Advanced Macroeconomics

Mathematical Foundations and Analytical Principles

Author: DENG Yanfei, SHEN Ji, WU Jieran, ZHANG Jun

Institute:

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Example2 in Pacielle and Wiederholt (2014, RES)

$$
\begin{aligned}
\kappa &= h(A_t; A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t+1,t-1}) - h(A_t; A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,t}) \\
&= [h(A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,t-1}) + h(A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,t-1}))] - [h(A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,t}) + h(A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,1})] \\
&= [h(A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,t-1}) - h(A_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,t}))] + [h(\Lambda_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,t-1}) - h(\Lambda_t[\mathcal{I}_{t,1})] \\
&= \left[\frac{1}{2}\log_2\left(2\pi e\sigma^2_{\eta,t-1}\right) - \frac{1}{2}\log_2\left(2\pi e\sigma^2_{\eta,t}\right)\right] + \left[\frac{1}{2}\log_2\left(2\pi e\sigma^2_{\lambda,t-1}\right) - \frac{1}{2}\log_2\left(2\pi e\sigma^2_{\lambda,t}\right)\right] \\
&= \frac{1}{2}\log_2\left(\frac{\sigma^2_{\eta,t-1}}{\sigma^2_{\eta,t}}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\log_2\left(\frac{\sigma^2_{\lambda,t-1}}{\sigma^2_{\lambda,t}}\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

Example3 in Pasten and Schoenle (2016, JME)

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\max \Gamma(P_{jt}, P_t, Y_t, Z_{jt}), \\
&\max_{\{a_{it}\}\in\Omega} \mathbb{E}_{it}\left\{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\sum_{i\in\mathcal{N}_t} \pi(P_{it}, P_t, Y_t, Z_{it})\right]\right\}, \\
&P^*_{it} = \arg\max_{P_{it}} \mathbb{E}\{\pi(P_{it}, P_t, Y_t, Z_{it})|s_{it}\}, \\
&s.t. \quad \mathcal{I}(\{P_t, Y_t\}, \{s_{it}\}) + \sum_{i\in\mathcal{N}_t} I(\{Z_{it}\}, \{s_{it}\}) \le \kappa(N), \\
&\Leftrightarrow \qquad\qquad \kappa_k + \sum_{i\in\mathcal{N}_t} \kappa_k \le \kappa(N); \\
&\int_0^1 z_{jt}\mathrm{d}j = 0, \\
&Q_t = P_t Y_t, \\
&p_t = \int_0^1 p_{jt}\mathrm{d}j, \\
&\mathcal{I}(\{Q_t, Z_{it}\}; \{s_{it}\}) \approx \mathcal{I}(\{q_t, s_{it}\}) = \mathcal{I}(\{z_{it}, s_{it}\}_{i\in\mathcal{N}_t}) \le \kappa(N). \\
&\max_{\{p_{it}=z_{it}\}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{N}_t} \left\{\bar{\pi}_1 p_{it} + \frac{\bar{\pi}_{11}}{2} p^2_{it} + \bar{\pi}_{12} p_{it} p_t + \bar{\pi}_{13} p_{it} a + \bar{\pi}_{14} p_{it} z_{it}\right\}, \\
&\bar{p}^*_{it} = p_t + \frac{\bar{\pi}_{13}}{|\bar{\pi}_{11}|} a_t + \frac{\bar{\pi}_{14}}{|\bar{\pi}_{11}|} z_{jt} \equiv \Delta_t + \frac{\bar{\pi}_{14}}{|\bar{\pi}_{11}|} z_{jt} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \bar{p}^*_t = \bar{q}_t.
\end{aligned}
$$

"A huge tree grows from a tiny sprout; A nine-story tower rises from piled earth; A thousand-mile journey begins beneath one's feet."—— Lao Tzu

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