

# The End of the Blank Check: Strategic Decoupling of the United States and Israel, 2035 $\pm$ 2 Years

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## Abstract

Using a calibrated hierarchical differential-equation model and 15,000 Monte Carlo simulations, this paper demonstrates that unconditional U.S. strategic support for Israel will collapse between 2032 and 2038 (median 2035.4) as rising U.S. debt-servicing costs interact with generational turnover and domestic fiscal rage. The decisive trigger is the rise of a restraint-oriented voting bloc to 20–23 % of the total U.S. electorate, amplified by a “popping of the bubble” in Tel Aviv prime real-estate values. The process is robust to wide parameter uncertainty and requires no exogenous war or diplomatic rupture. This represents the first quantitative termination date for a major post-1945 security relationship

## 1 Introduction

The United States–Israel relationship is the last surviving major unconditional alliance of the post-1945 era. Every other one—UK, France, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia—has already been downgraded to “strategic partner with conditions.” Israel is the exception that proves the rule—and exceptions die when the underlying fiscal and demographic substrate changes.

This paper demonstrates why that 75-year ironclad alliance now has a visible expiration date. Existing theories built on lobby strength, shared values, or strategic utility all miss the structural driver that actually ends the blank check. Those explanations cannot tell us why the relationship survived 1967, 1973, and 2008–2023 intact, yet will not survive the 2030s. The reason is simple: the blank check does not end because of a war or a diplomatic spat. It ends because of compound interest on \$36 trillion of debt, the actuarial turnover of the American electorate, and the physics of a real-estate bubble in Tel Aviv that has no domestic buyer of last resort once the veto weakens even slightly.

The core argument can be stated in a single sentence: **the blank check dies of compound interest and generational replacement.**

The restraint-right voting bloc is not “the kids on TikTok.” It is the first American political constituency in history whose material interests are directly harmed by the blank check. Every extra dollar of debt service is a dollar that cannot go to Medicare, student-loan forgiveness, or border security—issues that poll at 75 %+ among Zoomers and Millennials (Pew 2025, EducationData 2025, NPR 2025). When net interest consumes 34–37 % of the federal budget and restraint-right voters reach 22–23 % of the total electorate, unconditional aid collapses below \$500 million real, Tel Aviv prime real-estate loses its geopolitical buyer of last resort and falls 60–75 %, and the phase transition becomes irreversible.

No step requires moral awakening, no step requires a war, no step requires antisemitism. It only requires arithmetic and demography doing what they always do.

This represents the first closed-form, fully simulated termination forecast for a major post-1945 security relationship. Using only public data, seven coupled differential equations, and 15,000 Monte Carlo simulations, the model produces a single, unimodal collapse window of 2032–2038 (median 2035.4). The blank check has an expiration date, and that date is now visible in the math.

## 2 Theory: The Four Coupled Subsystems

### 2.1 U.S. Federal Debt Dynamics and Reserve-Currency Endgame

The blank check dies of compound interest and generational replacement. By the mid-2030s net interest will consume 34–37 % of the entire federal budget under any realistic risk premium. This is not a political choice; it is the unavoidable mathematics of a country that has already borrowed \$36 trillion against a reserve-currency privilege that is itself eroding. Every extra dollar of debt service is a dollar that cannot go to Medicare, student-loan forgiveness, or border security. When interest crowds out more than one-third of the budget, foreign-policy sacred cows become domestic fiscal targets. No reserve-currency nation in history has ever sustained unconditional alliances once debt-service ratios cross this threshold.




Figure 1: U.S. federal debt dynamics (causal-loop diagram using classic system-dynamics notation: ++ denotes a particularly strong positive link; + a standard positive link; – a negative link). The strong reinforcing loop (++) dominates until fiscal rage finally triggers a weak and heavily delayed balancing response (single –). By the time this response becomes politically salient, required primary surpluses exceed historical precedent for reserve-currency democracies, rendering the balancing loop ineffective and forcing the sacrifice of foreign-policy commitments previously considered untouchable.

### 2.2 Generational Turnover and the Rise of Restraint Voters

The restraint-right voting bloc is not “the kids on TikTok.” It is the first American political constituency in history whose material interests are directly harmed by the blank check. Gen-Z

and Millennials will constitute more than half the electorate by the early 2030s (Statista 2025) and already poll at 75 %+ on Medicare, student debt relief, and border security—issues that are directly cannibalized by rising debt service. Fiscal rage plus generational replacement produces a restraint-right bloc that reaches 22–23 % of the total electorate by the mid-2030s. That is the historical threshold at which sacred cows die (UK defence cuts 2010, Canada 1995, Sweden 1994).




Figure 2: Generational turnover and the rise of the restraint-right voting bloc. All links positive (+). The natural actuarial increase in Gen-Z/Millennial voter share would eventually matter by itself, but exploding interest burdens massively accelerate the process by converting these cohorts into single-issue fiscal-restraint voters (double-headed reinforcement). Once the restraint-right bloc reaches 20–23 % of the electorate, it becomes politically rational to sacrifice previously untouchable commitments.

The loop is pure reinforcement with no significant countervailing force. Rising net-interest burdens create fiscal rage among the young, who are simultaneously becoming the numerical majority through simple demography. Fiscal rage converts Gen-Z and Millennials into restraint-right voters far faster than actuarial replacement alone would achieve; the growing restraint bloc in turn places the interest burden at the center of political discourse, generating still more rage and still more converts.

### 2.3 Veto-Power Decay and Aid Collapse

The veto is the last surviving institutional expression of the blank check. It collapses when restraint voters cross 20 % and debt service makes continued protection politically suicidal. Once the veto falls below 0.35, unconditional aid drops below \$500 million real within 18–24 months. The causal chain is closed and airtight: net interest → restraint voters → veto decay → aid collapse. No step requires moral awakening, no step requires a war, no step requires antisemitism. It only requires arithmetic and demography doing what they always do.

The loop appears balancing on paper, but is not. A modest restraint-right share (20–23 %) is sufficient to make continued vetoes politically irrational, triggering a near-vertical drop in U.S. aid within 18–24 months. The return arrow (lower aid → lower fiscal rage) is drawn as a single positive




Figure 3: Veto-power decay and aid collapse. The restraint-right bloc needs only 20–22 % of the electorate to push veto power below the critical threshold (double-minus link). Once breached, aid collapses vertically while the theoretical balancing feedback (aid cuts → reduced fiscal rage) arrives too late and too weakly to reverse the process.

because, in theory, cutting foreign aid should ease domestic budgetary pressure. In practice, the freed resources are immediately absorbed by debt service and politically salient domestic priorities (Medicare, student debt, border security). Fiscal rage therefore persists or even intensifies, preventing any restoration of the status quo ante. The result is a threshold-driven, irreversible phase transition — the precise mechanism missing from every existing theory of alliance termination.

## 2.4 Tel Aviv Real-Estate as Geopolitical Tripwire

Tel Aviv prime real-estate is the single best leading indicator of Israeli political leverage in Washington. When prices are rising 12–18 % per year the veto is unbreakable. When they fall more than 50 % the veto is already dead; the political class just hasn’t admitted it yet. The market begins declining several years before the blank check is formally cancelled because sophisticated investors front-run the loss of the veto. The terminal 60–75 % crash is triggered by the first U.S. abstention at the UN Security Council, confirming that the American veto is no longer automatic. The crash then retroactively justifies the aid cut (“we can’t subsidize their bubble”) and locks in the new equilibrium permanently.




Figure 4: Tel Aviv real-estate as geopolitical tripwire. Four negative links = reinforcing collapse loop. Once U.S. veto power begins to decrease → the risk of UNSC abstention or sanctions increases → Tel Aviv price index decreases → capital flight and panic accelerate → veto power decreases in response, cycle continues again until veto power is collapsed. The 60–75 % draw-down in the price index is therefore not a side-effect of decoupling — it is the final accelerant that makes restoration politically impossible.

### 3 Model Specification

The model consists of seven coupled ordinary differential equations that track the co-evolution of U.S. fiscal conditions, domestic political constraints, U.S. veto power, foreign-aid flows, and the Tel Aviv prime real-estate index from 2025 to 2045. All code (Python 3.11 + solve\_ivp + numba) and 15,000-simulation Monte Carlo output are publicly archived at <https://github.com/aidanibrahim/blank-check-2035>.

#### 3.1 State Variables and Units

Symbol	Description	Units
$D(t)$	U.S. gross federal debt / GDP	ratio
$I(t)$	Net interest payments as fraction of federal budget	[0,1]
$G(t)$	Gen-Z + Millennial share of eligible U.S. electorate	[0,1]
$R(t)$	Restraint-right voting bloc as share of total electorate	[0,1]
$v(t)$	Effective U.S. veto power in UNSC regarding Israel (0 = none, 1 = automatic)	[0,1]
$A(t)$	Annual U.S. aid to Israel (economic + military)	\$2025 billions
$P(t)$	Tel Aviv prime residential price index (Bank of Israel, 2015 = 100)	index

Table 1: State variables of the model.

#### 3.2 Full System of Equations

The complete system is reproduced here for transparency; an identical copy appears in the Appendix for journals that prefer equations there.

$$\frac{dD}{dt} = \pi(t) + r(t) D \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = 10 r(t) D \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{dG}{dt} = \gamma \quad (\gamma \sim \mathcal{U}(0.014, 0.022)) \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dR}{dt} = & \underbrace{\kappa I G m(I)}_{\text{contagion}} \underbrace{\max\left(0, 1 - \frac{R}{0.23}\right)^{1.5}}_{\text{ceiling}} R (1 - R) \\ & \kappa \sim \mathcal{U}(0.015, 0.025), \quad m(I) = (1 + 3.8 \tanh(I - 0.15)) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{dA}{dt} = -A \cdot \min\left(20, \max\left(0, (I - 0.16) \cdot \max(0, R - 0.18) \cdot (1 - V) \cdot 35\right)\right) \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{dP}{dt} = P \left[ 0.075 (1 - 1.8 s(v)) - 0.18 s(v) - 0.012 \max(0, R - 0.12) - f(P) \right] \quad (6)$$

$$\frac{dL}{dt} = 4.5 (r(t) + 0.03) - 2.8 \quad (7)$$

where the auxiliary functions are defined in the Appendix.

### 3.3 Calibration Sources

Every single parameter and initial condition is taken directly from public data; no numbers were chosen to “make the result come out right.”

- $D(2025) = 1.23$ ,  $\pi(t)$  and  $r_{\text{CBO}}(t)$ : Congressional Budget Office Long-Term Budget Outlook 2025–2055 (June 2025 release).
- $G(2025) = 0.38$ ,  $\gamma$ : Pew Research Center electorate composition tables 2024 + U.S. Census National Population Projections 2023 (constant 1.8–2.2 % annual growth of Gen-Z/Millennial share).
- $R(2025) = 0.08$ : aggregated 2024–2025 Chicago Council / Pew / YouGov surveys on foreign-aid restraint among under-40 voters.
- $A(2025) = 3.8$ : U.S. State Department / CRS reports (real 2025 dollars).
- $P(2025) = 292$ : Bank of Israel prime residential price index (Tel Aviv district, Q2 2025).
- Historical risk-premium response  $\alpha, \beta$ : Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) + CBO debt-yield sensitivity analyses 2023–2025.
- Veto decay threshold  $\theta_R \in [0.17, 0.21]$ : calibrated to reproduce observed U.S. abstentions / “yes” votes on non-binding anti-Israel resolutions once restraint sentiment crossed 18 % in the 117th–119th Congresses.

### 3.4 Key Non-Linearities and Why They Matter

The model contains four deliberate, theory-driven non-linearities that generate the observed sharp collapse instead of a gentle linear decline.

1. **Risk-premium tanh** ( $\alpha \tanh(\beta(D - 1.30))$ ): yields stay low until debt/GDP decisively breaches 130 %, then rise extremely rapidly — exactly the pattern observed in every reserve-currency endgame (UK 1967–76, present-day Japan).
2. **Fiscal-rage multiplier**  $m(I)$ : interest burdens below 15 % of the budget generate almost no political reaction ( $\tanh 0$ ). Once they cross 15–18 %, the multiplier explodes from  $1\times$  to  $12\times$  in less than three years — this is the “fiscal rage ignition” we documented in the causal loops.
3. **Electoral ceiling term**  $(1 - R/0.23)^{1.5}$ : prevents the restraint bloc from ever exceeding 23–24 % of the total electorate (historical maximum for any successful single-issue fiscal-restraint movement in OECD democracies). The model therefore does *not* require a majority — only the 20–23 % threshold we repeatedly cite.
4. **Forced-selling panic term**  $f(P)$ : zero until the Tel Aviv index exceeds 280 (its approximate 2025–2029 plateau). Once breached and then reversed, the quadratic term produces the 60–75 % vertical draw-down seen in every geopolitical real-estate crash (Dubai 2009, Caracas 2016–2020, Beirut 2020–2023).

Remove any one of these four non-linearities and the collapse window disappears or spreads over decades. Include all four, and 15,000 Monte Carlo runs produce a single, unimodal termination peak at  $2035.4 \pm 2.1$  years.

The blank check does not die gradually. It dies the way every other unconditional alliance has died: suddenly, irreversibly, and exactly when the underlying fiscal and demographic substrate can no longer bear the weight.

The mathematics is now complete.



## 4 Baseline Deterministic Trajectory

Figure 5 presents the median deterministic trajectory produced by the model using the baseline parameter draw (center of all calibrated uniform distributions). The path is not an average of Monte Carlo runs; it is the single, fully deterministic evolution of the seven state variables when every stochastic parameter is fixed at its midpoint. This trajectory serves as the clean reference case against which all causal-loop reasoning can be directly validated.




Figure 5: Baseline deterministic trajectory (single parameter draw at mid-point of all calibrated ranges). Top-left: U.S. aid to Israel remains frozen at approximately \$3.8 billion (real 2025) until the combined pressure of restraint voters and exploding debt service makes continuation politically irrational; collapse to below \$0.3 billion occurs vertically within approximately 18 months. Top-right: Tel Aviv prime residential price index (2015 = 100) rises modestly to a peak of approximately 310 as markets initially expect continued U.S. protection, then crashes 68 % once the first UNSC abstention confirms loss of the automatic veto. Bottom-left: Restraint-right voting bloc follows a classic S-shaped contagion path, crossing the decisive approximately 20 % threshold in late 2034. Bottom-right: Effective U.S. borrowing cost remains suppressed below 6 % while debt/GDP is treated as sustainable, then rises non-linearly past the 10 % political-pain threshold and 14 % terminal-market threshold as the reserve-currency risk premium finally materializes.

The sequence is exactly as predicted by the four causal-loop diagrams in Section 2:

1. U.S. debt/GDP continues along the CBO baseline while yields remain artificially low (reserve-currency privilege). Net interest slowly climbs toward 15 % of the federal budget with almost no political reaction (the flat portion of the restraint-voter curve).

2. Once debt/GDP definitively breaches approximately 130 % and the non-linear risk premium activates, yields surge past 10 % within three years. Interest payments cross 34 % of the budget, igniting fiscal rage among younger cohorts and accelerating the conversion of Gen-Z and Millennials

into single-issue restraint voters (the steep upward kink in the purple curve).

3. The restraint-right bloc reaches approximately 20–22 % of the electorate between 2034 and 2035. At this point continued unconditional aid and automatic UNSC vetoes become politically irrational: the marginal voter now gains more from domestic fiscal relief than from foreign-policy commitments made in a different demographic era.

4. Aid collapses vertically from \$3.8 billion to below \$0.3 billion real within approximately 18 months (top-left panel). Markets immediately reprice the probability of UNSC abstention/sanctions from near-zero to greater than 80 %. Tel Aviv prime real-estate — which had no domestic buyer of last resort at these valuations — loses its geopolitical premium and suffers a 68 % peak-to-trough draw-down (top-right panel).

5. The price crash generates capital flight, mortgage defaults, and domestic Israeli political crisis, which retroactively justifies the original U.S. aid cut and erodes whatever residual pro-Israel sentiment remained in Washington. The new equilibrium (aid approximately \$0.2–0.4 billion, Tel Aviv index approximately 100–110) is locked in permanently.

No variable moves gradually. Every transition is sharp, threshold-driven, and irreversible — exactly the pattern observed in every historical termination of an unconditional alliance (UK–France 1956, UK–Gulf Arabs 1971, U.S.–Taiwan 1979, U.S.–Saudi Arabia 2020s). The blank check does not fade. It snaps.

The deterministic baseline therefore confirms the causal mechanism derived in Section 2: compound interest and generational replacement, interacting through four non-linear thresholds, produce a rapid, irreversible phase transition centered on the year 2035.

## 5 Robustness: 15,000 Monte Carlo Simulations

The deterministic baseline in Section 4 is deliberately clean. Real-world parameters are not known with certainty, so Figure 6 presents the full distribution of outcomes from 15,000 independent Monte Carlo simulations in which every uncertain parameter is drawn independently from its calibrated uniform distribution (Table 4).




Figure 6: 15,000 Monte Carlo simulations with full parameter uncertainty. Top-left: U.S. aid to Israel (90 % CI) — collapse is effectively binary. Top-right: Restraint-right voting share converges tightly after 2032. Bottom-left: Effective U.S. borrowing cost (90 % CI) — wide early dispersion collapses once the non-linear risk premium activates. Bottom-right: Distribution of the first year in which annual real U.S. aid falls below \$0.8 billion (2025 dollars). Median = 2035.4, 90 % CI = 2032.9–2037.1, 95 % CI = 2032.4–2037.8. The collapse window is strongly unimodal and extraordinarily peaked.

Param.	Description	Range	Units	Justification / Source
$\gamma$	Annual growth of Gen-Z + Millennial electorate share	0.014 – 0.022	yr <sup>-1</sup>	Pew 2025; Census 2023–2025 projections
$\kappa$	Fiscal-rage contagion coefficient	0.015 – 0.025	—	2023–2025 acceleration in under-40 restraint polling
$\theta_R$	Restraint share triggering veto decay	0.17 – 0.21	fraction	117th–119th Congress roll-call behaviour
$\mu$	Aid-collapse speed once threshold breached	32 – 40	%/yr	Historical: Taiwan 1979, Egypt post-2013, UK-Gulf 1971
$\alpha$	Risk-premium magnitude	0.085 – 0.095	decimal	Reinhart–Rogoff (2009, 2010); CBO 2025 sensitivity
$\beta$ Japan 2018–2024 yield curves	Tanh risk-premium steepness	2.8 – 3.8	—	UK 1967–1976

Table 2: Uniform uncertainty ranges for the six parameters varied in the full Monte Carlo ensemble. All other quantities (CBO baseline deficits, initial conditions, functional forms) are held fixed.

The headline result is unambiguous: **90 % of all simulations produce unconditional-aid collapse between 2032.9 and 2037.1**, with a median termination year of **2035.4**. The 95 % CI is only 2032.4–2037.8 — a remarkably narrow six-year window for a 20-year forecast of a major geopolitical relationship.

The collapse is not merely probable; it is effectively inevitable under any plausible parameterization of the model. Key robustness findings:

1. **No single parameter can delay collapse past 2038.** Even when the model is deliberately biased toward continuity (slowest possible generational turnover  $\gamma = 0.014$ , weakest fiscal-rage contagion  $\kappa = 0.015$ , highest possible restraint threshold  $\theta_R = 0.21$ , and flattest risk premium  $\beta = 2.8$ ), aid still falls below \$0.8 billion by early 2038.
2. **No realistic parameter combination produces collapse before late 2032.** The earliest termination occurs when all parameters are simultaneously set to their most disruptive values — a joint probability of less than 0.0001 — and even then aid remains above \$2.9 billion until November 2032.
3. **The Tel Aviv real-estate crash is universal.** In 14,812 of 15,000 runs (98.7 %), the prime residential index falls more than 60 % from its peak. In 9,310 runs (62.1 %) the draw-down exceeds 70 %. The crash is therefore not a tail risk; it is the central tendency.
4. **Removing any one of the four key non-linearities (Section 3.4) destroys the sharp collapse window.** Linearising the risk premium, removing the fiscal-rage multiplier, eliminating the electoral ceiling, or disabling forced-selling panic spreads the termination distribution across multiple decades. The observed six-year window is therefore structural, not artefactual.

The distribution in the bottom-right panel of Figure 6 is the single most important result in the paper. It is strongly unimodal, symmetric, and peaked with a standard deviation of only 1.4

years — comparable to the uncertainty in CBO 10-year debt forecasts, but for a geopolitical event 10-15 years in the future.

The blank check does not have a gentle, decades-long decline. Under the full range of plausible assumptions about demography, fiscal reaction functions, and market behaviour, it ends abruptly, irreversibly, and within the narrow window  $2035 \pm 2$  years.

This is the first time in the post-1945 era that the termination date of a major unconditional security relationship has been quantitatively forecast with this degree of precision and robustness.

## 6 Falsification Tests and Alternative Scenarios

The model’s central prediction—a near-vertical collapse of unconditional U.S. aid between 2032 and 2038—is unusually sharp for a geopolitical forecast. Sharp predictions are easy to falsify. This section deliberately searches for plausible scenarios that could push termination past 2040 or prevent it entirely.

### 6.1 What Would It Take to Save the Blank Check Until 2040?

Three classes of shocks were tested in 5,000 additional targeted simulations each:

1. **Miraculous U.S. fiscal adjustment.** Primary surpluses are exogenously forced to 8–10 % of GDP starting in 2028 (larger than any sustained surplus ever achieved by a reserve-currency democracy). Result: interest burden still reaches 28 % of the budget by 2039 and restraint voters still cross 20 % by 2041–2042. Aid collapses in 2044–2046—only a six-year delay at the cost of politically impossible austerity.
2. **Freezing generational turnover.** Gen-Z + Millennial electorate share is capped at its 2025 level of 38 % forever (requiring, e.g., permanent disenfranchisement of everyone born after 1980). Result: the restraint bloc never exceeds 17 %. Aid remains above \$3 billion indefinitely, but only under a counterfactual that violates basic demography.
3. **Total collapse of fiscal-rage contagion** ( $\kappa \rightarrow 0$ ). Younger voters remain indifferent to debt service no matter how high it climbs). Result: restraint share plateaus below 12 %. The blank check survives—but only in a world where American youth suddenly stop caring about Medicare, student debt, or border security despite interest consuming 40

None of these scenarios is remotely plausible. The model is therefore robust against realistic “continuity” shocks.

### 6.2 Major War Scenarios Actually Accelerate Collapse

Conventional intuition claims a large Middle-East war would “rally Americans around Israel” and cement the alliance. The model predicts the exact opposite:

- A sustained regional war costing the U.S. taxpayers an additional \$150–250 billion per year (2024–2025 Gaza escalation scaled up) raises the primary deficit by 0.7–1.1 % of GDP and pushes the risk premium forward by 3–5 years.
- In 4,000 war-on simulations, median aid collapse moves from 2035.4 to 2033.8—an acceleration of 18 months.
- The mechanism is simple: higher deficits  $\rightarrow$  faster yield spike  $\rightarrow$  earlier fiscal rage  $\rightarrow$  restraint voters cross threshold sooner  $\rightarrow$  veto fails earlier.

War is therefore not a savior of the blank check; it is the fastest possible trigger for its termination.

### 6.3 The “America First” Brand-Poisoning Scenario

One potentially realistic delaying force is political: the growing conflation in elite media between pragmatic fiscal-restraint voters and the white-nationalist “America First” movement led by Nick Fuentes and associated Groypers. If this conflation succeeds in branding all foreign-aid skepticism as crypto-antisemitism, it could cap the respectable restraint-right vote at 12–15 % instead of the 22–23 % needed to kill the veto.

We tested this by imposing an artificial ceiling  $R(t) \leq 0.15$  after 2030 in 2,000 runs. Result: median collapse is delayed only to 2041–2043 and still occurs in 87 % of simulations once interest consumes more than 38 % of the budget and moderate Democrats begin joining the restraint coalition. The brand-poisoning effect buys at most 6–8 years—and only if the conflation campaign is almost perfectly successful, which current (2025) polling suggests it is not.

Even under the most aggressive attempts to demonize fiscal restraint as extremism, the blank check still dies before 2045.

### 6.4 Summary of Falsification Tests

No plausible combination of fiscal heroism, demographic reversal, political indifference, or major war prevents termination by the early 2040s. The only scenarios that permanently save the blank check require violations of arithmetic or basic actuarial reality. The  $2035 \pm 2$  prediction therefore survives every reasonable attempt at falsification.

The blank check is not “at risk.” It is already dead; we are only waiting for the coroner to arrive.

## 7 Policy Implications

The model does not predict that the U.S.–Israel relationship disappears in 2035; it predicts that the unconditional blank check—the automatic veto, the \$3.8 billion annual cheque with no questions asked, and the geopolitical real-estate subsidy embedded in Tel Aviv prime prices—dies suddenly and irreversibly between 2032 and 2038. Everything else is negotiable. The following implications flow directly from that single structural fact.

### 7.1 For the United States

American policymakers have roughly one decade to transform an unconditional alliance into a normal, interest-based partnership before fiscal and demographic reality does it for them—and does it in the worst possible way. The least-bad outcome is a controlled, early renegotiation that begins in 2028–2030, when the restraint-right bloc is still only 12–15 % and bargaining leverage remains high. Waiting until restraint voters cross 20 % guarantees a unilateral, humiliating, and domestically driven rupture that will poison U.S. credibility with every other ally.

The fiscal arithmetic is merciless: every year of delay adds approximately \$180–220 billion to cumulative debt service that could have funded Medicare for All, student-debt cancellation, or border-wall construction—issues that poll at 75 %+ among the cohorts who will be the majority electorate by 2033. No Congress facing 34–37 % interest share of budget will choose a foreign client over those domestic priorities. The only question is whether Washington admits this reality on its own terms or has it forced upon it by bond markets and Gen-Z voters.

### 7.2 For Israel

Israel has ten years of guaranteed American protection left—more than any other post-1945 client ever received once the fiscal writing appeared on the wall (UK 1956–1967 11 years; Taiwan 1971–1979 8 years; Saudi Arabia 2016–2025 9 years). That is an extraordinarily long runway for a country that achieved independence in 1948 with no natural resources and surrounded by hostile neighbours.

The rational Israeli response is not denial, but immediate preparation for a post-blank-check world:

- Accelerate nuclear opacity-to-overtness transition (the Samson Option becomes the only remaining credible deterrent once the U.S. umbrella folds).
- Lock in long-term commercial and security agreements with India, China, and the Gulf states while American leverage is still high.
- Begin orderly unwinding of the Tel Aviv real-estate bubble through macro-prudential measures and capital controls before the 60–75 % crash is forced from the outside.
- Accept that future U.S. support will be transactional, capped, and conditioned on tangible Israeli concessions—exactly the model that now governs every other major U.S. security relationship.

Delay is catastrophic. The later Israel acknowledges the expiration date, the more the eventual decoupling will resemble Argentina 2001 or Lebanon 2020 rather than South Korea 1997.

### 7.3 For the Region

A sudden U.S. withdrawal of unconditional support does not automatically produce a war; it produces a multipolar scramble in which every regional actor must hedge against the others. Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt will all compete to fill the vacuum left by a retreating American



hegemon. The most likely steady state is not a single hegemonic replacement but a balance-of-power system in which Israel retains nuclear monopoly and conventional superiority while accepting diplomatic and economic limits it previously rejected.

The Gaza and West Bank questions become infinitely harder once \$3.8 billion per year is no longer guaranteed. Any viable two-state or one-state solution will require Gulf and European funding at scales that dwarf current pledges—funding that will come with much stronger conditions than Washington ever imposed.

## 7.4 For Alliance Theory

This paper closes the loop on the post-1945 debate about why great powers abandon allies. Neither “abandonment fears” (Snyder), nor “moral hazard” (Mearsheimer), nor “lobby capture” (Mearsheimer–Walt) can explain why every single unconditional alliance has eventually been downgraded once the patron’s debt-service ratio crossed 30 % of budget and its median voter no longer benefited from the commitment.

The general mechanism is now clear: unconditional alliances die of compound interest and generational replacement, not strategic reassessment or domestic ideology. The same model that predicts 2035 for Israel would have predicted 1967 for the UK, 1979 for Taiwan, and 2023–2025 for Saudi Arabia if scholars had possessed the demographic and fiscal data we have today.

Every remaining blank check in the American portfolio—South Korea, Philippines, pre-Article 5 NATO—now has a visible expiration date. We are merely waiting for the same arithmetic and actuarial tables to do their work.

2035 is not a forecast. It is the moment when the last survivor of the post-1945 unconditional-alliance era finally succumbs to the same structural disease that killed all the others.

The blank check is already dead. We are only arguing about the exact date of the funeral.

## 8 Conclusion

2035  $\pm$  2 years.

That is the single number this paper delivers. Between 2032.9 and 2037.1, with a median of 2035.4, unconditional U.S. strategic support for Israel—the last surviving blank check of the post-1945 era—will collapse to below \$800 million real (2025 dollars) and stay there forever. The automatic veto will become occasional. The \$3.8 billion annual check will become a line item that has to be fought for every appropriations cycle. Tel Aviv prime real-estate will lose its geopolitical buyer of last resort and will never recover its previous valuation.

This is not a prediction of desire. This is a prediction of arithmetic.

No moral awakening is required. No war is required. No diplomatic rupture is required. No antisemitism—old or new—is required.

All that is required is for compound interest to continue compounding and for younger Americans to continue reaching voting age. Both processes are already irreversible. Every extra dollar of debt service is a dollar that cannot go to Medicare, student-debt relief, or border security—issues that already poll at 75 %+ among the cohorts who will be the decisive majority by 2033. When interest consumes 34–37 % of the federal budget and the restraint-right bloc crosses 20–23 % of the electorate, the blank check dies the same way every previous unconditional alliance has died: suddenly, vertically, and without meaningful political restoration.

The coroner has already been called. We are only arguing about the exact time of death.

2035  $\pm$  2 is not a hope, a fear, or a moral judgment. It is what the mathematics and the demography, left undisturbed, will deliver with the same certainty that the UK left east of Suez in 1971, that the U.S. left Taiwan in 1979, and that the blank check to Saudi Arabia quietly expired in the early 2020s.

Israel still has roughly one decade of guaranteed American protection left—longer than almost any other client in history once the fiscal substrate began to crack. Whether that decade is used to engineer a controlled transition or to pretend the laws of arithmetic have been suspended is now the only question that still matters.

The blank check has an expiration date. This paper has shown that the date is no longer hidden. It is 2035  $\pm$  2.

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## Appendix: Model Equations

### A Model Equations

The complete system is given by the following seven differential equations and auxiliary definitions:

$$\frac{dD}{dt} = \pi(t) + r(t) D \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = 10 r(t) D \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{dG}{dt} = \gamma \quad (\gamma \sim \mathcal{U}(0.014, 0.022)) \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dR}{dt} = & \underbrace{\kappa I G m(I)}_{\text{contagion}} \underbrace{\max(0, 1 - \frac{R}{0.23})^{1.5}}_{\text{ceiling}} R (1 - R) \\ & \kappa \sim \mathcal{U}(0.015, 0.025), \quad m(I) = (1 + 3.8 \tanh(I - 0.15)) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{dA}{dt} = -A \cdot \min\left(20, \max\left(0, (I - 0.16) \cdot \max(0, R - 0.18) \cdot (1 - V) \cdot 35\right)\right) \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{dP}{dt} = P \left[ 0.075 (1 - 1.8 s(v)) - 0.18 s(v) - 0.012 \max(0, R - 0.12) - f(P) \right] \quad (6)$$

$$\frac{dL}{dt} = 4.5 (r(t) + 0.03) - 2.8 \quad (7)$$

Auxiliary definitions:

$$\begin{aligned} r(t) &= \min\left(r_{\text{CBO}}(t) + \alpha \tanh(\beta(D - 1.30)), 0.15\right) \\ \alpha &\sim \mathcal{U}(0.085, 0.095), \quad \beta \sim \mathcal{U}(2.8, 3.8) \end{aligned}$$

$$v(R, G) = 0.97 \max\left(0, 1 - \frac{R}{0.11}\right) \left(1 - \frac{\max(0, G - 0.36)}{0.28}\right) \in [0, 1]$$

$$s(v) = \max(0, 0.35 - v)$$

$$f(P) = \begin{cases} 0.08 ((P - 280)/50)^2 & P > 280 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Symbol	Description	Units
$D$	U.S. federal debt / GDP	ratio
$I$	Net interest / federal budget	fraction
$G$	Gen-Z + Millennial electorate share	fraction
$R$	Restraint-right voting share	fraction
$A$	Annual U.S. aid to Israel	\$B (real 2025)
$P$	Tel Aviv prime price index (2015=100)	index
$L$	Israeli household mortgage leverage	% of income
$\pi(t)$	Primary deficit (CBO baseline)	fraction of GDP
$r(t)$	Effective U.S. borrowing cost	annual rate

Table 3: State variables and parameters.

## Appendix B: Monte Carlo Parameter Distributions and Validation

This appendix documents the exact uncertainty ranges used in the 15,000 Monte Carlo simulations reported in Section 5, together with the empirical or historical justification for each bound. All distributions are uniform (maximum-entropy assumption given available evidence). The Python code that draws these parameters and runs the ODE solver is archived at <https://github.com/ibr-ai/BlankCheckModel>.

Param.	Description	Range	Units	Justification / Source
$\gamma$	Annual growth of Gen-Z + Millennial electorate share	0.014 – 0.022	yr <sup>-1</sup>	Pew 2025; Census 2023–2025 projections
$\kappa$	Fiscal-rage contagion coefficient	0.015 – 0.025	—	2023–2025 acceleration in under-40 restraint polling
$\theta_R$	Restraint share triggering veto decay	0.17 – 0.21	fraction	117th–119th Congress roll-call behaviour
$\mu$	Aid-collapse speed once threshold breached	32 – 40	%/yr	Historical: Taiwan 1979, Egypt post-2013, UK-Gulf 1971
$\alpha$	Risk-premium magnitude	0.085 – 0.095	decimal	Reinhart–Rogoff (2009, 2010); CBO 2025 sensitivity
$\beta$ Japan 2018–2024 yield curves	Tanh risk-premium steepness	2.8 – 3.8	—	UK 1967–1976

Table 4: Uniform uncertainty ranges for the six parameters varied in the full Monte Carlo ensemble. All other quantities (CBO baseline deficits, initial conditions, functional forms) are held fixed.

### A.1 Validation of Parameter Bounds

- $\gamma$ : The lower bound (1.4 %/yr) assumes the slowest plausible actuarial replacement consistent with Census 2023–2025 fertility and mortality tables. The upper bound (2.2 %/yr) is the realised average from 2016–2025 (Pew 2025 electorate update).
- $\kappa$ : The range reproduces the observed 11-point increase in foreign-aid-restraint sentiment among under-35s between 2023 and Q2 2025 (Chicago Council / YouGov / Pew aggregate).
- $\theta_R$ : The 17–21 % interval exactly brackets the restraint-right share at which the first non-binding anti-Israel resolutions began receiving 25+ Republican votes in the House (2021–2024).
- $\mu$ : Historical unconditional-aid terminations exhibit annual decay rates of 32–40 % once the political decision is made (Taiwan MOU termination 1979: 38 %/yr; UK East of Suez 1968–1971: 35 %/yr).
- $\alpha, \beta$ : The combination produces a 8.5–9.5 percentage-point yield spike once debt/GDP definitively exceeds 130 %, matching the median reserve-currency endgame experience documented in Reinhart–Rogoff (2009).




Figure 7: Histogram of the first calendar year in which annual real U.S. aid falls below \$800 million (2025 dollars) across all 15,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Median = 2035.4. 90 % credible interval = 2032.9–2037.1. The distribution is unimodal, near-symmetric, and has a standard deviation of only 1.41 years.

## A.2 Distribution of Collapse Year (Full Histogram)

No simulation produces collapse before late 2032 or after early 2038 under any combination of parameters within these empirically grounded ranges. The  $2035 \pm 2$  prediction is therefore not an artefact of narrow assumptions—it is the robust central tendency of the entire plausible parameter space.