[CS304] Introduction to Cryptography and Network Security

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1 Quick Recap

In the second week, the following topics were covered:

- Data Encyption Standard
 - 1. Initial Permutation
 - 2. Round Function (Expansion, Substitution and Permutation)
 - 3. Key Scheduling Algorithm (PC1 and PC2)
- Complementation Property of DES

2 Attack Models

2.1 Cipher Text Only Attack

The attacker knows only the cipher text produced by an encryption algorithm. The algorithm is known to the attacker. The goal is to recover the plain text corresponding to the cipher text or recover the secret key. If the attack is successful in finding the secret key (hence, plain text), the attack is able to completely break the encryption algorithm. However, if some non-randomness is discovered in the cipher text and the attack is able to get only part of the plain text, then the attack is not breaking the algorithm.

2.2 Known Plain Text Attack

The attacker knows some plain text corresponding to cipher text. Let's say the attacker knows the plain text p_1, p_2,p_n corresponding to the cipher text $c_1, c_2,, c_n$. The goal here is to generate new plain text p from new cipher text c, such that $c \notin \{c_1, c_2,, c_n\}$ or to recover the secret key.

The attacker has the advantage of knowing some plain text corresponding to cipher text. The Known Plain Text Attack is therefore stronger than Cipher Text Only Attack. If an encryption algorithm is secure to Known Plain Text Attack, then it will surely be secure for Cipher Text only Attack, but the reverse is not true.

2.3 Chosen Plain Text Attack

The attacker chooses the plain text according to his/her choice and he/she will be provided with the corresponding cipher text using the encryption algorithm. From this, the attacker tries to find the plain text for some different cipher text or tries to recover the secret key.

This attack model is much stronger than the Known Plain Text Attack as the attacker has the freedom to select the plain text arbitrarily. Hence, any encryption algorithm that is secure under this model, is also secure under the other two attack models.

2.4 Chosen Cipher Text Attack

In this attack model, the attacker chooses some cipher text and is allowed to get the corresponding plain text. The goal of the attack is again decrypting some new cipher text or recovering the secret key.

These attacks are much stronger in the Public-Key cryptography domains, as the key used to decrypt will be receiver's secret key. Hence, the attacker, if successful, will get the receiver's secret key.

3 Cryptanalysis of DES

The secret key involved in DES is of 56-bits. The parity bits are excluded as they can be generated using these 56-bits. This means that a Brute Force Attack or Exhaustive Search on DES will look for 2^{56} keys to get the secret key.

This search space can be reduced to 2^{55} keys using the complementation property of DES. The complementation property states:

$$DES(M, K) = C$$
$$DES(\overline{M}, \overline{K}) = \overline{C}$$

Let's now consider the Chosen Plain Text Attack Model. The attacker chooses two plain texts M and \overline{M} and asks for cipher text corresponding to these plain texts. Lets say:

$$DES(\underline{M}, K) = C_1$$
$$DES(\overline{M}, K) = C_2$$

Attacker is getting C_1 and C_2 and his/her goal is to get the secret key K. As the design of the algorithm is public, the attacker will perform the following computation:

$$DES(\overline{\overline{M}}, \overline{K}) = \overline{C_2}$$

$$\implies DES(M, \overline{K}) = \overline{C_2}$$

Now, the attacker has the following information:

$$DES(M, K) = C_1$$
$$DES(M, \overline{K}) = \overline{C_2}$$

where, C_1, C_2 and hence $\overline{C_2}$ are known to attacker. The set of all possible keys (say 'keys'):

$$keys = \{K_1, K_2,, K_{2^{56}}\}$$

Attacker chooses a key, say $K_i \in keys$. Since, set contains all the possible 56-bit keys, therefore, $\overline{K_i} \in keys$. Now, the attacker performs the following:

$$DES(M, K_i) = \tilde{C}$$

The attacker receives \tilde{C} as output. Now, the following can be interpreted from the information available to the attacker:

if
$$\tilde{C} = C_1 \implies K_i = K$$
 (the actual secret key)
if $\tilde{C} = \overline{C_2} \implies K_i = \overline{K}$ (complement of actual key)
if $\tilde{C} \neq C_1 \implies K_i \neq K$
if $\tilde{C} \neq \overline{C_2} \implies K_i \neq \overline{K} \implies \overline{K_i} \neq K$

Hence, for each key K_i , either the actual key K will be found, or we will be able to delete two keys, K_i and $\overline{K_i}$. Hence, our search space has become half and we need to search for 2^{55} keys to get the actual key.


Due to different attacks such as Differential Attacks and Linearization Attacks, DES is not secure. It has been observed that DES can be broken in approximately 2^{43} complexity. One possible solution to overcome this is to increase the length of the secret key. This is possible for any cryptographic system. Increase the length of the secret key to n times and perform the encryption n times.

4 Double Encryption of DES

The message is encrypted twice using the DES algorithm. The length of the secret key is 112 bits. The secret key is a concatenation of two 56-bit keys:


$$K = K_1 || K_2$$

The encryption and decryption function remains similar as they are in DES. One possible way to encrypt a message using Double Encryption DES is:




During decryption, first the cipher text should be decrypted using key K_2 and then using K_1 .

Since, encryption and decryption are just two functions, we can use a composition of these functions to generate other double DES algorithms. For example:



Similarly, we can make two other double DES algorithms, one will be Decryption-Encryption and the other will be Decryption-Decryption.

The length of key for Double Encryption DES is 112-bits and hence it is expected to provide better security. However, this is not the case. Consider the following double encryption technique:



The key K will be concatenation of two 56-bit keys, i.e. $K = K_1 || K_2$. Also, consider the Known Plain Text Attack, i.e. the attacker knows the plaintext M corresponding to cipher text C. Therefore,

$$C = Enc(Enc(M, K_1), K_2)$$

 $keys = \{sk_1, sk_2, ..., sk_{2^{56}}\}$

Since, the attacker has both, the cipher text as well as corresponding plain text. The attacker can perform the following:

$$Enc(M, sk_i) = X_i$$

 $Dec(C, sk_i) = Y_i$

The blue arrows in the above diagram represent the above steps. The attacker has performed encryption of the plain text in the forward direction using key sk_i , while decryption of cipher text using key $sk_j \neq sk_i$. Now,

if
$$X_i = Y_i \implies K_1 = sk_i$$
 and $K_2 = sk_i$


Two tables can be created, one that maps sk_i with corresponding X_i , and other that maps sk_j with corresponding Y_j . Now, we can do a lookup in these table, and where we find that $X_i = Y_j$, we get the secret key as:

$$K = sk_i || sk_i$$

Hence, Double DES will not provide any extra security over DES as the complexity will be more or less same (neglecting several smaller complexities). This is true, in general, for all the encryption algorithms.

5 Triple Encryption of DES

The standard mechanism to provide double security using DES is to use triple layer of encryption. The length of key in this remains 112-bit and it is a concatenation of two 56-bit keys. Let K be the key, then,



DES used in triple encryption is also known as Triple DES.

Similar to double encryption, different combinations such as EEE, EED, EDE etc. can be used. Consequently, the decryption will also have a different combination, where the E and D will be swapped, hence, DDD, DDE, DED etc. It should be kept in mind that the key in the middle function should be different from the key used in the middle function should be different than the key used in first and last function and the key in first and last function must be same.

6 Advanced Encryption Standard

When the design of DES was made public, it was immediately broken. Thereafter, NIST called for a competition named Advanced Encryption Standard. A lot of cryptographers around the world submitted their designs along with the implementation. One of the submission in the competition was *Rijndael*. It was developed by two Belgian cryptographers, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. In the proposal, it was mentioned that the winner will be renamed as Advanced Encryption Standard. AES is unbreakable till date.

Before studying the AES algorithm deeply, it is required to learn about certain mathematical structures.

6.1 Mathematics Recall

A binary operation * on a set S is a mapping from $S \times S$ to S. It means * is a rule which assigns to each ordered pair of elements from S to an element of S.

$$*: S \times S \to S$$
 if $*(a,b) = c$ and $a,b \in S \implies c \in S$
$$*(b,a) = d \implies d \in S$$

The ordering in the pair is important, hence, it is not necessary that c = d.

6.1.1 Group

A Group (G, *) consists of a set G and a binary operation * on G satisfying the following axioms:

- 1. * is associative on G, that is, $a*(b*c) = (a*b)*c \forall a,b,c \in G$
- 2. There is an element $e \in G$ called the Identity Element, such that $a * e = a = e * a \forall a \in G$.
- 3. For each $a \in G$, there exists an element $a^{-1} \in G$, called the inverse of a, such that $a * a^{-1} = e = a^{-1} * a \ \forall \ a \in G$.

6.1.2 Abelian Group

A group G is called an Abelian (or commutative) Group if $a * b = b * a \forall a, b \in G$.

Example 1: Let *: matrix multiplication over square matrices of order n and M: set of $n \times n$ matrices over \mathbb{R} . Is (M, *) a group?

Solution: We know that matrix multiplication is associative and hence * is associative on M. Also, there always exist Identity Matrix I_n , such that $A*I_n = A = I_n*A$. However,

$$\forall A \in M \nexists A^{-1} \in M \text{ such that } A * A^{-1} = I_n = A^{-1} * A$$

The inverse of matrix doesn't exist if its determinant is equal to zero. Hence, (M, *) is not a group.

Example 2: Consider M in the previous problem to be the set of all invertible square matrices and * be the same. Clearly, (M, *) will now be a group as non-invertible matrices do not belong to M. Is (M, *) an Abelian Group?

Solution: For a group to be an Abelian Group, it must be commutative over the set of elements. However, in general, matrix multiplication is not commutative, that is $A * B \neq B * A$. Hence, (M, *) is not an Abelian Group.

Example 3: \mathbb{Z} : set of all integers and + is addition operation. Is it a group? **Solution:** We know that addition is associative, i.e,

$$a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c$$

Also, $0 \in \mathbb{Z}$ is identity element such that:

$$a+0=a=0+a \ \forall \ a\in \mathbb{Z}$$

And, for each $a \in \mathbb{Z} \exists (-a)$ such that a + (-a) = 0 = (-a) + a. Hence, $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$ is a group.

It is worth noting that $(\mathbb{Z}, -)$ is not a group as subtraction is not associative.

Example 4: Consider the multiplication operation \times on the set of integers \mathbb{Z} . Is it a group? **Solution:** The multiplication operation is:

associative:
$$a \times (b \times c) = (a \times b) \times c$$

existence of identity element: $a \times 1 = a = 1 \times a$

However, inverse of a, that is, $a \times a^{-1} = 1 = a^{-1} \times a$ does not exist for multiplication operation on \mathbb{Z} . This is because, for multiplication operation $a^{-1} = \frac{1}{a} \notin \mathbb{Z}$. Hence, (\mathbb{Z}, \times) is not a group.

Example 5: \mathbb{Q} : set of all rational numbers and \times is multiplication operation. Is (\mathbb{Q}, \times) a group?

Solution: No, it is not a group. It satisfies all the other properties of a group but for $0 \in \mathbb{Q}$ inverse does not exist. Hence, (\mathbb{Q}, \times) is not a group. However, if we consider the set $\mathbb{Q} - \{0\}$, then $(\mathbb{Q} - \{0\}, \times)$ is a group.

6.1.3 Finite Group

If the number of elements in a set is finite, and (G,*) is a group, then (G,*) is a finite group.

Example 6: Consider the set \mathbb{Z}_n which contains integers from 0 to n-1 (both inclusive) and the operation $+_n$ which means $x +_n y = (x + y) mod n$. Is $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +_n)$ a group? **Solution:** Let's check for each property one by one:

• Associativity

$$(x +_n y) +_n z = (((x + y)modn) + z)mod n$$

$$\implies (x +_n y) +_n z = (x + y + z)mod n$$

$$\implies (x +_n y) +_n z = (x + (y + z)mod n)mod n$$

$$\implies (x +_n y) +_n z = x +_n (y +_n z)$$

Hence, $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +_n)$ is associative.

- Existence of Identity Element in \mathbb{Z}_n . Clearly, 0 is the identity element as $x +_n 0 = x = 0 +_n x$.
- Existence of inverse. Clearly, for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, n-x will be the inverse of x.

$$x +_n (n - x) = (x + n - x) \mod n = n \mod n = 0$$

Hence, $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +_n)$ is a group. Moreover, it is an Abelian group.

Example 7: Consider the set $(\mathbb{Z}_n - \{0\})$ and the operation $*_n$, i.e, $x *_n y = (x * y) mod n$. Is $((\mathbb{Z}_n - \{0\}), *_n)$ a group?

Solution: It is easy to verify that the given operation is associative on the given set, and also it has an identity element equal to 1. Now, let us see for inverse. We know that for $x \in (\mathbb{Z}_n - \{0\})$, inverse x^{-1} will be defined as:

$$x*_n x^{-1} = 1 \implies x*x^{-1} \equiv 1 \bmod n$$

The x^{-1} here is known as multiplicative inverse of x under modulo n. We know that it exists only iff gcd(x,n)=1. Hence, there may exist some x, for which $gcd(x,n)\neq 1$ and hence, x^{-1} does not exist. Hence, $((\mathbb{Z}_n-\{0\}),*_n)$ is not a group.

Consider the set which has only those integers from 0 to n-1, which are co-prime to n. This set is usually denoted by \mathbb{Z}_n^* . The cardinality of this set can be calculated using the Euler's Totient Function $\phi(n)$.

$$\mathbb{Z}_n^*$$
: $\{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \text{ and } gcd(x,n) = 1\}$

Hence, $(\mathbb{Z}_n^*, *_n)$ is a group.