

Easily Building Privacy-enabled Blockchain Applications

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Abstract—For many enterprises and individuals the inability to conduct secure private transactions has been a major obstacle to fully embracing public blockchain networks. In this paper, we provide an overview of how zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) allow getting both transparency and privacy in public ledgers. With a use case, we describe how to build a privacy-enabled blockchain application using ZKP and present the software tools we have developed to facilitate the process to high level practitioners.

■ **PUBLIC** ledgers are a disruptive tool for enabling interaction between parties that do not have previous trust. If the ledger state is considered a universal source of truth, trust can be based on the certainty that interactions will be performed exactly as defined in the ledger. This idea contrasts with the traditional approach, in which business relationships are based on legal contracts and reputation gained with previous interactions.

Blockchain is the main technology to build public ledgers in a distributed way. Essentially, blockchains work using a distributed consensus

algorithm that allows the network participants to deterministically update the ledger state. Ledger state changes are performed by transactions and in public distributed ledgers, each transaction is public (transparent) and remains immutable once ordered by the consensus algorithm.

Many public ledgers also provide the capability of using smart contracts, which are pieces of code that define a set of functions that implement business logic. Smart contracts, as everything, are deployed in the ledger through a transaction. Once a smart contract is deployed, it is possible to

modify the ledger state by sending a transaction calling a smart contract function that will make the changes according to its predefined logic.

The high transparency of traditional public ledgers is a desirable feature but it is a concern when dealing with privacy, understood as the right of each individual or legal entity to control the degree to which their personal or business information is shared with the environment. To this respect, the interest of society and regulators about data confidentiality and privacy has grown in the recent years for both individual's privacy and industry trade secrets.

For example, the need to guarantee individuals' privacy has ended with new legislation like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union. In the case of blockchain and industry, permissioned ledgers, which require an access control layer, appeared as a solution to enterprises and individuals that needed better privacy. However, security of blockchains rely on having a large number of participants contributing to the system. Hence, privacy and confidentiality should to be addressed by other means rather than by restricting participation.

Although transparency and privacy may seem contradictory terms, it is possible to have both using a set of cryptographic tools called Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP). ZKPs currently play an important role in the adoption of enterprise-friendly blockchain applications over public blockchains.

In the rest of the paper, we will provide an overview of ZKPs, we will describe how to build a privacy-enabled blockchain application with a use case and we will present our software implementations to make this process easier to developers and researchers.

ZKPs AND BLOCKCHAIN

Zero-knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) are cryptographic protocols that enable one party, called prover, to convince another, called verifier, that a statement is true without revealing any information beyond the veracity of the statement. In plain words, these protocols allow you to prove that you know a secret without leaking any information about it.

ZKPs were revolutionary because for the first time in cryptography, instead of looking for se-

cure communications in which some of the parties are trusted, the goal was to establish trust between distrustful parties. The first generation of these protocols worked the following way: the verifier sent some challenges to the prover to check that, in fact, he knew the secret information, but the answers from the prover did not allow the verifier to reconstruct any part of the secret. Hence, ZKPs not only protect verifiers against malicious provers but also provers from malicious verifiers that want to obtain information from the prover.

One of the variants of these protocols are the so-called Non-Interactive ZKPs (NIZK), in which the prover can generate all the proof himself without need to interact with the verifier. NIZKs are very suitable for blockchain applications because the prover can create the proof and send it as part of a transaction to a smart contract. Then, the smart contract can act as verifier and perform some action depending on whether the proof is valid or not. Among NIZK protocols, the most interesting ones for blockchain are those ones whose proof size is small and verification time is also short.

This type of NIZK protocols that have succinct proof size and constant verification time exist and are called zk-SNARKs [1]. These two properties led to achieve the duality privacy and transparency with a huge impact in public distributed ledgers. A prominent practical example is Zcash [2], a blockchain based on bitcoin, that uses zk-SNARKs in its core protocol for verifying that private transactions (named "shielded" transactions) have been correctly computed. This is done without revealing any details of trade, such as payment destinations or amounts, providing complete anonymity to their participants over a public ledger.

In the past, ZKP systems were very dependant on the computational statement that was being proved and changing this statement required a redesign of the cryptographic system and its corresponding security analysis. zk-SNARKs and other modern NIZKs allow proving generic computational statements that can be modelled with an arithmetic circuit (a circuit built with additions and multiplications over a finite field).

Circuit-based NIKZs are quite revolutionary because they provide a relatively simple interface (the arithmetic circuit) for developers that want to

create privacy-enabled applications and abstract the complexity of the underlying proving mechanism.

OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

At iden3, a self-sovereign identity open-source project developed by OKIMS association, in collaboration with research teams of several universities and the Ethereum Foundation, we are developing an ecosystem of tools to facilitate the process of building privacy-enabled blockchain applications. As first tool, we have developed a compiler called `circom` [3] that provides a language for designing and implementing circuits. `Circom` compiles the definition of a circuit into a system of equations that can be used by another crypto-compiler to finally generate the zero-knowledge proof. In particular, we have also implemented a crypto-compiler for zk-SNARKs called `snarkjs` [4].

Although zk-SNARKs are very efficient and suitable protocols for blockchain, they have a critical step called “trusted setup”. In this phase, an encrypted set of data that needs to be accessible to the prover is generated. An important issue is that during the trusted setup, several intermediate values called “toxic values” have to be eliminated without a trace. If the computation of the trusted setup is computed by several parties (also known as MPC or Multi-Party Computation), the trusted setup is more secure since it is enough that one of the parties removes her toxic values [2]. In our case, `snarkjs` generates a simple trusted setup but we are also working on MPC solutions.

In next section, we will describe the complete process of building a privacy-enabled blockchain application.

USE CASE: PROVING MEMBERSHIP

For illustrating the process of building a privacy-enabled application, we will consider a Distributed Autonomous Organization (DAO) ruled by a smart contract. By sending a signed transaction, members of the organization can perform actions predefined in the DAO’s smart contract, like voting or transferring cryptocurrency. We will focus on the logic that verifies that a user is a member of the DAO. To implement the membership validation logic we will use a Merkle tree, which is a tree structure built with a

hash function H that allows simple and efficient membership checking.

As shown in Figure 1, the leaves contain the hash of the public keys of DAO members and the internal nodes store the hash values that result from hashing the concatenation of its children. This way, a large number of separate data is tied to a single hash value which is the root of the tree.

The DAO would first create the Merkle tree and store its root in a smart contract. After that, the organization would provide a Merkle proof to each member. The Merkle proof of a leaf is the set of nodes in the tree that are necessary to compute the root from this leaf. For example, the Merkle proof of $H(pk_0)$ are the nodes $H01$ and $H1$.

Now, any member can prove that she belongs to the DAO by sending a signed transaction to the DAO’s smart contract including the Merkle proof of her public key. Then, the smart contract recovers the public key from the transaction signature and checks that the Merkle proof for this public key is valid according to its stored root. Finally, if everything is valid, the smart contract performs the corresponding action.

Although with this design a transaction does not reveal any information about the other members of the DAO and it is very efficient regarding blockchain storage (only one hash is stored no matter how many members there are), it does reveal who is performing the action so user-privacy is not preserved. In the next section, we are going to improve the privacy of the model using zero-knowledge technology.

HOW TO BUILD ZKP-ENABLED BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS

In the following, we describe how to make the logic that checks membership private but still verifiable using zero-knowledge proofs. The first step is to build the corresponding circuit, which is described in Figure 1.

The circuit needs as inputs the member private key, the Merkle proof and the tree’s root. The circuit uses the private key to calculate the public key and, using the Merkle proof computes the root. Finally, it checks if the computed root matches the root given as input and if so, the circuit outputs 1 and 0 otherwise.




Figure 1. Merkle tree and arithmetic circuit design for a DAO membership proof.

To preserve user-privacy, the private key and the Merkle proof are private inputs, whereas the root and the output are public values. As a result, any DAO member can generate a zero-knowledge membership proof using this circuit while keeping her inputs private. Attacks are not possible even for someone who knows all the values of the Merkle tree since to fake a proof the circuit requires knowledge of an authorized private key. Moreover, this means that the DAO does not need to provide individual Merkle proofs to each member as before but simply can make the whole tree public.

Circuit from Figure 1 can be implemented using `circom` which has a library with a collection of templates that can be combined to create larger circuits. In our example, the circuit would simply be a combination of the template that computes a public key given a private key, the template that computes a predefined hash function and the template that compares two values. The possibility of creating circuits by joining and combining small pieces of circuits makes programming in `circom` language very accessible to high level practitioners.

Once the circuit is created, it can be compiled to obtain a JSON file that contains a circuit representation. Then, this JSON file is used as input of `snarkjs` to generate the zero-knowledge proof. The output of `snarkjs` is another JSON file containing a set of values that prove that the circuit was computed correctly but without revealing anything about the private inputs used. In this example, the proof shows that the prover holds a private key associated to an authorized public key of the DAO. Moreover, to easily validate zero-knowledge proofs on chain, `snarkjs` can generate the Solidity code to create a verifier in Ethereum (for further details of `snarkjs` see [4]).

Finally, the last step would be that a DAO member sends a transaction to the smart contract including the zero-knowledge proof. In our previous non-ZKP model, it was necessary to check that the transaction signature was produced using a public key that belongs to the tree. In this privacy-enabled model, the proof already shows that the sender knows one of the authorized private keys. But, anyway, a transaction has to be sent to the DAO smart contract including the proof. If the member uses her private key to sign this transaction, she would lose her anonymity. To obfuscate the member's identity, a simple solution is to send the transaction from any another account or use a relay.

CONCLUSION

The key aspect of privacy-enabled blockchain applications is that they allow performing transactions that honour certain logic dependant on private data using a public transparent ledger. Currently, there is a need to make privacy-enabled applications more accessible in blockchain networks with smart contract capabilities like Ethereum. In this paper, we contribute to this necessity by describing a use case of how to build a privacy-enabled blockchain application and presenting our software tools to make this process easier and clearer for high level practitioners.

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