

Fast-Thinking Bias in Chain-of-Thought Reasoning Models

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ABSTRACT

We investigate whether large language models performing chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning exhibit biases analogous to human “fast thinking” (System 1) as described by Kahneman. Through systematic experiments across five cognitive bias categories—anchoring, framing, availability, base-rate neglect, and conjunction fallacy—we compare bias rates under direct prompting versus CoT reasoning with varying token budgets (50–2000 tokens). Our results reveal a clear fast-thinking pattern: direct prompting exhibits bias rates of 78–91%, while extended CoT reduces rates to 16–31%. The Fast-Thinking Index (ratio of direct to CoT bias rates) ranges from 2.91 to 5.05 across bias types, with all comparisons statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). Task complexity amplifies the gap between fast and slow reasoning modes. These findings confirm that LLMs exhibit a System 1-like bias under constrained reasoning and that deliberate chain-of-thought serves as an effective System 2 analog.

1 INTRODUCTION

Kahneman’s dual-process theory [3] distinguishes between System 1 (fast, heuristic, bias-prone) and System 2 (slow, deliberate, analytical) thinking. Recent work has shown that LLMs can exhibit human-like cognitive biases [1, 2], raising the question of whether reasoning models display analogous dual-process characteristics.

Kempt et al. [4] identify this as an open question, noting uncertainty about whether chain-of-thought reasoning models will exhibit a “fast thinking” bias analogous to System 1 processing. We address this question through controlled experiments measuring bias rates across reasoning modes and cognitive bias types.

2 RELATED WORK

Tversky and Kahneman [5] established that human judgment under uncertainty is governed by heuristics that lead to systematic biases. Wei et al. [6] demonstrated that chain-of-thought prompting improves LLM reasoning, suggesting a potential System 2 analog.

Recent work has found that LLMs exhibit human-like biases [1] and that these biases can be systematically characterized [2].

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Bias Categories

We test five well-established cognitive biases:

- (1) **Anchoring**: Influence of irrelevant numerical anchors
- (2) **Framing**: Sensitivity to gain/loss presentation
- (3) **Availability**: Over-reliance on salient examples
- (4) **Base-rate neglect**: Ignoring prior probabilities
- (5) **Conjunction fallacy**: Judging conjunctions as more probable

3.2 Reasoning Modes

We compare four reasoning configurations:

- **Direct**: Immediate response (50 tokens)
- **CoT-Short**: Brief reasoning (150 tokens)

- **CoT-Medium**: Moderate reasoning (500 tokens)

- **CoT-Long**: Extended reasoning (2000 tokens)

Each condition is evaluated at three complexity levels (simple, moderate, complex) with 50 trials of 100 problems each.

3.3 Fast-Thinking Index

We define the Fast-Thinking Index (FTI) as:

$$FTI = \frac{r_{\text{direct}}}{r_{\text{cot-long}}} \quad (1)$$

where r denotes the mean bias rate. An FTI significantly greater than 1.2 indicates a detectable fast-thinking bias.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Bias Detection

Table 1 presents the fast-thinking bias detection results. All five bias types show statistically significant fast-thinking patterns.

Table 1: Fast-thinking bias detection across cognitive bias types.

Bias Type	Direct	CoT-Long	FTI	Detected
Anchoring	0.782	0.155	5.05	Yes
Framing	0.836	0.207	4.03	Yes
Availability	0.855	0.235	3.64	Yes
Base-Rate Negl.	0.883	0.271	3.26	Yes
Conj. Fallacy	0.907	0.312	2.91	Yes

4.2 Reasoning Mode Comparison

Figure 1 shows bias rates across all reasoning modes and bias types. A clear monotonic decrease in bias rate is observed as reasoning depth increases.




Figure 1: Bias rates across reasoning modes for each cognitive bias type.

4.3 Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff

Figure 2 reveals a speed-accuracy tradeoff mirroring the human System 1/System 2 distinction. Direct prompting is fast but biased; extended CoT is slow but more accurate.




Figure 2: Speed-accuracy tradeoff across reasoning modes.

4.4 Complexity Effects

Figure 3 demonstrates that task complexity amplifies the gap between fast and slow reasoning, consistent with the human dual-process framework.




Figure 3: Bias rates by task complexity level across reasoning modes.

5 DISCUSSION

Our findings provide evidence that LLMs exhibit fast-thinking-like biases when reasoning is constrained. The Fast-Thinking Index consistently exceeds 2.9 across all bias types, indicating that direct prompting produces bias rates 3–5 times higher than extended chain-of-thought reasoning. This pattern mirrors the human dual-process framework and suggests that CoT serves as an effective System 2 analog.

The practical implication is that deployment contexts requiring rapid responses should implement bias mitigation strategies, such as minimum reasoning depth thresholds or bias-aware prompting.

6 CONCLUSION

We confirm that LLMs performing chain-of-thought reasoning exhibit a measurable fast-thinking bias analogous to Kahneman’s System 1. All five tested cognitive bias categories show statistically significant fast-thinking patterns, with bias rates 3–5 times higher under direct prompting compared to extended CoT. These results highlight the importance of reasoning depth in mitigating systematic biases in LLM outputs.

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