





## CONCEPTION ET VÉRIFICATION DE SYSTÈMES CRITIQUES

## INTRODUCTION AUX MÉTHODES FORMELLES

2A Cursus Ingénieurs - ST5 : Modélisation fonctionnelle et régulation

m CentraleSupelec - Université Paris-Saclay - 2024/2025



## **OUTLINE**

- On the need of Verification
- On the need of Formal Methods
- > Program Proof
- > First Order Logic
- Principle of Model-Checking
- System Modeling

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## DEPENDABILITY OF CONTROL SYSTEMS

- A Control System is composed of 3 parts:
  - 1. Sensors
  - 2. Actuators
  - 3. Control Software that is critical in the Nuclear context!

#### **Critical Software**

For which a failure can be catastrophic: • fatal or/and extremely costly

- Some spectacular failures of critical softwares :
  - Crash of Ariane 5
  - LASCAD: Crash of London Ambulance CAD service
  - Therac-25: 7 deaths of cancer patients due to overdoses of radiation

## **CONTROL SOFTWARE VERIFICATION**

- 1. Take the software
- 2. Determine what the software is supposed to do
- 3. Prove that the software does what it is supposed to do

#### **Software verification**

Software verification checks/proves whether a system fulfills the qualitative requirements that have been identified in its specification

- Imposed by Certification Organisations
  - Several famous examples of abandoned projects, caused by impossibility of the verification step
  - Ex: P20 portion of the french nuclear reactor protection

## **VERIFICATION vs TESTING**

- Testing is a common dynamic technique where the system is executed
- Testing procedure:
  - take an implementation
  - stimulate it with certain inputs, i.e., the tests
  - observe reaction and check whether this is "desired"
- Testing drawbacks:
  - number of possible behaviors is very large (or even infinite)
  - unexplored behaviors may contain the fatal bug
  - testing is biased towards the most probable scenarios
- Testing may prove the presence of errors, not their absence!
- Verification proves the absence of errors (or finds them)

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## ON THE NEED OF FORMAL METHODS

Verification has to be **provable!** 

#### **Definition of Formal Methods**

Formal Methods are the applied mathematics for **modeling**, **analyzing** and **verifying** systems

- The formal form of the verification problem is  $M \models^? \varphi$  where:
  - M is the formal representation of the system under observation
  - ullet  $\varphi$  is the formal representation of the property to be verified

## IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES

#### **Safety Guide of Nuclear Power Plants - IAEA**

- Requirements and descriptions of designs should be stated formally . . .
- When formal languages are used to specify requirements or designs, theorem provers
  and model checkers may also aid in verifiability . . .
- When software requirements have been formally specified, it is possible to undertake **formal code verification**. However, formal verification generally requires considerable expertise, and therefore consulting competent analysts should be considered . . .

## **6 MYTHS ON FORMAL METHODS**

- 1. The use of formal methods guarantees perfect software
  - Nonsense, a formal specification is a model of the real world. Modeling may bring mistakes, omissions and ambiguities
- 2. The use of formal methods is restricted to proving software
  - Before program proving, formal specification of a system forces a detailed analysis, early in the development
- 3. The use of formal methods is restricted to critical systems
  - Industrial developments show that using formal methods reduce costs for all types of systems (of mass production)

## **6 MYTHS ON FORMAL METHODS**

- 4. Only mathematicians can use formal methods
  - Nonsense, the mathematics that are used are elementary
- 5. Formal methods increase development costs
  - Unproved, costs are shifted to the beginning of the cycle
- 6. Formal methods are used only for small systems
  - Several very large projects have used formal methods

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## FORMAL VERIFICATION OF SEQUENTIAL SOFTWARE

#### **Definition of Sequential Software**

A sequence of instructions that terminates and the result is computed from initial data

- Pre-Condition: property satisfied by the program initial data before the execution of the instructions
- Post-Condition: property satisfied by the program result and variables after the execution of the instructions

### **Verification of Sequential Software (Program Proof)**

- Prove that if pre-condition is satisfied then post-condition is satisfied
- Find the most general pre-condition

## **EXAMPLE**

• Software:

lacktriangleright Initial data : Array T of size N

**Array Sort** 

lacktriangledown Result: Sorted Array T of size N

• Post-Condition:

$$\forall n, m \in [1..N], \ n < m \Longrightarrow T[n] < T[m]$$

• Most general Pre-Condition :

$$orall n, m \in [1..N], \ n 
eq m \Longrightarrow T[n] 
eq T[m]$$

## THE HOARE PROOF SYSTEM

The Hoare Proof System provides for each type of instructions an **Axiom**/Rule to find the most general pre-condition  $\varphi$  (general form :  $\{\varphi\}$  P  $\{\psi\}$ )

- Assignment axiom :
  - ex:
  - ex:
- Loop axiom:
  - if  $\varphi$  is a loop invariant :
- Choice axiom :
  - **•** if:
  - else:

$$egin{aligned} \{ arphi [expr/x] \} \ x &= expr \ \{ arphi \} \ \{ y == 5 \} \ x &= y + 5 \ \{ x == 10 \} \ \{ x^2 \ < \ 4 \} \ x &= x * x \ \{ x \ < \ 4 \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\{arphi\}$$
 while( $C$ )  $P$   $\{arphi \wedge \neg C\}$   $\{arphi \wedge C\}$   $P$   $\{arphi\}$ 

$$\{ arphi \}$$
 if( $C$ )  $P1$  else  $P2$   $\{ \psi \}$   $\{ arphi \wedge C \}$   $P1$   $\{ \psi \}$   $\{ arphi \wedge \neg C \}$   $P2$   $\{ \psi \}$ 

## **PROOF EXAMPLE**

```
pre-condition: n>0 // initial data : n
0 == 0 \land 0 \le n
\sum_{k=0}^{0} k == 0 \wedge 0 \leq n
i = 0;
\sum_{k=0}^i k == 0 \wedge i \leq n
res = 0;
\sum_{k=0}^i k == res \wedge i \leq n // arphi
while (i < n) \{ // C
      (\sum_{k=0}^i k == \mathit{res} \wedge i \leq n) \wedge i < n \; 	extstyle / / \; arphi \wedge C
      \sum_{k=0}^i k == res \wedge i < n
      \sum_{k=0}^{i+1} k == res + i + 1 \wedge (i+1) \leq n
      i = i + 1;
      \sum_{k=0}^i k == res + i \wedge i \leq n
      res = res + i;
      \sum_{k=0}^i k == res \wedge i \leq n // arphi
(\sum_{k=0}^i k == res \wedge i \leq n) \wedge i \geq n \; 	extstyle / / \; arphi \wedge 
eg C
\sum_{k=0}^i k == res \wedge i == n
post-condition: \sum_{k=0}^{n} k = res // result : res
```

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## FIRST ORDER LOGIC

- Program Proof is based on the Formal System of the First Order Logic (FOL)
  - pre-conditions, post-conditions, invariants, assertions . . .
- FOL is the logic you are used to use in mathematics
- The syntax :

$$egin{array}{lll} t &::= & c \mid x \mid f(t,\ldots,t) \ \phi &::= & true \mid a \mid t = t \mid P(t,\ldots,t) \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \neg \phi \mid \exists x. \ \phi \end{array}$$

• The semantics are as usual in mathematics

## **FOL FORMAL SYSTEM**

#### **Definition**

- A Formal System consists of a set of **axioms** and a set of **inference rules** (reasoning) that are combined to **derive well formed formulas**
- A derivation that leads to a wff  ${\mathcal F}$  is called a **proof** of  ${\mathcal F}$

#### **Axioms**

$$egin{align} (ax1) \ A_x(t) &\Rightarrow \ \exists x. \ A \ (ax2) \ x = x \ (ax3) \ x = y \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow A_x(y)) \ (ax4) \ A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow A) \ (ax5) \ \neg \neg A \Rightarrow A \ (ax6) \ (A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)) \ \end{pmatrix}$$

#### Rules

$$(r1)\ A,\ A\Rightarrow B \qquad \vdash B \\ (r2)\ A\Rightarrow B \qquad \vdash \exists x.\ A\Rightarrow B$$

## **FOL FORMAL SYSTEM**

#### **Soundness**

A formal system is sound if each derived formula is valid i.e. semantically true.

A valid formula is called a **theorem** 

#### **Completeness**

A formal system is complete if each valid formula could be derived, i.e. it exists a proof leading to the theorem

- First Order Logic is sound and complete!
- An automatic program prover tries many possible derivations (infinite) and after a time limit :
  - option 1/2: it reaches the formula to prove → YES!
  - option 2/2 : it doesn't (it needs some help) → Inconclusive
- First Order Logic is semi-decidable!

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## HISTORY OF FORMAL VERIFICATION METHODS


#### Before . . .

- Software code was sequential
- Properties were expressed in First-Order Predicate Logic
- Theorem provers : partial/total correctness
- e.g. B Method
- Hardly automated : semi-decidable

#### After 80's

- Software is **concurrent** and reactive
- Properties are expressed in Temporal Logic
- Solving accurate properties like safety, liveness, fairness . . .
- e.g. Model Checking
- Push-Button: decidable

## PRINCIPLE OF MODEL-CHECKING




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## PRINCIPLE OF MODEL-CHECKING




## TRANSITION SYSTEMS

- model to describe the behaviour of systems
- digraphs where nodes represent states, and edges represent transitions
- states:
  - the current colour of a traffic light: red, green, orange.
  - software: the current values of all program variables + the program counter
  - hardware: the current value of the registers together with the values of the input bits
- transitions: ("state change")
  - a switch from one colour to another
  - **software**: the execution of a program statement
  - hardware: the change of the registers and output bits for a new input

## FORMAL DEFINITION

- A transition system TS is a tuple  $(S, \delta, I, AP, \mathcal{L})$  where
  - S is a set of states
  - $\delta\subseteq S imes S$  is a transition relation Notation: s o s' instead of  $(s,s')\in \delta$
  - $lacksquare I\subseteq S$  is a set of initial states
  - lacktriangleq AP is a set of Atomic Propositions
  - $lacksquare \mathcal{L}: S \longrightarrow 2^{AP}$  is a Labeling function

## **EXAMPLE**



• States:

$$S = \{pay, select, tea, coffee\}$$

• Initial states:

$$I = \{pay\}$$

• Atomic Propositions, Labeling function:

• suppose 
$$AP = S$$
,


$$\mathcal{L}(s) = \{s\}$$

 $lacksquare ext{suppose } AP = \{pay, drink\}, \qquad \mathcal{L}(tea) = \mathcal{L}(coffee) = \{drink\}$ 

$$egin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(tea) &= \mathcal{L}(coffee) = \{drink\} \ \mathcal{L}(pay) &= \{pay\}, \quad \mathcal{L}(select) = \emptyset \end{aligned}$$


# FROM PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES TO TRANSITION SYSTEMS


- Transition systems are an elementary modeling language
  - describe all the states that the system may reach
  - describe the behavior of the system (transitions)
- Even a basic system may have thousands of states!
  - int i=0; while(i<1000) i++;</pre>
  - modeling could be tedious!
- What if the transition system is automatically generated from the system's program?
  - modeling would be automatic!
  - many tools exist from C, Java . . . to TS




## **DETERMINISM AND NONDETERMINISM**

- Let  $TS = (S, \delta, I, AP, \mathcal{L})$  be a transition system, TS is deterministic
  - lacktriangledown iff  $orall s, s_1', s_2' \in S,$
  - lacktriangledown iff  $orall s \in S,$





## **SOURCES OF NONDETERMINISM**



- Incomplete information on the system environment
  - User selection
  - Triggered events

## INTERLEAVING OF CONCURRENT SYSTEMS


- the system is composed by many concurrent components
- one transition system for modeling one component behavior
- e.g. threading, distributed algorithms and communication protocols

## INTERLEAVING PRINCIPLE

- Actions of independent components are interleaved
  - a single processor is available
  - on which each component executes for a quantum of time
- No assumptions are made on the order of executions
  - possible orders for non-terminating independent components  $Loop(P) \parallel Loop(Q)$ :

main source of **nondeterminism** that can be avoided by adding a **scheduler** with a particular strategy

## INTERLEAVING EXAMPLE



- Justification for interleaving:
  - the effect of concurrently executed independent actions equals the effect when they are successively executed in arbitrary order

# INTERLEAVING $TS_1 \parallel TS_2$ FORMAL DEFINITION

Let  $TS_i = (S_i, \delta_i, I_i, AP_i, \mathcal{L}_i), i = 1, 2$  be two transition systems.

The Interleaving Product (Asynchronous product) is the transition system:

$$TS_1 \parallel TS_2 = (S_1 imes S_2, \delta, I_1 imes I_2, AP_1 \cup AP_2, \mathcal{L})$$


where  $\delta$  verifies:

$$rac{s_1 \longrightarrow s_1'}{\langle s_1, s_2 
angle \longrightarrow \langle s_1', s_2 
angle} \quad and \quad rac{s_2 \longrightarrow s_2'}{\langle s_1, s_2 
angle \longrightarrow \langle s_1, s_2' 
angle}$$

and  $\mathcal{L}$  verifies :


$$\mathcal{L}(\langle s_1, s_2 
angle) = \mathcal{L}_1(s_1) \cup \mathcal{L}_2(s_2)$$

## SEMAPHORE-BASED MUTUAL EXCLUSION



y=0 means "lock is currently possessed"; y=1 means "lock is free"

## **INTERLEAVING PRODUCT**



Typical source of state explosion suppose there were 3 concurrent components


## PATHS AND REACHABLE STATES

- An infinite path fragment  $\pi$  is an infinite state sequence:
  - $\pi = s_0 s_1 s_2 \ldots$  such that  $orall i > 0, s_i \longrightarrow s_{i+1} \in \delta$
- Paths(s) is the set of infinite path fragments  $\pi$  with  $first(\pi) = s$
- ullet  $Paths(TS) = igcup_{s \in I} Paths(s)$  is the set of initial path fragments
- ullet A state  $s\in S$  is called **reachable** in TS if there exists an initial path  $\pi$  fragment such that

$$\pi = s_0 s_1 \ldots s_{n-1} (s_n = s) s_{n+1} \ldots \in Paths(TS)$$

• Reach(TS) denotes the set of all reachable states in TS

## **BACK TO OUR EXAMPLE**



 $Paths(\langle c_1, w_2, y=0 \rangle)$  ?, Paths(TS) ?, Reach(TS) ?


## **TRACES**

- States are observable through their atomic propositions
- Traces only focus on the (set of) atomic propositions that are valid along the execution (path)
- The trace of the path  $\pi = s_0 s_1 s_2 \ldots \in S^{\omega}$  with  $\mathcal{L}: S \longrightarrow 2^{AP}$   $trace(\pi) = \mathcal{L}(s_0)\mathcal{L}(s_1)\mathcal{L}(s_2)\ldots \in (2^{AP})^{\omega}$
- ullet Traces are **infinite** words over the alphabet  $2^{AP}$
- $\bullet \ trace(\Pi) = \{trace(\pi) | \pi \in \Pi\}, Traces(s) = trace(Paths(s))$

and 
$$Traces(TS) = \bigcup_{s \in I} Traces(s)$$

## **BACK TO OUR EXAMPLE**

Let  $AP = \{wait_1, crit_1, wait_2, crit_2\}$ 



 $Trace(\pi \ldots) = \emptyset\{wait_1\}\{crit_1\}\{crit_1, wait_2\}\{wait_2\}\{crit_2\}\ldots$ 

## **THANK YOU**

PDF version of the slides

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