relativism is offered as a means of guiding our ethical actions. To make a mindful ethical judgment, Ting-Toomey suggests that one must "possess both breadth and depth of context-sensitive knowledge, culture-specific knowledge, and genuine humanistic concerns" (p. 275). Finally, she reiterates the overall philosophy behind the book: the idea of moral inclusion and that human respect is a fundamental starting point for collaborative, transcultural dialogue, in which "...the voices of diversity are being listened to and being understood" (p. 276).

This is one of the most comprehensive and useful books available on intercultural communication. It is both theoretically grounded and pragmatically informative for students, teachers, scholars, and practitioners. The writing is engaging and accessible, with key ideas presented in tables and figures to clarify the constructs. One only has to look at the extensive reference section to understand the scope of the intercultural theoretical base. It is essential reading for interculturalists, a valuable resource, and a comprehensive text for courses on global or domestic diversity.

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Community, solidarity and belonging: levels of community and their normative significance
Andrew Mason; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000, 227pp.

In his scholarly treatment of the subject of community from the point of view of political philosophy, Andrew Mason grapples with a series of questions about the different kinds and levels of community. First, what kind of community, if any, is ideal at the level of the state, and what legitimate steps may be taken by the state to promote it? Second, when political communities deemed valuable come into conflict with communities below the state level, how should this conflict be resolved? Finally, when a community comes into conflict with promotion of a global community, how should such conflict be resolved? Mason's guiding assumption is that in order to understand the normative significance of community

at the level of the state, we have to understand its relationship to community above and below it.

Mason's focus on political community distinguishes his book on community theory from other recent works such as Etienne Wenger's (1998) *Communities of Practice*, in which engagement in social practice is the unit of analysis from which a social theory of learning is constructed. The major contribution of this book is to provide a political framework for sorting through the intercultural relationships that tend to be more commonly analyzed through the fields of communication, social psychology, and education. Mason's explanations of the interrelationships among culture, community, individual, national identity, and rights would be of value to teachers and researchers who seek a better understanding of the political contexts which surround the face-to-face communication issues inherent in intercultural contact.

Mason's style of writing is logical and linear. When posing a question, he consistently starts out from a neutral stance, analyzing scholarly opinion on both sides of issues such as the nature of the international system or the liberal-communitarian debate. Eventually, he synthesizes the propositions of the various arguments into a conclusion which represents his position, and which forms a building block for the subsequent chapters. While his style is dense and scholarly, the reader is amply rewarded by conclusions which are simply stated and reiterated throughout ensuing chapters.

The book's structure comprises three parts. In Part I (Chapters 1 and 2), Mason attempts to unravel the complexities surrounding the nature and value of community. While the discussion in these chapters forms the basis for subsequent arguments, Mason suggests that those less interested in "general philosophical issues" move on to Part 2, in which he explores various sources and kinds of value possessed by communities (Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6). In Part 3 (Chapters 7 and 8), the focus is on global community and the requirements for operationalizing a vision of persons united together in a way of life that enables mutual concern and enjoyment of "just" relationships. Throughout Parts 2 and 3, Mason presupposes a "liberal" perspective, by which he means a commitment to a set of individual rights which are to be given a high priority in the design of institutions and the choice of policies, but which sometimes may be less important than rights of communities.

In Chapter 1, Mason notes that the concept of community is fundamentally ambiguous. This observation of the difficult question, "what *is* community?" represents the classic starting place for many books on the subject (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Warren, 1978; Wenger, 1998). Like other authors, Mason concludes that the concept of community often seems to represent an ideal. Mason puts forth two distinct kinds of community: The "ordinary concept" is essentially uncontested, constituting a group of people who share a range of values, way of life, identification with the group and its practices, and mutual recognition of each other as group members. Members of a community may also share a culture—both communities and cultures can overlap, with people participating in more than one at a time. The "moralized concept" of community includes the conditions for the ordinary concept, plus two more: there must exist a solidarity

between members, and no systematic exploitation or injustice. Perhaps obviously, the latter concept is more controversial—and ambiguous—because it incorporates moral notions of solidarity, exploitation, and justice.

In Chapter 2, Mason looks at the value of community, drawing distinctions between individualist and collectivist accounts. The distinctions he makes between the two—individualist accounts valuing social relationship in terms of their contribution to the lives of individuals, the value of collectivist accounts emerging from relationships between individualists—coincides with the general cultural meanings used by interculturalists. The collectivist definition merges with Mason's claim of the "non-instrumental value" of communities, wherein relationships of justice and mutual concern are valued for their own sake. He further characterizes communities in the moralized sense as not requiring complete mutual identification or understanding, and in allowing members to participate in more than one way of life. Here also, Mason's view of the "nesting" quality of communities is consistent with the notion of a person's ability to hold membership in multiple cultures.

In Chapter 3, Mason lays out a basic disagreement between liberals who would define "basic" rights extensively, including freedoms of political liberty, speech, consensual sex, free association, among others, and those who favor a more limited range of freedoms, specifically those of association, and the right against cruel, inhuman treatment. He leaves open the question of under what circumstances greater injustice would be created by forcibly preventing a rights violation from occurring, suggesting that such decisions are highly dependent upon context. Mason concludes that the dominant liberal conception is non-procedural, assuming that there are standards outside the political process to be used in determining which concept of justice is best. He uses examples of clitoridectomy, circumcision, and arranged marriages to bolster his further conclusion that conflicts between political community and communities below state level are not always bound to be resolved by forcing communities to respect basic individual rights. Rather, "the best interpretation of the right to personal freedom" should prevail, as judged by citizen bodies.

Chapter 4 introduces the moralized notion of the "republican challenge", which focuses on what it means to be a good citizen, fulfilling both the responsibilities and obligations of citizenship (harking back to the communitarians who think obligations of citizens are as important as rights). More important than being a good citizen, however, is the good of citizenship, in which citizens have special obligations to one another, and as members of a collective, enjoy equal status and worth. Enforcing citizens' special obligations to one another need not be oppressive; it can still leave space for individuals to lead their own lives and for communities to sustain cultural practices.

Chapter 5 introduces the concept of belonging, both to a polity, and belonging together. Mason puts forth the intriguing notion that in general, groups need no special reason to cooperate together other than the fact that they share a common fate, resulting from the recognition that they belong to the same polity, and do not feel marginalized from institutions and practices. Sharing a sense of common fate is often enough motivation to support policies aimed at the common good, without

needing to share a common national identity. Mason lays out the three features of an inclusive political community: (1) having a sense of belonging to it, (2) a constitution resulting from inclusive political dialogue which aims at an ideal of consensus, even if this is not achieved, and (3) the constitution protects the basic rights to which liberals are committed. Cultural diversity raises two challenges for achieving a wide sense of belonging: first, when one or more of the culturally defined groups within the polity has suffered state-sponsored oppression, and second, when public institutions reflect the dominant culture. These challenges need not take away, however, from achievement of an inclusive political community in practice (versus the idealized version) in societies exhibiting considerable cultural diversity.

In Chapter 6, Mason speaks of the importance of educational institutions in promoting mutual valuing between members of different cultures as a means to fostering identification with major institutions. He contrasts a neutralist model, in which teachers don't take a stand on which culture's ideas, practices, or values are best, and a pluralist model, where it is legitimate for teachers to evaluate ideas of different cultures from a particular perspective, find them wanting and dismiss them. He concludes that a model of "constrained pluralism" best suits the fostering of a widespread sense of belonging, in which constraints respect parental choices by allowing them to choose education for their children. Among the curricula ruled out are those which don't privilege the history, politics, and literature of the liberal-democractic state to which they belong; teach widely accepted scientific understandings (thus making it impossible to not teach evolution); or curricula which do not introduce children to ideas, practices, and values of more than one culture. Mason presents the case for both respecting parental and teacher autonomy in making curricular choices, and ensuring that these same societal actors are cognizant of the need to foster a widespread sense of belonging in communities. Parents wanting their children to experience the education of a particular culture must heed the presumption that cultures that have survived have something valuable to offer. Further, even if teachers are critical of a culture's ideas, practices, and values, they must attempt to identify what is worthwhile in them.

In Chapter 7, Mason suggests that global community might be an "incoherent ideal", given that the shared values and common life necessary for true global community could not be forged and sustained without oppressive measures. Intervention in cases of injustice can only be justified if it takes on humanitarian character, and is restricted to extreme cases (massacres, enslavement deportation, institutional uses of torture or rape), when the rights violated could be the object of a reasoned global consensus. Given that conceptualizations of what constitutes injustice or oppression vary widely, he cautions against humanitarian intervention when such action would actually lead to greater injustice. Once again, Mason balances liberal concerns for autonomy of action against more communitarian evidence of empathy beyond one's personal and community borders.

In Chapter 8, Mason clarifies ways in which the inherently "anarchic" structure of the state system might stand in the way of liberal ideas of global community. He questions what changes might need to occur to reduce the incidence of dominator states, so that war can be avoided, and comes up with five general

answers, concluding that each of these would contribute to more peaceful global relations.

Throughout his book, Mason's focus on the practical political compromises and conditions necessary for inclusive communities to flourish is welcome. Certainly, his scope is large, and at times daunting: from the decisions made by parents on how best to educate children, to the decisions of national government on whether or not national minority populations should be treated any differently from immigrant communities, to how a global ethic of justice can be sufficiently shared to prevent war. Yet his focus on the political realities lurking beneath community conflict at a variety of levels provides a needed contextual frame to our efforts at achieving intercultural understanding.

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