

Fuzzing the Web for Mysterious Bugs

@0xacb



### \$ whoami

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# Agenda

- 1. Input & Regex quirks
- 2. The REcollapse technique
- 3. Mysterious bugs
- 4. Real-world examples



#### Intro

https://example.com/redirect?url=https://legit.example.com 🗸



https://example.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com 🗶



# 1. User Input

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#### Dealing with User Input

- Modern webapps / APIs rely on:
  - Validation



### Dealing with User Input

- Modern webapps / APIs rely on:
  - Validation
  - Sanitization

- > htmlspecialchars("input'\"><script>alert(1);</script>");
- = "input'"><script&gt;alert(1);&lt;/script&gt;"



#### Dealing with User Input

- Modern webapps / APIs rely on:
  - Validation
  - Sanitization
  - Normalization

```
> iconv("UTF-8", "ASCII//TRANSLIT", "Ãéï°úç");
= "~A'e"i^0'uc"
```

```
>>> import unidecode
>>> unidecode.unidecode("Ãéï°úç")
'Aeideguc'
```



#### Problems with Validation

- Regex is widely used to validate parameters from the user
  - Copied from StackOverflow, etc.
  - Mostly not tested by devs (copy paste)
  - Sometimes testing code exists but it's specific to a subset of the cases





# GitHub Copilot

```
def url_is_subdomain(url, domain):
    """Check if the url is a subdomain of the domain."""
    return re.match(r'^(?:https?://)?(?:[^/]+\.)?%s(?:/.*)?$' % domain, url)
```

```
"https://exampleccom"

"https://examplexcom"

"https://x.com#.example.com"

"https://x.com?.example.com"
```



s asserts position at the end of the string, or before the line terminator right at the end of the string (if any) ?



#### **JavaScript**



#### **Python**

```
>>> re.match(r"^[a-z]+$", "aaa")
<re.Match object; span=(0, 3), match='aaa'>
>>> re.match(r"^[a-z]+$", "aaa123") 
>>> re.match(r"^[a-z]+$", "aaa\n")
<re.Match object; span=(0, 3), match='aaa'>
>>> re.match(r"^[a-z]+$", "aaa\n123") 
>>> re.match(r"^[a-z]+$", "aaa\n123") 
>>> re.match(r"^[a-z]+$", "aaa\n123")
```



#### Ruby

```
"aaa".match(/^[a-z]+$/) #=> #<MatchData "aaa">
"aaa123".match(/^[a-z]+$/) #=> nil
"aaa\n".match(/^[a-z]+$/) #=> #<MatchData "aaa">
"aaa\n123".match(/^[a-z]+$/) #=> #<MatchData "aaa">
```



	JavaScript	Python	Ruby
"aaa"	<b>V</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>V</b>
"aaa123"	×	×	×
"aaa\n"	X	<b>V</b>	<b>V</b>
"aaa\n123"	×	×	<b>V</b>

# 2. REcollapse

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
0 a 0 0m; . 1 1 m

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# Probing the Unknown





- 1. Identify the regex pivot positions
  - a. Starting & termination positions
  - b. Separator positions
  - c. Normalization positions
- 2. Fuzz positions with all possible bytes

3. Analyze the responses



https://example.com/redirect?url=\$https://legit.example.com\$



https://example.com/redirect?url=https\$:\$/\$/\$legit\$.\$example\$.\$com

Separator positions



https://example.com/redirect?url=https://l\$git.ex\$mple.c\$m

Normalization positions

Typically vowels

 $A \acute{a} \tilde{a} \tilde{a} \longrightarrow a$ 



https://example.com/redirect?url=\$https\$:\$/\$/\$|\$git\$.\$ex\$mple\$.\$c\$m\$

Fuzz all positions from %00 to  $\%ff \neq$ 



#### More Examples

```
https://legit.example.com → $https$:$/$/$|$git$.$ex$mple$.$c$m$

legit@example.com → $|$git$@$ex$mple$.$c$m$

user_name → $us$r$_$n$me$

<a href=x>y</a> → $<$$$ $hr$f$=$$$>$$$<$/$$$>$
```



#### REcollapse Tool

- Helper tool capable of generating inputs according to these rules
- Supports multiple fuzzing sizes and encodings
- Easy to paste on Burp or other tools
- Available at https://github.com/Oxacb/recollapse

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# 3. Mysterious Bugs

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#### What to Look for?

Literally anything that gets validated, sanitized, normalized, used in queries, etc.

# This will open the door to mysterious bugs.



### **Uncovering Mysterious Bugs**

- 1. Set your goal (e.g. ATO)
- Pick your target field (e.g. email)
- 3. Identify all flows that consume it
- 4. For every endpoint: REcollapse
- 5. Analyze all response codes. Any successful response?
  - a. Is the regex always the same in all endpoints? Usually not
  - b. Pick a weird byte that went through



#### **Uncovering Mysterious Bugs**

6. Go through all the flows from step 3

Recovery, login, signup, OAuth, SSO, email change & confirmation (depends on target field)

- 7. Hopefully, you just found a mysterious bug
  - a. Look for errors and weird behaviors
  - b. Try to realize the impact or an attack scenario
  - c. If not, go back to step 5b or 1/2

# 4. Real-world Examples

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https://redacted.com/wp-json/v1/user 200

```
{
    "username": "xxxxxxxx",
    "api_token": "xxxxxxxxx"
}
```

https://redacted.com/wp-json/v1/user.css 404

```
[...] .pdf 404
```



- Caching rules are usually regex-based
- A static extension is not enough these days to perform web cache deception
- We need to enforce the correct Content-Type in the response
- Let's fuzz it!



• Fuzzing https://redacted.com/wp-json/v1/user\$.[extension] from %00 to

%ff and well-known extensions returned 200 with %23 [#] and %3f [?]



Fuzzing https://redacted.com/wp-json/v1/user\$.[extension] from %00 to %ff and well-known extensions returned 200 with %23 [#] and %3f [?]

Age: 35, X-Cache: Hit

https://redacted.com/wp-json/v1/user%23.pdf

We can send a link to a logged-in victim that will request this URL, and then we just need to access the cached content from our end and steal the api\_token.




- Shopify offers a "Signup/Login with Shopify" OAuth mechanism
- OAuth scope includes email address to login in multiple applications
- In taler.app, the email address doesn't need to be verified to create an account
- If the email already exists, you can't login or sign up on Shopify



- Let's fuzz the email change request on accounts.shopify.com
  - Proper regex in place, no weird characters allowed X



- Let's fuzz the email change request on accounts.shopify.com
  - Proper regex in place, no weird characters allowed X
- Fuzzing the signup request on accounts.shopify.com:
  - vict①m@domain.com goes through
- Login with Shopify in this state on taler.app
- Successful ATO







Normalization is often used in these flows.



### Takeaways

- Developers: always test/fuzz your regex, or rely on well-known libraries
- Simple input modifications can result in great damage
  - $\circ$  Fuzz by flipping or adding bytes +



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- Black-box regex testing is still not very touched
  - 🗅 🛮 Creative and manual work. Go for it 💰
- Regex behavior can reveal information about libraries, languages, etc.



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- Developers: always test/fuzz your regex, or rely on well-known libraries
- Simple input modifications can result in great damage
  - $\circ$  Fuzz by flipping or adding bytes +
- Black-box regex testing is still not very touched
  - 🔈 Creative and manual work. Go for it 💰
- Regex behavior can reveal information about libraries, languages, etc.
- If something is being validated and you can bypass it...
  - Think about the impact and you'll see the big picture!

# Special thanks

@regala\_ / fisher

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<u> @yassineaboukir</u>

@Oxteknogeek

<u>@ethiack</u>team

<u>@Oxdisturbance</u> team

<u>@hacker0x01</u> team



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