Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Pre-Registered Replication of Olson and Fazio (2001)

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Abstract

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is one of the most widely-studied and highly applicable pathways for establishing and changing attitudes. Although many paradigms have been used to study EC, the surveillance task (Olson & Fazio, 2001), is one of the most cited, and purportedly generates attitudes that are claimed to occur without awareness. The ability for EC effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and those that do are characterized by small samples and very small effect sizes. Our paper represents a high-powered (*N* =1,478), pre-registered replication attempt designed to provide a strong test of EC effects produced by this task. Although we obtained evidence for a small EC effect when the original authors awareness measure was used – therefore replicating the original effect – no such effect emerged when any of the other three alternative awareness measures were applied. Our findings place strong constraints on the surveillance task’s theoretical and practical utility.

Keywords: Pre-Registered Replication; Evaluative Conditioning; Contingency Awareness; Recollective Memory; Attitude Formation

Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Pre-Registered Replication of Olson and Fazio (2001)

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a widely-studied and highly applicable pathway for establishing and changing attitudes (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2001). In a typical EC task, a neutral (conditioned) stimulus (CS) is repeatedly paired with a positive or negative (unconditioned) stimulus (US), and as a result, the former typically acquires a similar valence as the latter.

Evaluative conditioning plays a central role in theory and application throughout psychological science. For instance, in its original version, the Associative–Propositional Evaluation (APE) Model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), an influential theory of attitudes in social psychology, distinguished between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes, and treated EC as a key pathway for changing the latter. The Elaboration-Likelihood Model, in the domain of persuasion (ELM: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), distinguishes between the central and peripheral routes to persuasion, and views EC as highly relevant to the latter route. Elsewhere, EC is said to play an important role in implicit bias (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2006), consumption behavior (e.g., Gibson, 2008), self-esteem (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004), disgust (e.g.,Schienle [et al., 2001](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0887618508001163" \l "bib40)), phobias (e.g., Merckelbach, et al., 1993) and much more. In the applied domain, it is frequently used as an intervention to address problematic attitudes and behaviors related to addictive substances such as alcohol (e.g., Houben et al., 2010), unhealthy food consumption (e.g., Shaw et al., 2016), and racism (e.g., Lai et al., 2014).

When it comes to theorizing about EC itself, debate is largely led by proponents of dual process (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), single process propositional (e.g., De Houwer, 2018), and association formation models (e.g., Jones, Fazio & Olson, 2009). Although many variables are used to differentiate between these positions, one has received considerable attention: contingency awareness (e.g., Corneille & Stahl, 2018). Showing that EC effects can occur without contingency awareness is often viewed as supporting dual process and association formation models whereas the opposite is true for propositional models (although see Stahl & Heycke, 2016). So far the general trend of evidence indicates that EC effects are highly dependent on contingency awareness (e.g., Bar-Anan, De Houwer & Nosek, 2010; Hofmann et al., 2010; Stahl et al., 2009). Yet there is one EC paradigm (Olson & Fazio, 2001) that some argue provides evidence for unaware EC effects (e.g., Jones et al., 2010; March et al., 2018).

This task, commonly called the ‘surveillance procedure’, consists of a stream of (distractor) stimuli and requires participants to detect and respond to target stimuli. Unbeknownst to them, several of the distractor stimuli are actually CS-US pairs. In this way the task requires people to process the CS-US pairs but directs their attention away from those pairings and towards irrelevant target items (Jones et al., 2010). Following training, self-reported (and implicit) attitudes are assessed. Participants are then asked post-hoc questions to gauge if they noticed the CS-US pairings during the surveillance task. If so, these ‘contingency aware’ participants are excluded from subsequent analyses. If not, then EC shown by ‘contingency unaware’ participants is often treated as supporting the idea that EC effects can occur without awareness (e.g., Jones et al., 2009, 2010; March et al., 2018).

Since its introduction in 2001, the surveillance task became one of the most frequently cited EC procedures in the literature (over 700 citations in Google Scholar). Several authors have claimed that the surveillance task provides evidences for unaware EC (e.g., March et al., 2018). They then used these effects to forward conceptual arguments on attitudes in general (i.e., that attitudes can emerge even when people are unaware of their origins), and EC in particular (Walther et al., 2005). For instance, the implicit misattribution theory of EC is based almost exclusively on the task’s findings (Jones et al., 2009). Still others use this task to change existing attitudes, primarily because of its purported implicit effects (e.g., Choi, & Lee, 2015; Houben et al., 2010; Olson & Fazio, 2006). Yet others argue that the retrospective measures of contingency knowledge used in this work do not reflect ‘unaware’ EC but instead capture recollective memory for CS-US pairings at the time of judgment rather than awareness of CS-US pairings during encoding (e.g., Gawronski & Walther, 2012).

Regardless of whether one subscribes to the awareness or memory position, constructing theories, and using tasks in applied settings, requires strong evidence. We believe that such evidence is currently lacking. Only a handful of published papers (*n* = 10 reporting 23 separate studies) have actually demonstrated EC effects without awareness/recollective memory using the surveillance paradigm. A random-effects meta-analysis of these studies (see [osf.io/4mh2d](https://osf.io/4mh2d/)) reveals a significant but small effect size, Hedges’ *g* = 0.20, 95% CI [0.13, 0.28]. However, features in the distribution of these effect sizes suggest that this small average effect may actually be inflated by publication or reporting biases. For instance, studies with larger standard errors tend to find larger effect sizes (see Figure 1). Such ‘funnel-plot asymmetry’ usually indicates that null results from small studies may be missing from the literature (Sterne et al., 2011). In addition, a meta-analytic selection model assuming publication bias (Vevea & Hedges, 1995) fit the data better than a standard random-effects meta-analysis, χ2(1) = 6.49, *p* = .011, and reveals a non-significant average effect size, Hedges’ *g* = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.006, 0.14]. It is therefore possible that the available evidence of EC effects generated using the surveillance paradigm is biased by the selective publication of significant results.



**Figure 1.** Funnel plot of the data entered into the meta-analysis of previous studies with the surveillance task. Each dot depicts effect size (Hedges’ g) against their Standard Errors. Studies falling inside the grey area are statistically non-significant in a two-tailed test. The triangle inside the dashed line is centered at the average mean effect size and represents the distribution of effect sizes that would be expected in the absence of publication bias. The red line represents Egger’s regression test for funnel plot asymmetry.

In short, the surveillance task is argued to provide evidence for EC effects without awareness/recollective memory, is used to advocate for dual-process and association formation models of EC and attitudes, and is often deployed as an intervention to ‘implicitly’ modify problematic attitudes and behavior. Such developments seem premature given that few studies exist, and those that do are characterized by small samples and very small effect sizes. Given the theoretical and practical implications stemming from this task, it seems prudent to replicate the basic effect with a highly powered sample. Doing so will provide a strong constraint on future theorizing about attitudes, EC, and the use of this task in applied contexts.

Towards this end, we contacted the original authors and asked for their assistance in designing a procedure that directly replicated their original (2001) procedure. Rather than directly replicate their original design, the original authors encouraged us to make changes to the study design, based on their own experiences with the task, and on the assumption that this would maximize our chances of obtaining an effect (e.g., March et al., 2018). It is therefore important to note that this study represents a close conceptual replication rather than a direct replication of Olson & Fazio (2001). Our final and approved (by the original authors) study protocol can be found at the following link ([osf.io/wnckg](https://osf.io/wnckg/)). The original authors also recommended that we run the experiment locally in the laboratory rather than on-line. In order to do so, and to collect the necessary sample size, we contacted several labs with extensive expertise with EC to help with data collection. Twelve labs, including the lab of one of the original authors, agreed to contribute to this replication effort.

In addition to replicating the original study, we wanted to explore whether evidence for EC in this task depends on the specific way in which contingency awareness/recollective memory is measured. The original authors contingency awareness criterion may have accidentally included individuals who were actually aware of/remembering the contingencies. We therefore included three additional (exploratory) contingency awareness/recollective memory measures that seek to assess this concept in a more conservative manner.

# Disclosures

All materials, data, analyses and code are available on the Open Science Framework ([osf.io/hs32y](https://osf.io/hs32y/)). We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study. Data was collected in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

# Method

## Participants

1478 participants were recruited from twelve labs at ten universities in Europe and North America. In each case, only native speaking participants were recruited (72% women, *Mage* = 21.2 *SD* = 4.9). We initially planned that each lab would collect data from a minimum of 100 participants and a maximum of 150 participants based on their local resources. The rational for this planned sample size was that in previously published studies the proportion of contingency aware participants ranged from 2% to 27%. Consequently, 1200 participants would allow for greater than 99% power to observe a small EC effect (Cohen’s *d* = 0.20) even if 30% of the sample were subsequently excluded on the basis of contingency awareness/recollective memory.[[1]](#footnote-2) Three labs collected data from more than 150 participants (see the Supplemental Online Material-Reviewed for details on the sample size and characteristics for each lab). We should note that one lab collected fewer than 100 participants.[[2]](#footnote-3)

## Materials

**Unconditioned stimuli**. Study materials provided by the original authors were used. Ten positive words, ten negative words, ten positive images, and ten negative images served as the USs. The positive (*Useful, Calming, Desirable, Appealing, Worthwhile, Relaxing, Beneficial, Valuable, Terrific, Commendable*) and negative words (*Inferior, Harmful, Offensive, Troublesome, Upsetting, Terrifying, Unhealthy, Useless, Dislikable, Undesirable*) were identical to those used in Experiment 5 of Jones et al. (2009).[[3]](#footnote-4) The positive and negative images were originally selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS: Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) or the web. However, due to the quality of the original images, we were only able to use nine of the ten positive and nine of the ten negative images from the Jones et al. (2009) study. In consultation with the original authors, we therefore chose two additional IAPS images – one positive and the other negative.

**Conditioned stimuli**. For the conditioned stimuli, the original authors recommended that we not use the CSs from their original (2001) study because these items may be relatively familiar to modern samples (see Jones et al., 2009). Instead they advised us to select stimuli that would be relatively novel and neutral to the sample population. Based on this recommendation we generated a set of sixty Pokémon characters. We pretested these characters along two dimensions (valence and familiarity) using a separate sample of 155 participants on the Prolific Academic website (https://prolific.ac) (see [osf.io/4ecx5](https://osf.io/4ecx5/)). On the basis of this pretest we then selected those twenty characters that were rated as most neutral and least familiar. Participating labs were instructed to further pretest these twenty characters onsite in order to identify the nine characters that are most neutral and least familiar to participants at that specific lab. The two characters that (a) were most neutral and least familiar, and (b) which differed least in valence and familiarity served as CSs (see [osf.io/a3qj9](https://osf.io/a3qj9/) for the results of the pretest conducted at each lab). One lab was unable to carry out such a pretest and therefore used the nine characters derived from our own initial pretest.

**Filler and target stimuli**. The seven characters not selected during the pre-rating phase to serve as CSs (*see above*) served as target and filler stimuli. Finally, six neutral words (*Book*, *Concrete*, *Umbrella*, *Pencils*, *Glasses*, *Computer*) and four neutral IAPS images served as filler stimuli. The original authors did not provide us with filler items and we had to therefore select these items and have them approved by those authors.

## Procedure

Participants completed four tasks in fixed order (surveillance task, filler task, evaluation task, post-experimental questionnaire) and did so in their native language. The assignment of CS to US valence was counterbalanced between participants.

**Surveillance task.** The surveillance task consisted of 5 blocks, each containing a differenttarget stimulus. Each block comprised of 86 trials, each presented for 1500ms with no inter-trial interval. Each block included 8 CS-US pair trials (4 CS-USpos trials and 4 CS-USneg trials), 10 target trials, 30 blank screen trials, and 38 fillers trials. In all cases (except for blank screen trials) one or two stimuli were presented on-screen. Each CS-US pair was preceded and followed by a blank screen trial, and these ‘triplets’ were fixed at various positions throughout the procedure (10-12, 20-22, 30-32, 40-42, 50-52, 60-62, 70-72, 80-82, with an alternation between the CSpos and CSneg). The assignment of CS-US pairs to the fixed positions occurred randomly. As recommended by Jones et al. (2009), the CS and the US were presented close to one another (approximately 1cm from each other) and the CS was always be larger than the US. In each block, target trials, filler trials, and 14 blank screen trials were presented randomly in the remaining locations (see [osf.io/wnckg](https://osf.io/wnckg/) for a detailed overview of trial content).

Prior to the surveillance task participants read the following instructions:

*“Imagine that you are a security guard watching for deviant activity at a business. Your job requires that you pay attention at all times, and respond quickly when something suspicious happens. In our lab we study attention and rapid responding, and in this experiment you’ll be asked to play the role of the security guard.*

*Specifically, you will be attending to a number of items presented on the computer screen, and you’ll be responding as quickly as possible when a target item appears by pressing the spacebar. The target item will appear at random several times throughout the experiment. The target item may appear as an image or as a name. So be sure to pay attention at all times and focus on the screen, because you never know when the target item will appear. A number of filler items that we’ve selected from our stimulus pool will also be shown randomly to make the task more challenging. These distractors are both pictures and words that were just randomly picked from our collection.*

*Sometimes two images will appear on the screen at the same time, and sometimes only one image will appear. Be sure to hit the spacebar only when the target appears. The target might appear anywhere on the screen as well, and it might also appear with other images. So whenever you see a target image or name anywhere on the screen, hit the spacebar.*

*The items will be displayed rapidly, so make sure that when you see a target, you hit the spacebar before it disappears. Again, be sure to pay close attention throughout the experiment so that you can respond as quickly and accurately as possible.*

*There will be five separate surveillance tasks of about 4 minutes each. Each task will have a different target, and all of the target items will be cartoon creatures.”*

**Filler task.** Although a filler task was not used in the original (2001) study nor in the vast majority of published surveillance task studies, the original authors recommended that we add a filler task in order to create a delay between that task and the evaluation task (e.g., Kendrick & Olson, 2012). The filler task included two questionnaires: the Need for Cognition scale (18-item NFC Scale: Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984) and the Need to Evaluate scale (16-item NFE scale: Jarvis & Petty, 1996), presented in a fixed order (NFC followed by NFE). These tasks are not central to the main hypotheses and were therefore not analyzed. Nevertheless, those interested in this data can retrieve it from the OSF website ([osf.io/k9nrf](https://osf.io/k9nrf/)).

**Evaluation task.** Following the filler task, participants completed a 30 trial forced-choice task (Jones et al., 2009). On each trial, a pair of stimuli was presented onscreen and participants indicated as quickly as possible which image they prefer by pressing a corresponding key. Ten of the trials presented one or both CSs (two presented the CSpos and CSneg together, four presented the CSpos with one of the neutral targets/fillers, and four presented CSneg with one of the neutral targets/fillers). The remaining 20 trials were filler trials, each presenting two neutral targets/fillers. Two filler trials always preceded the first critical trial, and subsequent critical trials appeared at fixed points separated by filler trials (positions 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27 and 30). The ten critical trials were randomly assigned to the fixed positions.

Participants saw the following instructions:

*“Next, you’ll be presented with 30 pairs of target and filler creatures from the surveillance tasks, and we’d like you to indicate which one you like better. You don’t need a reason for liking one rather than the other, just give us your gut feelings. We are interested in knowing if the pleasantness or unpleasantness of these stimuli affects the ability to attend and rapidly respond to them, so we need you to indicate which you prefer. Remember, you don’t need a reason for liking one rather than the other, so just go with your gut. Please respond quickly.”*

**Post-experimental questionnaire**. After the evaluation task, participants completed a questionnaire: we used the original Olson and Fazio (2001) post-experimental questionnaire followed by the questionnaire used in the studies of Bar-Anan et al. (2010). With respect to the former, participants first answered three open-ended questions: 1. *Think back to the very first part of the experiment. Did you notice anything out of the ordinary in the way the words and pictures were presented during the surveillance tasks?* 2. *Did you notice anything systematic about how particular words and images appeared together during the surveillance tasks?* 3. *Did you notice anything about the words and images that appeared with certain cartoon creatures?* Although the original authors recommended that we collect data for all three questions, they also recommended that we only use the first two questions when assessing awareness.

With respect to the Bar-Anan et al. (2010) protocol, participants were asked the following three questions: 1. For some participants, during the first task, there was one cartoon creature that always appeared with positive images and words, and one that always appeared with negative images and words. Do you think it happened in your case? (response options: No, I did not notice if that happened in my task, Yes, that happened in my task). 2. During the first task, which of the two characters was consistently presented with positive images and words? 3. During the first task, which of the two characters was consistently presented with negative images and words? (response options to questions 2 and 3: CSpos (certainly), CSpos (probably), CSpos (guess), CSneg (guess), CSneg (probably), CSneg (certainly). Finally, we assessed for familiarity with the Pokémon presented in the task: How familiar were you with the cartoon creatures that appeared in the surveillance tasks? (response scale: 0 = Not familiar at all to 8 = Very familiar).

**Experimental fidelity.** We took a number of steps in order to maximize experimental fidelity across labs. First, given differences in the native languages of participating labs (e.g., Dutch, German, Spanish, French, Polish), materials originally produced in English were translated. We did so using a forward and backward translation process. Specifically, materials were first translated from English into the native language used at a given lab by one member of that participating team. This translation was then backward translated into English by another member of that same team who was not involved in the initial translation process. This backward translation was returned to the coordinating team for verification and approval. When necessary (i.e., where the backward translation was not approved) the translation process was repeated until approval was provided. Second, the entire experimental protocol was standardized across all labs. Specifically, each lab run the experiment using the same program and general materials (i.e., developed in PsychoPy; Peirce, [2007](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699930903485076)) which generated identically formatted raw data files across all sites. We then collated these data files from all sites and analyzed them centrally using a single set of R code and scripts. All materials and analytic files were pre-registered before data collection begins (see [osf.io/3hjpf](https://osf.io/3hjpf)).

# Planned Analyses

## Data processing

**Surveillance task**. We computed the number of errors made during the surveillance task for each participant (errors are defined as responding to non-target trials, or not responding to target trials), to check if participants paid attention during that task. Based on the original authors’ recommendations, we excluded participants who were more than three standard deviations above or below the mean number of errors (2%).

**Evaluation task**. Following Jones et al. (2009), a *self-reported preference score* was calculated for each participant based on their performance during the evaluation task. Specifically, a score of 1 was assigned to trials in which the participant chose the CSpos or the image that appeared together with CSneg. A score of −1 was assigned to trials in which participants chose the CSneg or the image appearing together with CSpos. The sum of this coding,which ranged from -10 to +10 served as measure of evaluative responding (i.e., a preference for CSpos over CSneg).

**Contingency awareness/recollective memory.**

***Confirmatory analyses*.** We computed a score following the original authors’ recommendations. Specifically, two independent raters (from each lab) coded participants’ free responses to questions 1-2 from the original authors’ questionnaire and judged whether those responses show correct identification of the CS-US pairings. The coding in all labs were based on the same protocol (see [osf.io/wz2vs](https://osf.io/wz2vs/)). The original authors recommended that we exclude participants if both raters agreed that participants had identified the valence of the USs that were paired with each of the CSs, in at least one of the two questions. If participants identified that one of the CSs was paired with a US of a particular valence, or reported that CSs and USs were paired during the task (even if they do not mention the specific way in which they were paired), they were retained and coded as being ‘contingency unaware’. Likewise, in cases of rater disagreement, participants were also retained and coded as ‘contingency unaware’ as per the original authors criterion.

***Exploratory analyses*.** The original authors criterion may have accidentally included individuals who were aware of/remembering the contingencies. Therefore we computed three additional exploratory scores to examine if evidence for EC effects in this task depends on the specific way in which contingency awareness/recollective memory is measured.

The first (exploratory) score used a more conservative coding of the original authors’ questions (the ‘Olson & Fazio, 2001 modified’ criterion). Participants were coded as ‘aware’ if they expressed full or partial memory. Specifically, assignment to the ‘aware’ group occurred when both judges agreed that the participant identified the valence of the USs that were paired with each of the CSs, or identified that one of the CSs was paired with a US of a particular valence, or reported that CSs and USs were paired during the task (even if they did not mention the specific way in which they were paired), in at least one of the two questions. Assignment to the ‘unaware’ group occurred when both judges indicated that the participant did not report that CSs were systematically paired with USs, or that a CS was paired with a US of a specific valance, in at least one of the two questions. In cases of rater disagreement, a third judge was recruited (at each site) and asked to provide their own judgement according to the above criterion. The majority judgement was adopted. Participants in the ‘aware’ group were excluded from subsequent analysis.

The second (exploratory) score was computed based on Bar-Anan et al.’s (2010) criterion. Here participants were excluded if they chose the “yes” answer on the first question of the Bar-Anan et al. measure, and retained if they chose “no”.

The third (exploratory) score was computed based on a modification to Bar-Anan et al.’s (2010) criterion in order to verify that responding is not driven by guessing (the ‘Bar-Anan et al., 2010 modified’ criterion). Participants were excluded if they chose the “yes” answer on the first question and correctly identified the valence with which each of the two CSs appeared during the task (providing either a correct *probably* or *certainly* response on questions 2-3). All other participants were retained.

In all previous analyses, ‘contingency-aware’ participants were excluded. Yet one could also examine if awareness/recollective memory moderates the size of EC effects. With this in mind, we divided participants into two groups (‘aware’ and ‘unaware’) using the four aforementioned criteria, and then carried out an additional set of exploratory analyses that compare EC effects between these two groups using a multilevel moderator meta-analysis model.[[4]](#footnote-5)



**Figure 2.** Results of the pre-registered meta-analysis models. confirmatory model: (a) exclusions based on the original authors’ criterion (Olson & Fazio, 2001); exploratory models: exclusions based on the (b) Olson & Fazio (2001) modified, (c) Bar-Anan et al. (2010), and (d) Bar-Anan et al. (2010) modified criteria. DV was evaluative conditioning effect score (i.e., a preference for CSpos over CSneg). Each lab is identified by the last name of the corresponding author. In each forest plot, squares represent observed Hedges’ *g* effect sizes, size of square represents weighting in the model (i.e., inverse variance), and error bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals (CIs) around the effect size. The bottom row in the figure the outcome of a random-effects meta-analysis. No credibility intervals beyond the confidence intervals are visible due to no between site heterogeneity being observed. Estimates of heterogeneity (*I*2 and *H*2) are provided next to the meta-analysis model results. Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation was used for all models.

## Results

In each analysis, to determine if EC effects emerged in the absence of contingency awareness/recollective memory, we first excluded participants who were scored as ‘aware’ according to an awareness exclusion criterion, and then computed an EC effect size (Hedges’ *g*) for each site from the mean and standard deviation of the self-reported preference score. Thereafter we meta-analyzed these effect sizes in a meta-analysis using an alpha value of 0.05 (two-sided). Although all labs used similar materials, they may nevertheless differ in the translation of materials, selection of stimuli, or characteristics of the samples. In order to account for this within the analyses, we employed random effects meta-analysis models with a random intercept for data collection site. All analyses were conducted using the R package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010) and used Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation.

Four methods of excluding individuals based on their awareness were preregistered. While all were preregistered, we refer to them as confirmatory versus exploratory in order to separate the method that most closely resembles that employed in the original study (Olson & Fazio, 2001), a subsequent study (Bar-Anan et al., 2010), or our modified versions of these two criteria that were intended to be more stringent.

**Confirmatory analyses**. The meta-analysis based on the (confirmatory) Olson & Fazio (2001) awareness criterion (*N* = 1340) showed that, on average, the surveillance task led to a small but significant EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20], *z* = 3.17, *p* = .002, in the expected direction. Effect sizes ranged from -0.02 to 0.31 across labs (see Figure 2; top-left panel). The difference in effect sizes across labs were consistent with what one would expect by chance, τ = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, Q(11) = 5.83, *p* = .885.

**Confirmatory hypotheses**. When the original authors awareness exclusion criterion was employed, their original effect was replicated.

**Exploratory analyses.**

***EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness/recollective memory*.** Three other datasets were created using the other three awareness exclusion criteria (i.e., the Olson & Fazio, 2001 modified, Bar-Anan et al., 2010, and Bar-Anan et al. 2010 modified). New meta-analysis models were fitted for each, as in the confirmatory analysis.

When a modified version of the original authors’ exclusion criterion was applied (i.e., Olson & Fazio (2001) modified, *n* = 1007), the surveillance task was not found to produce an EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.13], *z* = 1.04, *p* = .299. The effect size in this group ranged from -0.08 to 0.30 across labs (see Figure 2; top-right panel). Differences in effect sizes across labs were consistent with what one would expect by chance, τ = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, *Q*(11) = 2.76, *p* = .994.

When the Bar-Anan et al. (2010) criterion was applied (*n* = 755), the surveillance task once again did not lead to an EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.13], *z* = 0.69, *p* = .493. The effect size in this group ranged from -0.24 to 0.18 across labs (see Figure 2; bottom-left panel). Differences in the effect size across labs were consistent with what one would expect by chance, τ = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, *Q*(11) = 4.17, *p* = .965.

When the modified Bar-Anan et al. (2010) criterion was applied (*n* = 1060), the surveillance task also did not lead to an EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.13], *z* = 1.17, *p* = .241. The effect size in this group ranged from -0.16 to 0.19 across labs (see Figure 2; bottom-right panel). Differences in the effect size across labs were consistent with what one would expect by chance, τ = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, *Q*(11) = 3.45, *p* = .983.

Finally, to investigate if the effect sizes computed based on the four awareness/recollective memory criteria differ from one another, we combined the datasets used in all of the above analyses into one, and used a multilevel moderator meta-analysis with the awareness exclusion criterion as a moderator, adding a random intercept for data collection site to account for the statistical dependency between effect sizes coming from related samples. The moderator test did not demonstrate evidence that the results of the four criteria differed from each other, *Q*(3) = 2.76, *p* = .430.

***Comparison of ‘contingency-aware’ vs. ‘unaware’ participants.*** Whereas the previous meta-analyses examined whether EC effects were found in ‘unaware’ participants, the following analyses examined whether EC effects differed between those who were ‘aware’ versus ‘unaware’. In each case, rather than excluding participants based on a given awareness criterion, all participants were instead included and that criterion was employed as a moderator in the meta-analysis. We did so in order to examine if the ‘contingency-aware’ participants excluded in previous analyses produced higher or lower EC effects than their ‘contingency-unaware’ counterparts. All moderator analyses reported in this section included a random intercept for data collection site in order to account for the dependencies between effect sizes coming from the same experimental setting. In each case, we report only the difference between the two conditions (i.e., moderation test) and the effect size in the ‘aware’ group (effect sizes in the ‘unaware’ groups can be found in the previous meta-analyses).

First, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the Olson & Fazio (2001) criterion showed a small EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.30, 95% CI [0.04, 0.56], *z* = 2.23, *p* = .026. Results from the moderator test did not provide evidence that EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 1.59, *p* = .207.

Second, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the modified Olson & Fazio (2001) criterion showed a small EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.33, 95% CI [0.20, 0.46], *z* = 5.01, *p* < .001. The moderator test demonstrated EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 12.90, *p* < .001.

Third, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the original Bar-Anan et al. (2010) criterion showed a small EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.24, 95% CI [0.14, 0.35], *z* = 4.60, *p* < .001. The moderator test demonstrated EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 8.10, *p* = .004.

Finally, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the modified Bar-Anan et al. (2010) criterion showed a medium EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.37, 95% CI [0.23, 0.51], *z* = 5.24, *p* < .001. The moderator test demonstrated EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 14.94, *p* < .001.

**Exploratory hypotheses.**

***EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness/recollective memory.*** Although we obtained an EC effect when using the original authors (Olson & Fazio, 2001) awareness exclusion criterion, no such EC effects were found when any of the other three alternative exclusion criteria were employed. Of course, the difference between significant and non-significant is not itself significant (Gelman, 2006): as such, it is important to also note the non-significant effect of exclusion criteria type in the multilevel moderator meta-analysis. As such, while it is correct to say that a significant EC effect was found for only the (confirmatory) Olson & Fazio (2001) criterion and not the other three, we also cannot conclude that EC effects in the surveillance task depend on or differ between the specific way in which contingency awareness/recollective memory is measured. As such, it is difficult to know whether to accept the significant result or the non-significant results given that no evidence of difference was found among these results. While the close replication of the original study therefore replicated the original effect, there is relative uncertainty about whether results provide support for the underlying verbal hypothesis or not (i.e., whether EC effects can be demonstrated in the absence of awareness).

***Comparison of ‘Contingency-Aware’ vs. ‘Unaware’ Participants*.** We hypothesized that EC effects would be larger for contingency-aware than for contingency-unaware participants. We obtained support for this hypothesis when the three exploratory exclusion criteria were applied (Olson & Fazio, 2001 modified; Bar-Anan et al., 2010, & Bar-Anan et al., 2010 modified) and failed to obtain support for it when the original authors criterion (Olson & Fazio, 2001) was applied. Once again, and as mentioned in Footnote 3, the results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution.

# Discussion

Over the past twenty years effects on the surveillance task have been treated as evidence for attitude formation in the absence of awareness/recollective memory. This claim has fed theories about EC and attitudes, as well as interventions that are assumed to ‘implicitly’ modify problematic beliefs and behavior. Yet strong claims regarding ‘unaware EC’ necessitate strong evidence. In this replication attempt we sought to *confirm* if an effect can be produced on the surveillance task when the original Olson & Fazio (2001) awareness exclusion criterion was used. We also *explored* if an effect still emerges when three other criteria were employed.

Our confirmatory analyses demonstrated a small but significant EC effect on the surveillance task when the original authors exclusion criterion was used. This close (but not exact) replication of the original study therefore replicated the original effect. However, there are also several reasons why we caution against making strong inference based on this finding. First, the effect we obtained (*g* = 0.12) was almost half of what was found in a meta-analysis of the published literature (*g* = 0.20). We believe that the effect sizes obtained here a more precise estimates of the true effect size (given larger sample sizes and multiple sites) with lower risk of bias (given the use of preregistration and the Registered Report format). This raises questions about the *practical significance* of the effect, especially seeing as we required over 1300 participants to observe it. Second, when ‘aware’ participants are excluded using any of the other three alternative criteria the EC effect disappears entirely. Notably, these alternative criteria were only slightly more conservative than the original authors approach. Third, moderator tests show that the EC effects obtained across the four exclusion criteria did not differ from one another. Put another way, although a small effect did emerge when the original authors criterion were applied, this effect did not differ from the non-significant effects obtained from the three alternative exclusion criteria.

Further reasons for caution can be found in the ‘awareness/recollection memory’ concept itself and the measures used to assess it. The measures employed here, and in most surveillance task studies, are problematic on several fronts: they are subjectively scored and open-ended (and thus prone to high degrees of interpretive freedom by both participant and researcher), correlational instead of causal, vary considerably in what constitutes an ‘aware’ or ‘unaware’ participant, and are typically delivered post-hoc rather than online. Debate continues to rage about what is even being indexed in such tasks: some argue that it is ‘awareness’ (Jones et al., 2009) whereas others advocate for ‘memory’ (REF). Combining these methodological and conceptual issues with the specific issues we had with the effect in this study further reinforces the need for caution when deriving theoretical claims and applied interventions based on such findings (for more see Gawronski & Walther, 2012).

In short, although we replicated the surveillance task effect, we urge others to be exceptionally cautious when using such an effect to make strong claims, especially when those claims are being used to justify *new* theory and interventions. We also encourage more careful reflection on existing theory and interventions that are currently founded on such an effect (e.g., March et al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2016). Strong claims necessitate strong evidence, evidence that we are currently lacking.

# Author contributions

TM lead the project administration, and contributed to the creation of the procedure protocol, the design of the materials, writing the original draft, data collection, and reviewing and editing the final manuscript. SH wrote the manuscript and contributed to project administration, and reviewing and editing the final manuscript. IH wrote the code for the materials, data processing, and analyses, and contributed to project administration, and writing, reviewing, and editing the manuscript. MAV conducted the meta-analysis of published work, and contributed to writing the original draft, the analyses, and reviewing and editing the final manuscript. MAO contributed to the creation of the procedure protocol, and review of the manuscript. FA, KB, RB, TB, OC, SBD, MJF, KAF, AG, BG, TH, FH, MH, BK, AM, JR, JS, CTS, CS, PT and CU organized and/or conducted data collection at their sites, and contributed to the review of the manuscript. JDH contributed to the creation of the procedure protocol and review of the manuscript. Authorship order will be updated according to contribution during the project.

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1. The planned minimum sample size after 30% exclusions had 99% power to detect Cohen’s *d* of 0.13 and 80% power to detect Cohen’s *d* of 0.08 (within subjects, one tailed, alpha = 0.05). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. This lab was that of one of the original authors. Given that we wanted to offer this lab the opportunity to fully participate in this replication effort, we updated our preregistration with a deadline for data collection at this site and specified that all data from all sites would be included regardless of sample size (see [osf.io/uyng7](https://osf.io/uyng7) for addition to preregistration, and Supplementary Online Materials – Reviewed for deviations from original preregistration). This choice was deemed compatible with our meta-analytic approach. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The original authors also recommended that we use mildly evocative stimuli in our replication attempt. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Note that the results obtained from such a comparison should be interpreted with extreme caution. First, any attempt to detect differences in EC effects between putatively ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants will ultimately depend on the reliability of the awareness measure used, and of the EC procedure itself. Previous evidence suggests that unconscious learning paradigms and awareness tests tend to yield unreliable measures (e.g., Vadillo et al., 2020). Second, it is conceptually and statistically problematic to use one outcome measure as a moderator of another outcome measure, due to the correlational nature of their relation (e.g., Gawronski & Walther, 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)