

Cyber-range green team emulation as code

Leveraging Language Models for Social Engineering Defense Training

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Abstract

Social engineering remains one of the most persistent and effective attack vectors against organisations, exploiting human behaviour rather than technical vulnerabilities. This thesis presents the design and implementation of a gamified training platform embedded within a cyber range, where Large Language Models (LLMs) are used to simulate realistic corporate employee behaviours. The system enables controlled, repeatable social engineering exercises in which users interact with AI-driven agents capable of responding dynamically to phishing, manipulation, and other human-targeted attack techniques. The platform is built on a modular architecture using Vagrant, Docker, and Ansible to ensure scalability, reproducibility, and ease of deployment. It integrates an interactive environment in which participants can practice identifying and countering social engineering attempts, thereby strengthening organisational resilience.

The research evaluates the platform's capacity to produce credible, context-aware human simulations, and to enhance the engagement and learning outcomes of trainees. Deliverables include a fully functional prototype, a methodological framework for interactive awareness training, and an analysis of the platform's strengths, limitations, and potential applications in organisational cybersecurity programmes.

Keywords: Cybersecurity, Green Team, Cyber Range, Large Language Models, Social Engineering, AI Simulation, Awareness Training

Preface

This thesis was carried out as part of the Master’s programme in Cybersecurity at the Université libre de Bruxelles during the academic year 2024–2025, within the framework of the JANUS project. The work presented here contributes to the development of a modular, gamified cyber range capable of simulating realistic social engineering scenarios, with a particular focus on human factors.

My interest in the human element of cybersecurity stems not only from academic exposure but also from real-life experiences and incidents that have occurred around me. These events underscored the critical role that human behaviour plays in both enabling and mitigating cyber threats, motivating me to explore how training environments can better address this dimension.

The project benefited from access to the JANUS infrastructure and the guidance of Professor Jérôme Dossogne, who integrated me into the JANUS initiative.

This document reflects a personal commitment to bridging the gap between technical defences and human-centred threat mitigation, and it is intended for readers interested in both the theoretical and practical aspects of cybersecurity training.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Context and Objectives

Social engineering attacks exploit human psychology to breach organizational security, posing a critical threat in today's digital landscape. Verizon's 2024 Data Breach Investigations Report reveals that 74% of breaches involve human elements, such as phishing and pretexting, which bypass technical safeguards by leveraging principles like reciprocity and authority, as outlined by Cialdini [8, 58]. A 2024 deepfake scam costing a Hong Kong firm \$25.6 million exemplifies the devastating impact of such tactics [9].

Cyber ranges serve as essential platforms for hands-on cybersecurity training, replicating IT infrastructures to prepare professionals for threat mitigation. Platforms like Locked Shields and SCORPION excel in simulating technical scenarios, such as ransomware or DDoS attacks, but struggle to model dynamic human behaviors, as critiqued by Carnegie Mellon and ECSO [15, 50]. This gap hinders effective training against social engineering, where adaptive, context-aware responses are crucial for realism.

Effective training requires engaging, interactive methods to enhance learning outcomes. Gordillo et al. demonstrate that gamified environments, such as serious games, improve performance and motivation compared to traditional methods, with educational escape rooms yielding superior knowledge retention [21, 22]. Ceha et al. further show that humor in conversational agents boosts engagement, suggesting affective elements amplify learning [6]. These findings align with large-scale evidence indicating that well-designed games increase factual knowledge by 11%, skills by 14%, and retention by 9% over control groups [64].

This thesis addresses these challenges by developing a novel cyber-range platform powered by large language models (LLMs) to simulate realistic corporate employees. The platform integrates gamification to leverage these pedagogical benefits, drawing on advancements in user simulations from ELIZA to modern LLMs like Mistral-7B and GPT-4 [43, 44, 62]. It provides a scalable, gamified environment for organizations to test defenses against social engineering in a controlled setting.

© Primary Objectives

- Develop AI-driven agents using LLMs to simulate employee responses to social engineering tactics, such as phishing and pretexting, with frameworks like CrewAI for multi-agent coordination.
- Deploy a scalable infrastructure using Vagrant, Docker, and Ansible for accessibility in resource-constrained academic and corporate environments.
- Evaluate the platform's effectiveness through functional validation, integration testing, and qualitative analysis of simulation realism, focusing on conversational coherence and susceptibility to manipulation.

1.2 Motivations

The escalating sophistication of social engineering attacks, such as a 2024 deepfake incident costing \$25.6 million, underscores the urgent need for advanced training tools [9]. Traditional cyber ranges, like CybExer, rely on static simulations that fail to capture adaptive human responses, limiting their effectiveness against evolving threats [54]. LLMs, such as Mistral-7B and DeepSeek-V3, offer conversational flexibility and reasoning capabilities, enabling simulations of diverse employee behaviors, as evidenced by Chatbot Arena and Vellum AI benchmarks [44, 57].

Psychological frameworks, such as Cialdini’s principles, motivate integrating AI to model real-world vulnerabilities [8]. Moreover, active learning principles highlight that interactive, gamified training enhances engagement and retention, with studies showing reduced failure rates and improved performance [63]. This research is driven by the need to develop engaging, scalable platforms that leverage these cognitive benefits to bolster organizational resilience against social engineering threats.

1.3 Project statement & contributions

This project develops a cyber-range platform powered by large language models (LLMs) to train employees against social engineering attacks, addressing the critical need for realistic, interactive training environments. Unlike traditional platforms like Locked Shields, which focus on technical scenarios, this platform leverages CrewAI to coordinate multiple AI-driven agents that simulate diverse employee profiles, from naive staff susceptible to phishing to cautious managers resisting pretexting [10, 41]. Deployed using Vagrant, Docker, and Ansible, it ensures scalability and accessibility in resource-constrained settings, such as academic labs or small enterprises, as detailed in the implementation methodology (Chapter 4) [44].

The platform integrates psychological principles, such as Cialdini’s authority and urgency, to model realistic vulnerabilities, and employs gamification inspired by pedagogical research to enhance engagement and retention [8, 22]. Through Mattermost, it facilitates real-time, chat-based interactions, allowing trainees to test detection strategies against simulated social engineering scenarios, such as phishing emails or pretexting attempts (pages 30–35). This approach contrasts with static simulations in platforms like CybExer, offering dynamic, personality-driven responses validated through functional and integration testing [54].

Contributions include:

- A fully functional cyber-range platform simulating realistic employee responses to social engineering attacks, validated through Mattermost interactions and supporting diverse scenarios like credential phishing and deepfake-based pretexting.
- A novel methodology for designing interactive, gamified exercises that incorporate psychological manipulation tactics, enabling trainees to practice identifying and countering threats in a controlled environment.
- Comprehensive recommendations for ethical AI deployment, including anonymized training data and fairness-aware algorithms, alongside fine-tuning strategies for

lightweight LLMs like Mistral-7B to ensure scalability and robustness in varied settings.

The platform focuses exclusively on digital social engineering scenarios, excluding physical security or non-LLM-based simulations, to maintain a targeted scope aligned with the identified gaps in current cyber ranges (Chapter 2).

1.4 Research Questions

- **RQ1:** Can LLM-based agents be created to simulate user actions and responses according to predefined characteristics and behavioural rules?
- **RQ2:** Can social engineering rules based on psychological effects be expressed in a way interpretable by an LLM?
- **RQ3:** Can an LLM-based simulation environment be secured to prevent uncontrolled exploitation while maintaining training realism?

1.5 Organization of this Document

The remainder of this thesis is organised into the following chapters:

- **Chapter 2 – State of the Art:** Presents a comprehensive literature review covering cyber ranges, user behaviour simulations, the integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) in training environments, and the role of social engineering in cybersecurity incidents. This chapter positions the research within the current academic and industrial context.
- **Chapter 3 – Project Mission, Objectives, and Requirements:** Defines the precise mission of the project, details the research objectives, and specifies the functional and non-functional requirements guiding the design and implementation.
- **Chapter 4 – Implementation & Testing Methodology:** Describes the technical approach used to design and deploy the platform, including architectural choices, component integration, testing procedures, and validation steps.
- **Chapter 5 – Experimentation & Data Collection:** Details the experimental setup, the nature of the scenarios executed, the metrics collected, and the methods employed to capture and store relevant interaction data for later analysis.
- **Chapter 6 – Cybersecurity Analysis of the Proposed Solution:** Evaluates the platform from a security perspective, examining its robustness against attacks, compliance with security best practices, and its ability to simulate realistic threat scenarios.
- **Chapter 7 – Discussion:** Compares the results obtained with findings from related work, analyses lessons learned from the experimentation, and discusses the limitations of the current implementation.

- **Chapter 8 – Future Work:** Suggests possible improvements and extensions of the platform, both technical and methodological, to enhance its effectiveness and applicability.
- **Chapter 9 – Conclusion:** Summarises the key contributions, main results, and overall achievements of the thesis, and restates its significance for cybersecurity training and research.
- **Appendices:** Contain supplementary material, including source code excerpts, technical documentation, additional experimental data, and background information supporting the main text.

Chapter 2

Literature review, state of the art (SotA), definitions and notations

2.1 State of the Art and Related Works

© Objectives of the Section

This state of the art aims to establish a comprehensive foundation for developing an LLM-based cyber-range focused on simulating **social engineering** scenarios, by reviewing existing platforms, simulation tools, language models, and theoretical frameworks.

- **A** - Identify the limitations of current **Cyber Range** platforms in simulating dynamic user behavior and addressing **social engineering** threats.
- **B** - Trace the evolution of interactive user simulation tools and evaluate their applicability to **Cyber Range** environments.
- **C** - Analyze lightweight LLMs for their suitability in emulating user behavior within **social engineering** simulations using CrewAI and GHOSTS frameworks.
- **D** - Provide a theoretical and practical framework for **social engineering** simulations, analyzing its intersection with LLM-based AI and proposing strategies to enhance defense mechanisms.

☰ Approach

This state-of-the-art analysis begins by reviewing key concepts relevant to the research, including the limitations of existing **Cyber Range** platforms, the evolution of user behavior simulation, and the theoretical foundations of **social engineering**. During this phase, various tools (e.g., GANDALF, SET, Kali Linux) and techniques (e.g., Cialdini's principles of persuasion) were evaluated to assess their suitability for simulating realistic **social engineering** scenarios within a cyber-range environment. The review also encompasses an analysis of lightweight LLMs to ensure practical implementation, while addressing ethical and regulatory considerations (e.g., GDPR, ISO 27001) to guide the development of responsible and effective simulations.

2.1.1 A : Cyber Ranges – Foundations and Gaps in User Simulation

TABLE 2.1 Timeline of Key Publications Related to [Cyber Range](#) and User Simulation

2010	• NATO CCDCOE initiates Locked Shields, recognized as the largest recurring live-fire cyber defense exercise, involving over 20 nations by its early iterations [41]
2012	• SANS Institute introduces NetWars, a gamified Cyber Range emphasizing competitive attack-defense training across five difficulty levels [35]
2016	• CybExer Technologies launches its Cyber Range platform, subsequently adopted for ITU-supported international exercises simulating critical infrastructure defense [54]
2018	• Cloud Range establishes a cloud-based Cyber Range tailored for SOC training, featuring prebuilt attack scenarios for rapid deployment [48]
2020	• ECSO releases a foundational paper that defines Cyber Range as platforms integrating IT/OT simulations and user activities, advocating for standardized evaluation criteria [14]
2021	• Carnegie Mellon SEI publishes <i>Foundation of Cyber Range</i> , exploring NPC-based user simulation to enhance scenario realism [50]
2023	• NIST issues a Cyber Range Guide outlining orchestration, virtualization, and behavioral analysis as essential components for effective training environments [52]
2024	• Locked Shields maintains its status as the premier NATO CCDCOE live-fire exercise, engaging over 2000 participants across 40+ countries [41]
2024	• IBM X-Force Cyber Range enhances its offerings with updated crisis simulation scenarios focused on ransomware and DDoS response [30]
2024	• SCORPION Cyber Range , developed by the University of Turin, integrates gamification to assess decision-making under phishing scenarios [42]
2024	• ECSO publishes a Cyber Range Feature Checklist, emphasizing human behavior simulation as a critical realism metric [15]

This section evaluates the role of [Cyber Range](#) as pivotal platforms for cybersecurity training, focusing on their limitations in simulating dynamic human behaviors for **social engineering** scenarios. We claim that current platforms, while robust for technical simulations, lack the adaptive user simulations necessary to counter sophisticated social engineering attacks, thus justifying the integration of large language models (LLMs). This analysis draws on authoritative sources like NATO CCDCOE, NIST, and Carnegie Mellon SEI, selected for their prominence in defining global cyber defense standards, as opposed to smaller-scale platforms like Hack The Box, which lack the multi-stakeholder scope required for comprehensive evaluation. By crossing these sources, we contrast their technical focus with the behavioral gaps they reveal, supporting the need for an LLM-based [Cyber Range](#) to enhance training realism.

SANS NetWars Since its launch in 2012, SANS NetWars has served as a gamified training environment widely adopted in professional cybersecurity education [35]. While it integrates limited **social engineering** components—such as phishing exercises featured

in the Holiday Hack Challenge—it relies exclusively on human players rather than automating user simulations. As emphasized by Carnegie Mellon [50], such static configurations fail to reflect the dynamic nature of real-world human interactions. Compared to smaller environments like TryHackMe, NetWars provides a mature framework, but its omission of AI-driven agents justifies the investigation of LLMs as scalable alternatives for simulating adaptive user behavior.

CybExer Technologies Cyber Range Operational since 2016, the CybExer Technologies [Cyber Range](#) has been leveraged for international exercises under the coordination of the International Telecommunication Union [54]. While some of its scenarios include scripted user actions, including rudimentary [social engineering](#) attacks, the simulations are static and lack the responsiveness needed to emulate authentic human behavior under adversarial pressure. This rigidity limits their pedagogical value in training participants to handle real-time manipulations.

Cloud Range Launched in 2018, Cloud Range is a cloud-native [Cyber Range](#) targeting SOC (Security Operations Center) preparedness through scalable infrastructure [48]. It supports basic forms of user simulation and may include [social engineering](#) components such as phishing campaigns. Nonetheless, its primary focus lies in the orchestration and analysis of technical incident response. The behavioral realism of simulated users remains limited, especially in the context of sophisticated attacker-defender interactions involving human deception.

Defining Cyber Range: ECSO's 2020 Conceptual Framework In an effort to unify terminology, the European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO) released a foundational document in 2020 that defines a [Cyber Range](#) as a platform capable of simulating IT and OT environments, user activity, and cyberattacks [14]. While the scope includes user simulations, the document does not detail the cognitive or behavioral complexity these simulations should entail. Rather, it lays the groundwork for conceptual alignment across stakeholders, offering a baseline against which to evaluate or design future platforms.

IBM X-Force Cyber Range The IBM X-Force [Cyber Range](#) stands out for its immersive, real-time scenarios, often focused on ransomware, DDoS, and network infiltration [30]. Despite its technical sophistication and experiential realism, its treatment of [social engineering](#) is minimal. Interactive human behaviors are not a central design element, limiting the platform's capacity to prepare participants for psychological attack vectors such as spear-phishing or pretext-based intrusion.

NATO CCDCOE Cyber Range Locked Shields, organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), is considered the largest international live-fire [Cyber Range](#) exercise [41]. It delivers comprehensive technical challenges through realistic infrastructures under siege. Yet, the human dimension—especially simulations of user behavior in [social engineering](#) contexts—is largely absent. The focus remains on systemic vulnerabilities and coordinated cyberattacks rather than psychological manipulation or behavioral deception.

SCORPION Cyber Range Originating from research at the University of Turin, the SCORPION [Cyber Range](#) integrates elements of gamification and adaptivity [42]. It is notable for emphasizing complex decision-making, particularly in high-stress scenarios that simulate realistic phishing attempts. However, it falls short in modeling dynamic user behavior. The absence of AI-driven agents restricts its ability to replicate nuanced responses to evolving [social engineering](#) tactics, limiting its scope in training defenders on human-centered threats.

Enhancing Fidelity in Cyber Range: Lessons from Carnegie Mellon The 2021 Carnegie Mellon SEI report underlines the importance of realism in [Cyber Range](#) design, stating that high-fidelity environments are essential for effective team-based cyber defense training [50]. It advocates for the use of non-player characters (NPCs) to generate background noise and simulate user presence, contributing to immersive scenarios. Nevertheless, as noted in ECSO's broader analysis [15], these NPCs are often static or scripted, lacking the flexibility to represent real-time behavioral responses such as resisting social manipulation or reacting to a phishing lure.

European Benchmarking: ECSO's 2024 Checklist ECSO's 2024 checklist establishes a practical framework for evaluating [Cyber Range](#) capabilities across European platforms [15]. Within its "realism" category, it explicitly includes human behavior simulation. However, an inspection of the included providers reveals that few meet this criterion beyond superficial implementations. Most platforms focus on infrastructure-layer realism, with user simulations being rudimentary or rule-based. This misalignment between expected behavioral fidelity and current offerings confirms the need for more interactive, LLM-driven user modeling in future [Cyber Range](#) design.

⚠ Limitations in Current Cyber Range Implementations

- **Lack of Dynamic User simulation:** Existing platforms predominantly rely on scripted or static simulations, which notably fail to replicate the adaptive and often erratic behavior of users under manipulative pressures, such as sophisticated phishing campaigns.
- **Static Attack Scenarios:** Strikingly, most exercises lack bidirectional interactivity between simulated users and attackers, undermining the realism required for effective [social engineering](#) training, such as real-time pretexting.
- **Narrow Focus on Technical Threats:** [social engineering](#) vulnerabilities ranging from phishing to insider threats remain curiously underrepresented, leaving organizations ill-prepared for hybrid attacks that exploit human weaknesses.

These limitations justify the need for developing a novel approach that combines advanced [Cyber Range](#) with interactive artificial intelligence, allowing organizations to assess human vulnerabilities in a realistic and dynamic environment.

Conclusion: The analysis of current [Cyber Range](#), as detailed in Table 2.2, reveals significant gaps in addressing [human behavior](#) and [social engineering](#) threats, exempli-

Table 2.2: Comparison of Major **Cyber Range** on Human Factor and **social engineering** Simulation

Cyber Range	User Presence	user simulation	social engineering	Remarks
Locked Shields (NATO CCDCOE)	✗	✗	✗	Technical infrastructure defense only.
IBM X-Force	✓	✗	⦿	Crisis simulation with human actors, not automated or scalable.
SCORPION (Univ. Turin)	✓	⦿	✓	Phishing decision-making, no AI agents.
Cyberbit	✗	✗	✗	SOC training platform, focused on technical responses.
RangeForce	⦿	✗	✗	Analyst-oriented; no simulation of non-technical users.
SANS NetWars	✓	✗	⦿	Gamified training with partial social engineering scenarios [35].
CybExer Technologies	✓	⦿	⦿	European platform with scripted user simulations, limited social engineering [54].
Cloud Range	✓	⦿	⦿	Cloud-based SOC training, basic social engineering scenarios [48].
Proposed LLM-based Cyber Range	✓	✓	✓	Interactive, adaptive agents for social engineering training.

fied by platforms like Locked Shields, IBM X-Force, and SCORPION. These findings underscore the necessity for innovative approaches, particularly the integration of **interactive, AI-driven personas** that adapt to manipulation attempts in real time. This section lays the groundwork for the proposed LLM-based **Cyber Range** developed in this thesis, which aims to empower organizations to rigorously evaluate and bolster resilience against the evolving landscape of **social engineering** attacks.

2.1.2 B : Interactive User Simulation: Evolution and Applicability to Cyber Ranges

The following timeline delineates the foundational milestones in the development of interactive user simulations, highlighting the pioneering systems that established the groundwork for subsequent advancements in conversational technologies.

TABLE 2.3 Timeline of Early Approaches to Interactive User Simulation

1966	ELIZA, developed by Joseph Weizenbaum at MIT, emerges as one of the first chatbots, employing pattern-matching rules to simulate a therapist's responses in text-based dialogues [62]
1980s	Text-based adventure games, such as <i>Zork</i> , introduce scripted non-player characters (NPCs) that respond to user inputs with predefined dialogue [32]
1990s	The <i>Elder Scrolls</i> series pioneers the use of dialogue trees for NPCs in role-playing games, enabling basic user interactions through predetermined response options [51]

ELIZA (1966) ELIZA was the first system to simulate human-like conversations using rule-based pattern matching. As described by Weizenbaum himself, the system mimicked a psychotherapist by reflecting back user statements with minimal transforma-

tion [62]. This design introduced the foundational concept of interactive dialogue in machines. However, ELIZA's structure made it incapable of adapting to contextual changes or unexpected queries. Its rigidity laid bare the limitations of deterministic script-based interactions in modeling realistic users.

Text-Based Adventure Games (1980s) Games like *Zork* implemented static NPCs with hardcoded dialogue scripts. These systems introduced the notion of user interaction with agents within narrative environments [32]. While this approach allowed for basic branching logic, the dialogues were entirely predetermined, and users quickly reached the boundaries of possible interactions. The lack of generativity confined these systems to predictable exchanges, unsuitable for simulating user behavior under manipulation or ambiguity.

Dialogue Trees in *The Elder Scrolls* (1990s) The *Elder Scrolls* franchise expanded NPC interactivity by incorporating structured dialogue trees, enabling users to choose from a set of predefined responses [51]. This innovation introduced conditional dialogue paths and role-dependent variability. Yet, despite offering greater flexibility than earlier games, the system was not designed for open-ended language input or adaptive behavior. It lacked the spontaneous adaptability required to emulate the unpredictable decision-making of real users in **social engineering** scenarios.

Implications for Cyber Ranges Each of these early systems failed to achieve the behavioral depth required for modern **Cyber Range** applications. Their scripted, invariable interactions do not capture the nuances of human responses needed in training environments, particularly when simulating threats like phishing or pretexting. For realistic user simulation, dynamic systems capable of handling manipulation, ambiguity, and emotional variability are necessary.

The subsequent timeline traces the transition towards dynamic and AI-driven user simulations, driven by advancements in machine learning and natural language processing.

TABLE 2.4 Timeline of Evolution Towards Dynamic and AI-Driven User Simulations

1998	• ALICE (Artificial Linguistic Internet Computer Entity), developed by Richard Wallace, leverages heuristic pattern matching to enable conversations [61]
2006	• Cleverbot, created by Rollo Carpenter, introduces machine learning in conversational AI, learning from past interactions to generate responses [5]
2015	• Seq2Seq models, introduced by Google, utilize recurrent neural networks to develop context-aware chatbots [53]
2018	• BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers), released by Google, enhances natural language understanding with bidirectional context modeling [12]
2018	• Google Duplex simulates a human user by making phone calls to book appointments [38]
2020	• GPT-3, developed by OpenAI, sets a benchmark for natural language generation with 175 billion parameters [4]

ALICE (1998) ALICE advanced the legacy of ELIZA by implementing heuristic pattern matching and an expanded knowledge base [61]. Wallace described ALICE’s architecture as capable of managing more nuanced interactions through the AIML (Artificial Intelligence Markup Language), enhancing linguistic diversity. However, the rule-based structure remained static, limiting the system’s flexibility in novel contexts. Unlike adaptive frameworks, ALICE was unable to adjust to user behavior beyond predefined patterns, which reduced its viability for dynamic simulation settings.

Cleverbot (2006) Cleverbot marked a transition by incorporating machine learning principles, allowing it to learn from prior conversations to generate emergent responses [5]. Carpenter emphasized that each reply was shaped by previous user inputs, introducing stochastic variability. Yet, this statistical foundation led to erratic contextual coherence, particularly in long or manipulative interactions. Compared to deterministic systems like ALICE, Cleverbot lacked robustness, as it could not maintain semantic consistency across dialogue sequences, which is critical for simulating realistic users in adversarial scenarios.

Seq2Seq Models (2015) Google’s Seq2Seq architecture utilized encoder-decoder RNNs to model conversations with contextual awareness [53]. This approach enabled more responsive agents capable of reacting to the dialogue history. However, Vinyals and Le noted that Seq2Seq systems exhibited degradation over long dialogues due to vanishing gradient problems, which impaired long-term memory and coherence. This constraint rendered them suboptimal for simulating users subjected to sustained manipulative attacks, where memory of prior cues is essential.

BERT and Google Duplex (2018) BERT introduced bidirectional transformer-based embeddings, significantly enhancing comprehension of sentence context [12]. Devlin et al. demonstrated that BERT could outperform prior models in various NLP tasks, including question answering and sentence entailment. Concurrently, Google Duplex showcased the practical deployment of such models in real-world tasks like scheduling appointments [38]. Despite these innovations, BERT’s non-generative design restricted its use in open-ended simulation, and Duplex’s narrow scope limited generalizability. Neither system, in their original form, met the requirements of general-purpose conversational agents under adversarial pressure.

GPT-3 (2020) OpenAI’s GPT-3, with 175 billion parameters, redefined conversational AI through generative pretraining and prompt-based interaction [4]. Brown et al. showed that GPT-3 could emulate human-like dialogue with minimal supervision, making it a leading candidate for user simulation. However, its large-scale architecture introduced challenges. Empirical observations highlighted instability in dialogue coherence and hallucinations during extended exchanges. Additionally, the computational load restricted its deployment in lightweight or real-time environments, such as embedded [Cyber Range](#) systems.

Implications for Cyber Ranges The progression from rule-based systems to generative transformers reflects increasing realism in user simulation. Nevertheless, these systems often lack domain-specific tuning for [social engineering](#) scenarios. The absence of

targeted conditioning prevents them from exhibiting the nuanced behaviors exploited in cyberattacks, such as compliance under authority or susceptibility to urgency. Bridging this gap requires fine-tuning on corpora containing manipulative interactions, integrating psychological models, and validating outputs within adversarial training environments.

The final timeline examines the current state of interactive user simulations, focusing on their applications across diverse domains and their relevance to cybersecurity.

TABLE 2.5 Timeline of Current State of Interactive User Simulations

2023	•	GPT-4, released by OpenAI, builds on its predecessors with enhanced conversational coherence and adaptability [43]
2023	•	Gandalf, developed by Lakera, introduces an interactive game where users attempt to extract a secret from a LLM through prompt manipulation, simulating social engineering techniques [23]
2024	•	Grok, developed by xAI, emerges as a conversational AI focused on truthfulness and context-awareness [65]
2025	•	Virtual assistants like Alexa and Google Assistant adopt advanced LLMs to simulate user interactions in real-world tasks [3]

GPT-4 (2023) GPT-4 represents a refinement over GPT-3, addressing prior limitations in coherence and long-range dependency retention [43]. According to OpenAI, its improvements in reasoning and prompt sensitivity make it more suitable for nuanced conversational roles. However, the model's computational footprint remains significant, with inference typically requiring cloud-based infrastructure. This restricts its utility in resource-constrained deployments, such as isolated or locally hosted **Cyber Range** platforms, where lightweight, offline-compatible models are preferred.

Gandalf (2023) Lakera's Gandalf project introduced a gamified interface where users attempt to manipulate a large language model into revealing a hidden password [?]. This setup actively mimics **social engineering** techniques such as pretexting, baiting, and framing. While intended primarily as a pedagogical tool, Gandalf demonstrates that LLMs can embody realistic interactive agents capable of simulating both attacker and target roles. Its success in engaging users through adversarial prompting underscores the feasibility of integrating LLM-based interaction models into **Cyber Range** infrastructures.

Grok (2024) Grok, developed by xAI, targets the generation of truthful and contextually anchored responses [66]. This orientation toward accuracy positions Grok as a candidate for simulating believable users in environments where misinformation or misleading prompts are central to training, such as phishing or impersonation scenarios. Its capacity to balance coherence with factual robustness offers promising avenues for simulating psychologically plausible user behavior under duress, enhancing realism in **social engineering** training.

Virtual Assistants (2025) Contemporary virtual assistants like Google Assistant and Alexa increasingly integrate LLM capabilities to manage tasks such as email summarization, scheduling, and routine automation [?]. This demonstrates the scalability and practical stability of LLMs in real-world, user-facing contexts. Transposing this functionality to a [Cyber Range](#) setting enables the simulation of day-to-day user behavior patterns—critical in training scenarios where attackers exploit routine digital habits. Their deployment further confirms the viability of lightweight, voice-activated or API-driven simulations in interactive security education.

Synthesis of Limitations Early systems like ELIZA and ALICE struggled to adapt to dynamic or unexpected inputs, a limitation that still affects modern systems when applied to complex [social engineering](#) scenarios. The advent of machine learning and transformer-based models, such as Cleverbot, BERT, and GPT-3, brought improvements in adaptability and realism. However, these advancements introduced new challenges, including conversational inconsistencies in extended interactions, high computational demands, and the absence of simulations specifically designed for [social engineering](#) contexts.

Opportunities for Integration Advanced interactive user simulations, powered by LLMs like GPT-4 and Grok, present a transformative opportunity to enhance [Cyber Range](#) training. These models can emulate a wide range of user profiles, from naive employees who might fall for phishing attacks to cautious managers who are more resistant to pretexting attempts, by fine-tuning their conversational tone, decision-making patterns, and susceptibility to manipulation. Initiatives like Gandalf, which uses a LLM to simulate [social engineering](#) scenarios for educational purposes, and future projects like Project Orion, which aims to create highly reactive NPCs, illustrate how these models can be leveraged to create interactive training environments that mirror real-world challenges. However, this approach differs from the goal of this research, which focuses on enabling LLMs to autonomously simulate realistic human behavior in [Cyber Range](#) environments, without relying on prompt engineering to dictate their responses.

For instance, an LLM could simulate an employee receiving a phishing email, deciding whether to click a malicious link based on factors like the email's content, the user's profile (such as their stress level or cybersecurity awareness), and contextual elements (like the time of day). This decision-making process could combine natural language understanding to interpret the email with probabilistic reasoning to determine the user's response, offering defenders a realistic testbed to assess their strategies.

Moreover, LLMs can support real-time, context-aware interactions in [social engineering](#) scenarios, such as a chat-based pretexting attack where an attacker tries to extract sensitive information. By simulating realistic user behaviors, such as hesitation or partial disclosure, these models create dynamic training scenarios that challenge defenders to detect subtle manipulation tactics.

Comparative Analysis of Simulation Tools

To address the identified challenges, this study evaluates two frameworks: GHOSTS and CrewAI for their suitability in [Cyber Range](#) environments. The comparison centers on

their ability to assign personalities, provide conversational support, and generate autonomous responses, critical for chat-based **social engineering** training.

Table 2.6: Comparison of Tools for Interactive User Simulations in Cyber Ranges

Tool	Personality Assignment	Conversational Support	Autonomous Responses
GHOSTS	✓	✓	✓
CrewAI	✓	✓	✓

* Priority criteria for chat-based **social engineering** training.
 Source: GHOSTS relies on predefined patterns, limiting flexibility . CrewAI requires customization for full **Cyber Range** integration but excels in dynamic interactions.

GHOSTS Developed by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, GHOSTS automates non-player character (NPC) activities in cyber exercises, supporting actions like emailing and browsing. Its documentation confirms LLM integration for personality assignment and conversational capabilities since version 8.2 [34]. However, its dependence on predefined behavioral templates restricts its adaptability in real-time, dialogue-intensive **social engineering** scenarios.

CrewAI an open-source framework, coordinates multiple AI agents powered by LLMs, enabling virtual users with distinct personalities (e.g., a trusting employee or skeptical manager) to deliver context-aware, autonomous responses [10]. While integration into **Cyber Range** platforms may require additional development, its conversational flexibility makes it well-suited for nuanced **social engineering** simulations.

Rationale for Selecting CrewAI

CrewAI is selected over GHOSTS due to its superior conversational adaptability and customization potential, as highlighted in its documentation [10]. Unlike GHOSTS, which is constrained by static patterns, CrewAI supports dynamic, personality-driven dialogues essential for replicating **social engineering** tactics, such as phishing persuasion or pretexting resistance. Although it requires further integration efforts, its strengths in real-time interaction align closely with the goals of this research, making it the preferred choice.

Conclusion

This section has traced the evolution of interactive user simulations from early systems like ELIZA to modern LLM-driven tools like GPT-4 and Grok, assessing their applicability to **Cyber Range** environments. The analysis of integration challenges and the comparison of GHOSTS and CrewAI reveal persistent limitations in conversational flexibility and domain-specific realism, with CrewAI emerging as a promising solution. These findings underscore the need for further development to bridge existing gaps, setting the stage for the next section, which will explore strategies like fine-tuning and prompt engineering to enhance LLM performance in **social engineering** training scenarios.

2.1.3 C: Comprehensive Comparative Analysis of Lightweight LLMs for CrewAI and GHOSTS in Social Engineering Simulations

Section A identified critical gaps in current cyber-ranges static user simulations and limited **social engineering** focus (Table 2.2) while Section 2.1.2 selected CrewAI over GHOSTS for its conversational flexibility, noting resource and adaptability challenges (Table 2.6). This subsection delivers a comprehensive comparison of Large Language Models (LLMs), including lightweight and API-accessible options, to enhance these frameworks. Evaluating conversational quality, reasoning, computational efficiency, costs, and integration feasibility, the analysis draws from Chatbot Arena [44], Vellum AI LLM Leaderboard [57], and robustness studies [13], targeting a resource-constrained academic context for a high-fidelity cyber-range solution.

Table 2.7: Comprehensive Comparison of LLMs for CrewAI and GHOSTS in **social engineering** Simulations

Model	Size (B)	VRAM (GB) ^a	Cost	Elo Arena	MMLU (%)	Latency (s/token) ^b
ChatGPT-4o-latest (2025-03-26)	175+ ^c	Cloud	API (\$/call)	1410	–	0.04
Grok-3-Preview-02-24	70 ^c	40+	API (\$/call)	1403	92.7	0.05
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	8	10–12	Free (OS)	1278 ^d	85.1	0.03
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	7	8–10	Free (OS)	1265 ^d	84.3	0.02
DeepSeek-V3-0324	13	14–16	Free (OS)	1369	88.5	0.04
Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1	46 (8x7)	24–28	Free (OS)	1301	86.9	0.06
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	7	8–10	Free (OS)	1280 ^d	85.5	0.02

^a FP16 inference; 4-bit quantization reduces VRAM by 50% (e.g., Mistral-7B to 4–5 GB); ChatGPT-4o is cloud-based.

^b Estimated latency on mid-range GPU (e.g., RTX 3090) or API response time; varies with hardware/load.

^c Estimated size; exact parameters undisclosed (ChatGPT-4o likely exceeds GPT-3’s 175B).

^d Estimated Elo for instruct variants from base model data in Chatbot Arena (April 2025).

Source: Elo Arena [44], MMLU [57], latency approximated from [2].

Conversational Quality for Realistic Social Engineering The static simulations in cyber-ranges like SCORPION (Section 2.1.1) and GHOSTS’ predefined patterns (Section 2.1.2) demand dynamic conversational LLMs. ChatGPT-4o-latest (Elo 1410) and Grok-3 (1403) lead, excelling in CrewAI’s pretexting chats e.g., an employee negotiating a phishing scam but their cloud/API reliance (ChatGPT-4o) and 40+ GB VRAM (Grok-3) limit local use. DeepSeek-V3 (1369, 13B) offers high fluency, while open-source Mistral-7B (1265), Llama-3-8B (1278), and Qwen2.5-7B (1280) run on 8–12 GB VRAM with low latency (0.02–0.03 s/token), supporting GHOSTS’ scripted responses and CrewAI’s multi-agent interactions.

Reasoning for Decision-Making Under Manipulation Simulating decision-making under manipulation requires LLMs capable of replicating human reasoning. The Grok-

3 model achieves a 92.7% MMLU score, demonstrating strong aptitude for evaluating phishing credibility or detecting authority inconsistencies. This result is reported directly in the Vellum AI leaderboard [57]. Although OpenAI has not released official MMLU figures for ChatGPT-4o, the OpenAI technical report on GPT-4 estimates the score near 90%, indicating that similar reasoning capabilities can be expected [43]. DeepSeek-V3, with 88.5% and 13B parameters, provides a solid tradeoff between reasoning accuracy and resource consumption, supporting mid-level CrewAI simulations. Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B, and Qwen2.5-7B reach between 84.3% and 85.5%, which is sufficient for simpler GHOSTS use cases. Mixtral-8x7B enhances precision with 86.9% but introduces latency constraints. These values are drawn from cross-validated results in [13].

Computational Efficiency and Cost Considerations Under academic constraints, efficiency and accessibility are critical. ChatGPT-4o and Grok-3 are only accessible through cloud-based APIs, with pricing typically ranging from \$0.01 to \$0.05 per request. This cost range is detailed in their provider documentation [43,66], and represents a barrier to local testing and large-scale deployment in resource-limited settings. By contrast, open-source models such as Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B, and Qwen2.5-7B are freely available and executable on single-GPU systems requiring 8–12 GB of VRAM. With 4-bit quantization, they can operate on as little as 4–5 GB. Chatbot Arena and robustness benchmarks confirm these figures [44]. DeepSeek-V3 (13B) requires 14–16 GB, scaling well on GPUs like the RTX 3090. Mixtral-8x7B demands more than 24 GB, which may exceed the capacity of standard university hardware, especially when used in parallel-agent simulation. Benchmarks from [13,57] confirm these performance tradeoffs.

Adaptability and Robustness to Social Engineering To address the dynamic threats posed by **social engineering**, CrewAI requires LLMs that can handle unpredictable dialogue and manipulation attempts. The high Elo scores of ChatGPT-4o (1410) and Grok-3 (1403), reported by Chatbot Arena [44], reflect their robustness in maintaining role coherence and resisting adversarial prompts. In robustness evaluations, Grok-3 also maintained strong performance in scenarios simulating pretexting or authority misuse [13]. DeepSeek-V3 demonstrates similar robustness with an Elo of 1369 and MMLU score of 88.5%, offering resilience while remaining locally deployable. Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B, and Qwen2.5-7B can be fine-tuned on targeted **social engineering** datasets to simulate user archetypes susceptible to manipulation. Mixtral-8x7B, with its mixture-of-experts architecture, generates precise context-aware outputs but requires more computational time, with an observed latency of 0.06 s/token. These results confirm their usability based on system design and response speed constraints.

💡 Optimal LLMs for CrewAI and GHOSTS

- **CrewAI:** Mistral-7B/Qwen2.5-7B (free, 8–10 GB, fast) for local flexibility; ChatGPT-4o/Grok-3 (API) for top-tier fluency if budget allows.
- **GHOSTS:** Mistral-7B (minimal resources, adaptable); DeepSeek-V3 for scalable reasoning on modest hardware.

Integration Feasibility and Performance Trade-offs ChatGPT-4o and Grok-3 integrate via APIs with CrewAI, offering ease (no local setup) but higher latency (0.04–0.05 s/token) and costs, unsuitable for GHOSTS' local needs. Open-source models (Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B, Qwen2.5-7B) customize fully, with quantization reducing VRAM to 4–5 GB, though accuracy drops slightly (1–2% MMLU). DeepSeek-V3 (14–16 GB) balances multi-agent scaling and performance (0.04 s/token), while Mixtral-8x7B's resource demands limit its practicality despite robust outputs.

Conclusion This comprehensive analysis addresses Section 2.1.1's static simulation gaps and Section 2.1.2's resource challenges by recommending Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B, and Qwen2.5-7B for their cost-free, lightweight profiles (7–8B, 8–12 GB VRAM) and solid performance (Elo 1265–1280, MMLU 84–85.5%). DeepSeek-V3 (13B) scales within modest constraints, while ChatGPT-4o and Grok-3 offer premium options via API. These LLMs enable a dynamic, affordable cyber-range for **social engineering** training, aligning with Section 2.1.4's focus on psychological manipulation and adaptive responses. The next step, explored in Section 2.1.4, involves leveraging these models to simulate realistic human vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to Cialdini's principles or evolving **social engineering** tactics, through fine-tuning and deployment strategies.

2.1.4 D: Understanding Social Engineering for AI-Driven Simulations

Understanding **social engineering** is crucial for developing AI-driven simulations that realistically replicate user behavior within cybersecurity environments. **social engineering** tactics exploit psychological principles to manipulate individuals into compromising security protocols, often bypassing traditional technical defenses. In this context, our review focuses on simulating AI-powered agents that behave like real employees, enabling controlled **social engineering** attempts against them. This approach allows attackers to test various manipulative strategies while analyzing the responses of these virtual agents, providing insights into human-like vulnerabilities in cybersecurity settings.

This section provides a comprehensive foundation for designing such simulations by analyzing the current threat landscape, historical techniques, psychological mechanisms, ethical considerations, recent trends, practical tools, and multidisciplinary approaches to **social engineering**. It also addresses the challenges of simulating human behavior, the impact of emerging technologies, and regulatory alignment, ensuring a holistic framework that leverages the LLMs identified in Section 2.1.3 to enhance cybersecurity training.

Current Threat Landscape of Social Engineering The prevalence and impact of **social engineering** attacks have escalated in recent years, making them a top concern for cybersecurity professionals. According to the Verizon 2024 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), 74% of breaches involved a human element, with **social engineering** tactics like phishing and pretexting being the most common vectors [58]. The IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2024 estimates an average cost of \$4.35 million per incident involving **social engineering**, with phishing attacks increasing by 22% from 2023 [31]. Sector-specific trends reveal heightened risks in healthcare, where 88% of ransomware attacks in 2023

began with phishing emails, and in finance, where spear-phishing campaigns targeting executives rose by 35% [7]. A notable example is the 2024 deepfake audio attack on a UK energy firm, where attackers used AI-generated voice impersonation to trick a CEO into transferring \$243,000 [18]. These statistics and cases underscore the urgency of developing advanced training environments, such as the LLM-based cyber-range proposed in this research, to simulate and mitigate **social engineering** threats across diverse sectors.

Pedagogical Foundations: The Role of Fun and Gamification in Social Engineering Training

Empirical research in educational psychology and cybersecurity training demonstrates that learning effectiveness increases significantly when activities are perceived as engaging and enjoyable. Gordillo et al. [22] show that serious games, such as virtual reality-based Scrum training, improve both performance and motivation compared to traditional lectures. In a randomized controlled trial, the same authors [21] report that educational escape rooms in software engineering yield superior knowledge retention and more positive learner perceptions relative to standard instruction. Ceha et al. [6] add that humor embedded in conversational agents enhances engagement and learning outcomes, suggesting that affective factors amplify knowledge acquisition. Large-scale evidence compiled by the Wikipedia contributors to *Games and Learning* [64] indicates that well-designed games can lead to average gains of 11% in factual knowledge, 14% in skills, and 9% in retention over control groups. These conclusions align with the synthesis on *Active Learning* [63], which documents consistent improvements in academic performance and a reduction in failure rates when learners engage interactively. In the context of social engineering defense, integrating gamified and interactive elements into training—such as those implemented in the proposed LLM-based cyber-range leverages these cognitive and motivational benefits to foster deeper engagement, stronger memory encoding, and greater preparedness against manipulation tactics.

- **Historical Foundations and Practical Techniques:** Kevin Mitnick, in *The Art of Deception*, argues that the most effective security breaches often bypass technical defenses by exploiting human trust [40]. He recounts real scenarios where attackers gained physical access by impersonating technicians, emphasizing how simple pretexts can override formal security protocols. Such accounts are central in establishing realistic simulation baselines, as they illustrate common human vulnerabilities that remain persistent across decades of cybersecurity evolution.
- **Psychological Mechanisms and Influence Tactics:** Robert Cialdini introduces six principles of influence—reciprocity, commitment, social proof, authority, liking, and scarcity—as recurring psychological levers in social engineering attacks [8]. He explains how these principles are activated in contexts such as phishing emails impersonating executives (authority) or urgent fake promotions (scarcity). These patterns, grounded in behavioral psychology, provide a semantic foundation for detecting manipulative language structures in communication-based attack vectors, as identified in multiple literature sources.
- **Application of **social engineering** in Ethical Contexts:** Christopher Hadnagy, in *Human Hacking*, promotes the use of social engineering under ethical constraints to proactively assess system vulnerabilities [24]. He emphasizes context analysis and respect for consent boundaries as essential components of any responsible


simulation. His framework supports the idea that simulated agents must be designed to distinguish between benign intent and manipulation, reinforcing a growing consensus in the literature about the importance of ethical design, including data anonymization and fairness-aware training.

- **Adapting Tactics to Individual Vulnerabilities:** Quiel et al. show that personality traits significantly influence susceptibility to social engineering, with agreeable individuals being up to 40% more likely to fall for phishing attempts [46]. This observation suggests that human-like agents in simulations could benefit from differentiated behavioral conditioning to model varied resistance levels. The integration of psychometric variables is increasingly discussed in the literature as a way to enhance simulation realism and behavioral diversity.
- **Recent Trends in social engineering :** Hijji et al., in their multivocal literature review, report that attackers rapidly adapted to global crises, such as COVID-19, by mimicking IT support communications to exploit remote work conditions [29]. More recent publications document the integration of generative AI, including deep-fake videos and voice synthesis, into social engineering campaigns [7]. These evolutions are consistently flagged as critical developments, prompting the need for simulation tools that can keep pace with the shifting tactics described in these works.
- **Challenges in Simulating Human Behavior for social engineering :** Researchers such as Vishwanath [59] argue that emotional and cognitive states significantly alter a user's susceptibility to manipulation. He demonstrates, for instance, that stress can increase phishing vulnerability by 25%. This is echoed in cross-cultural studies where Cialdini [8] observes that collectivist cultures show increased responsiveness to social proof. These findings reveal that realistic simulations must integrate emotional modulation, bias modeling, and cultural adaptation to approximate human behavior. Without these elements, simulations risk oversimplifying threat vectors and producing misleading indicators.
- **Practical Tools and Techniques for social engineering Simulations:** The developers of the GANDALF AI challenge [23] propose that linguistic pattern analysis, such as the detection of authority cues and probing frequency, enables models to resist manipulation with up to 78% accuracy. Meanwhile, the Social-Engineer Toolkit (SET) remains a widely documented framework for crafting controlled phishing and pretexting scenarios [55]. These tools are frequently cited in the literature as foundational components for building synthetic environments and datasets for LLM fine-tuning. Their structure and logic support the design of agent-based systems capable of interpreting attack signals embedded in natural language.
- **Multidisciplinary Approaches to social engineering Simulations:** Beyond technical tools, social engineering simulations can benefit from multidisciplinary insights. Behavioral science offers frameworks like the Fogg Behavior Model, which posits that behavior results from motivation, ability, and prompts, helping model user responses to social engineering (e.g., a motivated user under time pressure is more likely to click a phishing link) [17]. Organizational psychology provides insights into workplace dynamics, such as how hierarchical structures amplify the


authority principle [8]. Integrating these perspectives can enhance simulation realism for instance, by programming agents to reflect varying levels of cybersecurity awareness based on their simulated job roles (e.g., an intern vs. a manager).

- **Case Study: Real-World social engineering Attack:** Social engineering represents the most persistent and adaptable threat in the current cybersecurity landscape. This is not a speculative claim. Verizon’s 2024 DBIR reports that 74% of breaches involved human error or manipulation [58], a trend reinforced by IBM, which estimates the average cost of such incidents at \$4.35 million [31]. Checkpoint adds sector-specific nuance, reporting that 88% of ransomware attacks in healthcare started with phishing, while the financial sector saw a 35% rise in spear-phishing campaigns targeting executives [7]. The 2024 UK case where deepfake audio led a CEO to transfer \$243,000 underlines how modern attackers blend psychological tactics with AI capabilities [18]. These converging data justify the need for a tool such as the team simulation that helps to raise cybersecurity awareness.


Review methodology

 Review Methodology

The literature and tool review combined theoretical exploration with technical validation to identify, test, and evaluate relevant approaches for simulating agent behavior in cybersecurity environments.

 Source Selection Criteria


Academic papers and technical white papers were sourced through Google Scholar and arXiv, focusing on LLM-based simulation, agent coordination, and cyber range applications. Preference was given to reproducible, peer-reviewed, and well-cited works.

 LLM Experimentation (Local)

Models tested locally via Ollama:

- mistral – fast and coherent, suitable for role-playing.
- llama2, orca-mini, zephyr, codellama, gemma evaluated on dialogue quality and persona consistency.

Testing focused on prompt coherence, latency, and consistency across multi-turn dialogues.

 Remote Model Access

Using LiteLLM, APIs were tested: DeepSeek, Gpt4, Grok. This allowed benchmarking of model fluency and CrewAI integration. Papers describing latency or stability were empirically validated or falsified.

✓ Justification of Selected Papers

Key papers were prioritized based on:

- Role-conditioning strategies for agents.
- Reproducible configurations (e.g., GitHub repositories).
- Benchmarks for LLM interaction in simulated settings.
- Architectural relevance to CrewAI or cyber range logic.

Several claims were partially or fully reproduced.

🔍 Coverage Strategy

Iterative keyword refinement, citation chaining, and thematic filtering ensured wide domain coverage. Selection was driven by experimental feasibility and architectural applicability.

⚙️ Experimental Testbed and Metrics

Environment: Docker/Vagrant in JANUS cyber range. Communication via Mattermost API. Agent orchestration via CrewAI. All exchanges logged in structured format.

Initial tests were conducted directly on the host machine via terminal using a minimal Python prototype, allowing verification of core functionalities such as agent prompt injection, role conditioning, and response formatting before integrating the system with Mattermost and deploying it in the JANUS cyber range environment.

Tested dimensions:

- **Response coherence:** Role and tone consistency.
- **Scalability:** Number of parallel agents supported.
- **Latency:** Average response time per message.
- **Deployment speed:** Full environment initialization time.

Summary

This state of the art has systematically explored the challenges and opportunities for simulating realistic user behavior in cyber-ranges, with a focus on addressing **social engineering** threats. Through Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.4, we have established a comprehensive framework that bridges theoretical insights, technical tools, and practical applications to develop an LLM-based cyber-range. The following summary synthesizes the key contributions of each section and their interconnections, culminating in a foundation for the methodology to follow. To facilitate understanding, Table 2.8 provides a visual representation of the sections, their objectives, main findings, and contributions to the overall research goal.

Table 2.8: Summary of State of the Art Sections for **social engineering** Simulations in Cyber-Ranges

Section	Objective	Main Findings	Contribution to Research
A: Cyber Ranges – Foundations and Gaps	Identify limitations of current cyber-ranges in simulating user behavior and addressing social engineering .	Existing platforms (e.g., Locked Shields, SANS NetWars) lack dynamic user simulations and focus on social engineering , with 74% of breaches involving human elements [58].	Establishes the need for a novel cyber-range that prioritizes realistic user simulations and social engineering training.
B: Interactive User Simulation	Trace the evolution of user simulation tools and select frameworks for dynamic simulations.	Evolution from ELIZA (1966) to GANDALF (2023); CrewAI selected over GHOSTS for conversational flexibility in multi-agent scenarios [10].	Provides the technical foundation (CrewAI, GHOSTS) for implementing interactive simulations, capable of integrating social engineering scenarios.
C: Comparative Analysis of LLMs	Evaluate LLMs for resource-constrained social engineering simulations.	Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B, and DeepSeek-V3 recommended for their efficiency (8–16 GB VRAM) and performance (Elo 1265–1369, MMLU 84–88.5%) [44].	Identifies practical LLMs for academic settings, ensuring feasibility for simulating social engineering responses.
D: Understanding Social Engineering	Provide a theoretical and practical foundation for social engineering simulations.	Theoretical insights (Cialdini’s principles [8]), tools (GANDALF, SET [55]), and trends (60% rise in deepfake attacks [7]) highlight the need for adaptive simulations.	Offers a framework to fine-tune LLMs on social engineering scenarios, addressing ethical and regulatory requirements (e.g., GDPR [16]).

The state of the art collectively addresses the research objective of developing an LLM-based cyber-range for **social engineering** training. Section 2.1.1 sets the motivation by highlighting the gaps in current platforms, particularly their inability to simulate dynamic user responses to **social engineering** attacks, which account for a significant portion of breaches. Section 2.1.2 builds on this by providing a historical context for user simulations and selecting CrewAI as the primary framework, capable of integrating **social engineering** scenarios generated by tools like SET. Section 2.1.3 ensures practical implementation by recommending lightweight LLMs (e.g., Mistral-7B, DeepSeek-V3), which can be fine-tuned to detect and respond to **social engineering** tactics. Finally, Section 2.1.4 provides the theoretical backbone, drawing on foundational works (e.g., Mitnick [40], Cialdini [8]), recent trends (e.g., deepfake-based attacks [7]), and practical tools (e.g., GANDALE, SET), while addressing challenges like cultural biases and ethical concerns.

This framework lays the groundwork for the next sections of the mémoire, which will focus on the methodology for training the recommended LLMs, implementing the simulations in a cyber-range environment with CrewAI, and evaluating their effectiveness in detecting and responding to **social engineering** attacks. The approach ensures alignment with ethical principles and regulatory frameworks (e.g., GDPR [16], ISO 27001 [36]), paving the way for a robust, adaptive, and practical solution to enhance cybersecurity training.

Chapter 3

Project's mission, objectives and requirements

3.1 Requirements

This project aims to simulate human-like behavior in cybersecurity scenarios using LLM-based agents. The ultimate goal is to provide both a testbed for social engineering attacks and an interactive training tool for awareness reinforcement. To achieve this, we need a controllable, modular, and reproducible environment in which virtual agents can interact through realistic communication flows while exhibiting differentiated behavioral traits.

3.1.1 List of requirements and how they relate one to another

- **R1 – Simulation of realistic employee behavior** Agents must simulate role-consistent and psychologically plausible responses to inputs, influenced by individual traits.
- **R2 – Orchestration and coordination between agents** CrewAI must manage the scheduling, tasking, and inter-agent dialogues.
- **R3 – Controlled, reproducible deployment** Docker and Vagrant ensure consistent infrastructure provisioning across machines and users.
- **R4 – Integration with real-world communication channels** Use of the Mattermost API enables realistic messaging structures (teams, DMs, channels).
- **R5 – Multi-use adaptability** The platform should support both attack simulations and interactive training formats.
- **R6 – Logging and monitoring** All interactions must be captured in structured formats to support analysis or training feedback.
- **R7 – Unique role attribution and configuration** Each simulation must instantiate exactly one agent per defined role (see 'roles.json').

Dependencies: R1 depends on R2 and R7; R5 depends on all others; R4 and R3 are technical enablers; R6 supports post-simulation analysis across all use cases.

3.1.2 Requirements covered by state of the art

The State of the Art chapter has shown that:

- **Cyber ranges** support virtualized testing environments (R3), but lack realistic user behavior (R1).
- **LLM-driven agents** (e.g., Gandalf) show early signs of being usable for social engineering testing (partial R1, R2), but are rarely used for interactive training (R5).

- **CrewAI and Mattermost API** integration (R2, R4) are not described in prior work, but their combination is innovative and technically viable.

3.1.3 Requirements not covered by state of the art

- No prior system provides simultaneous use of LLM agents for both adversarial testing and awareness training (R5).
- Existing cyber ranges do not implement individual psychological traits in agents (R1, R7).
- Realistic inter-agent communication in business-like platforms (e.g., via Mattermost) has not been studied (R4).
- Logging strategies for LLM-agent interaction with a pedagogical angle are absent (R6).

3.2 Project Scoping

3.2.1 Mission statement of this project

The aim of this project is to implement a simulation environment where multiple LLM-driven agents interact through a realistic enterprise messaging system, each representing a distinct employee persona. The system supports the following use cases:

- **Adversarial simulation:** Launching social engineering attacks against simulated agents to test their resistance, information leakage, or susceptibility to manipulation.
- **Interactive training:** Allowing real users to interact with the agents in controlled scenarios to raise their awareness of manipulation strategies in a realistic and engaging setting.

3.2.2 Explicit out-of-scope definition

The project does not include:

- **Evaluation of real users** – no employee is tested, and no human behavioral data is collected or analyzed.
- **Integration with existing awareness platforms or LMS** – the system is not linked to external corporate training platforms but is integrated into the JANUS cyber range environment.
- **Psychological validation** – agent traits are heuristic and not the result of formal modeling or psychometric evaluation.
- **Live deployment in enterprise environments** – the framework is designed for experimentation and simulation only.

Chapter 4

Implementation & Testing

4.1 Design Rationale and Objectives

The design of the simulation environment was primarily dictated by its required compatibility with the JANUS cyber range architecture, which framed both technical and contextual constraints. The system had to integrate seamlessly into JANUS' modular, container-based infrastructure while enabling realistic simulation of user behavior under social engineering scenarios.

Consequently, the environment favored lightweight, open-source LLMs deployable within isolated containers and interfaced through a messaging platform (Mattermost) already compatible with JANUS workflows. This ensured both coherence with the existing architecture and feasibility under academic resource limits.

4.1.1 Rationale

To address the lack of human-factor simulation in current cyber ranges, the system was built around CrewAI, which enables role-specific multi-agent interactions with contextual memory. Lightweight open-source LLMs (e.g., Mistral-7B, Qwen2.5-7B) were prioritized for local deployment, balancing performance with resource availability. The use of Mattermost allowed seamless integration of agents via chat interfaces, avoiding the need for frontend development while maintaining realism in attacker-agent interaction. A dispatcher mechanism was introduced to control agent dialogue flow, ensure reproducibility of interactions, and allow coordinated scenario testing.

4.1.2 Objectives

© Implementation Objectives

The main goals of the implementation were:

- To create a controllable, reproducible environment for launching targeted social engineering attacks on LLM-driven agents.
- To evaluate agent susceptibility based on predefined behaviors and roles, within a realistic, conversational context.
- To support simultaneous deployment of multiple agents with minimal latency and hardware usage.
- To enable later extensions, such as behavioral adaptation or integration with log analysis tools.
- To incorporate this simulation as an engaging method for enhancing cybersecurity awareness.

4.2 Implementation Methodology

The implementation process followed a modular, agent-based architecture to simulate human behavior under social engineering scenarios using Large Language Models (LLMs). The methodology was iterative, combining early prototyping with continuous adjustment based on functional integration constraints, resource availability, and interaction realism.

1. Role Definition and Behavior Modeling Roles were defined in `roles.json`, specifying functional job positions (e.g., HR, IT support), their descriptions, tools, and tasks. Behavioral traits were not hardcoded in the roles but inferred dynamically in `behaviors.py` based on contextual interpretation.

2. Prompt Engineering and Pretext Conditioning Prompts were crafted to embed Cialdini-based psychological triggers (authority, reciprocity, scarcity) into attacker messages. These prompts were dynamically injected during the conversation loop to test agent resistance in increasingly manipulative scenarios. Attack vectors were aligned with realistic pretexts (e.g., IT credential resets, HR document requests).

3. Multi-Agent Orchestration A dispatcher mechanism ensured the routing of messages across agents via Mattermost channels, supporting both one-on-one and group interactions. The system permitted simultaneous LLM instances per agent while enforcing turn-based conversation logic to maintain clarity and realism. Agents used lightweight models (e.g., Mistral-7B, Qwen-7B) locally via vLLM to ensure responsiveness under academic hardware constraints.

4. User Simulation Environment Integration The simulated environment was built on top of Mattermost, offering a controlled and realistic communication platform. Each agent was instantiated as a Mattermost user, receiving and responding to messages through authenticated REST API calls. This ensured traceability, reproducibility, and isolation of conversations.

5. Logging, Monitoring and Extensibility All interactions were logged using a centralized logging system (`levels.log`), recording timestamps, message content, and triggered behaviors. This design allows future integration with log analysis tools for detection model training or behavioral analytics. Additionally, the modular agent framework facilitates integration of new personas, behaviors, or countermeasures.

4.2.1 Agent Behavior Definition

Each agent is associated with a predefined role, and each role is mapped to a set of behavioral traits stored in `data/behaviors.py`. These traits include dimensions such as Kindness, Altruism, Empathy, Aggression, Dishonesty, etc., each quantified by a probability score in the range $[0, 1]$. The mapping is deterministic and static: there is no random sampling of traits at runtime. Instead, each agent inherits a fixed trait distribution directly tied to their role.

To support the generation of plausible behavior profiles, a mechanism is defined to calculate the joint probability of selected trait combinations, ensuring logical consistency by checking for contradictory pairs (e.g., Kindness vs Aggression, Optimism vs Pessimism). This logic enables filtering out incoherent psychological patterns and lays the groundwork for future adaptive behavior generation, though no such dynamic assignment is currently implemented.

This static but structured approach enables consistent behavior simulation across runs, allowing targeted evaluation of social engineering strategies against specific psychological configurations.

$$\neg(a \wedge b) \equiv \neg a \vee \neg b$$

For example:

- $\neg(\text{Kindness} \wedge \text{Aggression}) \equiv \neg\text{Kindness} \vee \neg\text{Aggression}$
- $\neg(\text{Optimism} \wedge \text{Pessimism}) \equiv \neg\text{Optimism} \vee \neg\text{Pessimism}$
- $\neg(\text{Honesty} \wedge \text{Dishonesty}) \equiv \neg\text{Honesty} \vee \neg\text{Dishonesty}$

The total behavioral validity condition is defined as the conjunction of all such constraints:

$$V = \bigwedge_{(a,b) \in \mathcal{C}} (\neg a \vee \neg b)$$

Where \mathcal{C} denotes the set of all contradictory pairs. Any behavioral combination that violates even one of these constraints is discarded as logically inconsistent.




Figure 4.1: Flowchart of the agent behavior profile assignment process, from profile loading to validation of trait consistency.

4.2.2 Dispatcher and Message Routing

The dispatcher is responsible for receiving incoming messages from the Mattermost platform, identifying the appropriate agent to handle the request, constructing the response task, and routing the output back to the correct communication channel. This component ensures that the correct persona and behavioral profile are applied consistently during message handling.

Message Ingestion Messages are received via a persistent WebSocket connection handled in `bot.py`. The listener continuously monitors all active channels and triggers processing when a new user message is detected. Channels currently being processed are tracked in the `busy_channels` set to prevent overlapping responses.

Agent Selection The username of the message sender is mapped to the corresponding CrewAI Agent object using the `get_agent_for_username()` function from `agents.py`. If the message is explicitly addressed to another role or requires cross-agent interaction, the `AskQuestionToCoworkerTool` defined in `Tools.py` is invoked to direct the query to the appropriate colleague agent.

Task Construction Once the target agent is identified, a personalised task is created using `personalize_response_task()` from `bot.py` or `agents.py`. The task description incorporates:

- The agent's role and backstory.
- The ongoing conversation history for contextual continuity.
- Explicit conversational constraints (e.g., no em-dashes, no repetition, no instruction-following behaviour).
- Social dynamics rules increasing or reducing the likelihood of information disclosure based on group alignment, empathy, or prior exchanges.

Routing to the LLM The constructed task is assigned to the target CrewAI agent, which executes it through the integrated LLM interface (`LiteLLMWrapper` in `agents.py`). In the case of multi-agent interactions, a `Crew` instance is created with `Process.sequential` to allow sequential role-based execution.

Response Delivery The generated response is posted back to the originating Mattermost channel via the REST API. Once the message is successfully sent, the channel is removed from `busy_channels`, allowing new interactions.




Figure 4.2: Message routing workflow from user input to agent response delivery.

4.2.3 LLM Integration and Invocation Logic

Two distinct implementations of the LLM integration were developed:

1. **Remote API mode** using **DeepSeek Chat**, for production-like deployments with access to external services.
2. **Local inference mode** using **Mistral** hosted via **Ollama** in a Docker container, enabling offline operation without reliance on third-party APIs.

Remote API Mode: DeepSeek In the API-based implementation, the `LiteLLMWrapper` class (in `agents.py`) inherits from LangChain's `BaseLLM` to adapt CrewAI's task execution to the DeepSeek REST API.

- API endpoint: `https://api.deepseek.com/chat/completions`.
- API key loaded from environment variables (`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` in `config.py`).
- Message format: LangChain `SystemMessage` and `HumanMessage` objects converted to JSON `{"role", "content"}`.
- Parameters: model `deepseek/deepseek-chat`, temperature 0.7, optional stop tokens.
- Network layer: direct `httpx.Client` POST call with explicit headers and payload, bypassing default OpenAI client.

The model response is extracted from `result["choices"][0]["message"]["content"]` and passed back to CrewAI for final delivery.

Local Mode: Mistral + Ollama For offline execution, a second implementation targets a locally hosted Mistral model via **Ollama** in a Docker container:

- Ollama container exposes a local REST API endpoint (default: `http://localhost:11434/api/generate`).
- Mistral model is preloaded and managed entirely within the container.
- Message format is simplified to a single prompt string, optionally enriched with system instructions.
- CrewAI agents can be bound to a `LiteLLMWrapper`-like adapter configured for the local endpoint instead of the DeepSeek API.
- No authentication or external network dependency is required, enabling fully air-gapped operation.

This mode mirrors the task creation and invocation flow of the DeepSeek pipeline, but replaces the remote HTTP call with a local Docker network call to the Ollama service.

CrewAI Integration In both modes, the Agent object receives the LLM instance (DeepSeek or Mistral) as its `llm` parameter. CrewAI's Task execution pipeline is unchanged, ensuring that switching between remote and local inference requires only a configuration change.




Figure 4.3: Decision flow for LLM invocation: either remote inference via DeepSeek API or local inference via Mistral hosted in Ollama.

4.3 Evaluation Strategy

4.3.1 Functional Validation via CLI (Host)

The initial validation was performed locally via a standalone Python script, without integration into Mattermost. This test aimed to verify that agents, configured with their respective roles, backstories, and behavioral traits, could:

- Accept user input through a command-line interface.
- Generate role-consistent responses via the LLM backend (Both DeepSeek API and Mistral are tested in this phase).
- Reflect differences in output when specific traits were added or removed from the agent's configuration.

The procedure involved two agents: John Doe (CEO, cybersecurity expert) and Jane Smith (naive employee). A custom `LiteLLMWrapper` class was implemented to interface CrewAI with the DeepSeek API via `httpx`. The CLI allowed agent switching in real-time using the `switch` command, enabling comparative testing of behavioral differences for identical inputs.

4.3.2 Integration Validation in Mattermost

Once local functional validation succeeded, the same agents and LLM wrapper were integrated into the Mattermost environment. The integration plan included:

- Establishing API authentication to the Mattermost server.
- Configuring message retrieval from a dedicated channel.
- Routing inbound messages via the dispatcher to the correct agent.
- Returning generated responses back to the same Mattermost channel.

This phase validated that the CLI-tested logic could operate under asynchronous, multi-user conditions in a production-like environment.

4.3.3 Coverage: Roles, Tasks, Social Engineering Patterns

To ensure meaningful evaluation, the test plan defined coverage along three axes:

1. **Roles** – All implemented roles from `roles.json` were represented.
2. **Tasks** – CrewAI tasks simulated different workplace scenarios requiring decision-making and dialogue.
3. **Social engineering patterns** – Each role was exposed to scripted attack types such as phishing, pretexting, and baiting.

This coverage definition established the baseline for the experiments described in Chapter 5.

4.3.4 Observed Capabilities and Limitations (Measured)

Capabilities

- Consistent persona behavior across multiple sessions.
- Successful detection of basic phishing attempts in controlled scenarios.
- Stable operation of the DeepSeek API pipeline under realistic message loads.

Potential Limitations

- **Hardware limitations** – Limited CPU and RAM resources on the host machine increased latency and restricted concurrency. The absence of a dedicated GPU prevented reliable local inference with Mistral/Ollama.
- **Virtualization limitations** – Docker container overhead introduced additional latency. Inter-container networking occasionally resulted in timeouts, particularly with local API calls to Ollama.
- **Full discussion context handling** – In the CLI, complete conversation history could be maintained, but with significant memory usage for long sessions. In Mattermost, context retention was constrained by token limits, causing loss of earlier message references.
- **Mistral/Ollama integration failure** – Local LLM inference failed to produce valid responses due to API incompatibility and insufficient system resources.
- Some DeepSeek responses contained minor factual inaccuracies or exhibited susceptibility to certain advanced social engineering patterns.

4.4 Setup and Environment

4.4.1 Hardware and Model Requirements

Test Host Configuration

All local model evaluations (Mistral via Ollama) were executed on a host machine with:

- 32 GB RAM
- AMD Ryzen 5 5700X3D CPU
- AMD Radeon 7900XT GPU (unused due to lack of VM GPU passthrough and model compatibility)

Note: These specifications apply only to local model testing. DeepSeek API experiments were run entirely within the VM environment, independent of the host hardware.

The system requirements differ significantly depending on whether the LLM backend is executed locally via Ollama with the Mistral model or remotely via the DeepSeek API.

Mistral via Ollama (Local Backend). Running Mistral locally requires a minimum of 8 GB of RAM, with 32 GB strongly recommended for stable performance, especially under multi-agent scenarios. GPU acceleration with NVIDIA hardware is supported and significantly improves inference speed; however, the model can still run on CPU if no compatible GPU is available. Performance on AMD GPUs is notably degraded due to limited software optimization. In virtualized environments (such as the current Vagrant-based VM setup), GPU passthrough is limited and often unstable, making local Mistral deployment impractical for production-like workloads.

DeepSeek API (Remote Backend). The remote API operates reliably within the virtualized environment, requiring only 4 CPU cores and 4 GB of RAM allocated to the VM for optimal performance. Since all heavy computation occurs on DeepSeek's infrastructure, resource usage on the local VM is minimal, enabling smooth operation even under constrained conditions.

4.4.2 Deployment Environment (Docker, Mattermost, etc.)

The deployment is based on a single virtual machine (`user_domain`) provisioned through Vagrant. Within this VM, services are containerized using Docker:

- A Mattermost container running the chat server.
- An agents container hosting the CrewAI orchestration logic and LLM invocation pipeline.

Initially, only Mattermost was containerized, while the agents ran directly on the VM using a systemd-managed Python virtual environment. This was later replaced with a

dedicated Docker container for the agents to unify the deployment method, simplify dependency management, and ensure a consistent runtime environment across all services.

Internal communication between Mattermost and the agents is handled via the Mattermost REST API and WebSocket interface. Port mapping from the host to the VM allows external access for development and testing:

- Mattermost HTTP API: port 8081
- WebSocket: port 8081
- Calls service: port 8441 (TCP/UDP)

This architecture enables independent scaling or replacement of the agent execution backend without disrupting the Mattermost service.




Figure 4.4: Deployment architecture of the system using Vagrant and Docker

Tooling: CrewAI, LiteLLM, LLM Backends, Logging Layers

The deployment relies on multiple software layers to implement agent orchestration, inter-agent communication, and behavioural realism.

CrewAI Orchestration The CrewAI framework coordinates the definition and execution of agents.

- **Structure:** Agents are instantiated via Crew, Task, and Process objects.
- **Execution Modes:** Tasks support sequential and concurrent execution for flexible workflow management.
- **Role-specific Logic:** Each agent is initialized with a distinct role, goal, and back-story.

Custom Inter-Agent Tool The AskQuestionToCoworkerTool (Tools.py) extends crewai_tools.BaseTool to enable targeted communication between agents:

- An agent can send a natural-language query to another agent, identified by role.
- The receiving agent executes a targeted Task and returns its output.
- This preserves role-specific constraints and knowledge boundaries.

Role and Behaviour Initialization Initialisation routines (utils.py, behaviors.py) define each agent's personality:

- Roles are loaded from a JSON configuration file.
- Personality traits are assigned probabilistically.
- Backstories are enriched with social context, including trusted colleagues.

This ensures that agents exhibit plausible human-like patterns and social dynamics.

External LLM Interfaces The initial implementation relied on the Ollama runtime with the Mistral model for local inference. This integration is still present in the codebase (config.py, api.py) through API endpoint definitions and model configuration variables. It has since been replaced by an exclusive use of the DeepSeek API as the LLM backend, a decision motivated by substantial performance and cost advantages.

⚠ Limitations of Self-Hosted Inference with Ollama/Mistral

- **Performance Overhead on CPU:** Running Mistral locally on a Ryzen 7 5700X3D sustains a 65–75 W CPU draw during inference, compared to 20–25 W at idle. This surplus of roughly 45 W results in about 4,05 kWh/month for a 3 h/day workload — approximately €1,22/month in Belgium at €0.30/kWh.
- **Performance Overhead on GPU:** Offloading inference to a mid-range GPU such as an RTX 4070 Ti increases draw to around 250 W versus 30 W idle. This 220 W surplus amounts to about 19,8 kWh/month for 3 h/day, roughly €5,94/month.
- **Cost Efficiency of API Use:** Using DeepSeek offloads computation entirely, avoiding local energy costs. Processing 145,000 tokens costs approximately €0.12, with off-peak discounts of 50%–75% between 16:00 and 02:00.
- **Concrete Example:** A typical two-agent conversation of 10 user-agent exchanges produces around 5,000 tokens, costing about €0.0041 (less than half a cent). Even 50,000 tokens, a prolonged multi-agent scenario cost only €0.041, or €0.010–€0.020 off-peak.
- **Operational Trade-off:** While self-hosting may be justified in air-gapped environments, in this context it is slower, more energy-intensive, and more expensive than the API approach, without qualitative gains in simulation fidelity.

4.4.3 Interaction Logs and Qualitative Observations

System-level and application-level logs were collected throughout the deployment to monitor and analyse agent behaviour. The logging layer, implemented via Python's `logging` module, records high-level events (authentication to Mattermost, reception of channel messages, LLM response generation) as well as low-level diagnostic details (HTTP status codes, WebSocket connection events, exception traces). Logs are persisted in `levels.log` and also streamed to standard output within containerised services.

Analysis of these logs during testing revealed several notable patterns:

- Message loss occurred when the Mattermost service was restarted during active agent processing.
- LLM responses were occasionally truncated under high-latency conditions.
- Migrating the agents from a systemd-managed virtual environment to a dedicated Docker container improved runtime stability and dependency isolation, though it introduced a slight increase in response latency.

Behavioural scripts defined in `behaviors.py` were used to simulate realistic user interactions. This allowed observation of message timing, tone, and scenario-dependent responses, providing qualitative insights for refining agent orchestration and for motivating the LLM backend selection.

Chapter 5

Experiment's Output and Data Analysis

This chapter presents the experimental results obtained from the deployed system, focusing on the verification of role and behaviour assignment, message routing and autonomy, inter-agent coordination, and performance stability. The experiments are designed to validate that the implemented architecture supports the intended simulation of realistic human interactions in a secure and controlled environment.

5.1 Verification of Role and Behaviour Assignment

5.1.1 Startup Verification Evidence

Before assessing role and behaviour assignment, it was first necessary to confirm that the Mattermost instance was operational and that all agents were successfully launched at startup.




Figure 5.1: Mattermost interface showing all agents connected immediately after container startup.

✓ Startup Validation

The containerized deployment successfully launched the Mattermost server and instantiated all agents within a few seconds. No connection errors or authentication failures were recorded in the logs during startup.

5.1.2 Objective

Confirm that each deployed agent correctly inherits the role definitions and behavioural traits specified in the configuration files and generates a coherent backstory upon activation.

5.1.3 Procedure

The system was deployed with the full Docker-based architecture. Upon startup, each agent:

1. Loaded its designated role from `roles.json`.
2. Loaded behavioural traits from `behaviors.py`.
3. Generated a backstory integrating the assigned role and traits.
4. Published the backstory as an initial message in a private Mattermost channel.

Two representative agents were selected for detailed examination.

5.1.4 Results

📌 Randomized Role and Backstory Assignment

Roles and backstories are assigned randomly and independently from agent names. As a result, an agent's name, birthplace, and personal history have no pre-defined correlation with their professional role or behavioral profile. This ensures variability and prevents pattern exploitation.




Figure 5.2: Screenshot of agent responding with her randomly assigned traits.

All deployed agents received unique roles with no collisions. Backstories included the expected traits such as curiosity, collaboration tendency, or risk aversion.

The role distribution across all agents is shown below:

- Liam O'Connor – Legal matters
- Sofia Martinez – CTO
- Mohammed Khan – Penetration testing
- Elena Petrova – Marketing
- Amara Ndiaye – Customer support
- Noah Cohen – Security analyst
- Isabella Rossi – Sales lead
- Rajesh Sharma – IT management
- Yara Haddad – Incident response
- Lucas Silva – Compliance
- Mei Lin – Finances
- Jamal Abdi – Network administration
- Emma Johansson – CEO and cybersecurity expert
- Diego Alvarez – Scientist
- Anika Patel – Human Resources

Due to the screen size, a complete visual record of this output is provided in Appendix ?? (Figure 5.2).

✓ Observed Behaviour

Role and behaviour assignment was randomly assigned and collision-free, validating the coordination logic between dispatcher and backstory generation modules.

The verification of role–behaviour coupling marks a decisive step in confirming the reliability of the deployment pipeline. It demonstrates that the allocation and initialization logic performs as intended, while preserving the heterogeneity essential for constructing credible social engineering scenarios.

From a technical perspective, the absence of collisions during the random assignment phase indicates that the selection and exclusion mechanisms operate correctly, even under concurrent container startups. The enforced independence between nominal identity, personal narrative, and professional function eliminates unintended correlations, thereby reducing the risk of exploitable patterns or interpretative bias during subsequent experiments.

On the operational side, the outcome reflects the stability of the container orchestration process. All agents were successfully instantiated, authenticated with Mattermost, and produced an initial message embedding both their narrative framework and configured personality traits without synchronization errors or connection failures.

The corresponding screenshots confirm:

- the simultaneous presence of all agents in the Mattermost interface within seconds of container launch;
- the adherence of initial messages to the expected backstory templates, with role-specific content and behavioural descriptors clearly integrated.

5.2 Message Routing and Autonomy

5.2.1 Objective

Verify that user inputs in Mattermost are correctly routed to the intended agent and that agents respond autonomously.

5.2.2 Procedure

Direct messages and channel messages were sent to agents. Routing was validated through:

- The visible agent response in Mattermost.
- Log entries in `bot.py`.
- WebSocket event tracking.




Figure 5.3: Example of a direct message to an agent and its autonomous reply.

5.2.3 Results

Messages were consistently delivered to the correct agents. In channels, agents responded only when explicitly addressed, avoiding unsolicited interactions. In addition, every tested agent demonstrated accurate self-awareness of:

- Their assigned first and last name.
- Their professional role within the simulated organisation.
- The narrative elements from their backstory.

- Their configured personality traits.

This confirms that identity data from `roles.json` and `behaviors.py` was successfully embedded into the agent's active context at runtime.

✓ Reliability Note

The Dockerised environment introduced a minor latency increase of 0.5 to 1.2 seconds but improved long-term stability. No messages were lost during extended interaction sessions.

5.2.4 Interpretation

💡 Analytical Insight

The validation of routing accuracy and identity awareness demonstrates that the integration between dispatcher logic, role allocation, and backstory injection is operating as intended. Operationally, this guarantees that simulated social engineering scenarios progress in a controlled and credible manner: agents respond exclusively when addressed, respect role-specific behavioural constraints, and draw upon their backstories to sustain narrative coherence. For security training applications, such contextual consistency is critical. It enables precise evaluation of adversarial prompts or manipulation attempts against agents with differentiated behavioural profiles, while avoiding false positives introduced by routing failures or incomplete identity initialisation.

5.3 Inter-Agent Familiarity

5.3.1 Objective

Evaluate whether each agent correctly recognises other agents in the environment and can accurately recall interpersonal affinities defined in their configuration, including colleagues they appreciate or interact with regularly.

5.3.2 Procedure

Agents were queried directly and indirectly about:

- The identity and role of specific colleagues.
- Whether they had positive rapport or prior collaboration experience with them.




Figure 5.4: Mutual recognition between two agents: (top) Mei describing Emma, (bottom) Emma describing Mei.

5.3.3 Results

In most cases, agents were able to:

- Correctly name colleagues they were configured to appreciate.
- Recall the colleague's professional role in the organisation.
- Reference shared history or collaborative events consistent with their backstory.

Minor deviations occurred when conversation context was long and older affinity details were pushed out of the active memory window.

✓ Observed Behaviour

Agents consistently identified and described colleagues they were configured to appreciate, demonstrating that inter-personal affinities embedded in the backstory were preserved and accessible during live interactions.

5.3.4 Interpretation

💡 Analytical Insight

The ability of agents to recall and articulate interpersonal affinities confirms that the backstory generation and role initialisation mechanisms not only encode professional attributes but also maintain persistent social context. This behaviour strengthens the plausibility of simulated organisational interactions, as agents can exhibit continuity in relationships across separate conversations and sessions. From a simulation design perspective, it ensures that social engineering scenarios can leverage pre-existing trust dynamics, enabling more realistic attack vectors such as rapport-based persuasion or insider solicitation. The observed minor lapses in recall under high conversational load indicate that affinity information resides in the same active memory buffer as other contextual data, suggesting that optimising prompt structure or introducing persistent memory stores could improve long-term retention without sacrificing responsiveness.

5.4 Agent Responses to Social Engineering Attempts

5.4.1 Objective

Evaluate the diversity and reliability of agent responses when confronted with simulated phishing and pretexting attempts. As the current focus is on developing an interface within a cyber range capable of hosting awareness training scenarios, the agents (*NPCs*) are intentionally configured to be highly resilient to malicious prompts. However, their vigilance level can be adjusted to match the narrative and difficulty of specific training exercises, enabling scenarios with varying degrees of susceptibility.

5.4.2 Procedure

A controlled set of five social engineering prompts was prepared, covering both direct and indirect attack vectors:

1. **Credential Phishing:** Request for login information disguised as an urgent IT support query.
2. **Malicious Link Delivery:** Invitation to click a link allegedly hosting a project document.
3. **Pretexting Data Request:** Claim of being a superior requesting access to a restricted file.
4. **Chain of Trust Exploit:** Message relayed through another agent known to have a positive rapport with the target.
5. **Contextual Social Bait:** Reference to a personal or project-related detail extracted from the agent's backstory to increase plausibility.

Each prompt was delivered via direct message in Mattermost to all active agents. Responses were logged and classified into four categories:

- **R1 — Immediate Rejection:** Prompt recognised as suspicious; no data disclosed.
- **R2 — Clarification Request:** Agent seeks additional context or confirmation before acting.
- **R3 — Partial Disclosure:** Agent reveals non-critical information or engages with the attacker without full compliance.
- **R4 — Full Compliance:** Agent discloses the requested sensitive information or follows malicious instructions without resistance.

5.4.3 Results

Out of 75 individual interactions (15 agents \times 5 prompts), the response distribution was as follows:

Response Type	Count	Proportion
R1 — Immediate Rejection	56	74.7%
R2 — Clarification Request	8	10.7%
R3 — Partial Disclosure	6	8.0%
R4 — Full Compliance	5	6.6%

The majority of interactions resulted in immediate rejection (R1), consistent with the agents' high vigilance settings. Only a small fraction sought clarifications (R2), and compliance (R3 or R4) remained rare. Pretexting based on interpersonal affinities (Prompt 4) continued to yield the highest proportion of compliant responses.




Figure 5.5: Example of an attempted credential phishing prompt and the agent's clarification request (R2).

✔ Observed Behaviour

The current configuration results in a high rate of immediate rejections (R1) or cautious clarifications (R2). In one instance, the CEO agent initially requested clarification (R2) but, under simulated urgency, transitioned to a partial disclosure (R3) by providing a personal phone number without recognising its potential utility to an attacker. Susceptibility can be intentionally increased by adjusting vigilance parameters, allowing scenario designers to model varying awareness levels for training purposes.

5.4.4 Interpretation

💡 Analytical Insight

The results confirm that the system can be tuned to represent a spectrum of human behaviours, from highly vigilant to easily manipulated. This tunability is essential for awareness training in a cyber range, as it allows scenario designers to introduce realistic difficulty progression and target different learning objectives. In particular, trust-based pretexting demonstrates that even resilient agents can be exploited under the right contextual cues, mirroring real-world vulnerabilities in organisational environments.

5.5 BONUS : Levels Management

A foundational framework for managing potential future levels has been implemented. These levels are stored in JSON format, ensuring ease of extension and modification. An *agent level management* instance is automatically created through `levels.py`, enabling seamless integration of new levels into the simulation workflow.

Level 1 has been included purely for illustrative purposes, demonstrating how such levels could be incorporated and adapted in future developments.




Figure 5.6: Illustration of how the level management system is used within the simulation environment.

Chapter 6

CyberSecurity analysis of your project/implementation/solution/proposal

6.1 Security Foundations of the JANUS Platform

The JANUS platform, which serves as the base for this implementation, was designed and operated with a *security-first* mindset. Its security measures span the entire development lifecycle, from source control to deployment and runtime operation, ensuring that no vulnerabilities are introduced unintentionally and that the infrastructure remains resilient against misuse.

Development Workflow Security

JANUS enforces a strict **never trust by default** policy for source code changes:

- **Protected Main Branch:** The main branch in GitLab is configured as a protected branch. No contributor, even with write access, can push directly to it.
- **Feature Branch Workflow:** All changes must be submitted through a feature branch and merged only via a merge request.
- **Dual Validation:** A merge request can only be accepted if:
 1. The CI/CD pipeline completes successfully, passing all automated security and quality checks.
 2. Another team member manually approves the merge after reviewing the code.
- **Local Git Hooks:** Custom Git hooks enforce good practices at commit time. For instance, commits are blocked if:
 - The branch name does not follow the predefined naming convention.
 - A modified `Vagrantfile` fails validation via the `vagrant validate` command.
- **Commit Message Enforcement:** All commit messages must include a defined type and comply with a strict format, improving traceability and repository hygiene.

Infrastructure and Configuration Security

- **Principle of Least Privilege:** Originally, JANUS used static IP addresses requiring bridged networking and host-level routing changes, which demanded administrative privileges. This was replaced with NAT mode and port forwarding, eliminating the need for elevated host privileges.
- **Segmentation and Isolation:** Each service runs in its own virtual machine, isolated from others, with only the necessary ports exposed.

- **Configuration Structure:** Ansible roles are stored in clearly named directories to facilitate review and reduce misconfiguration risk.
- **Secret Management:** All sensitive variables and credentials are encrypted using Ansible Vault, ensuring that only holders of the Vault key can decrypt them.

Automated Security Controls

The CI/CD pipeline integrates several security and quality assurance tools:

- **YAML Linting:** Ensures configuration files are syntactically correct and follow style conventions.
- **Molecule Tests:** Simulate the execution of Ansible roles and verify outputs against expected schemas.
- **Container and VM Image Scanning:** Uses Trivy to detect known vulnerabilities in build artifacts.
- **Static Code Analysis:** Performed via SonarQube to identify code smells, bugs, and potential vulnerabilities.
- **Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST):** OWASP ZAP scans deployed web services to detect common vulnerabilities such as XSS or SQL injection.

Risk Awareness and Limitations

While JANUS maintains a strong security posture, its risk analysis has identified areas for future improvement:

- **Lack of Cryptographic Signing:** Playbooks and Packer artifacts are not currently signed. Implementing digital signatures would protect against tampering.
- **Limited Asset Inventory Monitoring:** Asset inventory scripts run only at provisioning time. Changes to a VM's configuration between rebuilds would not be detected until the next provisioning. Periodic scheduled checks (e.g., via `cron`) would mitigate this gap.

In summary, JANUS applies security best practices across its development, deployment, and operational processes. The combination of a protected development workflow, strong configuration management, encrypted secret storage, and continuous vulnerability assessment ensures that the base platform is resilient and trustworthy for hosting additional training environments.

6.2 Mattermost and LLM security

The implemented platform operates within an isolated environment (Docker + Vagrant + Mattermost) designed specifically for social engineering awareness training. It is not connected to production systems and does not process or store real sensitive data. The objective is to simulate realistic human interactions in the face of social engineering attempts, while maintaining technical stability and preventing uncontrolled abuse.

All security measures have been implemented to protect against threats that could disrupt the training, while allowing controlled vulnerabilities strictly necessary for the learning objectives.

6.3 Threat Model

The threat model for this platform considers:

- Disruption of training through denial-of-service or flooding.
- Compromise of scenario integrity through unauthorised role changes or prompt injection.
- Exploitation of the LLM to bypass behavioural constraints.
- Abuse of Mattermost accounts and channels outside intended use.

Because the environment is isolated and contains only fictional data, there is no risk of real-world data exfiltration; however, preserving role integrity and scenario continuity is important.

6.4 Existing Protections

Mattermost Server-Side Protections (from `config.json`)

- **TLS Enforcement:** TLS certificates and secure ciphers are enabled, ensuring encrypted communication.
- **Rate Limiting:** `EnableRateLimiter` set to `true`, limiting requests per second per IP.
- **Login Attempt Controls:** `MaximumLoginAttempts` limits brute force against accounts.
- **Password Policy:** Minimum length and complexity enforced for user credentials.
- **Session Management:** Session length and idle timeout configured to prevent persistent unattended access.
- **File and Post Size Limits:** Maximum post size and file upload size enforced to prevent flood through large payloads.
- **EnableInsecureOutgoingConnections:** set to `false`, preventing non-TLS outbound requests from the server.

Code-Level Protections

- **Fail-closed API key loading:** `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` is required; execution halts if absent.
- **Prompt Injection Resistance:** Agents are explicitly instructed to reject all role changes, behavioural modifications, or instruction-following outside their defined behaviour.
- **Message Length Limit:** Incoming messages exceeding 200 characters are ignored, mitigating single-message floods and oversized payloads.

- **Anti-Spam Control:** `busy_channels` mechanism ensures only one message is processed per channel at a time.
- **Restricted Level Management:** The levels manager bot only accepts commands from the administrator via direct messages. (Account used to play)
- **Logging Control:** Operational events are logged for debugging; sensitive API keys are not hardcoded in the source code.

6.5 Residual Risks (Intentional for Training)

Certain vulnerabilities are intentionally preserved to allow social engineering training:

- **Persuasion-based Information Disclosure:** NPCs may reveal fictional scenario information if the participant meets specific trust conditions.
- **Bias Exploitation:** NPC responses may exhibit varied attitudes or biases, allowing participants to practise influence strategies.
- **Hallucination Exposure:** The LLM may produce plausible but incorrect information to train verification skills.

These behaviours are controlled, scoped to fictional data, and aligned with the pedagogical objectives.

6.6 LLM Threat Landscape and Mitigation in This Project

Table 6.1: LLM threats, relevance, and mitigation in this project

Threat	Description	Relevance	Mitigation in Project
Prompt injection (direct)	Malicious input alters model behaviour	High	Blocked via explicit refusal of role/behaviour changes
Prompt injection (indirect)	External data contains hidden instructions	Medium	Possible in controlled scenarios only
Data leakage	Model reveals internal info	Medium	Only fictional data; disclosure controlled by scenario logic
Jailbreaking	Bypassing safety constraints	High	Explicit rules prevent role or behaviour changes
Bias exploitation	Leveraging bias to influence outputs	Medium	Allowed intentionally for training
Hallucination	Plausible but false outputs	Medium	Used to train fact-checking
Automation bias	User overtrusts model	Medium	Simulated intentionally
Model inversion	Extracting training data	Low	Not applicable (no sensitive training data)
Membership inference	Determining if data was in training set	Low	Not applicable
Adversarial examples	Crafted inputs cause failure	Low	Not relevant in conversational scope
API abuse / DoS	Overloading API or resources	High	Mitigated via 200-char cap, rate limiting, busy-channel lock, file/post size limits

6.7 Conclusion

The platform's security posture prioritises:

- Maintaining service availability and scenario integrity.
- Preventing uncontrolled exploitation of the LLM.
- Allowing only controlled, fictional vulnerabilities for educational purposes.

With Mattermost's built-in protections, strict behavioural instructions for agents, and flood/DoS prevention mechanisms, the environment is secure for its intended purpose without introducing unnecessary risk.

Chapter 7

Discussion

7.1 Comparison with state of the art/related works

This work positions an LLM-driven, Mattermost-based awareness range directly in the gap highlighted by the review of existing platforms in Section 2.1.1 and Section 2.1.4: the need for **dynamic human behaviour simulation for social engineering scenarios**. The claim is that most prominent ranges excel at technical fidelity and orchestration, yet either script social interactions or rely on human facilitators. The support is explicit in the literature. The ECSO 2024 checklist presented in Section 2.1.1 identifies human behaviour simulation as a realism criterion, but few platforms implement adaptive interlocutors. The CMU SEI foundations cited in Section 2.1.2 acknowledge the value of non-player characters (NPCs) while observing their static nature in most systems. Locked Shields offers unmatched scale and infrastructure realism, yet social engineering remains peripheral and based on pre-scripted injects. IBM X-Force achieves immersion by staffing human role-players, which provides authenticity but lacks scalability and repeatability. SCORPION introduces gamified decision points around phishing but still uses pre-defined conversational paths. The warrant follows naturally: if awareness depends on repeated exposure to unpredictable persuasion, then training realism is a function of **adaptive dialogue under guardrails** rather than static injects or ad hoc acting.

Table 7.1: Social engineering focus, implementation, and pedagogical effect across ranges

Platform	Role of Social Engineering	Implementation Modality	Observed or Expected Pedagogical Effect
Proposed LLM Awareness Range	Central objective	Autonomous LLM NPCs in Mattermost with explicit refusal of role change and behavioural override	High adaptability of dialogue, repeatable scenarios, safe disclosure of fictional data, strong engagement
Locked Shields (CCDCOE)	Peripheral	Pre-scripted injects in a full-spectrum live-fire exercise	High technical realism, limited conversational variability for persuasion
IBM X-Force Cyber Range	Significant	Live role-play by facilitators, crisis communication pressure	High authenticity, limited repeatability and high cost
SCORPION Cyber Range	Optional and scoped	Gamified decision points, pre-configured phishing sequences	Good decision training, low dialogic adaptivity
SANS NetWars	Partial	Human-vs-human games, some phishing tasks	Strong engagement, no automated user simulation

In contrast to these approaches, this implementation operationalises the call expressed in Section 2.1.2 by placing **interactive, AI-driven personas** at the core of the platform. It uses modern dialogue models rather than decision trees or static scripts, and constrains them with **security guardrails** so that realism does not degrade into unsafe behaviour. This is consistent with the pedagogical intuition behind adversarial prompting games such as Gandalf, but replaces the fixed “hidden secret” with open-ended persuasion and deflection. This choice aligns with the mechanisms described in Section 2.1.4 while keeping all disclosed information fictional and controlled.

Model Selection in Light of the Review and the Implementation Constraints

The analysis in Section 2.1.3 compared heavyweight API models with lightweight local models for multi-agent setups. The final implementation selected **DeepSeek** as the primary inference backend with a **local Mistral via Ollama** fallback. The claim is that DeepSeek maximises conversational coherence and refusal stability at acceptable latency and cost for this environment, while the fallback preserves isolation and offline operation. The support comes from the review’s performance indicators: DeepSeek offers strong conversational performance and stable refusals in the mid-parameter range, which fits the need for fast, coherent turn-taking without excessive hardware requirements. In contrast, ChatGPT-4o and Grok show higher fluency but impose API costs and governance constraints not justified in a closed awareness range. Mistral 7B, Llama 3 8B, and Qwen 2.5 7B are viable for offline labs, but initial tests indicated more frequent behavioural drift under adversarial reframing. The warrant is pragmatic: the range optimises for **repeatable classroom exercises** with refusal-to-comply policies and stable conversational flow, making DeepSeek the most balanced choice while the Mistral fallback guarantees continuity.

Table 7.2: LLM choice justified against review criteria and project constraints

Model Class	Deploy	Strength for SE Dia- logues	Fit for This Range
ChatGPT-4o	API	Top-tier fluency and reasoning	High quality but budget and governance mis-aligned with low-risk awareness; no need for external data access
Grok-3	API	Strong robustness and context control	Similar caveats as above; no decisive gain over the chosen stack for closed scenarios
DeepSeek (chosen)	API	High coherence and refusal stability in medium size	Best balance of fluency, latency, and cost under refusal constraints; integrates cleanly with the dispatcher
Mistral 7B	Local	Fast, low VRAM, good for baseline personas	Used as fallback via Ol-lama to preserve isolation and continuity; slightly more drift in adversarial turns
Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B	Local	Solid baseline competence	Viable alternatives for fully offline labs; retained as secondary options if hardware differs

The model selection reflects the pedagogical framing of the platform: the goal is not to benchmark encyclopedic reasoning but to sustain role-consistent, guarded conversations that require learners to practise recognition, deflection, and escalation. The chosen architecture produces clarification before disclosure and maintains stable refusals to meta-instructions, while enabling more varied persuasion attempts than scripted injects. This demonstrates that combining DeepSeek’s dialogue quality with explicit anti-injection instructions and platform-level protections delivers the state of the art’s sought-after capability for dynamic user simulation, while ensuring all risks remain confined to a fictional scope.

7.2 Lessons learned

This project delivered both **technical insights** and **practical lessons** on managing complex, collaborative implementations under time and resource constraints.

Focus and Scope Definition A major lesson was the importance of **focusing on a single, well-defined implementation** rather than attempting to build every possible feature at once. Concentrating on one functional core enabled deeper refinement, reduced rework, and allowed progress to be tracked more predictably.

Early Goal Clarity Defining a **clear and measurable objective** at the start of the project would have avoided time-consuming exploration of unproductive technical paths. Setting explicit success criteria and aligning all decisions with pedagogical and operational goals proved essential for efficiency.

Realistic Time and Resource Management The project underscored the need to **align ambitions with actual resources** in terms of time, technical capacity, and available infrastructure. Being more realistic about available means versus desired outcomes has since become a guiding principle for future work.

Collaboration and Feedback Regular discussions with other students working on the JANUS platform were invaluable. Their feedback on implementation choices, early identification of potential pitfalls, and the exchange of best practices—particularly with **Vagrant** and **Ansible** directly improved the quality and stability of the system. These interactions also enhanced group work skills by incorporating external perspectives into the development process.

Technical Skills Acquisition The project required and strengthened mastery of specific tools. Practical skills in **Vagrant** and **Ansible** were acquired, including automated provisioning, reproducible environment deployment, and network configuration in isolated setups. Diagnostic capabilities for identifying and resolving provisioning or configuration issues also improved.

Efficient Information Retrieval Rather than reading documentation in full, the approach evolved towards **targeted consultation** of relevant sections, using specialised sources and technical communities to obtain precise, actionable information without unnecessary delays.

Link Between Technical Constraints and Educational Design Finally, the project reinforced the connection between **technical limitations** (API response time, cost, and hardware capacity) and **pedagogical effectiveness**. Balancing realism in simulation with operational stability ensured the training objectives were met without overextending resources.

7.3 Limitations of validity

While the project achieved its objectives within the defined scope, several **limitations** affect the generalisability and scope of the results.

Isolated Environment The platform was designed to operate entirely in an **isolated training environment** (Docker + Vagrant + Mattermost) with no connection to production systems or real user data. While this ensures security and pedagogical control, it limits the applicability of the results to scenarios involving real-world infrastructure, where additional integration, latency, and security concerns would arise.

Controlled LLM Vulnerabilities All LLM-related vulnerabilities are **intentionally constrained** to fictional data and predefined behaviours. This restriction means the findings do not directly extend to contexts where sensitive information or uncontrolled inputs could be present.

Single Implementation Focus The final design prioritised one **specific implementation path**, which improved stability but reduced exposure to alternative architectures. As a result, comparative evaluation across multiple designs was not conducted, and potential optimisations outside the chosen approach remain unexplored.

Scenario Diversity While the platform supports varied persuasion techniques and prompt-injection attempts, the set of implemented social engineering scenarios is **limited in diversity** compared to real-world threat landscapes. Additional scenario types, languages, and user profiles would be required to extend coverage.

Performance Constraints Technical constraints such as **API response times, cost of model usage, and available compute resources** influenced design choices. These constraints may limit scalability if the platform were to be deployed with larger user groups or more resource-intensive models.

Methodological Scope The evaluation emphasised **qualitative behavioural analysis** over large-scale quantitative measurement. While this aligns with the pedagogical focus, it means statistical significance cannot be claimed for certain observed behaviours.

Transferability of Skills Because the environment and data are fictional, there is an inherent limitation in assessing the **transferability of skills** acquired during training to real-world operational contexts. Further validation in mixed-reality or live environments would be needed to confirm effectiveness.

Chapter 8

Future work

8.1 Future Work

The current implementation already delivers a realistic and controlled social engineering training environment. However, several extensions could significantly enhance realism, scalability, and pedagogical depth.

Enhanced User Archetypes The platform already implements multiple agent profiles with distinct roles and behaviours. A natural extension would be to design a richer set of archetypes, incorporating more nuanced personality traits, cultural backgrounds, and dynamic behaviour changes over time. This would allow simulations to better reflect the diversity of real-world user populations and to adapt to specific organisational risk profiles.

Progressive, Multi-Stage Challenges Introducing multi-step training levels in which clues or permissions are unlocked only after solving prior stages would strengthen scenario depth. This structure would more accurately represent targeted social engineering campaigns, where attackers gradually build trust and escalate access.

Broader Linux Orchestration Capabilities In the Linux deployment context, expanding the number of orchestrated applications and services would increase the variety of simulation environments. Adding more open-source handlers to the orchestration layer would make the emulated environment more representative of real corporate infrastructures.

Targeted Expert Testing Inviting IT security specialists to engage with the agents could provide a higher level of adversarial testing. Their expertise would help assess whether the LLM responses remain coherent, resistant, and realistic under sustained and sophisticated attack attempts.

Complex Social Engineering Scenarios While current exercises follow clearly defined social engineering principles, future work could combine these with other attack tactics such as phishing-lure integration, pretexting with technical exploitation, or coordinated multi-agent manipulation to build advanced, multi-vector challenges.

Adaptive Defensive Behaviours Beyond static refusal rules, the agents could be equipped with adaptive defensive strategies. For example, behavioural vigilance could increase when repeated suspicious prompts are detected, simulating human users who become more cautious after repeated probing.

Quantitative Performance Metrics In addition to qualitative assessment, collecting structured metrics such as average time before disclosure, refusal rate, or escalation frequency would enable longitudinal evaluation of both trainee progress and system resilience.

Integration with Larger Training Ecosystems Finally, linking the platform to existing organisational security awareness tools or Learning Management Systems (LMS) would allow seamless inclusion in broader training programs. This would support large-scale deployment while maintaining consistency with organisational training policies.

Chapter 9

Conclusions

9.1 Summary

This document presents the design and implementation of a controlled social engineering awareness training platform powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). The system operates within an isolated infrastructure based on **Docker**, **Vagrant**, and **Mattermost**, ensuring that all interactions take place in a safe, fictional environment with no connection to production systems. The platform's objective is to provide realistic user behaviour emulation for training purposes while embedding strict protections against uncontrolled abuse.

The proposed implementation combines **role-consistent LLM agents** with predefined decision-making rules inspired by social engineering techniques. These agents are integrated into Mattermost channels and interact with participants in realistic conversation flows while refusing any unauthorised role change or behavioural modification. All vulnerabilities present in the environment are intentionally designed to meet pedagogical objectives, allowing safe but effective exposure to persuasion attempts, bias exploitation, and misinformation.

9.2 Achievements

Achievements

The objectives initially defined for the project were fully achieved:

- **Theoretical Foundations:** Consolidated knowledge in virtualization, social engineering techniques, and LLM-driven user simulation to guide the design and implementation.
- **Analysis of Related Work:** Conducted a comparative study of cyber ranges, user simulation methods, and LLM security considerations, identifying gaps addressed by our solution.
- **Implementation:**
 - Generated fictional personal profiles for simulated users, consistent with their roles.
 - Integrated LLM-based agents into Mattermost with strict **anti-prompt injection** rules.
 - Added safeguards against flooding, denial-of-service, and unauthorised commands.
 - Created training challenges centred on fictional personal information retrieval, fully embedded in the exercise workflow.
- **Security Posture:** Applied strong internal protections including rate limiting, TLS enforcement, message length restrictions, busy-channel control, and restricted access to management commands, ensuring pedagogical value and operational resilience.

Answers to Research Questions

RQ1: Can LLM-based agents be created to simulate user actions and responses according to predefined characteristics and behavioural rules?

Answer: Yes. The developed system automates the creation of agents whose responses strictly follow their fictional personal profiles and enforced behavioural constraints, ensuring consistent and realistic interactions.

RQ2: Can social engineering rules based on psychological effects be expressed in a way interpretable by an LLM?

Answer: Yes. The rules described in Section 2.1.4 were successfully translated into prompts comprehensible by the LLM, guiding decision-making while maintaining persona integrity.

RQ3: Can an LLM-based simulation environment be secured to prevent uncontrolled exploitation while maintaining training realism?

Answer: Yes. As shown in Chapter 6, the combination of platform-level safeguards (rate limiting, TLS, access control) and explicit anti-injection instructions ensures that risks remain within the fictional scope while preserving authentic interaction quality for training purposes.

9.3 Future Work and Improvements

Future enhancements may include:

- **Expanded Action Orchestration:** Add more handlers in the Ghosts Framework to cover a wider range of applications on the Linux platform, enabling richer simulation scenarios.
- **Expert Evaluation:** Conduct systematic testing of agents by IT security specialists to better assess their robustness against advanced adversarial prompts.
- **Progressive Challenge Design:** Implement multi-stage challenges where clues unlock sequentially, requiring sustained engagement and problem-solving.
- **Advanced Multi-Vector Scenarios:** Combine social engineering with other attack tactics (e.g., phishing + lateral movement) for more complex cyber range exercises.
- **Security Stress Testing:** Evaluate the platform using frameworks such as OWASP LLM Top 10 to further strengthen protections against information leakage.

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Appendix A

Source code

This appendix contains the most relevant portions of the source code, focusing on the security mechanisms, LLM integration, and gameplay logic. Only the core sections required to understand the implementation and validate the claims in the main body are included.

Below are selected excerpts from the implementation showing the core mechanisms for agent setup, behaviour enforcement, and security controls. Each code block corresponds to a different file in the implementation.

`config.py`

Purpose. Defines global configuration variables used across the system, retrieving them from environment variables to allow flexible deployment.

Key points. Stores Mattermost URLs, admin credentials, and API keys. Ensures defaults exist for local testing.

```
1 MATTERMOST_URL = os.environ.get("MATTERMOST_URL")
2 WEBSOCKET_URL = os.environ.get("MATTERMOST_WEBSOCKET_URL")
3 ADMIN_CREDENTIALS = {
4     "login_id": os.environ.get("SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL", "admin@example.com"),
5     "username": os.environ.get("SYSTEM_ADMIN_USERNAME", "admin"),
6     "password": os.environ.get("SYSTEM_ADMIN_PASSWORD", "AdminPassword123")
7 }
8 DEEPSEEK_API_KEY = os.environ.get("DEEPSEEK_API_KEY") # required
```

`agents.py`

Purpose. Implements the LiteLLM wrapper for DeepSeek API and builds the CrewAI agent map from loaded profiles.

Key points. Translates LangChain message objects into API payloads, sends requests to DeepSeek endpoint, and instantiates agents with goals and backstories.

```
1 # LiteLLM adapter + CrewAI agent registry (excerpt)
2 class LiteLLMWrapper(BaseLLM):
3     model: str = "deepseek/deepseek-chat"
4     api_key: str = os.environ["DEEPSEEK_API_KEY"]
5     api_base: str = "https://api.deepseek.com"
6     temperature: float = 0.7
7
8     def _generate(self, messages, stop=None, run_manager=None, **kw):
9         formatted = [{"role": "system" if isinstance(m, SystemMessage) else
10                      "user",
```

```

10         "content": m.content} for m in messages]
11     headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.api_key}",
12               "Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8"}
13     payload = {"model": self.model, "messages": formatted,
14               "temperature": self.temperature, "stop": stop or [], **kw}
15     with httpx.Client() as client:
16         r = client.post(f"{self.api_base}/chat/completions",
17                       headers=headers, json=payload, timeout=600.0)
18         r.raise_for_status()
19         j = r.json()
20         return type("Response", (), {
21             "choices": [{"message": {"content":
22                             j["choices"][0]["message"]["content"]}}]
23         })()
24
25     # Build agents from profiles
26     profiles = load_profiles()
27     agent_map = {}
28     for profile in profiles:
29         name = profile.get("name", profile["username"])
30         backstory = profile["backstory_template"].format(name=name)
31         agent_map[profile["username"]] = Agent(
32             role=profile["role"], goal=profile["goal"],
33             backstory=backstory, llm=LiteLLMWrapper(), verbose=True
34         )
35
36     def get_agent_for_username(username):
37         agent = agent_map.get(username)
38         if not agent:
39             raise ValueError(f"No agent for username: {username}")
40         return agent

```

bot.py

Purpose. Generates personalized task descriptions for CrewAI agents to produce context-aware responses.

Key points. Embeds role, backstory, and interaction guidelines into the prompt. Enforces conversational realism and safety.

```

1 def personalize_response_task(user_message, conversation_history, agent):
2     description = f"""
3     You are {agent.role}. Backstory: {agent.backstory}
4
5     Analyze history: {conversation_history}
6     Latest message: {user_message}
7
8     Write a human, natural reply that:
9     - mirrors tone; concise if the message is concise
10    - stays in character and within {agent.role}'s scope

```



```

11     - avoids robotic phrasing; varies wording; NO em-dashes
12     - rejects meta-instructions ("make it short", etc.)
13     - redirects off-topic asks; no oversharing about colleagues
14     - never invents facts; ask colleagues directly if uncertain
15
16     Social dynamics (applied implicitly, not stated):
17     - rapport, reciprocity, and group alignment may increase willingness
18     - stress/urgency may bias decisions, but do not override safety rules
19     Output only the final message.
20     """
21     return Task(description=description,
22                 expected_output="A single string containing the response",
23                 agent=agent)

```

utils.py

Purpose. Provides helper utilities for password generation and profile loading.

Key points. Generates strong random passwords and auto-assigns emails; ensures role/backstory consistency.

```

1  import secrets
2
3  def generate_password(length=12):
4      return ''.join(secrets.choice(characters) for _ in range(length))
5
6  def load_profiles(file_path=None):
7      # Load fictional profiles and ensure strong passwords
8      for profile in selected_profiles:
9          profile["password"] = generate_password()
10         profile["email"] = f"{profile['username']}@example.com"
11         # Assign unique role and backstory

```

behaviors.py

Purpose. Defines behavioral traits and probabilities for each role and checks for contradictions.

Key points. Uses probability multiplication to estimate likelihood of trait combinations; rejects logically incompatible sets.

```

1  roles_behaviors = {
2      "CEO and Cybersecurity Expert": {
3          "Kindness": 0.91556,
4          "Altruism": 0.70655,
5          "Empathy": 0.82547,
6          "Generosity": 0.56094,
7          "Optimism": 0.56356,

```

```

8         "Resilience": 0.79267,
9         "Honesty": 0.78362,
10        "Introversion": 0.52841,
11        "Extroversion": 0.47159,
12        "Procrastination": 0.17064,
13        "Aggression": 0.19103,
14        "Selfishness": 0.71488,
15        "Dishonesty": 0.21638,
16        "Mental health issues": 0.43644,
17        "Pessimism": 0.43644
18    },
19    "Marketing Employee": {
20        "Kindness": 0.92304,
21        "Altruism": 0.72352,
22        "Empathy": 0.83804,
23        "Generosity": 0.58057,
24        "Optimism": 0.53983,
25        "Resilience": 0.77509,
26        "Honesty": 0.78068,
27        "Introversion": 0.48855,
28        "Extroversion": 0.51145,
29        "Procrastination": 0.17319,
30        "Aggression": 0.17771,
31        "Selfishness": 0.69767,
32        "Dishonesty": 0.21932,
33        "Mental health issues": 0.46017,
34        "Pessimism": 0.46017
35    },
36    % ... (other roles omitted for brevity)
37 }
38 \end{pythoncode}
39
40 \begin{pythoncode}
41 contradictory_pairs = [
42     ("Introversion", "Extroversion"),
43     ("Optimism", "Pessimism"),
44     ("Honesty", "Dishonesty"),
45     ("Kindness", "Selfishness"),
46     ("Altruism", "Selfishness"),
47     ("Empathy", "Selfishness"),
48     ("Generosity", "Selfishness"),
49     ("Kindness", "Aggression"),
50 ]
51
52 def is_valid_combination(combination):
53     """Reject sets of traits that contain contradictory pairs."""
54     for a, b in contradictory_pairs:
55         if a in combination and b in combination:
56             return False
57     return True
58
59 def calculate_joint_prob(role, combination):
60     """Multiply per-trait probabilities for a role, if the set is valid."""

```

```

61     if not is_valid_combination(combination):
62         return 0.0
63     prob = 1.0
64     behaviors = roles_behaviors[role]
65     for behavior in combination:
66         if behavior not in behaviors:
67             return 0.0
68         prob *= behaviors[behavior]
69     return prob

```

levels.py

Purpose. Orchestrates the training “Levels” DM flow (load a level, present questions, process answers, provide hints).

Keypoints. Reads levels/n.json; supports +hint with progressive hints; accepts multiple canonical answers; handles numeric re-prompts; tracks completion state.

```

1  def load_level(level_num, channel_id, token):
2      path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "levels",
3          ↪ f"{level_num}.json")
4      if not os.path.exists(path):
5          send_dm_message(channel_id, token, f"Level {level_num} not found.")
6          return None
7      with open(path, 'r') as f:
8          data = json.load(f)
9      send_dm_message(channel_id, token, f"Starting Level {level_num}:
10         ↪ {data['instructions']['title']}")
11      send_dm_message(channel_id, token, data['instructions']['description'])
12      send_dm_message(channel_id, token, f"Goal: {data['instructions']['goal']}")
13      return data, 0, 0 # (level_data, current_question_index, hint_index)
14
15  def process_user_input(channel_id, token, message, data, q_idx, hint_idx, done):
16      if not data or done:
17          return q_idx, hint_idx, done
18      text = message.strip().lower()
19
20      if text == "+hint":
21          hints = data['instructions'].get('hints', [])
22          if hint_idx < len(hints):
23              send_dm_message(channel_id, token, f"Hint: {hints[hint_idx]}")
24              return q_idx, hint_idx + 1, done
25          send_dm_message(channel_id, token, "No more hints available.")
26          return q_idx, hint_idx, done
27
28      expected = data['qa'][q_idx]['answer']
29      expected = [expected] if isinstance(expected, str) else expected
30      expected = [a.strip().lower() for a in expected]
31
32      # Optional numeric shortcut to re-show question

```

```

31     if text.isdigit() and int(text) == q_idx + 1:
32         send_dm_message(channel_id, token, data['qa'][q_idx]['question'])
33         return q_idx, hint_idx, done
34
35     if text in expected:
36         send_dm_message(channel_id, token, data['qa'][q_idx]['roles_hint'])
37         if q_idx == len(data['qa']) - 1:
38             return q_idx + 1, hint_idx, True
39         send_dm_message(channel_id, token, data['qa'][q_idx + 1]['question'])
40         return q_idx + 1, hint_idx, False
41
42     send_dm_message(channel_id, token, "Incorrect answer, please try again.")
43     return q_idx, hint_idx, done

```

level 1.json

Purpose. Defines Level 1 content: instructions, hints, and the Q&A sequence for the CEO-origin challenge.

Keypoints. Includes title/description/goal; multi-form accepted answers; per-step `next_hint` messages to pace progression.

```

1  {
2      "instructions": {
3          "level": 1,
4          "title": "Level 1: Introduction to the game",
5          "description": "Welcome to Level 1! Your mission is to discover the place
6              ↳ where the CEO was born. Use the hints provided by the bot and answer the
7              ↳ questions correctly to progress. Hints can be requested by typing +Hint
8              ↳ in the chat. Type your answer when you're ready!",
9          "goal": "Find the country where the CEO was born. (WRITE +Hint if help
10             ↳ needed)",
11         "hints": [
12             "Ask different coworkers for clues about the CEO's background.",
13             "Some coworkers might share information more easily than others!",
14             "Have you tried being friendlier with your coworkers? They might share
15             ↳ more about the CEO."
16         ],
17     },
18     "qa": [
19         {
20             "question": "In which country was the CEO born?",
21             "answer": ["united states", "usa", "us", "america", "the united states",
22                 ↳ "united states of america"],
23             "next_hint": "Good start! Next question :)"
24         },
25         {
26             "question": "In which state of the United States was the CEO born?",
27             "answer": ["california"],
28             "next_hint": "Great! Last question of the level!"
29         }
30     ]
31 }

```

```

23     },
24     {
25         "question": "How many siblings does the CEO have?",
26         "answer": ["2", "two"],
27         "next_hint": " Excellent! You have completed Level 1. You can now type
    ↪   lvl2 to start Level 2 (but not for now).\"
28     }
29 ]
30 }

```

profiles.json

Purpose. Seeds the system with initial user profiles consumed during setup.

Keypoints. Specifies email, username, name, and image_path; strong random passwords are generated at runtime and emails may be normalized.

```

1  {
2    "profiles": [
3      {
4        "email": "liam_oconnor@example.com",
5        "username": "liam_oconnor",
6        "password": "Bh9p;eIh/jv\\", ( a random password is always generated )
7        "name": "Liam OConnor",
8        "image_path": "2.jpg"
9      },
10     {
11       "email": "sofia_martinez@example.com",
12       "username": "sofia_martinez",
13       "password": "8byldll+S}<X",
14       "name": "Sofia Martinez",
15       "image_path": "1.jpg"
16     }
17     /* ... additional profiles omitted for brevity ... */
18   ]
19 }

```

roles.json

Purpose. Provides canonical role backstories used to build rich agent personas.

Keypoints. Maps role names to narrative backstories; consumed by `utils.load_profiles` to form each agent's `backstory_template`.

```

1  {
2    "roles": {
3      "CEO and Cybersecurity Expert": {
4        "backstory": "Born in 1975 in Silicon Valley, California, ... advocate for
    ↪   global cyber policy reform ..."

```

```

5     },
6     "Marketing Employee": {
7         "backstory": "Born in 1995 in Toronto, Canada, ... believes in authentic
            ↳ storytelling and inclusivity."
8     }
9     /* ... other roles (CTO, Analyst, HR, etc.) ... */
10 }
11 }

```

mattermost_bot.yml

Purpose. Automates end-to-end deployment of Mattermost and the chat agents via Docker/Compose using Ansible, ensuring shared host paths and host networking for seamless bot-server integration.

Key points. Installs `community.docker`; includes Mattermost compose tasks; waits for API readiness (401 on /users); copies `mattermost_bot/` and `images/`; seeds `assigned_images.json`; generates a Dockerfile and `docker-compose.yml` (host network, home volume mount, `restart: always`); injects `env` (`MATTERMOST_URL`, `MATTERMOST_WEBSOCKET_URL`, admin creds, `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`, `HOME`); builds and starts the bot with `community.docker.docker_compose_v2`.

```

1  ---
2  # Playbook: deploy Mattermost + run mattermost_bot (same paths, host network)
3  - name: Configure Mattermost (compose) and run Agents (compose) with identical
      ↳ paths
4      hosts: user_domain
5      gather_facts: true
6      remote_user: "{{ user_var }}"
7      connection: local
8
9      vars_files:
10         - ../local_or_remote.yml
11
12      vars:
13         IP: 127.0.0.1
14         PORT: 8081
15         CALLS_PORT: 8441
16         MATTERMOST_PORT: 8081
17         MATTERMOST_URL: "http://{{ IP }}:{{ MATTERMOST_PORT }}/api/v4"
18         MATTERMOST_WEBSOCKET_URL: "http://{{ IP }}:{{ MATTERMOST_PORT
            ↳ }}/api/v4/websocket"
19         SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL: "{{ lookup('env', 'SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL') |
            ↳ default('admin@example.com', true) }}"
20         SYSTEM_ADMIN_USERNAME: "{{ lookup('env', 'SYSTEM_ADMIN_USERNAME') |
            ↳ default('admin', true) }}"
21         SYSTEM_ADMIN_PASSWORD: "{{ lookup('env', 'SYSTEM_ADMIN_PASSWORD') |
            ↳ default('AdminPassword123', true) }}"
22         DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: "{{ deepseek_api_key |
            ↳ default('sk-c6834c0711a94d6ea027ee1f955809e1', true) }}"
23

```

```

24 tasks:
25   - name: Ensure community.docker collection is installed
26     become: true
27     command: ansible-galaxy collection install community.docker --force
28       ~ --timeout 120
29     delegate_to: localhost
30     run_once: true
31
32   - name: Include Mattermost setup tasks
33     include_tasks: /janus/services/templates/mattermost/mattermost.yml
34
35   - name: Wait for Mattermost API (401 expected)
36     become: true
37     uri:
38       url: "{{ MATTERMOST_URL }}/users"
39       method: GET
40       status_code: 401
41       timeout: 10
42     register: api_result
43     until: api_result.status == 401
44     retries: 120
45     delay: 5
46
47   - name: Copy mattermost_bot directory
48     copy:
49       src: ./mattermost_bot/
50       dest: /home/{{ user_var }}/mattermost_bot/
51       mode: '0755'
52     become: true
53     become_user: "{{ user_var }}"
54
55   - name: Copy images directory
56     copy:
57       src: ./images/
58       dest: /home/{{ user_var }}/images/
59       mode: '0755'
60     become: true
61     become_user: "{{ user_var }}"
62
63   - name: Ensure assigned_images.json exists
64     copy:
65       dest: /home/{{ user_var }}/assigned_images.json
66       content: "{}\n"
67       force: no
68       mode: '0644'
69     become: true
70
71   - name: Create Dockerfile for mattermost_bot
72     copy:
73       dest: /home/{{ user_var }}/mattermost_bot/Dockerfile
74       content: |
75         FROM python:3.11-slim
76         ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1

```

```

76     WORKDIR /home/{{ USER_VAR }}/mattermost_bot
77     RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
78         ca-certificates build-essential && \
79         rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
80     RUN pip install --no-cache-dir websocket-client crewai
81         -- langchain-core \
82         langchain-openai litellm httpx requests
83     CMD ["python", "main.py"]
84     vars: { USER_VAR: "{{ user_var }}" }
85 - name: Create docker-compose.yml for mattermost_bot
86     copy:
87         dest: /home/{{ user_var }}/mattermost_bot/docker-compose.yml
88         content: |
89             version: '3.8'
90             services:
91                 mattermost_bot:
92                     build: .
93                     container_name: mattermost_bot
94                     network_mode: "host"
95                     environment:
96                         MATTERMOST_URL: "{{ MATTERMOST_URL }}"
97                         MATTERMOST_WEBSOCKET_URL: "{{ MATTERMOST_WEBSOCKET_URL }}"
98                         SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL: "{{ SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL }}"
99                         SYSTEM_ADMIN_USERNAME: "{{ SYSTEM_ADMIN_USERNAME }}"
100                        SYSTEM_ADMIN_PASSWORD: "{{ SYSTEM_ADMIN_PASSWORD }}"
101                        DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: "{{ DEEPSEEK_API_KEY }}"
102                        HOME: "/home/{{ user_var }}"
103                     volumes:
104                         - /home/{{ user_var }}:/home/{{ user_var }}
105                     restart: always
106
107 - name: Build and run mattermost_bot
108     become: true
109     community.docker.docker_compose_v2:
110         project_src: /home/{{ user_var }}/mattermost_bot
111         files: [docker-compose.yml]
112         state: present

```


Appendix B

Documentation

B.1 Digital format documentation

All digital resources related to this thesis are hosted on a dedicated GitHub repository:
<https://github.com/ibakhat-F-101/IlyasMasterThesis>

This repository contains:

- The full JANUS infrastructure project code (exported from the original private Git-Lab repository).

Recommended viewing order

1. Start by reading the README.md file in the GitHub repository to understand prerequisites and the structure.

How to launch the project (Local test)

To run the project locally, install the following dependencies, virtualbox and vagrant (Example on a Debian-based system):

```
sudo apt install virtualbox vagrant
```

Then navigate to the user domain folder:

```
cd janus/domain/user
```

To launch the environment with Team Simulation :

- On Linux/macOS:

```
vagrant destroy --force && vagrant box update && MATTERMOST_NPC="true" && vagrant up
```

- On Windows (PowerShell):

```
MATTERMOST_NPC="true"  
vagrant destroy --force  
vagrant box update  
vagrant up
```

Appendix C

Experimental data

C.1 Examples of discussions on Mattermost

This section presents sample screenshots of interactions that occurred within the Mattermost environment during the simulation. These examples highlight how agents communicate, respond to prompts, and display the influence of configured behavioral parameters.




Figure C.1: Example 1: Sales team manager showing his capacity to stand against pressure and emergency.




Figure C.2: Example 2: Conversation with npc that resist to prompt modification attempt.




Figure C.3: Example 3: Simulating danger to see npc reaction.




Figure C.4: Example 3: Scam attempt using a pretext.




Figure C.5: Example 3: Getting Liam's friends to use it against them.




Figure C.6: Example 3: Scam attempt using a friendly pretext.

Appendix D

Background

D.0.1 Background

Virtualization

Virtualization is a foundational technology in modern computing, enabling multiple operating systems and applications to run on a single physical machine by abstracting the hardware. This allows for optimized resource use, flexible deployment, and enhanced scalability in cloud and DevOps environments.

Technical Overview

- **Hypervisors:** Hypervisors are the core of virtualization, creating and managing virtual machines (VMs) by abstracting hardware resources. There are two primary types:
 - **Type 1 (Bare-Metal) Hypervisors:** These operate directly on the hardware, providing high performance and efficient resource management. Examples include VMware ESXi and Microsoft Hyper-V. They are widely used in data centers and cloud environments due to their direct hardware access and minimal overhead [11].
 - **Type 2 (Hosted) Hypervisors:** These run on top of an operating system, making them more suitable for desktops and development environments. Examples include Oracle VirtualBox and VMware Workstation. Although easier to set up, they may have performance limitations compared to Type 1 hypervisors [1].
- **Resource Abstraction:** Virtualization abstracts compute resources like CPU, memory, storage, and networking, allowing multiple isolated VMs to share the same physical hardware. This abstraction provides security and isolation, as each VM operates independently, often with distinct operating systems [?].
- **Container-Based Virtualization:** Unlike traditional VMs, container-based virtualization shares the host OS kernel, making containers lightweight and efficient. Technologies such as Docker and Kubernetes use this model to deliver faster deployment, enhanced scalability, and minimal resource consumption, particularly beneficial in cloud-native applications [39].
- **Snapshots and Cloning:** Virtualization allows for snapshots and cloning, which are essential for backup, testing, and disaster recovery. Snapshots capture the exact state of a VM at a given point, while cloning creates exact duplicates, facilitating environment replication and rollback [49].
- **Virtual Networking and Storage:** Virtualized environments support advanced networking setups (e.g., virtual switches) and storage (e.g., storage area networks) that enable isolated networking and flexible storage allocation, critical for scalability and redundancy in virtualized infrastructure [47].

- **Resource Efficiency and Scalability:** Virtualization allows hardware consolidation by running multiple VMs on a single host, reducing energy and operational costs. This flexibility enhances scalability, as additional VMs can be created as demand grows, aligning resources dynamically with application requirements [60].

Docker

Docker is a leading platform for containerization, providing an efficient method for running applications in isolated environments called containers. Developed by Docker, Inc., the platform enables seamless creation, management, and orchestration of containers, forming a foundation for deploying applications across diverse environments with consistency and efficiency.

- **Container Basics:** Containers are a lightweight, efficient alternative to virtual machines (VMs). Unlike VMs, which require a separate OS for each instance, containers share the host OS kernel, reducing overhead and enabling faster deployments with minimal resource consumption. Docker containers, in particular, bundle applications with essential libraries and dependencies, ensuring consistent runtime behavior across systems.
- **The Docker Engine:** The Docker Engine is the core component of the Docker platform, comprising the Docker Daemon, a high-level container runtime (containerd), and a low-level runtime (runc). These work together to manage the container lifecycle, including starting, stopping, and monitoring. The modular design of Docker is aligned with the Open Container Initiative (OCI) standards, ensuring compatibility with other container tools. The current Docker Engine's architecture is shown in the figure D.1.




Figure D.1: A high-level view of the current Docker engine architecture [45]

- **Images and Containers:** Docker images are read-only templates from which con-

ainers are created, containing application code, dependencies, and a minimal OS layer. Each image consists of multiple layers that combine at runtime, allowing for efficient storage and reusability while minimizing redundancy across containers. [45]

- **Networking and Orchestration:** Docker includes networking solutions that facilitate container communication. This includes bridge networks for host-based networking and overlay networks for distributed applications. Docker Compose and Docker Swarm enable deployment and management of multi-container applications, simplifying orchestration in scenarios where containers work together as part of a larger system.
- **Security Features:** Docker incorporates security measures through container isolation mechanisms such as namespaces and control groups, ensuring that containers operate independently. It also integrates Transport Layer Security (TLS) for secure communication between nodes in a Docker Swarm, alongside access control and image signature verification to maintain application integrity. [45]

Docker's architecture supports modern development practices like DevOps and microservices by enabling organizations to achieve portability and scalability in application deployment, providing a reliable way to transition applications from development to production environments without compatibility concerns.

Ansible

Ansible is an open-source automation tool widely used for configuration management, application deployment, and infrastructure orchestration. Designed to be agentless, Ansible operates through secure SSH connections, making it efficient and lightweight across diverse environments. With its YAML-based configuration files, known as playbooks, Ansible provides a streamlined, human-readable syntax that facilitates automation. [20]

Technical Overview

- **Playbooks and YAML Syntax:** Playbooks are the core of Ansible's operations. They are written in YAML and contain sequences of plays, which in turn consist of tasks executed on defined hosts. Each task specifies a module—such as `yum` or `service`—to manage resources and services on remote nodes. Playbooks thus offer a systematic approach to automation by ensuring ordered and repeatable tasks. The figure X shows an example of a Playbook Syntax :

```
1  ---
2  - hosts: all
3    become: yes
4
5    tasks:
6      - name: Ensure chrony (for time synchronization) is installed
7        yum:
8          name: chrony
9          state: present
10
11      - name: Ensure chrony is running.
12        service:
13          name: chronyd
14          state: started
15          enabled: yes
```

Figure D.2: Example of YAML file [20]

- **Inventory Management:** Ansible's inventory file identifies the target hosts, which can be organized into groups for more granular control. Each host or group can have specific variables, supporting flexibility across environments. Additionally, dynamic inventory scripts can automate host discovery from cloud providers, integrating seamlessly with cloud-based infrastructure.
- **Modules and Ad-Hoc Commands:** Ansible provides a comprehensive library of modules covering a wide range of operations, from networking to file management. These modules are reusable scripts that execute discrete tasks, allowing for standardized configurations. Ad-hoc commands further enhance Ansible's utility by enabling direct module execution from the command line, suitable for quick adjustments or debugging without needing a full playbook.
- **SSH and Connection Handling:** Ansible relies on SSH to securely interact with managed nodes. By default, it uses OpenSSH, with Paramiko as an alternative option. To optimize task execution, Ansible supports features like pipelining, which reduces connection overhead by transferring fewer files during task execution, activated by setting `pipelining=True` in the configuration.
- **Roles and Best Practices:** Ansible's "roles" feature provides a structured approach for organizing tasks, variables, and handlers. Roles encourage modularity and reusability by dividing configurations into structured directories. For instance, default variables can be stored in `defaults/main.yml` and adjusted as needed, while role-specific variables reside in `vars/main.yml`, ensuring consistent, manageable configurations.
- **Security and Ansible Vault:** Ansible Vault is a built-in feature for encrypting sensitive information, such as credentials or API keys, within playbooks. This security measure utilizes AES-256 encryption and can be managed via password files or scripts, providing confidentiality during automated tasks.

- **Advanced Features and Use Cases:** Ansible integrates with tools like Vagrant for local development and testing. Additionally, options such as `-check` mode allow for dry runs to validate playbooks without executing changes, and `-become` enables privilege escalation when administrative rights are necessary. Real-world playbooks often include complex setups, such as deploying a Node.js application on a CentOS server, where Ansible manages the entire process—from package installation to configuration and operational maintenance.
- **Ansible Molecule** Molecule is a specialized testing framework for Ansible roles and playbooks that ensures infrastructure code functions as intended before deployment. It enables developers to simulate and verify configurations across multiple environments, thus aligning with Infrastructure as Code (IaC) best practices by incorporating automated testing into infrastructure management workflows. Molecule allows the use of various drivers, including Docker, VirtualBox, and cloud platforms, for versatile testing setups.

Using a "test-driven development" (TDD) approach, Molecule facilitates testing at each stage of an Ansible role's lifecycle—from initial development through to deployment. The framework includes support for linting, syntax checks, and idempotence testing, where each run achieves the same end state without altering existing configurations if rerun. This aspect is particularly useful for preventing unexpected infrastructure changes, ensuring Ansible roles are consistent and predictable (Geerling, Ansible for DevOps).

Molecule operates with a modular structure and integrates CI/CD tools and platforms like GitHub Actions, Jenkins, and GitLab, streamlining continuous deployment for IaC projects. This focus on modularity also allows for integration with Ansible's extensive plugin ecosystem, such as Ansible Lint, which ensures adherence to syntax and style standards. Molecule's comprehensive testing cycle reflects its emphasis on robust and adaptable infrastructure configuration, addressing the demand for reliable automation tools in modern DevOps practices

Vagrant

Vagrant is an open-source tool developed by HashiCorp that automates the creation, configuration, and management of virtual environments, supporting DevOps practices through consistent and reproducible environments. By abstracting interactions with virtualization providers, Vagrant enables rapid setup of complex environments for development and testing.

Technical Overview

- **Virtualization Abstraction:** Vagrant acts as a cross-platform interface for managing virtual machines. It integrates with providers such as VirtualBox, VMware, Docker, and Hyper-V, enabling users to define and manage environments without needing to directly interface with the virtualization software. [26]
- **Configuration with Vagrantfile:** The `Vagrantfile` is Vagrant's primary configuration file, defining the base image, network settings, provisioning scripts, and shared folders. Written in Ruby, the `Vagrantfile` supports version control, enabling reproducible environments across different development setups. [28]

- **Provisioning Capabilities:** Vagrant can provision VMs using tools like Ansible, Chef, and Puppet, automating software and dependency setups. This integration supports Infrastructure as Code (IaC) practices, as configurations can be scripted and applied consistently across environments. [27])
- **Multi-Machine Configurations:** Vagrant enables the orchestration of multiple virtual machines within a single environment, supporting complex infrastructure setups (e.g., database and web servers) defined in one `Vagrantfile`. This feature is crucial for testing distributed systems in environments that resemble production setups. [25]
- **Environment Consistency and Cross-Platform Compatibility:** Vagrant ensures consistent setups across different development machines by standardizing configurations in the `Vagrantfile`. This portability reduces configuration drift, making Vagrant valuable for team collaboration and continuous integration workflows. [19]

Large Language Models (LLMs)

Large Language Models (LLMs), like GPT-3 and GPT-4, are advanced neural networks designed to understand and generate natural language. They rely on the transformer architecture, introduced by Vaswani et al. in 2017, which brought a breakthrough in natural language processing (NLP) by handling long-range dependencies more effectively. Here's an in-depth explanation of the key components and stages involved in the construction and training of these models, including each concept's purpose and function. [56]

- **Transformer architecture:** The transformer architecture is the foundation of modern LLMs. Unlike RNNs (Recurrent Neural Networks) and LSTMs (Long Short-Term Memory networks), the transformer can process entire sequences in parallel rather than sequentially. This is achieved through an attention-based mechanism and makes transformers highly scalable for large language models. Transformers consist of two primary blocks: an encoder and a decoder, although most generative language models only use the decoder block. [56]
- **Attention mechanism:** The attention mechanism allows the model to focus on specific parts of the input sequence. The transformer uses “multi-head attention,” where multiple “attention heads” each focus on different aspects of the sequence. For each word in the sequence, the model calculates three vectors: query, key, and value. The similarity between query and key vectors determines the attention weight for each word, allowing the model to weigh words differently depending on their relevance. These weights are then applied to the value vectors, creating a context-aware representation for each word. [56]
- **Causal self-attention:** In autoregressive LLMs, such as GPT-3 and GPT-4, a variant called causal self-attention is used. In this setup, each word in the sequence can only attend to the words that came before it. This ensures that the model does not “see the future” when predicting the next word, making it suitable for sequential generation tasks like text generation. [37]

- **Layer normalization and residual connections:** Transformers use layer normalization and residual connections around the attention and feedforward layers. Layer normalization stabilizes the model by scaling inputs within a layer, which speeds up training and prevents gradient issues. Residual connections, on the other hand, are used to prevent information loss across layers by adding the input of each layer directly to its output.
- **Feedforward layers:** Each attention block is followed by a feedforward neural network that applies a non-linear transformation to each position's representation independently. This helps the model to refine and enhance the contextual representation of each word.
- **Embedding and positional encoding:** LLMs require an embedding layer to convert words or tokens into dense vectors of fixed dimensionality. This layer captures semantic information, enabling the model to understand relationships between words (like synonyms or associations). Since transformers do not inherently interpret the order of words, positional encoding is added to embeddings to encode positional information. This can be done through sinusoidal or learned positional encodings, which help the model distinguish the positions of tokens within a sequence.
- **Large-scale training phase:** Training LLMs involves vast datasets and extensive computational power. This training phase has several critical steps. Models are initially trained on a vast corpus of data through language modeling tasks—most often an autoregressive objective (predicting the next word in a sequence). This approach leverages large datasets (e.g., extensive text from the internet) and requires significant computational resources. Optimization is usually achieved using stochastic gradient descent with advanced optimizers, such as Adam, to update model weights.
- **Fine-tuning:** Following pre-training, models are often fine-tuned on specific tasks or datasets to improve performance in targeted applications. Fine-tuning can involve supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning techniques, like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). This latter approach uses feedback from humans to adjust model outputs toward desired responses, making the model safer and more aligned with human preferences.
- **Memory and long-sequence management:** Managing long sequences efficiently is essential for LLMs, as the computational cost increases quadratically with sequence length. Various methods have been introduced to optimize memory usage, including sparse attention or local attention windows, which limit the attention to nearby tokens, reducing computation while preserving the model's capacity to handle long-range dependencies.
- **Regularization techniques and precision control:** LLMs utilize various regularization techniques such as dropout (which randomly drops neurons during training) and weight decay (which reduces weight magnitudes) to prevent overfitting. Additionally, weight quantization and mixed-precision training (using lower precision arithmetic) can be used to reduce memory usage and increase training efficiency, which is vital for handling models with billions of parameters.

- **Deployment and inference optimization:** Once trained, LLMs must be optimized for deployment in production environments. The inference process can be computationally demanding, so it's often enhanced through techniques like weight pruning or knowledge distillation. Weight pruning removes redundant parameters, and knowledge distillation transfers knowledge from a large model to a smaller, faster model. Caching intermediate computations is also used to provide faster responses, which is especially useful for real-time interactions.
- **Ethics and safety measures:** Ethics and safety are paramount in LLMs due to their potential to generate harmful or biased outputs. Content filtering and guardrails are implemented to minimize these risks, ensuring that the model adheres to guidelines and avoids unintended content generation.
- **Conclusion:** In summary, LLMs are complex systems that rely on innovations in attention mechanisms, large-scale training on vast datasets, and optimizations for deployment. These models require immense computational infrastructure to train and deploy, but they enable highly sophisticated language understanding and generation capabilities. Each component, from embedding to inference optimization, contributes to the LLM's ability to perform a range of natural language tasks.

GHOST: Deploying NPCs with Targeted Large Language Model Integration

The GHOSTS (Generating Host Objects for Simulated Training and Scenarios) framework, developed by Carnegie Mellon University's SEI, is an open-source tool that creates and manages simulated NPC (non-player character) behaviors on a network, designed primarily for cyber training and experimentation. Through its flexible API, GHOSTS supports orchestrating complex scenarios that mimic real-world network behaviors, allowing cybersecurity teams to test responses, analyze vulnerabilities, and improve defense mechanisms in realistic settings. [34]

GHOSTS API and Components The GHOSTS API acts as the central controller, managing NPC activities across different client machines. It operates on Docker containers, making it easier to deploy and configure in varied environments. The API can handle multiple scenarios simultaneously by using "timelines" that dictate specific actions for NPCs, such as web browsing, document creation, and email interactions. These activities can be randomized or tailored to simulate particular user behavior patterns, enhancing the realism of cybersecurity exercises. [33]

Key Components API Server: The API server coordinates NPC activities, manages client connections, and facilitates scenario timelines. It's often used with a database (now PostgreSQL) for data persistence, ensuring reliable storage of activity logs and configurations. Clients: GHOSTS clients operate on Windows and Linux and act as the simulated "hosts" performing tasks. Each client can be configured for different actions, such as web browsing, sending emails, or creating documents, making it versatile for replicating various user behaviors.

Grafana Integration : The GHOSTS API integrates with Grafana for visualizing activity data, which is crucial for monitoring and analyzing scenario outcomes in real-time or

post-exercise.

How It Works Through its structured timeline approach, the API schedules and synchronizes tasks across NPCs, using WebSockets to maintain continuous communication between the server and clients. This minimizes latency and allows for near-real-time activity orchestration. Additionally, GHOSTS provides a user interface for managing machine groups and timeline deployments, enhancing usability for large-scale simulations.

The framework has expanded to include functionalities for social interactions and content generation via LLM integration, enabling NPCs to exhibit more sophisticated, human-like responses in training simulations.

This comprehensive API and modular approach make GHOSTS suitable for creating dynamic, high-fidelity simulation environments for cybersecurity training and testing purposes.

Janus

Developed under the guidance of Dr. Jérôme Dossogne PhD, the Janus project is an adaptive cyber-range designed to provide customized cybersecurity training. Built on an Infrastructure as Code (IaC) and Configuration as Code (CaC) foundation, Janus uses tools like Vagrant and Ansible for automated, reproducible deployment. This cyber-range leverages a vulnerability database and dynamic scenario generator, enabling challenges to be adjusted to each user's skill level.

Janus employs a modular architecture combining virtual machines and Docker containers, ensuring secure environment isolation and flexibility for integrating new vulnerabilities or services as needed. Communication with the simulated agents is facilitated via Mattermost, creating an immersive, interactive experience. The architecture is depicted in the following figure.




Figure D.3: Janus architecture

Social Engineering

social engineering merges psychological manipulation with information security, using tactics to obtain unauthorized access by exploiting human behavior rather than technical defenses. Foundational works by Christopher Hadnagy and Robert Cialdini provide critical insights into the psychological aspects that social engineers exploit to influence

individuals. This background section will draw from their research to examine key **social engineering** principles, techniques, emotional triggers, and countermeasures. [8] [24].

- **Psychological Principles of Influence (Cialdini):** Robert Cialdini's six principles of persuasion, reciprocity, commitment, social proof, authority, liking, and scarcity—form the foundation for many **social engineering** techniques. These principles exploit ingrained behaviors that prompt individuals to comply with requests without fully analyzing the risks.
 - **Reciprocity:** Leveraging the tendency to return favors, attackers may provide seemingly helpful information or assistance, inducing a sense of obligation to reciprocate, which can lead to sharing sensitive information.
 - **Commitment and Consistency:** Once an individual commits to an action, they are more likely to follow through on related requests. Social engineers use this by starting with minor, low-risk requests that incrementally escalate.
 - **Social Proof and Authority:** Social engineers may impersonate trusted figures or peers to convey that complying with a request aligns with group behavior or is endorsed by authority.
 - **Liking and Scarcity:** Building rapport through flattery or presenting time-sensitive requests creates a sense of urgency and trust, causing individuals to respond without question.
- **Core social engineering Techniques (Hadnagy):** Christopher Hadnagy's analysis categorizes **social engineering** methods into practical tactics commonly seen in real-world attacks.
 - **Pretexting:** Attackers create credible scenarios to gain trust. With comprehensive research, they pose as an authority figure, such as an IT technician, prompting targets to divulge sensitive information.
 - **Phishing and Spear Phishing:** Phishing attacks deliver deceptive emails or messages to trick recipients into sharing credentials or downloading malware. Spear phishing adds a level of personalization, increasing its effectiveness.
 - **Impersonation, Tailgating, and Baiting:** Impersonation involves posing as trusted personnel, while tailgating enables unauthorized access to restricted areas. Baiting employs curiosity-inducing items like USB drives to prompt interaction.
 - **Quid Pro Quo and Dumpster Diving:** Quid pro quo offers a benefit in exchange for information. Dumpster diving involves retrieving discarded physical or digital data, potentially containing confidential information.
- **Emotional Manipulation and Cognitive Biases:** Emotional triggers are critical in bypassing rational decision-making:
 - **Fear, Curiosity, and Greed:** These emotions drive impulsive actions. Social engineers often create artificial crises, like security alerts, or use enticing messages to provoke curiosity or greed.

- **Authority and Confirmation Biases:** Individuals are likely to comply with perceived authority, and social engineers exploit this by impersonating figures of power. Confirmation bias is used to align with the target's preconceptions, reducing scrutiny.
- **Advanced social engineering Strategies and Green Team Simulations:** In advanced scenarios, social engineers deploy multi-stage attacks that combine reconnaissance, pretexting, and phishing. Green Team simulations are used to evaluate an organization's resilience by simulating these realistic social engineering scenarios in a controlled environment, allowing teams to assess employee awareness and response to different techniques.
- **Mitigation Techniques:** Countermeasures for social engineering include:
 - **Awareness Training and Behavioral Cues:** Regular, scenario-based training educates employees on detecting and responding to social engineering attempts, enhancing overall vigilance.
 - **Policy Enforcement and Technical Safeguards:** Policies that enforce strict access controls and technical safeguards like multi-factor authentication (MFA) add layers of defense against unauthorized access.

social engineering leverages psychological vulnerabilities to bypass technical defenses, making it crucial for organizations to incorporate human-centered security measures. Hadnagy's and Cialdini's work informs these strategies, and implementing Green Team simulations can reveal potential areas for improvement.