Figure A22: Firm Pay Premiums Assimilation: Arrival Age Heterogeneity

(a) Males.



(b) Females.



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (9), estimated separately for different age-at-arrival groups. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

B AKM decomposition for the Israeli economy

The main analyses in the paper consider an enriched AKM model featuring group-specific pay premiums and unrestricted time-since-arrival effects for natives. However, there literature currently lacks a wage decomposition stemming from a standard AKM model applied to the Israeli labor market. To fill in this gap, here we provide a log monthly wage variance decomposition based on the following wage model:

$$\ln w_{it} = \alpha_i + \psi_{J(i,t)} + X'_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (\text{B1})$$

where all variables are defined as in Section 4.1 in the main text. The key differences with the main analysis in the paper is that firm pay premiums ψ_j are assumed to be common for all types of workers and that the sample includes all workers in Israel.¹

Table B1 shows results for the wage variance decomposition resulting from the estimation of equation (B1).² Firm effects account for 16.3% of the wage variance for women and 22.5% for men. Person effects, in turn, account for 63.1% of the female wage variance and 55.3% of males'. We find evidence of positive assortative matching, with a positive correlation of person/firm effects and a corresponding covariance that accounts for about 10% of wage inequality among both genders.

Our variance decomposition and, in particular, our plug-in estimates of the share of wage inequality explained by firm effects, is in line with similar estimations carried out for other countries. Bonhomme et al. (2023) report comparable estimates using 6-year panels for Austria, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the US. While we find that the variance of firm effects explains 16–23% of wage inequality, the corresponding numbers in Bonhomme et al. (2023) are 12% for the US, 15% for Sweden, 18% for Austria, 23% for Italy, and 24% for Norway. Card et al. (2013) report equivalent figures of 19–21% for West Germany, while Babet et al. (2022) report shares between 12–14% in France.

Table B1: Summary of Standard AKM Model for Israel

| | Males (1) | Females (2) |
|--|--------------|----------------|
| SD of log wages | 0.697 | 0.600 |
| SD of person effects | 0.518 | 0.477 |
| SD of firm effects | 0.330 | 0.243 |
| SD of covariates | 0.249 | 0.284 |
| Correlation of person/firm effects | 0.146 | 0.148 |
| Percentage of log wages variance due to: | | |
| Person effect | 55.3 | 63.1 |
| Firm effect | 22.5 | 16.3 |
| Covariance person/firm effect | 10.3 | 9.5 |
| Firm effect + cov. person/firm | 32.8 | 25.8 |
| <i>N</i> person-year observations | 24,039,848 | 21,713,397 |

Notes: Log wage variance decomposition of two-way fixed effects outlined in equation (B1), estimated using data on the whole Israeli economy 1991–2019.

¹I.e., it includes all natives and all immigrants, and it includes all Jews (including the ultra-Orthodox) and Arabs.


²Note that these plug-in estimates could suffer from limited mobility bias, yet in this context due to the long panel dimension of 29 years, any resulting bias should not be large. We compare our estimates to other estimates in the literature that are similarly susceptible to limited mobility bias.

C Assimilation in Other Employer Characteristics

We now consider assimilation in employer attributes that go beyond contemporaneous pay. These attributes are firm size, firm age, distance to Tel Aviv, and segregation. These employer dimensions could impact workers through skill acquisition and future compensation, non-pay amenities, or network formation. As a result, this analysis provides a richer picture of labor market assimilation than the one arising from focusing on compensation only.

Firm size. Figure C1 shows estimates of assimilation in terms of firm size (number of employees). On arrival to Israel and relative to comparable natives, FSU immigrants were employed in substantially smaller firms, with a firm size differential of .90 log points for males and 1.4 log points for females. Convergence in firm size takes a long time for females, only occurring after 29 years, while the gap closes after 15 years for males and it steadily continues to grow after having changed its sign. After 29 years in Israel, FSU males are employed in firms that are on average .30 log points larger than those employing comparable natives.


Figure C1: Employer Size Assimilation



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (??) when the outcome variables are equal to log number of employees. Standard errors clustered at the person level.

Firm age. Figure C2 displays the assimilation pattern in term's of employer age, where the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a worker's employer was born less than five years ago. On arrival, FSU immigrants were disproportionately found in young firms, with a probability of employment at a young firm greater than that of comparable natives by 0.11–0.17. Male immigrants experience relatively quick convergence along this margin, closing the gap after nine years in Israel. For females, the gap is closed only after 23 years. After closing, gaps stabilize at values that imply immigrants are slightly less likely to work in young firms.


Figure C2: Employer Age Assimilation



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (??) when the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a worker's employer is less than five years old. Standard errors clustered at the person level. Unconditional mean for natives is equal to 0.22 (males) and 0.16 (females).

Distance to Tel Aviv. Disparities and assimilation in employer characteristics can naturally coexist with disparities and assimilation in geographical location.¹ We summarize an individual's geographic location by their employer's distance to Tel Aviv, Israel's commercial and financial capital. Figure C3 shows that, on arrival, FSU immigrants were located on average about 800km farther away from Tel Aviv compared to natives (21–24 percent of the natives' average). The location gap with natives gradually closes over time and 29 years after arrival it is reduced to 200km for males and closed for women.

Figure C3: Employer Distance to Tel Aviv Assimilation



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (??) when the outcome variable is distance to Tel Aviv (in km). Standard errors clustered at the person level. Unconditional mean for natives is equal to 3,839 (males) and 3,328 (females).


¹Porcher et al. (2022) document the interrelation between the firm and city size premiums; De La Roca and Puga (2017) show evidence consistent with workers experiencing greater skill accumulation in large cities; Buchinsky et al. (2014) use survey data to model the location choice of FSU engineers who arrived in Israel between 1989–1994.

Segregation. Whether immigrants are mostly employed with other similar immigrants or, instead, mostly natives can have implications for cultural assimilation, language learning, or network formation (Eliason et al., 2019; San, 2021). We consider three measures of employment segregation: whether a firm is composed of 50% or more of FSU employees, the same index for a 75% threshold instead of 50%, and a dummy equal to one if a firm's highest-paid worker is an FSU immigrant (as a proxy for the firm being owned or operated by an FSU person). Figure C4 shows assimilation patterns for these three measures.

On arriving in Israel, FSU immigrants' employment was highly segregated. Relative to comparable natives, the probability of being employed in a majority or over-75% FSU firm was 0.16–0.18 and 0.07–0.08 higher, respectively (relative to very low baseline probabilities for natives). This segregation takes time to unfold. For example, the share of those employed in majority-FSU firms starts to slowly decline only after seven years in Israel.

Lastly, the squares profile in Figure C4 shows that the relative probability of working at a firm where the highest-paid worker is an FSU immigrant *increases* as a function of time since arrival. This differential probability is equal to about 0.05 on arrival for both males and females, it climbs up to 0.09 for males after 29 years, while it stays relatively constant for females.

Figure C4: Employer Segregation Assimilation



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of parameters β_a , $a \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$ in regression equation (??) when the outcome variable is equal to a dummy equal to one if a worker's employer is composed of 50% or more FSU employees, the same metric for a 75% threshold, and a dummy equal to one if a worker's employer's highest-paid worker is an FSU immigrant. Standard errors clustered at the person level. Unconditional mean for natives is equal to 0.011 (males) and 0.006 (females) for the 50% threshold, to 0.002 (males) and 0.001 (females) for the 75% threshold, and equal to 0.013 (males) and 0.009 (females) for the highest paid employee is FSU dummy.