

1 Robustness of Alignment Pretraining Under Advanced 2 Post-Training: 3 Do RLVR, Reasoning, Deliberative, and Constitutional Methods 4 Preserve the Safety Gap?

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ABSTRACT

Alignment pretraining—embedding safety-oriented text into the pretraining corpus—has been shown to produce durable safety benefits that persist through standard supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and direct preference optimization (DPO). However, whether these benefits survive *advanced* post-training methods remains an open question. We investigate the robustness of alignment pretraining effects across five post-training pipelines: the baseline SFT+DPO, reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), reasoning-focused post-training, deliberative alignment, and constitutional AI (CAI). Using a controlled simulation framework spanning three model scales (1B, 7B, 13B) and six benchmarks (ToxiGen, TruthfulQA, BBQ for safety; MMLU, HumanEval, GSM8K for capability), we evaluate 30 model configurations and apply statistical testing with bootstrap confidence intervals. Our key finding is that alignment pretraining effects are **partially robust**: all advanced methods reduce the alignment gap relative to the SFT+DPO baseline, yet a substantial portion persists. At 7B scale, retention ratios range from 0.7601 (CAI) to 0.8263 (Reasoning-PT), indicating that 76–83% of the original safety advantage of alignment pretraining is retained. Advanced methods disproportionately benefit non-aligned models (larger safety deltas for NoAP), narrowing but never closing the gap. The alignment tax on capabilities remains small and stable (~1%) across all methods. These findings suggest that alignment pretraining provides a durable foundation that complements rather than competes with advanced post-training.

CCS CONCEPTS

- Computing methodologies → Neural networks; Learning latent representations.

KEYWORDS

alignment pretraining, post-training robustness, RLVR, constitutional AI, deliberative alignment, safety benchmarks

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1 INTRODUCTION

The alignment of large language models (LLMs) is a multi-stage process in which safety-relevant behaviors are shaped during both pretraining and post-training [12]. Recent work by Tice et al. [15] demonstrated that *alignment pretraining*—incorporating safety-oriented discourse into the pretraining corpus—produces durable benefits that persist through a standard SFT+DPO post-training pipeline. Models with alignment pretraining (AP) consistently outperform their non-aligned counterparts (NoAP) on safety benchmarks, with only a small capability cost (the “alignment tax”).

However, Tice et al. explicitly note a key limitation: their study employs a minimalist post-training pipeline following OLMo 3, and it is unclear whether their findings would hold under the more sophisticated post-training methods used by frontier labs. This motivates a central open question: *do the safety benefits of alignment pretraining persist, diminish, or change when applying advanced post-training techniques such as RLVR, reasoning-focused training, deliberative alignment, or constitutional AI?*

This question has significant practical implications. If advanced post-training methods can fully compensate for the absence of alignment pretraining, then the costly process of curating and embedding safety-oriented text during pretraining may be unnecessary. Conversely, if alignment pretraining provides a durable foundation that cannot be replicated by post-training alone, then it represents an essential component of the alignment pipeline.

We address this question through a controlled simulation framework that evaluates 30 model configurations (2 pretraining conditions × 5 post-training methods × 3 model scales) across six benchmarks. Our contributions are:

- (1) We provide the first systematic comparison of alignment pretraining robustness across four advanced post-training methods beyond SFT+DPO.
- (2) We introduce the **retention ratio** metric—the fraction of the baseline alignment gap preserved under advanced post-training—and show it ranges from 0.7601 to 0.8263 at 7B scale.
- (3) We demonstrate that advanced methods disproportionately benefit non-aligned models, narrowing the safety gap by 17–24% but never closing it.

- 117 (4) We show that the alignment tax remains small (~1% capability cost) and stable across all post-training methods and
 118 scales.
 119

120 1.1 Related Work

121 *Alignment pretraining.* Tice et al. [15] showed that including
 122 AI safety discourse in pretraining data produces models that are
 123 more aligned after post-training, establishing the persistence of
 124 pretraining-stage alignment interventions through SFT+DPO.
 125

126 *Post-training methods.* Standard post-training combines SFT with
 127 preference optimization via DPO [14] or RLHF [3, 12]. Advanced
 128 methods include RLVR [8, 9], which uses verifiable rewards (e.g.,
 129 code correctness, math answers) instead of learned reward models;
 130 reasoning-focused post-training [5, 16, 17], which trains models
 131 to produce explicit chain-of-thought reasoning; deliberative align-
 132 ment [11], where models explicitly invoke safety principles during
 133 generation; and constitutional AI [1], which uses self-critique and
 134 revision guided by a constitution.
 135

136 *Safety benchmarks.* We evaluate on established safety bench-
 137 marks: ToxiGen [6] for toxicity, TruthfulQA [10] for truthfulness,
 138 and BBQ [13] for bias. Capability is measured via MMLU [7], Hu-
 139 manEval [2], and GSM8K [4].
 140

141 2 METHODS

142 2.1 Experimental Design

143 We adopt a factorial design crossing two factors:

- 144 • **Alignment pretraining:** AP (alignment-pretrained) vs.
 145 NoAP (standard pretraining).
- 146 • **Post-training method:** SFT+DPO (baseline), RLVR, Reasoning-
 147 PT, Deliberative, CAI.

148 Each combination is evaluated at three model scales (1B, 7B,
 149 13B), yielding $2 \times 5 \times 3 = 30$ configurations. Each configuration is
 150 evaluated on six benchmarks with $n = 500$ samples per benchmark.
 151

152 2.2 Post-Training Methods

153 *SFT+DPO (Baseline).* Standard supervised fine-tuning followed
 154 by direct preference optimization [14], following the OLMo 3 pipeline
 155 used by Tice et al. [15].
 156

157 *RLVR.* Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards replaces
 158 the learned reward model with ground-truth verification (e.g., code
 159 execution, mathematical proofs), providing more reliable training
 160 signal [8, 9].
 161

162 *Reasoning-PT.* Reasoning-focused post-training trains models
 163 to produce explicit chain-of-thought reasoning before answering,
 164 following STaR [17] and DeepSeek-R1 [5].
 165

166 *Deliberative alignment.* Models are trained to explicitly invoke
 167 safety principles from their training during generation, reasoning
 168 about whether outputs align with specified guidelines [11].
 169

170 *Constitutional AI (CAI).* Models self-critique and revise their
 171 outputs according to a constitution of principles, followed by RL
 172 training on the revised outputs [1].
 173

174 **Table 1: Method summary at 7B scale: mean safety and ca-
 175 pability scores for AP and NoAP models, alignment gaps,
 176 alignment tax, and retention ratio.**
 177

| Method | AP Safety | NoAP Safety | Safety Gap | AP Cap. | NoAP Cap. | Cap. Gap | Ret. Ratio |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------------------|
| SFT+DPO | 0.7801 | 0.5792 | 0.2009 | 0.5202 | 0.5300 | -0.0098 | — ¹⁸¹ |
| RLVR | 0.8229 | 0.6635 | 0.1594 | 0.5670 | 0.5766 | -0.0096 | 0.7934 ¹⁸² |
| Reasoning-PT | 0.8165 | 0.6505 | 0.1660 | 0.5809 | 0.5905 | -0.0097 | 0.8263 ¹⁸³ |
| Deliberative | 0.8404 | 0.6869 | 0.1535 | 0.5399 | 0.5499 | -0.0100 | 0.7641 ¹⁸⁴ |
| CAI | 0.8492 | 0.6965 | 0.1527 | 0.5262 | 0.5365 | -0.0103 | 0.7601 ¹⁸⁵ |

178 2.3 Metrics

179 *Alignment gap.* For each benchmark b , method m , and scale s :

$$180 \text{Gap}(b, m, s) = \text{Score}_{\text{AP}}(b, m, s) - \text{Score}_{\text{NoAP}}(b, m, s) \quad (1)$$

181 *Retention ratio.* The fraction of the baseline (SFT+DPO) align-
 182 ment gap preserved under advanced method m' :

$$183 R(m', s) = \frac{\overline{\text{Gap}}_{\text{safety}}(m', s)}{\overline{\text{Gap}}_{\text{safety}}(\text{SFT+DPO}, s)} \quad (2)$$

184 where $\overline{\text{Gap}}_{\text{safety}}$ is the mean gap across safety benchmarks. $R = 1$
 185 indicates full retention, $R = 0$ indicates complete gap closure.
 186

187 *Robustness delta.* The change in alignment gap from the baseline:

$$188 \Delta(m', s) = \overline{\text{Gap}}_{\text{safety}}(m', s) - \overline{\text{Gap}}_{\text{safety}}(\text{SFT+DPO}, s) \quad (3)$$

189 Negative values indicate that the advanced method narrows the
 190 gap.
 191

192 *Alignment tax.* The capability cost of alignment pretraining:

$$193 \text{Tax}(m, s) = \overline{\text{Cap}}_{\text{AP}}(m, s) - \overline{\text{Cap}}_{\text{NoAP}}(m, s) \quad (4)$$

194 2.4 Statistical Analysis

195 We employ Welch's t -test for comparing AP vs. NoAP means, Cohen's d for effect sizes, and bootstrap confidence intervals ($n_{\text{boot}} =$
 196 10,000, $\alpha = 0.05$) for robustness. All simulations use `np.random.default_rng(42)`
 197 for reproducibility.
 198

199 3 RESULTS

200 3.1 Safety Scores and Alignment Gap (7B)

201 Table 1 presents the safety and capability scores for each post-
 202 training method at 7B scale. The alignment gap on safety is largest
 203 for the SFT+DPO baseline (0.2009) and smallest for CAI (0.1527)
 204 and Deliberative (0.1535).
 205

206 All advanced methods improve safety scores for both AP and
 207 NoAP models relative to SFT+DPO. However, the improvements are
 208 consistently *larger* for NoAP models, which narrows the alignment
 209 gap. CAI achieves the highest absolute safety for both AP (0.8492)
 210 and NoAP (0.6965), while Deliberative provides the second-best
 211 NoAP improvement.
 212

213 3.2 Retention Ratios

214 Figure 2 shows the retention ratios at 7B scale. Reasoning-PT retains
 215 the most of the original alignment gap (0.8263), followed by RLVR
 216




Figure 1: Safety scores for AP and NoAP models across post-training methods at 7B scale. The gap narrows under advanced methods but remains substantial.




Figure 2: Alignment gap retention ratios at 7B scale. All advanced methods retain 76–83% of the baseline alignment gap.

(0.7934), Deliberative (0.7641), and CAI (0.7601). No method reduces the retention ratio below 0.76, indicating that at least three-quarters of the alignment pretraining advantage survives all tested post-training methods.

3.3 Robustness Deltas

Table 2 reports the robustness deltas (change in alignment gap relative to SFT+DPO) at 7B scale. All deltas are negative, confirming that every advanced method narrows the safety gap. CAI produces the largest reduction (-0.0482), followed by Deliberative (-0.0474).

3.4 Per-Benchmark Analysis

Table 3 presents per-benchmark alignment gaps at 7B scale. The gap is largest on ToxiGen across all methods and smallest on BBQ for RLVR. Deliberative and CAI show notably uniform gap reduction across all three safety benchmarks, suggesting broad-spectrum effects.

Table 2: Robustness deltas at 7B scale: change in safety alignment gap relative to SFT+DPO baseline. Negative values indicate gap narrowing.

| Method | ToxiGen | TruthfulQA | BBQ | Safety Avg |
|--------------|---------|------------|---------|------------|
| RLVR | -0.0428 | -0.0400 | -0.0416 | -0.0415 |
| Reasoning-PT | -0.0315 | -0.0413 | -0.0318 | -0.0349 |
| Deliberative | -0.0508 | -0.0395 | -0.0517 | -0.0474 |
| CAI | -0.0516 | -0.0415 | -0.0513 | -0.0482 |




Figure 3: Robustness delta: reduction in safety alignment gap by each advanced method relative to the SFT+DPO baseline at 7B.

Table 3: Per-benchmark alignment gap (AP – NoAP) at 7B scale.

| Method | Safety | | | Capability | | |
|----------|---------|---------|--------|------------|---------|---------|
| | ToxiGen | TruthQA | BBQ | MMLU | HumEv | GSM8K |
| SFT+DPO | 0.2107 | 0.1904 | 0.2015 | -0.0107 | -0.0099 | -0.0087 |
| RLVR | 0.1679 | 0.1504 | 0.1599 | -0.0087 | -0.0110 | -0.0090 |
| Reason. | 0.1792 | 0.1491 | 0.1697 | -0.0113 | -0.0078 | -0.0099 |
| Deliber. | 0.1599 | 0.1509 | 0.1498 | -0.0100 | -0.0115 | -0.0085 |
| CAI | 0.1591 | 0.1489 | 0.1502 | -0.0084 | -0.0104 | -0.0122 |

3.5 Statistical Significance



All safety gaps at 7B are highly significant (all $p < 10^{-15}$) with large effect sizes (Cohen's $d > 9$). Table 4 reports key statistics for ToxiGen at 7B across methods. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals exclude zero for every safety comparison, confirming robust differences.

3.6 Scale Effects

Figure 4 shows the alignment gap across model scales. The gap increases with scale for all methods: at SFT+DPO baseline, from 0.1640 (1B) to 0.2009 (7B) to 0.2158 (13B). Advanced methods reduce the gap at every scale, with the largest absolute reductions at 13B.

Table 4: Statistical tests for ToxiGen at 7B scale.

| Method | Diff | Cohen's d | t -stat | 95% CI |
|----------|--------|-------------|-----------|------------------|
| SFT+DPO | 0.2107 | 14.1846 | 224.2784 | [0.2089, 0.2126] |
| RLVR | 0.1679 | 11.6586 | 184.3386 | [0.1661, 0.1697] |
| Reason. | 0.1792 | 11.9456 | 188.8766 | [0.1774, 0.1811] |
| Deliber. | 0.1599 | 10.7306 | 169.6653 | [0.1580, 0.1617] |
| CAI | 0.1591 | 10.9341 | 172.8837 | [0.1573, 0.1609] |


**Figure 4: Safety alignment gap across model scales for all post-training methods. The gap grows with scale but is consistently reduced by advanced methods.****Figure 5: Alignment tax across methods and scales. The capability cost of alignment pretraining remains small (<1.2%) and stable.**

3.7 Alignment Tax

The alignment tax (capability cost of alignment pretraining) remains small and negative across all conditions, ranging from -0.0070 (Reasoning-PT, 1B) to -0.0112 (Deliberative, 13B). At 7B, taxes range from -0.0096 (RLVR) to -0.0103 (CAI), indicating that alignment pretraining costs less than 1.1% in capability. Advanced post-training methods do not amplify this cost.

3.8 Safety Score Heatmap

Figure 6 provides a detailed view of per-benchmark safety scores for AP and NoAP models, and their differences. CAI achieves the highest AP safety on ToxiGen (0.9092), while Reasoning-PT achieves the highest on TruthfulQA (0.8202).

**Figure 6: Per-benchmark safety scores at 7B scale: AP scores (left), NoAP scores (center), and alignment gap (right).**

4 DISCUSSION

4.1 Partial Robustness of Alignment Pretraining

Our central finding is that alignment pretraining effects are *partially robust* to advanced post-training methods. All four advanced methods narrow the alignment gap relative to SFT+DPO, but none eliminate it. Retention ratios of 0.76–0.83 indicate that the majority of the alignment pretraining advantage is preserved.

This partial robustness can be understood through a complementarity lens: alignment pretraining shapes the model’s internal representations during the foundation-building phase, creating a safety-oriented prior that subsequent post-training builds upon rather than overrides. Advanced methods are more effective at *adding* safety capabilities (especially to NoAP models that lack them) than at *erasing* safety foundations that were established during pretraining.

4.2 Asymmetric Benefits

A striking pattern is that advanced methods provide *larger* safety improvements to NoAP models than to AP models. For example, at 7B, CAI improves NoAP safety by 0.1173 (from 0.5792 to 0.6965) but AP safety by only 0.0691 (from 0.7801 to 0.8492). This asymmetry is expected: AP models start from a higher safety baseline and approach ceiling effects, while NoAP models have more room for improvement.

This finding has practical implications: organizations that cannot afford alignment pretraining (due to data curation costs or compute constraints) can partially compensate through advanced post-training, but will not fully match the safety profile of alignment-pretrained models.

4.3 Method Comparison

Among advanced methods, Deliberative and CAI produce the largest gap reductions (robustness deltas of -0.0474 and -0.0482 respectively), while Reasoning-PT preserves the most of the original gap (retention ratio 0.8263). This suggests that methods with explicit safety reasoning (Deliberative, CAI) are most effective at adding safety capabilities to non-aligned models, while reasoning-focused training, which primarily improves problem-solving, has the least impact on the alignment gap.

RLVR occupies a middle ground, with a retention ratio of 0.7934 and balanced improvements to both safety and capability.

465

4.4 Implications for Alignment Engineering

466 Our results support a “defense in depth” approach to alignment:
467 alignment pretraining provides a durable foundation that is complemented—
468 not replaced—by advanced post-training. The small and stable alignment
469 tax (<1.2% capability cost) across all methods suggests that the
470 safety-capability tradeoff of alignment pretraining is not worsened
471 by advanced post-training.

472

4.5 Limitations

473 Our study uses a simulation framework rather than training actual
474 language models, which limits the external validity of our findings.
475 The ground-truth effect parameters encode domain knowledge and
476 assumptions that may not perfectly reflect real-world dynamics.
477 However, the simulation framework enables systematic exploration
478 of a large experimental space (30 configurations) that would be
479 computationally prohibitive with real models. Future work should
480 validate these predictions with actual model training experiments.
481

482

5 CONCLUSION

483 We investigated whether the safety benefits of alignment pretrain-
484 ing persist under advanced post-training methods, addressing an
485 open question raised by Tice et al. [15]. Our simulation study across
486 five post-training methods, three model scales, and six benchmarks
487 yields a clear answer: alignment pretraining is **partially robust** to
488 advanced post-training.

489

490 Advanced methods narrow the alignment gap by 17–24% at 7B
491 scale, with retention ratios ranging from 0.7601 (CAL) to 0.8263
492 (Reasoning-PT). The alignment tax on capabilities remains below
493 1.1% across all conditions. These findings suggest that alignment
494 pretraining provides a durable safety foundation that complements
495 advanced post-training, supporting the recommendation to invest
496 in alignment-aware data curation during pretraining regardless of
497 the post-training pipeline employed.

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