

Bringing Private Reads to Hyperledger Fabric via Private Information Retrieval

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ABSTRACT Permissioned blockchains ensure integrity and auditability of shared data but expose query parameters to peers during read operations, creating privacy risks for organizations querying sensitive records. This paper proposes a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) mechanism to enable *private reads* from Hyperledger Fabric’s world state, allowing endorsing peers to process encrypted queries without learning which record is accessed. We implement and benchmark a PIR-enabled chaincode that performs ciphertext–plaintext (*ct×pt*) homomorphic multiplication directly within *evaluate* transactions, preserving Fabric’s endorsement and audit semantics. The prototype achieves an average end-to-end latency of 113 ms and a peer-side execution time below 42 ms, with approximately 2 MB of peer network traffic per private read in development mode—reducible by half under in-process deployment. Storage profiling across three channel configurations shows near-linear growth: block size increases from 77 KB to 294 KB and world-state from 112 KB to 332 KB as the ring dimension scales from 2^{13} to 2^{15} . Parameter analysis further indicates that ring size and record length jointly constrain packing capacity, supporting up to 512 records of 64 bytes each under 2^{15} . These results confirm the practicality of PIR-based *private reads* in Fabric for smaller, sensitive datasets and highlight future directions to optimize performance and scalability.

INDEX TERMS Private Information Retrieval (PIR), Hyperledger Fabric, Private Reads, Query Privacy.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

Blockchain [1] is a peer-to-peer network protocols that uses cryptographic primitives and consensus mechanism to create and maintain a distributed ledger of transactions, such as Ethereum [2] and Hyperledger Fabric [3].

Hyperledger Fabric (HLF or Fabric) is widely adopted in various domains, one of them being Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sharing [4]–[7], where multiple organizations exchange threat indicators and wish to keep their queries confidential not to be associated with specific threats or incidents. Blockchain guarantees, however, primarily cover data integrity and auditability, not query privacy. This issue was recently highlighted by the Ethereum’s privacy special interest group in their “PSE Roadmap: 2025 and Beyond” [8], where they also emphasized the need for *private reads* next to private writes and private voting.

In Hyperledger Fabric [3], the separation of *evaluate* and *submit* makes the read-privacy gap explicit: an *evaluate* call is a read-only proposal sent to endorsing peers, which execute the chaincode and return results without committing to the ledger [9]. Crucially, these peers still observe all

function arguments and read-sets, creating a privacy risk if queries are sensitive.

This motivates us to target *read* privacy issue in Fabric, defined as the ability to hide which record is being queried from endorsing peers during *evaluate* type calls. Given problem description, an obvious approach is to construct and use Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [10] protocol, which would enable client to retrieve an item from a world state database without revealing to peer which item was requested. However, integrating PIR into Fabric’s architecture introduces non-trivial challenges related to execution model compatibility, communication-computation trade-offs, and parameter tuning.

B. CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE PIR SCHEME

PIR protocols can broadly be categorized into two families: *Information-Theoretic* (IT-PIR) and *Computational* (CPIR) schemes. Later, each family can be further divided into: *non-preprocessing* schemes that perform all computation online, and *preprocessing-based* schemes that split the protocol into offline and online phases.

Information-Theoretic. IT-PIR schemes [10]–[14] provide unconditional privacy by distributing the database across **multiple non-colluding servers**, a client then queries subsets of servers such that no single server learns the selection index. Though IT-PIR schemes offer strong privacy guarantees and low communication overhead, they require multiple non-colluding servers, which is often impractical in consortium blockchains where all peers are typically honest-but-curious and collusion is a realistic threat.

PIR without Preprocessing. Older [15]–[19] and more recent non-preprocessing single-server schemes such as SealPIR [20], FastPIR [21], OnionPIR [22], and Spiral [23] rely on cryptographic assumptions, such as homomorphic encryption (HE) to achieve privacy using **single untrusted server**. These constructions require only one round of interaction—an encrypted query sent to the server and an encrypted response returned—making them well-suited to Fabric’s *evaluate* model, where minimal state is preserved between calls and each peer executes chaincode statelessly. While HE-based protocols are computationally heavier, they avoid persistent client-specific state and additional communication rounds, which are incompatible with Fabric’s endorsement flow and deterministic transaction semantics.

PIR with Preprocessing. Beimel et al. [24] introduced the concept of PIR with preprocessing, where an **offline preprocessing is performed before the actual query** phase to reduce online communication and computation costs. Recent advances such as SimplePIR [25], Piano [26], HintlessPIR [27], and YPIR [28] achieve sublinear or near-constant online time by introducing an offline phase where the client or server precomputes query-independent data, usually called “hints”. Other doubly-efficient constructions [29]–[31] shift most computation to preprocessing, trading online efficiency for large offline communication or storage. While appealing for cloud-hosted servers, these techniques are ill-suited for permissioned blockchains for two reasons: (i) if the hints are stored client-side, each participant must predownload large portions of the world state to generate them, defeating Fabric’s lightweight-client model; and (ii) if hints are stored peer-side, the chaincode or world state would need to maintain per-client data, violating Fabric’s stateless transaction design. Moreover, these schemes introduce significant storage blowup: for instance, SimplePIR’s [25] client must download a 121 MB hint for a 1 GB database, and Piano’s [26] client preprocessing requires full-database downloads in its initialization stage. Such assumptions are incompatible with blockchain environments, where deterministic, replayable, and stateless transaction execution is critical.

Although less computationally efficient in theory and limited in database capacity due to polynomial packing constraints, we argue that **HE-based PIR currently is the most viable option** for enabling *private reads* in Fabric-like permissioned ledgers, for the following reasons: (i) HE-based PIR requires no changes to Fabric’s consensus,

core architecture, or endorsement policies, and maintains the stateless transaction model without per-client state on peers. (ii) It avoids the need for multiple non-colluding servers (or endorsing peers), which is difficult to guarantee in a permissioned blockchain setting. (iii) It avoids offline preprocessing phases, which are incompatible with Fabric’s on-demand *evaluate* calls, and prevents storage blowup on clients or peers. (iv) It supports single-round query-response interactions that naturally align with Fabric’s *evaluate* calls. (v) It leverages existing homomorphic encryption libraries and, with appropriate parameter choices, achieves practical performance.

We further argue that the limitations of HE-based PIR, particularly its database capacity constraints due to polynomial packing, are an acceptable trade-off for enabling *private reads* in permissioned ledgers handling smaller amounts of more sensitive records in multi-organization settings.

C. RELATED WORK

We now review prior efforts to integrate PIR with blockchain and distributed systems to enhance query privacy. Detailed comparison Table 10 is available in Section V.

Xiao et al. [32] propose Cloak, a privacy-preserving blockchain query scheme that uses distributed point functions (DPF) and noise-based sub-requests to hide retrieval information, achieving communication costs of 0.2-0.5 KB and query latency of 0.4-0.5 ms for databases with 4-64 records of 16-32 bytes each.

Mazmudar et al. [33] propose Peer2PIR, a privacy solution for IPFS using a combination of PAILLIERPIR and RL-WEPIR schemes to hide query content across peer routing, provider advertisements, and content retrieval functionalities. For relevant private content retrieval function, they achieve communication costs of 10-15 MB and latencies of 0.5-15 s for databases of 1,000 to 1,000,000 records with 256 KB content blocks using the Spiral [23] protocol.

Kaihua et al. [34] design an SPV protocol for lightweight Bitcoin clients using a hybrid PIR scheme (combining IT-PIR and C-PIR) to enhance query privacy over Bloom-filter-based methods. Their system uses temporally-partitioned databases (Address, Merkle Tree, and Transaction DBs) to optimize performance. For a single transaction verification in the weekly database, it achieves a communication cost of 666 KB and latency of 2.84 s for databases with 7,688-512,460 records of 62-876 bytes each.

Kumar et al. introduced a series of HLF frameworks that integrate Private Information Retrieval (PIR) across different domains, namely BRON [35] and DEBPIR [36]. Although posed as enabling PIR functionality, their evaluations primarily focus on the system’s write throughput for general transactions rather than the specific performance of PIR queries.

Targeted gap. Permissioned ledgers like Hyperledger Fabric ensure integrity and auditability of shared data but leak function arguments and read-sets to endorsing peers

during both *evaluate* calls, creating privacy risks in multi-organisation settings. While prior works have explored PIR integration in various blockchain and distributed systems contexts, none have specifically addressed the challenge of enabling *private reads* in Hyperledger Fabric without modifying its core architecture. To fill this gap, we explore how to enable *private reads* from Fabric’s world state by integrating a HE-based PIR mechanism directly into chaincode, and we evaluate its practicality through detailed benchmarks and parameter studies.

D. KEY OBJECTIVE AND CONTRIBUTIONS

In this work, we demonstrate that HE-based PIR can be implemented natively in chaincode to enable *private reads* in Hyperledger Fabric under *evaluate* calls and achieve practical performance under certain parametrization choices.

Hence, the main contributions of this work are:

- 1) **Enabling Private Reads in Hyperledger Fabric.** We present the first end-to-end design and implementation of a native *privacy layer for read operations* in Fabric, realized through a PIR-enabled chaincode that preserves Fabric’s endorsement and audit semantics. This mechanism allows endorsing peers to process encrypted queries without learning which key or record was accessed, introducing the concept of *private reads* as a new privacy primitive for permissioned blockchains. Our integration requires no modifications to Fabric’s consensus or world-state management, demonstrating that private queries can coexist with standard endorsement logic.
- 2) **Polynomial database construction.** We formalize the mapping between Fabric’s key–value world state and a homomorphically encodable polynomial database, deriving feasibility constraints that link record length, ring dimension, and slot allocation. These relationships ensure correctness of homomorphic retrieval and guide practical parameter selection for real-world datasets.
- 3) **Multi-channel approach.** To overcome database size limits imposed by polynomial packing constraints, we propose a multi-channel architecture where each channel hosts a specific HE parameter set and corresponding polynomial database instance, enabling clients to select appropriate channels based on their query needs.
- 4) **Comprehensive evaluation.** We implement a prototype using the Lattigo [37] library and benchmark cryptographic operations, blockchain interactions, and end-to-end query latency under various configurations. Our results show that single-query latencies remain practical for typical Fabric deployments.
- 5) **Open-Source Release.** To encourage reproducibility, we release the full implementation of our Fabric chaincode, client logic and benchmarks scripts at: https://github.com/artias13/2_2_HLF_CPIR.

E. ORGANIZATION

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews Fabric privacy features, database limits, Homomorphic Encryption-based PIR, and notation. Section III describes our system and threat models, polynomial database construction, feasibility constraints, multi-channel architecture, workflow and algorithms. Section IV shows experimental setup, cryptographic and blockchain benchmarks, and overall system performance. Section V discusses limitations and future directions, and Section VI concludes the paper.

II. PRELIMINARIES

A. FABRIC NATIVE PRIVACY FEATURES

We hereby acknowledge several native solutions for privacy that Hyperledger Fabric provides and explain why they do not fully address the query privacy problem.

Separate Channels. Fabric’s multi-channel architecture [9] isolates ledgers across subgroups of organizations, limiting which participants observe which data. However, channel separation controls *who* sees a ledger, query intent remains visible to all endorsers of a channel.

Private Data Collections (PDC). PDCs [9] restrict which organizations store and access private key–value pairs. The shared ledger records only hashes, while members of the collection hold plaintext. PDCs provide access control but still expose function arguments to endorsers inside the collection, leaving query patterns observable.

Fabric Private Chaincode (FPC). FPC [9], [38] executes chaincode within Intel SGX enclaves. Arguments and state are protected even from peer operators, but this requires Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and attestation, introducing additional hardware and trust assumptions.

B. FABRIC STORAGE LIMITS

We here address the question of how large a database can be stored in Fabric world state and ledger history, as this impacts the practical limits of our PIR construction.

World state (LevelDB/CouchDB). Fabric imposes no hard limit on the number of key–value entries in world state; capacity depends on available disk space and peer I/O throughput. In our implementation, each channel maintains a few small artifacts in world state that amount up to a 350 KB under typical parameters (see Section IV), LevelDB is sufficient and preferable for performance and simplicity, while CouchDB [9] remains an option to extend from 8 MB to 4 GB if needed.

Ledger history (blockchain log). According to the documentation [9], block size is constrained by the ordering service configuration. By default, the Fabric orderer limits the serialized payload to *AbsoluteMaxBytes* = 10 MB (recommended under 49 MB given the gRPC ceiling of 100 MB), and typically aggregates up to *MaxMessageCount* = 500 transactions per block or *PreferredMaxBytes* = 2 MB. In our system, these limits affect only *submit* transactions such as *InitLedger* or record updates. *Evaluate* transactions

(including `PIRQuery`) are read-only and do not generate blocks, thus unaffected by ordering or batching constraints.

Implication. The effective capacity of a channel is governed primarily by cryptographic feasibility defined in Section III, and the size of a single world-state value (i.e., m_{DB}), rather than by Fabric’s block or database limits. For large or binary CTI objects (e.g., malware samples or full PCAPs), an optional extension is to store them off-chain in IPFS [39] while persisting only their content identifiers (CIDs) in world state, keeping the polynomial m_{DB} as the structured component used for private retrieval.

C. HE-BASED PIR

Homomorphic Encryption. Lattice-based homomorphic encryption schemes, such as Brakerski/ Fan-Vercauteren (BFV), Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV), CKKS and TFHE [40]–[43] have emerged as foundational technologies for practical CPIR implementations.

We base our CPIR construction on the BGV scheme, a lattice-based homomorphic encryption based on the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem [44], which supports both addition and multiplication over ciphertexts. The BGV scheme defines operations over two polynomial rings: a ciphertext ring $R_Q = \mathbb{Z}_Q[X]/(X^N + 1)$ and a plaintext ring $R_T = \mathbb{Z}_T[X]/(X^N + 1)$, both sharing the same dimension $N = 2^{\log N}$. In our implementation, these rings are jointly specified by a single parameter literal $(\log N, \log Q_i, \log P_i, T)$ as provided by the Lattigo library [37] and paper [45]. The field T determines R_T , while the modulus chain (Q, P) and their bit-lengths $(\log Q_i, \log P_i)$ determine R_Q .

CPIR Definition. Model the database as a vector $D = \{d_0, \dots, d_{n-1}\}$. To retrieve desired record d_i without revealing i , the client forms a one-hot selection vector \hat{v}_i defined as $\hat{v}_i = (0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0)$ where 1 corresponds to the desired record at index i . He then encrypts it as $ct_q = \text{Enc}_{pk}(\hat{v}_i)$ under a public key pk and sends ct_q to the server, which computes $ct_r = (ct_q \cdot D) = \text{Enc}_{pk}(d_i)$, returning ct_r to the client for decryption $d_i = \text{Dec}_{sk}(ct_r)$ using his secret key sk , thus obtaining the desired record d_i without revealing i to the server, or peer in our case.

CPIR Instantiation: We instantiate Computational PIR as a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen , Enc , Eval , Dec):

- $\text{KeyGen}(\lambda) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$: On input the security parameter λ , output a public key pk and a secret key sk .
- $\text{Enc}_{pk}(\hat{v}_i) \rightarrow ct_q$: Given a windowed selection vector $\hat{v}_i \in \{0, 1\}^N$, encode it into the plaintext ring R_T and encrypt to a query ciphertext ct_q under pk .
- $\text{Eval}(ct_q, m_{DB}) \rightarrow ct_r$: Given ct_q and the plaintext polynomial database $m_{DB} \in R_T$, homomorphically evaluate the product to obtain an encrypted response $ct_r \in R_Q$.
- $\text{Dec}_{sk}(ct_r) \rightarrow d_i$: Using the secret key sk , decrypt the response ciphertext ct_r to recover the desired record d_i .

Protocol objective. Correctness requires that for all $i \in [n]$,

$$\text{Dec}_{sk}(\text{Eval}(\text{Enc}_{pk}(\hat{v}_i), m_{DB})) = d_i.$$

Remark (restricted operation set). The full BGV scheme also provides `EvalKeyGen` to generate relinearization and rotation keys, supporting ciphertext–ciphertext multiplication ($ct \times ct$), automorphisms, and modulus switching. Since the database m_{DB} is stored in plaintext within world state, our PIR construction only requires homomorphic ciphertext–plaintext multiplication ($ct \times pt$). Further extension to ciphertext–ciphertext operations is possible but incurs additional overhead, as discussed in Section V.

D. NOTATION

We summarize the main notation used throughout the paper in Table 1.

III. PROPOSED SYSTEM

A. SYSTEM MODEL

We introduce a blockchain-based query privacy system designed for permissioned ledgers. The system enables clients to perform *private reads* from the ledger while endorsing peers can evaluate read-only queries over encrypted inputs without learning which record was accessed. We achieve this by integrating a lattice-based CPIR scheme based on the BGV [41] homomorphic encryption scheme directly into Fabric chaincode. This approach ensures that clients remain the sole holders of decryption keys, while peers perform only black-box computations, thereby enhancing overall privacy without requiring trusted hardware or protocol modifications. Our system is composed of the following entities:

- **Data Owner (DO):** Endorsing peers that hold the current plaintext polynomial m_{DB} in world state and execute PIR during *evaluate*. \mathcal{DO} is honest-but-curious.
- **Data Writer (DW):** A client organization that provisions or refreshes the database. \mathcal{DW} invokes *submit* to initialize the ledger (e.g., set n and template bounds). Chaincode computes *records*, packs $D = \{d_0, \dots, d_{n-1}\}$, encodes it into m_{DB} , and persists it.
- **Data Requester (DR):** A client that privately retrieves a record. \mathcal{DR} runs $\text{KeyGen}(\lambda) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$, forms $ct_q = \text{Enc}_{pk}(\hat{v}_i)$, calls *evaluate* `PIRQuery`, and later decrypts ct_r .
- **Gateway (GW):** The Fabric client/chaincode interface used by \mathcal{DW} and \mathcal{DR} to invoke *InitLedger*, *GetMetadata*, and `PIRQuery`. It follows standard Fabric semantics; no extra trust is assumed.

Remark (world-state scope). In Fabric, the “ledger” comprises the blockchain log and the world state. Our CPIR operates on the world state: m_{DB} encodes the latest key-value snapshot, not the historical transaction logs. Both *world state* and *ledger* capacity concerns are addressed in Section II.

TABLE 1. Notation

Symbol	Description
λ	Security parameter
n	Database size; index domain $[n] = \{0, \dots, n-1\}$
D	Database records $\{d_0, \dots, d_{n-1}\}$
m_{DB}	Plaintext polynomial representation of D
\hat{v}_i	One-hot selector for index i
v_i	Windowed selector for index i with $record_s$ contiguous ones
c	Coefficient vector (c_0, \dots, c_{N-1})
J_i	Disjoint window for index i
$Enc_{pk}(\cdot), Dec_{sk}(\cdot)$	Encrypt / Decrypt
$Eval(\cdot)$	Homomorphic evaluation (ct-pt multiply)
pk, sk	Public / secret keys
ct_q	Encrypted query $Enc_{pk}(\hat{v}_i)$
ct_r	Encrypted response $Eval(ct_q, m_{DB})$
d_i	Decrypted record $Dec_{sk}(ct_r)$
$KeyGen(\lambda)$	Key generation $\rightarrow (pk, sk)$
N	Ring dimension
$\log N$	Logarithm base 2 of ring dimension N
$\log Q_i$	Bit-lengths of primes forming modulus chain Q
$\log P_i$	Bit-lengths of special primes P
T	Plaintext modulus
$record_s$	Slots allocated per record
$record_b$	Base serialized size of a record in bytes
$record_{\mu, \log N}$	Template-specific minimum
\mathcal{S}	Allowed discrete slot sizes
$ \cdot , \text{size}(\cdot)$	Length in elements / bytes
$\mathcal{C}(N, s, n)$	Capacity predicate: $n \cdot s \leq N$
$\mathcal{M}(\log N, s)$	Template predicate: $s \geq record_{\mu, \log N}$
$\mathcal{D}(s)$	Discrete predicate: $s \in \mathcal{S}$
$\mathcal{F}(\log N, s, n)$	Feasibility tuple: $\mathcal{C} \wedge \mathcal{M} \wedge \mathcal{D}$
$\mathcal{DO}, \mathcal{DW}, \mathcal{DR}, \mathcal{GW}$	Data Owner; Data Writer; Data Requester; Gateway
$evaluate, submit$	Fabric read / write transaction types
\mathcal{L}	Leakage considered (ciphertext size, protocol timing)

B. THREAT MODEL

Our design follows the standard *honest-but-curious* adversarial model. We explicitly consider the following assumptions and threats:

- **Endorsing peers (\mathcal{DO}).** Execute chaincode correctly but may try to infer the queried index from *evaluate* inputs or logs. They see ct_q , metadata, and m_{DB} .
- **Data Writer (\mathcal{DW}).** Issues initialization writes via *submit*. \mathcal{DW} is not trusted with decryption keys and learns nothing about \mathcal{DR} 's queries. We assume \mathcal{DW} follows the write protocol but is not relied upon for privacy.
- **External observers.** May eavesdrop on client-peer traffic. Without sk , ct_q and ct_r reveal nothing under BGV assumptions.

Security objective. For any $i \in [n]$, neither \mathcal{DO} nor external observers can distinguish which d_i is requested from ct_q and ct_r . The only permissible leakage is ciphertext size and protocol timing, denoted collectively as \mathcal{L} .

C. SYSTEM OVERVIEW

The proposed system integrates computational Private Information Retrieval (CPIR) directly into Hyperledger Fabric chaincode. Its purpose is to ensure that query indices remain hidden from endorsing peers while preserving Fabric's endorsement and audit workflow. At a high level, the workflow consists of four stages, illustrated in Fig. 1.

- 1) **Ledger initialization.** \mathcal{DW} invokes *InitLedger* via \mathcal{GW} using *submit*. Chaincode derives $record_s$ from $record_b$, packs D into $c = (c_0, \dots, c_{N-1})$, encodes m_{DB} , and stores m_{DB} and metadata in world state held by \mathcal{DO} .
- 2) **Metadata discovery.** \mathcal{DR} calls *GetMetadata* via *evaluate* to obtain n , $record_s$, and BGV parameters needed to form a valid query.
- 3) **Private retrieval.** \mathcal{DR} constructs $ct_q = Enc_{pk}(v_i)$ and invokes *PIRQuery* via *evaluate*. \mathcal{DO} computes $ct_r = Eval(ct_q, m_{DB})$ and returns it.
- 4) **Decryption.** \mathcal{DR} decrypts ct_r to recover $d_i = Dec_{sk}(ct_r)$.

D. POLYNOMIAL DATABASE CONSTRUCTION

To enable PIR queries over structured ledger data, we must embed records into a plaintext polynomial m_{DB} suitable for BGV evaluation. Our prototype adopts a fixed-width packing strategy, illustrated in Fig. 2, which proceeds in four steps.

Step 1: Serialize to Byte Array. Each structured record d_i is serialized into a byte array using a deterministic JSON-to-bytes scheme. Every character is represented by its ASCII code in $[0, 255]$, which is also our plaintext modulus T . Although we set $T = 65537$ as default in Section IV, we use $T = 256$ as an example here for clarity.

Step 2: Calculate Slot Window. To achieve uniform packing, we determine a fixed slot window $record_s$ across all records, where $record_b$ is the maximum serialized record length in bytes and *bytesPerSlot* is the number of bytes stored per slot. We first calculate the basic slot requirement




FIGURE 1. “Workflow. *DW* initializes the ledger via *GW*, which triggers chaincode on endorsing peers (*DO*). *DO* executes the protocol and persists state in world state (m_{DB} , metadata, JSON records). *DR* later obtains metadata, submits $ct_q = \text{Enc}_{pk}(v_i)$, *DO* evaluates $ct_r = \text{Eval}(ct_q, m_{DB})$ against world state, and *DR* decrypts to d_i .

and then apply a discrete rounding policy:

$$record_s = 8 \cdot \left\lceil \frac{record_b}{8 \cdot \text{bytesPerSlot}} \right\rceil, \quad (1)$$

where $\text{bytesPerSlot} = \frac{\log_2(T)}{8}$ given plaintext modulus T . In our implementation, we set $T = 256$, so $\log_2(256) = 8$ and thus $\text{bytesPerSlot} = 1$ byte. For example, if the largest record is 126 bytes, then the basic requirement is $\lceil 126/1 \rceil = 126$ slots, and after discrete rounding $record_s = 8 \cdot \lceil 126/8 \rceil = 8 \cdot 16 = 128$ slots.

Step 3: Pack into Coefficient Vector. Each serialized record d_i is packed into its disjoint window $J_i = \{i \cdot record_s, \dots, (i+1) \cdot record_s - 1\}$ in the coefficient vector $c = (c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{N-1})$:

$$c[J_i[k]] = c[i \cdot record_s + k] = \begin{cases} d_i[k] & \text{if } k < |d_i| \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

for $i \in [n]$ and $k \in [0, record_s - 1]$, where $d_i[k]$ denotes the k -th byte of record d_i , $J_i[k] = i \cdot record_s + k$ is the k -th slot index in window J_i and $c_j \in [0, T - 1]$ are polynomial coefficients.

Padding zeros are added if a record is shorter than $record_s$. Thus each record d_i occupies a contiguous slot interval that can be privately retrieved through PIR.

Step 4: Encode into Polynomial. Finally, the coefficient vector c is encoded into a plaintext polynomial:

$$m_{DB}(X) = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} c_j X^j \in R_T, \quad (3)$$

where $R_T = \mathbb{Z}_T[X]/(X^N + 1)$. This polynomial serves as the database representation m_{DB} in the PIR protocol, which endorsing peers use during query evaluation and clients recover only the slots corresponding to their requested record.

E. FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS

Embedding records into the plaintext polynomial m_{DB} is feasible only for parameter triples $(\log N, n, record_s)$ that satisfy *all* of the following constraints.

Constraint 1: Ring capacity. The total number of occupied slots cannot exceed the ring size:

$$n \cdot record_s \leq N. \quad (4)$$

This represents the fundamental mathematical limit imposed by the cryptographic parameters. For example, with $\log N = 13$ ($N = 8192$) and $record_s = 224$, at most $\lfloor 8192/224 \rfloor = 36$ records can be packed.

Constraint 2: Template-specific minima. We anticipate that different application scenarios require different record templates composed of distinct field combinations. Each template μ imposes a minimum slot requirement $record_{\mu, \log N}$, determined by its mandatory fields:

$$record_{\mu, \log N} = B_\mu + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}_\mu} |F_i| + O_\mu, \quad (5)$$

where B_μ is the base structure size for template μ , $\mathcal{H}_\mu \subseteq F_1, F_2, \dots, F_L$, denotes the set of fields included in template μ , $|F_i|$ is the byte length of field F_i , O_μ captures serialization overhead and metadata specific to template μ .

Plug in the CTI record templates we consider in this work in Eq. (5), we have:

- $record_{\mu, 13} = \{B_{\text{mini}}, F_{\text{MD5}}\}$, with $B_{\text{mini}} \approx 81$ bytes and $O = 15$ bytes, so $record_{\mu, 13} \approx 81 + 32 + 15 = 128$ bytes.
- $record_{\mu, 14} = \{B_{\text{mid}}, F_{\text{MD5}}, F_{\text{SHA256-s}}\}$, with $B_{\text{mid}} \approx 161$ bytes and $O = 15$ bytes, so $record_{\mu, 14} \approx 161 + 32 + 16 + 15 = 224$ bytes.
- $record_{\mu, 15} = \{B_{\text{rich}}, F_{\text{MD5}}, F_{\text{SHA256-l}}\}$, with $B_{\text{rich}} \approx 145$ bytes and $O = 15$ bytes, so $record_{\mu, 15} \approx 145 + 32 + 64 + 15 = 256$ bytes.

These minima ensure that for each template μ , the slot allocation satisfies $record_s \geq record_{\mu, \log N}$, guaranteeing adequate space for all mandatory fields while maintaining the uniform packing strategy across records.

Constraint 3: Discrete allocation policy. Operationally, we restrict the slot window $record_s$ to a discrete set for implementation simplicity:

$$record_s \in \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{S} = \{64, 128, 224, 256, 384, 512\} \text{ bytes}. \quad (6)$$




FIGURE 3. Multi-channel CPIR architecture. Each channel instantiates a separate CPIR chaincode and maintains its own m_{DB} polynomial, parameterized by $\log N$. This allows compact, mid-size, and rich CTI records to coexist under the same Fabric network.

- The *polynomial view*: the packed plaintext polynomial m_{DB} under key “ m_{DB} ”.
- The *normal view*: JSON records stored optionally under keys “ $record\%03d$ ” for auditability.
- *Metadata*:
 - “ n ”: number of records n ,
 - “ $record_s$ ”: slots per record $record_s$,
 - “ bgv_params ”: $\{\log N, N, \log Q_i, \log P_i, T\}$.

G. WORKFLOW DETAILS

The proposed system has five main routines (Alg. 1–5), corresponding to 3 chaincode-side functions (InitLedger, GetMetadata, PIRQuery) and 2 client-side utilities (FormSelectionVector, DecryptResult). Figure 1 provides the high-level overview. A Data Writer (DW) provisions the database $D = \{d_0, \dots, d_{n-1}\}$, a Data Owner (DO) maintains the polynomial m_{DB} in world state and executes PIR evaluations, and a Data Requester (DR) retrieves d_i privately using homomorphic encryption. The detailed steps are as follows:

- 1) **DW submits initialization.** DW calls InitLedger (Alg. 1) via GW (submit) with inputs $(n, record_s^{DW})$ and an optional hint $(\log N, \log Q_i, \log P_i, T)$. Here $record_s^{DW}$ denotes the maximum JSON size anticipated by the writer.
- 2) **DO validates and derives parameters.** DO rounds the writer’s input to a discrete slot size $record_s^{GW} = 8 \cdot \lceil record_s^{DW} / 8 \rceil$. If $\log N$ is absent, the smallest

feasible $\log N$ is chosen such that $\mathcal{C}(N, record_s^{GW}, n)$ holds. BGV parameters $\{\log N, N, \log Q_i, \log P_i, T\}$ are constructed and stored.

- 3) **DO prepares records.** Records $D = \{d_0, \dots, d_{n-1}\}$ are ingested or synthesized with $|d_i| \leq record_s^{DW}$. The definitive slot allocation is then fixed as $record_s = 8 \cdot \lceil \max_i |d_i| / 8 \rceil$ (discrete policy), checked against feasibility predicates $\mathcal{M}(\log N, record_s), \mathcal{D}(record_s), \mathcal{C}(N, record_s, n)$.
- 4) **Pack and persist.** Each d_i is placed in a disjoint window $J_i = \{i \cdot record_s, \dots, (i+1)record_s - 1\}$ of $c = (c_0, \dots, c_{N-1})$, zeros pad unused slots, and the polynomial $m_{DB}(X) = \sum c_j X^j$ is encoded at max level. World state stores “ m_{DB} ”, “ n ”, “ $record_s$ ”, and “ bgv_params ” plus optional “ $record\%03d$ ” entries.
- 5) **DR discovers metadata.** DR calls GetMetadata (Alg. 2) via evaluate to obtain $(n, record_s, \log N, N, T, \log Q_i, \log P_i)$. This enables reconstruction of the cryptographic context.
- 6) **DR instantiates crypto context.** From metadata, DR builds parameters, executes $KeyGen(\lambda) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$, and prepares encoder/encryptor objects.
- 7) **Form and encrypt query.** For index $i \in [n]$, DR runs FormSelectionVector (Alg. 3): define J_i , set v_i with ones on J_i , encode to $m_q(X)$, encrypt as $ct_q = Enc_{pk}(v_i)$, and serialize/Base64-encode.
- 8) **PIR query evaluation.** DR issues PIRQuery(ct_q^{B64}) (Alg. 4) via evaluate. DO decodes, reloads m_{DB}

if necessary, and computes $ct_r = \text{Eval}(ct_q, m_{DB})$, returning the Base64-encoded ciphertext.

- 9) **Decryption and reconstruction.** \mathcal{DR} runs DecryptResult (Alg. 5) to recover $m'(X)$, extract bytes from J_i , stop at padding zero, and reconstruct d_i .

Algorithm 1 InitLedger (chaincode)

Require: n ; $record_s^{DW}$; op : hint

- 1: $\log N \leftarrow \text{selMinLogN}\left(\left(n, 8 \cdot \left\lceil \frac{record_s^{DW}}{8} \right\rceil\right)\right)$
- 2: **if** $\log N = \emptyset$ **then**
- 3: **return** \perp
- 4: **end if**
- 5: $bgvParams \leftarrow \text{selParams}(\log N, op : \text{hint})$
- 6: $D \leftarrow \text{genRecords}(n, record_s^{DW})$
- 7: **if** $\exists i : |d_i| > record_s^{DW}$ **then**
- 8: **return** \perp
- 9: **end if**
- 10: $record_s \leftarrow 8 \cdot \left\lceil \frac{\max_i |d_i|}{8} \right\rceil$
- 11: **if** $\neg \text{feasible}(\log N, n, record_s)$ **then**
- 12: **return** \perp // infeasible configuration
- 13: **end if**
- 14: $c \leftarrow [0, \dots, 0] \in \mathbb{Z}_T^N$ // init coefficient vector
- 15: **for** $i \in [0, n-1]$ **do**
- 16: $J_i \leftarrow \{i \cdot record_s, \dots, (i+1) \cdot record_s - 1\}$ // slot window for d_i
- 17: **for** $k = 0$ **to** $record_s - 1$ **do**
- 18: **if** $k < |d_i|$ **then**
- 19: $c[J_i[k]] \leftarrow \text{byte}(d_i[k])$ // copy byte of record
- 20: **else**
- 21: $c[J_i[k]] \leftarrow 0$ // padding
- 22: **end if**
- 23: **end for**
- 24: **end for**
- 25: $m_{DB}(X) \leftarrow \text{enc}^{\text{poly}}(c) \in \mathbb{Z}_T[X]/(X^N + 1)$
- 26: $worldState \leftarrow \{m_{DB}, n, record_s, bgvParams, op : D\}$
- 27: **return** OK

Algorithm 2 GetMetadata (chaincode)

Require: \emptyset

- 1: $n \leftarrow worldState.n$
- 2: $record_s \leftarrow worldState.record_s$
- 3: $paramsMeta \leftarrow worldState.bgvParams$
- 4: **if** $n = \emptyset \vee record_s = \emptyset \vee paramsMeta = \emptyset$ **then**
- 5: **return** \perp
- 6: **end if**
- 7: $paramsMeta = (\log N, N, \log Q_i[], \log P_i[], T)$
- 8: $metadata \leftarrow (n, record_s, paramsMeta)$
- 9: **return** $metadata$

Algorithm 3 FormSelectionVector (client)

Require: pk ; $i \in [n]$; $record_s$; N

- 1: **if** $i < 0 \vee i \geq n$ **then**
- 2: **return** \perp
- 3: **end if**
- 4: **if** $n \cdot record_s > N$ **then**
- 5: **return** \perp
- 6: **end if**
- 7: $J_i \leftarrow \{i \cdot record_s, \dots, (i+1) \cdot record_s - 1\}$
- 8: $v_i \in \{0, 1\}^N \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$
- 9: **for** $j \in J_i$ **do**
- 10: $v_i[j] \leftarrow 1$
- 11: **end for** // windowed selector
- 12: $m_q(X) \leftarrow \text{enc}^{\text{poly}}(v_i)$ // polynomial encode at max level
- 13: $ct_q \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(m_q)$
- 14: $ct_q^{B64} \leftarrow \text{enc}^{B64}(\text{ser}^{\text{bin}}(ct_q))$
- 15: **return** ct_q^{B64} // Base64(marshalled ciphertext)

Algorithm 4 PIRQuery (chaincode)

Require: ct_q^{B64}

- 1: **if** $ct_q^{B64} = \emptyset$ **then**
- 2: **return** \perp
- 3: **end if**
- 4: $ct_q \leftarrow \text{des}^{\text{bin}}(\text{dec}^{B64}((ct_q^{B64})))$
- 5: **if** m_{DB} not cached in memory **then**
- 6: $m_{DB} \leftarrow worldState.m_{DB}$
- 7: **end if**
- 8: $ct_r \leftarrow \text{Eval}(ct_q, m_{DB})$
- 9: $ct_r^{B64} \leftarrow \text{enc}^{B64}(\text{ser}^{\text{bin}}(ct_r))$
- 10: **return** ct_r^{B64}

Algorithm 5 DecryptResult (client)

Require: ct_r^{B64} ; sk ; $i \in [n]$; $record_s$; n

- 1: **if** $i < 0$ **or** $i \geq n$ **then return** \perp
- 2: **if** $n \cdot record_s > N$ **then return** \perp // sanity
- 3: $ct_r \leftarrow \text{des}^{\text{bin}}(\text{dec}^{B64}((ct_r^{B64})))$
- 4: $u \in \mathbb{Z}_T^N \leftarrow \text{dec}^{\text{poly}}(m'(X)) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{sk}(ct_r)$
- 5: $J_i \leftarrow \{i \cdot record_s, \dots, (i+1) \cdot record_s - 1\}$
- 6: $b \leftarrow$ byte array // init empty buffer for record
- 7: **for** $j \in J_i$ **do**
- 8: **if** $u[j] = 0$ **then**
- 9: **break**
- 10: **end if** // stop at padding zero
- 11: $b.append(u[j])$
- 12: **end for**
- 13: **if** $record_s = 1$ **then return** $u[i \cdot record_s]$
- 14: $d_i \leftarrow \text{dec}^{UTF8}(b)$
- 15: **return** d_i

IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

All experiments were executed on a local Ubuntu 24.04 host running under WSL2 on an Intel Core i5-3380M CPU (2 cores/4 threads, 2.90 GHz) with 7.7 GB of RAM and a 1 TB SSD. During evaluation, the average available memory was 6.9 GB with a 2 GB swap partition, and the root filesystem reported 946 GB of free space.

The software stack consisted of Go 1.24.1, Docker 27.4.0, and Docker Compose v2.31.0, hosting Hyperledger Fabric v2.5 with a single Raft orderer and LevelDB as the world-state database. Fabric’s ordering service used the recommended parameters (*BatchSize.AbsoluteMaxBytes*=99 MB, *PreferredMaxBytes*=2 MB per block).

Our implementation employs the *Lattigo* v6 library [37] as the homomorphic encryption backend. Lattigo provides a Go-native implementation of the BGV scheme [41], whose security and correctness have been validated in prior literature. Accordingly, our focus is on evaluating its *practical performance within a permissioned blockchain environment*.

Client–peer communication was performed through the Fabric Go SDK [46]. The network configuration comprised a single organization with one peer per channel, sufficient for privacy evaluation since PIR execution occurs solely at endorsing peers and ordering nodes do not access the world state. Unless otherwise stated, each reported value represents the mean of 20 executions under both cold and warm cache conditions, cross-verified against peer logs for consistency.

B. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE

Parameter Configuration. Table 2 summarizes the BGV parameter sets used in our evaluation, including the ring dimension N , ciphertext modulus chain ($\log Q_i, \log P_i$), plaintext modulus T , slot allocation $record_s$, and database size n . Each configuration corresponds to one Fabric channel and maintains a feasible packing ratio as defined in Section III.

TABLE 2. Default BGV Parameter Configuration per Channel

N	$\log Q_i$	$\log P_i$	T	$record_s$	n
2^{13}	[54]	[54]	65537	128	64
2^{14}	[54]	[54]	65537	224	73
2^{15}	[54]	[54]	65537	256	128

Overall Results. Table 3 lists the measured execution time of core cryptographic operations (*KeyGen*, *Enc*, *Eval*, and *Dec*) for each evaluated ring dimension N . Table 4 summarizes the corresponding sizes of primary cryptographic artifacts, including public and secret keys, ciphertexts (ct_q , ct_r), the encoded plaintext database m_{DB} , and auxiliary metadata. Figure 4 consolidates the main cryptographic evaluation metrics: (A) end-to-end latency by algorithmic stage, (B) serialized artifact size, and (C) slot utilization ratio within the packed database polynomial m_{DB} .




FIGURE 4. Cryptographic performance of the BGV-based CPIR system: (A) latency by algorithmic stage, (B) artifact size by ring configuration, and (C) allocated-slot utilization.

C. BLOCKCHAIN PERFORMANCE

Blockchain performance. Figure 5 summarizes the performance of the CPIR chaincode within Hyperledger Fabric across three channels, each corresponding to a different ring size N and record configuration: (A) block size breakdown,




FIGURE 5. Blockchain-side evaluation of the CPIR system across three Fabric channels. (A–C) Storage-level metrics: block and world-state composition. (D–F) Peer-level resource utilization: CPU, memory, and network I/O per function.

TABLE 3. Execution Time of Cryptographic Operations (ms)

N	KeyGen	Enc	Eval	Dec
2^{13}	27.7	11.7	16.9	5.1
2^{14}	42.7	27.7	30.7	11.9
2^{15}	55.0	49.8	64.8	15.6

TABLE 4. Size of Main Cryptographic Artifacts (KB)

N	pk	sk	ct_q	ct_r	m_{DB}	Metadata
2^{13}	256.1	128.0	128.3	128.3	64.3	0.08
2^{14}	512.1	256.0	256.3	256.3	128.3	0.08
2^{15}	1024.1	512.0	512.3	512.3	256.3	0.08

(B) world-state (LevelDB) breakdown, (C) block vs. world-state size, (D) peer CPU utilization, (E) peer memory utilization, and (F) peer network I/O.

Chaincode Execution Timings. Figure 6 and Table 5 summarize the average server-side execution time of the main chaincode functions across different ring sizes.

TABLE 5. Average Chaincode Execution Time (ms)

N	InitLedger	GetMetadata	PIRQuery
2^{13}	165.24	6.16	12.53
2^{14}	187.03	8.31	18.17
2^{15}	307.87	5.94	40.36

Remark (execution paths). Transactions that modify world state (e.g., InitLedger) are issued via the *submit* path and committed through Raft consensus, while read-only operations (GetMetadata, PIRQuery) use the *evaluate* path, bypassing block creation and ordering. All metrics are averaged over 20 executions under identical peer configurations.

Execution time of chaincode functions per channel (server-side avg)




FIGURE 6. Average chaincode execution time by function and ring size. Each bar represents the mean execution time over multiple epochs.

D. OVERALL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

On-chain network behavior is reported in Table 6, which presents the average peer-side network I/O per PIRQuery transaction across the three channel configurations. Block and world-state sizes are detailed in Table 7, showing the breakdown of storage components per channel. Figure 7 illustrates the peer- and client-side execution during a PIR query.

TABLE 6. Peer network I/O per PIRQuery (avg, KB/tx)

Channel	N	NET I/O (KB/tx)
mini	2^{13}	524.62
mid	2^{14}	1042.09
rich	2^{15}	2072.88




FIGURE 7. Detailed execution logs illustrating the privacy-preserving query workflow. Left: peer-side chaincode logs showing InitLedger, GetMetadata, and PIR evaluation with ciphertext-plaintext multiplication. Right: client-side logs showing metadata retrieval, query encryption, PIR query invocation, and decryption of the result.

TABLE 7. Block and World-State Size per Channel Configuration

N	n	m_{DB} (KB)	Metadata (KB)	JSON (KB)	Overhead _{block} (KB)	Overhead _{ws} (KB)	Block (KB)	World (KB)
2^{13}	64	65.838	0.061	8.064	3.037	38.037	77	112
2^{14}	73	131.374	0.062	16.206	1.358	36.358	149	184
2^{15}	128	262.446	0.063	32.512	0.000	36.979	294	332

End-to-End Workflow Summary. Based on the data in Table 3 and Table 5, we now to summarize two main operational workflows in the system, involving DW and DR , while DO is implicitly involved as the executing peer during private queries.

The first workflow corresponds to \mathcal{DW} initializing the ledger through `InitLedger`, which packs and encodes the plaintext database m_{DB} into world state.

The second workflow corresponds to \mathcal{DR} performing a private query by sequentially executing $\text{GetMetadata} \rightarrow \text{KeyGen} \rightarrow \text{Enc} \rightarrow \text{PIRQuery} \rightarrow \text{Dec}$. The PIR evaluation itself is performed by \mathcal{DO} (endorsing peer) using ciphertext-plaintext multiplication during the evaluate transaction.

Table 8 summarizes the cryptographic and blockchain timings for both workflows, averaged across all three channel configurations.

Component	Configuration	Latency (ms)	Throughput (req/s)
Client	Standard	120	100
	Optimized	80	150
Server	Standard	250	50
	Optimized	150	100
Network	Standard	50	200
	Optimized	30	300
Database	Standard	180	30
	Optimized	100	60
Cache	Standard	40	400
	Optimized	20	600
API Gateway	Standard	30	300
	Optimized	15	450
Load Balancer	Standard	20	500
	Optimized	10	750
CDN	Standard	10	800
	Optimized	5	1200
Monitoring	Standard	5	1000
	Optimized	2	1500
Security	Standard	15	200
	Optimized	8	350
Logging	Standard	10	100
	Optimized	5	200
Authentication	Standard	20	50
	Optimized	10	100
Authorization	Standard	15	40
	Optimized	8	80
Reporting	Standard	30	20
	Optimized	15	40
Alerting	Standard	10	50
	Optimized	5	100
Configuration	Standard	5	100
	Optimized	2	200
Deployment	Standard	10	50
	Optimized	5	100
Backup	Standard	20	20
	Optimized	10	40
Recovery	Standard	15	10
	Optimized	8	20
Compliance	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Maintenance	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Testing	Standard	10	10
	Optimized	5	20
Documentation	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Support	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Training	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Research	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Innovation	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Partnership	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Marketing	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Sales	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Customer Success	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Operations	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Finance	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Legal	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
HR	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
IT	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Security	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Compliance	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Maintenance	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Testing	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Documentation	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Support	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Training	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Research	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Innovation	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Partnership	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Marketing	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Sales	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Customer Success	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Operations	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Finance	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Legal	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
HR	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
IT	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Security	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Compliance	Standard	10	5
	Optimized	5	10
Maintenance	Standard	5	5
	Optimized	2	10
Testing	Standard	10	

Workflow	Cryptographic Operations (ms)	Blockchain Operations (ms)	Total Time (ms)
DW 's Upload	0.0	220.0	220.0
\mathcal{DR} 's Query	82.4	30.5	112.9

Projected Cost for PIR Query. Among our results, for the ring size 2^{15} configuration, issuing 100/1000/10000 private queries incurs $\approx 207\text{MB}$ / 2.07 GB / 20.7 GB of peer-side network I/O with an associated chaincode evaluation time

of $\approx 0.07/0.67/6.73$ minutes, respectively, when using our protocol, as shown in Table 9 and Figure 8.

TABLE 9. Projected cost for multiple PIR queries at 2^{15} (peer perspective)

# Transactions	Total Bandwidth (MB)	Total Time (min)
100	207.3	0.07
1000	2073.0	0.67
10000	20730.0	6.73



FIGURE 8. Projected cost for multiple PIR queries at 2^{15} (peer perspective)

Remark (on network I/O measurement). The network I/O values in Table 6 and Table 9 were obtained from *docker stats* snapshots collected for the *peer0.org1.example.com* and *orderer0.group1.orderer.example.com* containers during each benchmark epoch.

TABLE 10. Comparison with existing privacy-preserving query systems

Work	Targeted System	Privacy Technique	Execution Location	Targeted Operation	Comm. Cost / Query (MB)	E2E Query Time (ms)	Db Size / (# of records)	Record Size / length (bytes)
[36]	HLF	OT	on-chain	read / write	N/A	600	10,000	N/A
[35]	HLF	ZKP	on-chain	read / write	N/A	N/A	10,000	N/A
[32]	Blockchain	DPF	off-chain	read	0.0002-0.0005	0.4-0.5	4-64	16-32
[33]	IPFS	HE-PIR	off-chain	read	10-15	500-16,000	1,000-1M	256,000
[34]	Bitcoin	Hybrid PIR	off-chain	read	0.65	2840	7,688-512,460	62-876
Ours	HLF	HE-PIR	on-chain	read	1-2	112.9	16-512	64-512

V. DISCUSSION

A. FUTURE WORK AND OUTLOOK

While this work demonstrates the feasibility of integrating CPIR directly into Hyperledger Fabric’s chaincode for *private reads*, several challenges remain in performance, scalability, and deployment. Future research should address (i) side-channel resilience through constant-time chaincode evaluation and standardized ciphertext serialization to mitigate timing and size-based leakages. (ii) Scaling beyond moderate database sizes will require some form of sub-linear or sharded CPIR, similar to [25]–[28], yet adapted to Fabric’s architecture and resource constraints. Moreover, (iii) extending the current ciphertext–plaintext ($ct \times pt$) evaluation to fully encrypted-database ($ct \times ct$) computation would enable richer on-chain analytics under encryption, though it demands relinearization, rotation, and modulus-switching capabilities within Fabric’s resource limits. (iv) Dynamic ledger updates, (addRecord) operation would allow incremental growth without full reinitialization, raising questions around re-encoding and key management. (v) Selective field-level retrieval through adaptive packing could enable varying length records and partial access control. (vii) Deployment optimization is crucial. In our setup, the chaincode ran in *development mode* as an external service, causing duplicated gRPC transmissions for each ciphertext (ct_q , ct_r) due to two network hops—client \leftrightarrow peer and peer \leftrightarrow chaincode. This resulted in ≈ 2072 KB per query for $N = 2^{15}$, as shown in Table 9. Running the chaincode *in-process* within the peer would eliminate the second hop, halving the network cost to ≈ 1024 KB per query.

B. RELATED WORK COMPARISON

Table 10 contrasts representative blockchain privacy frameworks mentioned in Section I, that integrate Private Information Retrieval (PIR) or related cryptographic mechanisms to achieve query privacy across different domains. The comparison focuses on six key aspects: (i) which target system the privacy solution is built for, (ii) the underlying privacy primitive (CPIR, IT-PIR, hybrid, DPF etc), (iii) whether privacy computation occurs on-chain (via smart contracts or chaincode) or off-chain, (iv) the targeted operation (read-only or read/write), (v) communication cost per query (in MB), (vi) end-to-end query time (in ms), (vii) database size (number of records), and (viii) record size (in bytes).

VI. CONCLUSION

This paper presented a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) mechanism for enabling *private reads* in Hyperledger Fabric, allowing endorsing peers to evaluate encrypted queries without learning which record was accessed. The proposed chaincode performs ciphertext–plaintext ($ct \times pt$) homomorphic multiplication directly within *evaluate* transactions, preserving Fabric’s endorsement and audit semantics. Our prototype achieves an average end-to-end latency of 113 ms and a peer-side execution time below 42 ms, with approximately 2 MB of peer network traffic per query in development mode—reducible to about 1 MB under in-process deployment. Storage profiling shows near-linear growth in both block and world-state sizes as the ring dimension scales, and parameter analysis confirms practical support for up to 512 records of 64 bytes each under 2^{15} . These results validate the feasibility of PIR-based *private reads* in permissioned ledgers, offering millisecond-scale query latency and full compatibility with Fabric’s architecture. Future work will explore constant-time and sublinear execution, sharded CPIR architectures, and fully encrypted ($ct \times ct$) on-chain evaluation to further enhance scalability and privacy.

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