





Al Risk Taxonomies

MIT AI Risk Repository

OVERVIEW

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Read more: <u>airisk.mit.edu</u>

MIT AI Risk Repository - Causal Taxonomy of AI risks

Category	Level	Description of how the risk is presented in evidence			
Entity	tity Al Due to a decision or action made by an Al system				
	Human	Due to a decision or action made by humans			
	Other	Due to some other reason or ambiguous			
Intent	Intentional	Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal			
	Unintentional	Due to an unexpected outcome from pursuing a goal			
	Other	Without clearly specifying the intentionality			
Timing	Pre-deployment	Before the AI is deployed			
	Post-deployment	After the AI model has been trained and deployed			
	Other	Without a clearly specified time of occurrence			

"Malicious utilization of AI has the potential to endanger digital security, physical security, and political security. International law enforcement entities grapple with a variety of risks linked to the Malevolent Utilization of AI." Habbal, 2024 [29.03.01]



Entity = Human Intent = Intentional Timing = Post-deployment

Read more: <u>airisk.mit.edu</u>

MIT AI Risk Repository - Domain Taxonomy of AI risks

Domain / Subdomain

1 Discrimination & Toxicity

- 1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation
- 1.2 Exposure to toxic content
- 1.3 Unequal performance across groups

2 Privacy & Security

- 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information
- 2.2 Al system security vulnerabilities and attacks

3 Misinformation

- 3.1 False or misleading information
- 3.2 Pollution of information ecosystem and loss of consensus reality

4 Malicious actors & Misuse

- 4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale
- 4.2 Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm
- 4.3 Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation

Domain / Subdomain

5 Human-Computer Interaction

- 5.1 Overreliance and unsafe use
- 5.2 Loss of human agency and autonomy

6 Socioeconomic & Environmental Harms

- 6.1 Power centralization and unfair distribution of benefits
- 6.2 Increased inequality and decline in employment quality
- 6.3 Economic and cultural devaluation of human effort
- 6.4 Competitive dynamics
- 6.5 Governance failure
- 6.6 Environmental harm

7 AI system safety, failures, and limitations

- 7.1 Al pursuing its own goals in conflict with human goals or values
- 7.2 Al possessing dangerous capabilities
- 7.3 Lack of capability or robustness
- 7.4 Lack of transparency or interpretability
- 7.5 Al welfare and rights
- 7.6 Multi-agent risks

MIT AI Risk Repository - I	Domain Taxonomy of Al risks - Detailed descriptions	Read more: <u>airisk.mit.ed</u>		
Domain / Subdomain Description		Domain / Subdomain	Description	neau more. <u>amsk.mit.eu</u>
1 Discrimination & toxio	city	5 Human-computer interaction		
1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation	Unequal treatment of individuals or groups by AI, often based on race, gender, or other sensitive characteristics, resulting in unfair outcomes and representation of those groups.	5.1 Overreliance and unsafe use	to inappropriate rel to harvest informat	ig, trusting, or relying on AI systems by users, leading to emotional or material dependence and ationships with or expectations of AI systems. Trust can be exploited by malicious actors (e.g., ioin or enable manipulation), or result in harm from inappropriate use of AI in critical situations emergency). Overreliance on AI systems can compromise autonomy and weaken social ties.
1.2 Exposure to toxic content	Al that exposes users to harmful, abusive, unsafe, or inappropriate content. May involve providing advice or encouraging action. Examples of toxic content include hate speech, violence, extremism, illegal acts, or child sexual abuse material, as well as content that violates community norms such as profanity, inflammatory political speech, or pornography.	5.2 Loss of human agency and autonomy	Delegating by humans of key decisions to AI systems, or AI systems that make decisions that diminish human control and autonomy. Both can potentially lead to humans feeling disempowered, losing the ability to shape a fulfilling life trajectory, or becoming cognitively enfeebled.	
		6 Socioeconomic & environmental harms		
1.3 Unequal performance across groups 2 Privacy & security	 Accuracy and effectiveness of Al decisions and actions are dependent on group membership, where decisions in Al system design and biased training data lead to unequal outcomes, reduced benefits, increased effort, and alienation of users. 	6.1 Power centralization and unfair distribution of benefits	Al-driven concentra or ownership of po inequality.	ation of power and resources within certain entities or groups, especially those with access to werful AI systems, leading to inequitable distribution of benefits and increased societal
2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking, or correctly	Al systems that memorize and leak sensitive personal data or infer private information about individuals without their consent. Unexpected or unauthorized sharing of data and information can compromise user expectation of privacy, assist identity theft, or cause loss of confidential intellectual property.	6.2 Increased inequality and decline in employment quality		ic inequalities caused by widespread use of AI, such as by automating jobs, reducing the ent, or producing exploitative dependencies between workers and their employers.
inferring sensitive information		6.3 Economic and cultural devaluation of human effort	(e.g., art, music, wi The ubiquity of Al-	e of creating economic or cultural value through reproduction of human innovation or creativity itling, coding, invention), destabilizing economic and social systems that rely on human effort. generated content may lead to reduced appreciation for human skills, disruption of creative and industries, and homogenization of cultural experiences.
2.2 AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks	Vulnerabilities that can be exploited in AI systems, software development toolchains, and hardware that results in unauthorized access, data and privacy breaches, or system manipulation causing unsafe outputs or behavior.	6.4 Competitive dynamics	Competition by Al o systems to maximi systems.	developers or state-like actors in an Al "race" by rapidly developing, deploying, and applying Al ze strategic or economic advantage, increasing the risk they release unsafe and error-prone
3 Misinformation		6.5 Governance failure	Inadequate regulatory frameworks and oversight mechanisms that fail to keep pace with Al development, leading to ineffective governance and the inability to manage Al risks appropriately.	
3.1 False or misleading information	Al systems that inadvertently generate or spread incorrect or deceptive information, which can lead to inaccurate beliefs in users and undermine their autonomy. Humans that make decisions based on false beliefs can experience	6.6 Environmental harm		nd operation of AI systems that cause environmental harm through energy consumption of materials and carbon footprints associated with AI hardware.
	physical, emotional, or material harms	7 Al system safety, failures & limitations		
3.2 Pollution of information ecosystem and loss of consensus reality	Highly personalized Al-generated misinformation that creates "filter bubbles" where individuals only see what matches their existing beliefs, undermining shared reality and weakening social cohesion and political processes.	7.1 Al pursuing its own goals in conflict with human goals or values	or users. These mis through reward had	t in conflict with ethical standards or human goals or values, especially the goals of designers saligned behaviors may be introduced by humans during design and development, such as sking and goal misgeneralisation, and may result in AI using dangerous capabilities such as ption, or situational awareness to seek power, self-proliferate, or achieve other goals.
4 Malicious actors & mi	7.2 Al possessing		velop, access, or are provided with capabilities that increase their potential to cause mass	
4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and	Using AI systems to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns, malicious surveillance, or targeted and sophisticated automated censorship and propaganda, with the aim of manipulating political processes, public	dangerous capabilities	harm through deception, weapons development and acquisition, persuasion and manipulation, political strateg cyber-offense, AI development, situational awareness, and self-proliferation. These capabilities may cause ma- harm due to malicious human actors, misaligned AI systems, or failure in the AI system.	
influence at scale	opinion, and behavior.	7.3 Lack of capability or robustness		I to perform reliably or effectively under varying conditions, exposing them to errors and ive significant consequences, especially in critical applications or areas that require moral
4.2 Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm	Using AI systems to develop cyber weapons (e.g., by coding cheaper, more effective malware), develop new or enhance existing weapons (e.g., Lethal Autonomous Weapons or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives), or use weapons to cause mass harm.	7.4 Lack of transparency or interpretability	Challenges in unde	rstanding or explaining the decision-making processes of AI systems, which can lead to in enforcing compliance standards or holding relevant actors accountable for harms, and the and correct errors.
4.3 Fraud, scams, and	Using AI systems to gain a personal advantage over others through cheating, fraud, scams, blackmail, or targeted	7.5 AI welfare and rights		ons regarding the treatment of potentially sentient AI entities, including discussions around is and welfare, particularly as AI systems become more advanced and autonomous.
targeted manipulation	manipulation of beliefs or behavior. Examples include Al-facilitated plagiarism for research or education, impersonating a trusted or fake individual for illegitimate financial benefit, or creating humiliating or sexual imagery.	7.6 Multi-agent risks	structure of multi-a	pent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the igent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security a lack of shared information and trust.

Changelog

2025-04-20 - Added 7.6 Multi-agent risks

2024-08-01 - initial release

Other resources

Read full report on ArXiv

Explore included frameworks

View the full database

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