

Theory and Evidence on Corruption and Innovation

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Motivation

Corruption is a serious issue affecting most economies, but particularly those that are "middle income"

Countries in transition (like China) can't rely only on allocation/accumulation of physical capital

- need to generate new knowledge and ideas through innovation

Corruption affects allocation of profits amongst firms and hence incentives for innovation

Corruption and Innovation

We propose a theory higher industry concentration results in less innovation

Under the assumption that corruption exacerbates concentration, this yields a theory where corruption lowers innovation

Corruption \longrightarrow Concentration \longrightarrow (Less) Innovation

Empirical Strategy

The 2012 anticorruption campaign affords a good opportunity to study efforts to reduce corruption

- but many things happened at that time!

Following Gianetti et al (2017) we use heterogeneity in prevalence of corrupt activity to generate variation

- industries with more corruption will see larger effect of campaign

Proxy industry corruption with level of entertainment expenses compared to sales

Model Primitives

Fixed industry size with N separate firms


Each firm has a particular productivity/knowledge stock q_i

Firms combine knowledge and labor (Cobb-Douglas) to produce output

- industry's pool of labor is fixed
- labor could stand in for any fixed factor

Firms invest innovation to improve their productivity

Innovation Cycle



Production Decisions

The production function is given by

$$y_i = q_i^{1-\alpha} \ell_i^\alpha$$

We assume that firms take output price and wage as given

$$\pi_i = p y_i - w \ell_i$$

Optimal output is then linear in Productivity

$$y_i = q_i \left(\frac{\alpha p}{w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

Labor Market

Labor market clearing yields the equilibrium wage rate

$$w = \alpha p \left[\sum_i q_i \right]^{1-\alpha} \equiv \alpha p Q^{1-\alpha}$$

Thus profits are also linear in Productivity

$$\pi_i = \frac{(1 - \alpha)p}{Q^\alpha} \cdot q_i$$

Other firms' productivities drive up wages, thus cutting into firm profits

Tullock Contest

Assuming constant spending share on industry yields

$$p = \frac{Z}{Y} = \frac{Z}{Q^{1-\alpha}}$$

Thus the ultimate profit function is then

$$\pi_i = (1 - \alpha)Z \cdot \frac{q_i}{Q}$$

This functional form is that of the well known **Tullock contest**

Innovation Incentives

Firms invest continuously in innovation by choosing a proportional **step size** λ_i with cost $d(\lambda_i)$ researcher workers and law of motion

$$\dot{q}_i = \lambda_i q_i$$

This type of cumulative investment technology differentiates knowledge capital from physical capital

Marginal profit incentives

$$q_i \frac{\partial \pi_i}{\partial q_i} = (1 - \alpha)Z \cdot \frac{q_i}{Q} \left(1 - \frac{q_i}{Q} \right) = (1 - \alpha)Z \cdot s_i(1 - s_i)$$

One-shot Model

For intuition, consider setting with short-sighted firms

$$\max_{\lambda_i} \pi_i(q_i(1 + \Delta\lambda_i)); q_{-i}) - \nu\Delta d(\lambda_i)$$

Further assume quadratic costs $d(\lambda) = \frac{1}{2}d\lambda^2$

$$\lambda_i = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\tilde{\nu}} \cdot s_i (1 - s_i)$$

Firm innovation is first increasing, then decreasing after

$$s_i^* = \frac{1}{2}$$

Innovation Rates

We may be interested in the average innovation rate (number of patents) in a positive sense

$$\bar{\lambda} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \lambda_i = \frac{1}{N} \frac{1 - \alpha}{\tilde{\nu}d} (1 - H)$$

Where H is the Herfindal index of industry concentration (also known as a **diversity index** of order 2)

$$H = \sum_i s_i^2 = D^2$$

Corruption


What form does corruption take? We model it as a direct shifter of the productivity: $q_i \longrightarrow q'_i = e_i q_i$

- this can be shown to be equivalent to an input cost subsidy

Large firms get more favor from officials so the effective productivity is

$$e_i = q_i^\delta \quad \Rightarrow \quad q'_i = q_i^{1+\delta}$$

Effect of Corruption



Pushes market shares towards 0/1 and away from 1/2,
which reduces innovation rates

Data Sources

Chinese firms from Annual Tax Survey, 2007-2015

- balance sheet: sales, cost, profits
- R&D investment
- business entertainment expenses
- various taxes paid

Chinese patent data from SIPO, 1985-2016


- merged by firm name with firm level data

Industrial R&D investment in US by industry, 2007-2014

Entertainment Expenses

$$\text{EE Share} = \frac{\text{EE Spending}}{\text{Total Sales}}$$

Average = 0.9%



Anticorruption

Anecdotal evidence on effect on entertainment

Going through old photos. Dinners in Beijing were more fun before November 2012



Patent Regressions

Patent count data is both discrete and highly non-normal, so we use GLM with Poisson kernel

$$y_i \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_i) \quad \log(\mu_i) = \beta \cdot \mathbf{X}_i$$

Alternative specifications such as Negative Binomial and/or zero inflation generally yield qualitatively similar results


Diff-in-diff

Across industry: median/Herfindahl industry EE spending
Across time: pre/post 2012 anticorruption campaign

Log Poisson Rate	
Log Sales	0.3918*** (0.0013)
Post x Median EE/Sales	26.7869*** (0.5259)
Post x EE Herfindahl	3.1091*** (0.0873)
Controls	Year, Province, Industry
N	75172

Year Dummies



Mean industry EE share interaction shows a strong jump in 2013, after the 2012 campaign



Herfindahl EE share shows a positive trend, but is gradual and starts before 2012

R&D Investment

Secular trend in R&D investment rates, but no clear relation to pre/post anticorruption



May be that time-scale of R&D projects is too long

Realized Enforcement (Patents)

We can also look at *realized* anticorruption enforcement by tracking the number crimes per public official at the provincial level

	Log Poisson Rate
Log Sales	0.3926*** (0.0014)
Criminal Cases	0.0336*** (0.0011)
Crime x Median EE/Sales	0.1264** (0.0517)
Crime x EE Herfindahl	0.1565*** (0.0068)
Controls	Year, Province, Industry

Realized Enforcement (R&D)

Now we see a positive effect for patent as well as R&D investment

	Log R&D Spending
Log Sales	0.5273*** (0.0045)
Criminal Cases	0.0096*** (0.0036)
Crime x Median EE/Sales	0.7099*** (0.2426)
Crime x EE Herfindahl	0.0071 (0.0270)
Controls	Year, Province, Industry

Market Concentration

Main mechanism in our model is that corruption affects innovation through industry concentration

We find evidence that market concentration is reduced in industries with high median EE share

Sales Herfindahl	
Post x Median EE/Sales	−0.4292** (0.1987)
Controls	Year, Province, Industry

Protection Substitution

Evidence on R&D spending is somewhat mixed

One interpretation is firms switching from informal modes of protection (corruption) to formal ones (patenting)

Benefit would be that protection rewards new technology rather than connections

- may encourage knowledge diffusion through patents

However, connected firms may understand institutions better (Ang and Jia, 2014)

Possible Extensions

Consider entry/exit margin in addition to concentration as it relates to anticorruption (would need panel)

Examine implications of switching to formal modes of protection from competition (more or less secrecy?)

Investigate efficiency considerations theoretically, including knowledge diffusion dimension

Thanks!