

# Data don't speak for themselves

## a Bayesian course

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### Abstract

Bayesian statistics is rising in popularity in the astrophysical literature. It is no longer a debate: “work in Bayesian statistics now focuses on applications, computations, and models. Philosophical debates [...] are fading to the background” [1]. This is happening for two main reasons: faster computers and more complex models. In order to keep up, it is important to understand the fundamentals of Bayesian statistics, but it is as important to know how to deal with data analysis applications. In this course I want to provide a brief introduction to advanced concepts in Bayesian statistics. Emphasis will be on *intuition* and *computation*. No coin tossing, only real applications that relate to our day-to-day problems.

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## A (tiny) primer on philosophy

While preparing for this course, I asked people what it was they wanted to learn about. Much to my dismay, no one answered with “the philosophy of Bayesian statistics”. Most want to learn about the “theory” and “applications” (read MCMC). They want to know how they can *use* Bayesian statistics in their work.

Fair enough. But bypassing philosophy means making assumptions. Therefore, I shall introduce here Jaynes’ *robot*, an imaginary being whose brain is designed by us, so that it reasons according to certain definite rules [2]. These rules will simply be stated, not derived and not defended. They will be taken as being true. Then, everything that follows logically from them, everything the robot does, will be true.

The robot is objective<sup>1</sup> in its actions, and takes as input (i) data and (ii) the subjective knowledge we feed into it.

## 1 The basics of probability theory

Here we present the rules of the game. I follow very closely (too closely) the presentation in [4]. Using Bayesian statistics to analyse data (some might call it doing probabilistic inference) means working with likelihoods, prior probabilities, posterior probabilities and marginalization of nuisance parameters. All this will be explained later but the options we have when working with these mathematical objects are strongly constrained by the rules of probability calculus.

*On voit, par cet Essai, que la théorie des probabilités n’est, au fond,  
que le bon sens réduit au calcul;*

– Pierre-Simon Laplace

If we have a continuous parameter  $a$ , and a probability distribution function  $p(a)$  for  $a$ , it must obey the normalization condition

$$1 = \int p(a) da \quad (1)$$

where the integral is limited by the domain of  $a$ .

Often times we will have more than one parameter. Even if we *condition*  $p(a)$  on some particular value of another parameter  $b$ , that is, we ask for  $p(a|b)$  (read “the pdf for  $a$  given  $b$ ”), it must obey the same normalization

$$1 = \int p(a|b) da \quad (2)$$

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<sup>1</sup>Which is not saying much... [3].

If we have a probability distribution for two things,  $p(a, b)$  (read “the pdf for  $a$  and  $b$ ”), you can always factorize it into two distributions, one for  $a$ , and one for  $b$  given  $a$  or the other way around:

$$p(a, b) = p(a) p(b|a) \quad (3)$$

$$p(a, b) = p(b) p(a|b) \quad (4)$$

These two factorisations together lead<sup>2</sup> to Bayes’ theorem:

$$p(a|b) = \frac{p(b|a) p(a)}{p(b)}. \quad (5)$$

Conditional probabilities factor just the same as unconditional ones

$$p(a, b|c) = p(a|c) p(b|a, c) \quad (6)$$

$$p(a, b|c) = p(b|c) p(a|b, c) \quad (7)$$

$$p(a|b, c) = \frac{p(b|a, c) p(a|c)}{p(b|c)} \quad (8)$$

where we just carried the condition  $c$  through all the terms.

You can integrate out or *marginalize* variables you want to get rid of (or *not* infer) by integrals like

$$p(a|c) = \int p(a, b|c) db \quad (9)$$

$$p(a|c) = \int p(a|b, c) p(b|c) db \quad (10)$$

where the second is a factorized version of the first. Remember that, since  $b$  can be a very high-dimensional mathematical object (a set of parameters), integrals like these can be extremely difficult to calculate in practice.

## 1.1 Some familiarity

Let us write some of the preceding equations with more familiar terms<sup>3</sup>.

We have data  $D$  and a set of parameters  $\theta$  that we are interested in learning about. In all our analyses we condition on information  $\mathcal{I}$  that we have about the world. Then we can write Eq. (8) as

$$p(\theta|D, \mathcal{I}) = \frac{p(\theta|\mathcal{I}) p(D|\theta, \mathcal{I})}{p(D|\mathcal{I})} \quad (11)$$

The terms in this equation are usually called

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<sup>2</sup>Bayes’ theorem is a consequence of the previous equations, it is not assumed as a rule. That’s why it’s called a theorem, actually.

<sup>3</sup>Only if you have heard about Bayesian statistics, otherwise just different terms.

$p(\theta|D, \mathcal{I})$  the posterior distribution  
 $p(\theta|\mathcal{I})$  the prior distribution  
 $p(D|\theta, \mathcal{I})$  the likelihood  
 $p(D|\mathcal{I})$  the evidence, sometimes denoted with a  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

but calling them this may hide something important (see Section 2.2).

From Eq. (2) we can derive<sup>4</sup> that

$$p(D|\mathcal{I}) = \mathcal{Z} = \int p(\theta|\mathcal{I}) p(D|\theta, \mathcal{I}) d\theta \quad (12)$$

Because  $\mathcal{Z}$  does not depend on  $\theta$ , you might see many times Eq. (11) written as

$$p(\theta|D, \mathcal{I}) \propto p(\theta|\mathcal{I}) p(D|\theta, \mathcal{I}), \quad (13)$$

so **the posterior is proportional to the likelihood times the prior**. Nevertheless, try to stick with Eq. (11);  $\mathcal{Z}$  contains in it a big deal of information.



#### think about it

Eq. (13) means that the likelihood and the prior can be defined up to an arbitrary multiplicative constant (i.e. not a function of  $\theta$ ).

For example, imagine we are interested in comparing two models  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  which have parameters  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$ , respectively. We still only have data  $D$ . Bayes' theorem works the same:

$$p(M_i|D, \mathcal{I}) = \frac{p(M_i|\mathcal{I}) p(D|M_i, \mathcal{I})}{p(D|\mathcal{I})} \quad (14)$$

and the ratio of model probabilities is

$$\frac{p(M_1|D, \mathcal{I})}{p(M_2|D, \mathcal{I})} = \frac{p(M_1|\mathcal{I}) p(D|M_1, \mathcal{I})}{p(M_2|\mathcal{I}) p(D|M_2, \mathcal{I})} \quad (15)$$

$$= \frac{p(M_1|\mathcal{I}) \int p(D, \theta_1|M_1, \mathcal{I}) d\theta_1}{p(M_2|\mathcal{I}) \int p(D, \theta_2|M_2, \mathcal{I}) d\theta_2} \quad (16)$$

$$= \frac{p(M_1|\mathcal{I}) \int p(\theta_1|M_1, \mathcal{I}) p(D|\theta_1, M_1, \mathcal{I}) d\theta_1}{p(M_2|\mathcal{I}) \int p(\theta_2|M_2, \mathcal{I}) p(D|\theta_2, M_2, \mathcal{I}) d\theta_2} . \quad (17)$$

See how the evidence (of both models) turns out to be important!

The term

$$\frac{p(M_1|\mathcal{I})}{p(M_2|\mathcal{I})}$$

<sup>4</sup>Multiply both sides of Eq. (8) by  $p(D|\mathcal{I})$  and integrate over  $\theta$ , noting that  $p(D|\mathcal{I})$  does not depend on  $\theta$  and that the posterior obeys Eq. (2).

is the ratio of prior probabilities for the two models. If we believe they are equally likely at the start, then this is equal to 1.



### think about it

$\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$  can be any set of parameters and, in particular, they can have different sizes. Say model  $M_1$  has 2 parameters  $\theta_1 = (a, b)$  and model  $M_2$  only has one parameter  $\theta_2 = (c)$ . Then the integrals in Eq. (17) are of different dimensionality. That's fine, probability theory doesn't care. Enough of that "divide by the degrees of freedom" nonsense! [5]

## 2 Assigning probabilities

Now that we have a set of rules with which we can manipulate our distributions, it is useful to learn how we can assign values to all these terms and actually start calculating things.

### 2.1 The prior

### 2.2 The likelihood

The likelihood is a prior. I will repeat so you know this is not a typo: the likelihood is a prior. The term  $p(D|\theta, I)$  represents your beliefs on what the data will be like, given parameters  $\theta$  and information  $I$ . Therefore, the likelihood encodes prior information. Following [6], the likelihood is *not*

- the process that generated the data
- the pdf that your data kind of looks like when you plot it in a histogram

It is, instead, what we usually call *the model*. And the model is nothing else than a set of assumptions about the data and how they relate to the parameters. **The likelihood provides a (the) connection from  $\theta$  to  $D$ .**

## 3 MCMC

This statement requires citation [?]; this one does too [?]. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Aenean dictum lacus sem, ut varius ante dignissim ac. Sed a mi quis lectus feugiat aliquam. Nunc sed vulputate velit. Sed commodo metus vel felis semper, quis rutrum odio vulputate. Donec a elit porttitor, facilisis nisl sit amet, dignissim arcu. Vivamus accumsan pellentesque nulla at euismod. Duis porta rutrum sem, eu facilisis mi varius sed. Suspendisse potenti. Mauris rhoncus neque nisi, ut laoreet augue

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Figure 1: Fish

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## Conclusion

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