CS 731: Blockchain Technology And Applications

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
C3I Center



Acknowledgement

 The material of this lecture material is mostly due to Prof. Arvind Narayanan's Lecture at Princeton and his

book on Bitcoin (Chapter 5 mostly



Recap: Bitcoin miners

Bitcoin depends on miners to:

- Store and broadcast the block chain
- Validate new transactions
- Vote (by hash power) on consensus


But who are the miners?

The task of Bitcoin miners

Mining Bitcoins in 6 easy steps

- 1. Join the network, listen for transactions
 - a. Validate all proposed transactions
- 2. Listen for new blocks, maintain block chain
 - a. When a new block is proposed, validate it
- 3. Assemble a new valid block
- 4. Find the nonce to make your block valid
- 5. Hope everybody accepts your new block
- 6. Profit!

Useful to Bitcoin network



Mining difficulty "target" (2014-08-07)

256 bit hash output

64+ leading zeroes required

Current difficulty = 2^{66.2}

=84,758,978,290,086,040,000

Setting the mining difficulty


Every two weeks, compute:




Expected number of blocks in 2 weeks at 10 minutes/block

Mining difficulty over time

Bitcoin Hash Rate vs Difficulty (2 Months)



Time to find a block




Mining hardware

SHA-256

- General purpose hash function
 - Part of SHA-2 family: SHA-224,SHA-384,SHA-512
- Published in 2001
- Designed by the NSA
- Remains unbroken cryptographically
 - Weaknesses known
- SHA-3 (replacement) under standardization

256-bit state



CPU mining

```
while (1) {
    HDR[kNoncePos]++;
    IF (SHA256(SHA256(HDR)) < (65535 << 208) / DIFFICULTY)
    return;
}


two hashes</pre>
```

Throughput on a high-end PC = $10-20 \text{ MHz} \approx 2^{24}$

139,461 years to find a block today!

GPU mining







- GPUs designed for high-performance graphics
 - high parallelism
 - high throughput
- First used for Bitcoin ca. October 2010
- Implemented in OpenCL
 - Later: hacks for specific cards

GPU mining advantages

- easily available, easy to set up
- parallel ALUs
- bit-specific instructions
- can drive many from 1 CPU
- can overclock!

"Goodput"

Observation: some errors are okay (may miss a valid block)

Goodput: throughput × success rate

Worth over-clocking by 50% with 30% errors!



Source: LeonardH, cryptocurrencies talk.com


GPU mining disadvantages

- poor utilization of hardware
- poor cooling
- large power draw
- few boards to hold multiple GPUs

Throughput on a good card = $20-200 \text{ MHz} \approx 2^{27}$

≈173 years to find a block w/100 cards!

FPGA mining





- Field Programmable Gate Area
- First used for Bitcoin ca. June 2011
- Implemented in Verilog



FPGA mining advantages

- higher performance than GPUs
 - o excellent performance on bitwise operations
- better cooling
- extensive customisation, optimisation



Bob Buskirk, thinkcomputers.org

FPGA mining disadvantages

- higher power draw than GPUs designed for
 - frequent malfunctions, errors
- poor optimization of 32-bit adds
- fewer hobbyists with sufficient expertise
- more expensive than GPUs
- marginal performance/cost advantage over GPUs

Throughput on a good card = 100-1000 MHz ≈ 2³⁰ 25 years to find a block w/100 boards!

Bitcoin ASICs

TerraMiner™ IV – 2TH/s Networked ASIC Miner

\$5,999

Shipping June 2014





300 GH Bitcoin Mining Card The Monarch BPU 300 C

\$1,497.00

Qty: 1 ADD TO CART

Pre-Order Terms: This is a pre-order. 28nm ASIC bitcoin mining hardware products are shipped according to placement in the order queue, and delivery may take 3 months or more after order. All sales are final.



DETAILS

- 2.5 TH/s
- Dimensions: 15" x 13.3" x 13.7" (38cm x 34cm x 35cm)
- 28nm ASIC technology
- · Silent Cooling
- In-built WiFi Connection (without Antenna)
- Less than 750 watt (0.3 per GH)
- 1 Year Guarantee
- \$ 5.800

COMES WITH

- 1. Power Supply
- Free Remote Power Outlet & Smartphone App
- 3. Free User Guide
- 4. Free Personal Assistance for Setup

SHPPING

- · Worldwide, Express
- · Included in the price
- Available:

 100 Units: Shipping Ap
 (Week 3)

Bitcoin ASICs

- special purpose
 - o approaching known limits on feature sizes
 - o less than 10x performance improvement expected
- designed to be run constantly for life
- require significant expertise, long lead-times
- perhaps the fastest chip development ever!

Case study: TerraMiner IV



- First shipped Jan 2014
- 2 TH/s
- Cost: US\$6,000

Still, 14 months to find a block!

Market dynamics (2013/2014)

- Most boards obsolete within 3-6 months
 - Half of profits made in first 6 weeks
- Shipping delays are devastating to customers
- Most companies require pre-orders
- Most individual customers should have lost...

But... rising prices have saved them!

Professional mining centers

Needs:

- cheap power
- good network
- cool climate



BitFury mining center, Republic of Georgia

The future

- Can small miners stay in the game?
- Do ASICs violate the original Bitcoin vision?
- Would we be better off without ASICs?

Energy consumption & ecology

Thermodynamic limits

Landauer's principle: Any non-reversible computation must consume a minimum amount of energy.

Specifically, each bit changed requires (kT In 2) joules

SHA-256 is not reversible

Energy consumption is inevitable

Energy aspects of Bitcoin mining

- Embodied energy: used to manufacture mining chips & other equipment
 - should decrease over time
 - returns to scale
- Electricity: used to perform computation
 - should increase over time
 - returns to scale
- Cooling: required to protect equipment
 - costs more with increased scale!

Estimating energy usage: top-down

- Each block worth approximately US\$15,000
- Approximately \$25/s generated
- Industrial electricity (US): \$0.03/MJ
 - ○\$0.10/kWh

Upper bound on electricity consumed:

 $900 \, MJ/s = 900 \, MW$

Estimating energy usage: bottom-up

- Best claimed efficiency: 1 GHz/W
- Network hash rate: 150,000,000 GHz
- (excludes cooling, embodied energy)

Lower bound on electricity consumed:

150 MW

How much is a MW?



Three Gorges Dam = 10,000 MW typical hydro plant ≈ 1,000 MW

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant = 7,000 MW typical nuclear plant ≈ 4,000 MW



major coal-fired plant ≈ 2,000 MW

All payment systems require energy







Data furnaces

- **Observation:** in the limit, computing devices produce heat almost as well as electric heaters!
- Why not install mining rigs as home heaters?
- Challenges:
 - Ownership/maintenance model
 - Gas heaters still at least 10x more efficient
 - O What happens in summer?

Open questions

- Will Bitcoin drive out electricity subsidies?
 - Will Bitcoin require guarding power outlets?
 - Can we make a currency with no proof-of-work?

Mining pools


Economics of being a small miner



- Cost: ≈US\$6,000
- Expected time to find a block: ≈14 months
- Expected revenue: ≈\$1,000/month

TerraMiner IV

Mining uncertainty





Time to find first block

Mining pools

- Goal: pool participants all attempt to mine a block with the same coinbase recipient
 - send money to key owned by pool manager
- Distribute revenues to members based on how much work they have performed
 - minus a cut for pool manager

How do we know how much work members perform?

Mining shares

Idea: prove work with "near-valid blocks" (shares)

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ining pools

Hey folks! Here's our next block to work on

coinbase:

25→pool

Pool manager

H(prev: mrkl_root: nonce: hash: $0 \times 00000000000000003$

0x000000000007313f 89...

1f...

58900000000045a161

\$\$\$ 0x00000000000a87790

8€0000000001e8709

6気0000000000490c6b

00.





Mining pool variations

- Pay per share: flat reward per share
 - Typically minus a significant fee
 - O What if miners never send in valid blocks?
- Proportional: typically since last block
 - Lower risk for pool manager
 - More work to verify
- "Luke-jr" approach: no management fee
 - Miners can only get paid out in whole BTC
 - Pool owner keeps spread


Mining pool protocols

- API for fetching blocks, submitting shares
 - Stratum
 - Getwork
 - Getblockshare
- Proposed for standardization with a BIP
 - Increasingly important; some hardware support

Mining pool history

- First pools appear in late-2010
 - O Back in the GPU era!
- By 2014: around 90% of mining pool-based
- June 2014: GHash.io exceeds 50%

Mining pools (as of August 2014)



Are mining pools a good thing?

Pros

- Make mining more predictable
- Allow small miners to participate
- More miners using updated validation software

Cons

- Lead to centralization
- Discourage miners from running full nodes

Can we prevent pools?



Mining incentives and strategies

Game-theoretic analysis of mining

Several strategic decisions

- Which transactions to include in a block
 - Default: any above minimum transaction fee
- Which block to mine on top of
 - Default: longest valid chain
- How to choose between colliding blocks
 - Default: first block heard
- When to announce new blocks
 - Default: immediately after finding them


Game-theoretic analysis of mining

Assume you control $0 < \alpha < 1$ of mining power

Can you profit from a non-default strategy?

For some α , YES, though analysis is ongoing!

Forking attacks



Forking attacks

- Certainly possible if $\alpha > 0.5$
 - o may be possible with less
 - avoid block collisions
- Attack is detectable
 - Might be reversed
 - Might crash exchange rate

I expect you to die, Mr.
Bitcoin



Goldfinger Attack?

Forking attacks via bribery

- Idea: building $\alpha > 0.5$ is expensive. Why not rent it instead?
 - Payment techniques:
 - Out-of-band bribery
 - Run a mining pool at a loss
 - Insert large "tips" in the block chain

This is an open problem!

Checkpointing

satoshi

Founder Sr. Member



Activity: 364



Bitcoin 0.3.2 released

July 17, 2010, 09:35:51 PM


Download links available now on bitcoin.org. Everyone should upgrade to this version.

- Added a simple security safeguard that locks-in the block chain up to this point.
- Reduced addr messages to save bandwidth now that there are plenty of nodes to connect to.
- Spanish translation by milkiway.
- French translation by aidos.

Default clients ship with built-in checkpoint


Block-withholding attacks

Strategy: don't announce blocks right away. Try to get ahead!



Block-withholding attacks, take 2

What happens if a block is announced when you're ahead by 1?





The race is on!

Block-withholding attacks

- Improved strategy for any α if you can win every race
 - Ideal network position
 - Our Bribery?
- With a 50% chance of winning races, improved strategy for α >
 0.25
- Not yet observed in practice!

Surprising departure from previous assumptions

Punitive forking

- Suppose you want to blacklist transactions from address X
 - Freeze an individual's money forever
- Extreme strategy: announce that you will refuse to mine on any chain with a transaction from X

With α < 0.5, you'll soon fall behind the network

Feather-forking strategy

- To blacklist transactions from X, announce that you will refuse to mine directly on any block with a transaction from X
 - but you'll concede after n confirming blocks

• Chance of pruning an offending block is α^2

Response to feather forking

- For other miners, including a transaction from X induces an α^2 chance of losing a block
- Might be safer to join in on the blacklist
- Can enforce a blacklist with $\alpha < 0.5!$

Success depends on convincing other miners you'll fork

Feather-forking: what is it good for?

- Freezing individual bitcoin owners
 - ransom/extortion
 - o law enforcement?
- Enforcing a minimum transaction fee...

A second look at transaction fees

Default policy:

```
priority = sum(input_value * input_age)/size_in_bytes
```


Accept without fees if:

priority > 0.576



Transaction fees will matter more


Currently, block rewards are > 99% of miner revenue. But:



Eventually, transaction fees will dominate

Courtesy: Brian Warner

Will miners cooperate to enforce fees?



Bribery attacks

Start a new mining pool paying 25+\varepsilon

Guarantee payment instead of dividing up wins

Mutual trust issues

Pay miners directly

Potentially cheaper

Trust/information issues

Kickbacks

Solve some trust issues

Complicated technically

Summary

- Miners are free to implement any strategy
- Very little non-default behavior in the wild
- No complete game-theoretic model exists

Things might be about to get interesting...