

ACME Persistent DNS Challenge Update

draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist-00

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IETF ACME WG - Montreal

Status Update

WG adopted October 16, 2025

draft-sheurich-acme-dns-persist → draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist

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How dns-persist-01 Works

Record Format

```
_validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT  
"ca.example; accounturi=https://ca.example/acct/123"
```

Key Features

- ✓ **Persistent** - Reuse for multiple certificates
- ✓ **Account-bound** - accounturi parameter
- ✓ **CA-specific** - Issuer domain name
- ✓ **Multi-CA** - Separate TXT records per issuer
- ✓ **Expiration** - Optional persistUntil
- ✓ **Scope** - policy=wildcard covers subdomains

Why We Need This

Current Challenges

http-01/tls-alpn-01

- Port 80/443 required
- Geo-blocking blocks validation
- Wildcards unsupported

dns-01

- DNS propagation delays
- API keys on servers risk compromise
- Automation complexity

dns-account-01 (draft-ietf-acme-dns-account-challenge)

Current Workarounds

"Magic CNAMEs" (acme-dns.io)

- Single point of failure
- DNS cache poisoning risk
- BGP hijacking vulnerability

Why Standardize?

CAs could deploy via pre-validation without protocol changes, but this bypasses ACME's challenge selection.

Standardization enables proper protocol integration.

Key insight: ACME account URIs provide durable, cryptographic binding

Implementation Support

Timeline:

- **Oct 9:** CA/BF SC088v3 **PASSED** (26 CAs YES, 3 consumers YES)
- **Oct 9 - Nov 8:** IP Rights Review Period
- **Oct 16:** IETF WG adoption
- **2026:** Let's Encrypt implementation

Status

Committed: Let's Encrypt (2026)

Expected: Fastly/Certainly, Amazon Trust Services

Proof of Concept: Pebble server fork, eggsampler client fork

Active WG Discussions

Security Trade-offs

- Freshness vs. operational simplicity
- Account key becomes long-lived credential
- **Key compromise:** Immediate issuance without DNS access
- **Privacy:** `accounturi` in public DNS

Validation Reuse Period

How long CA relies on one DNS check

Effective period = shortest of:

- DNS record TTL (MUST respect)
- `persistUntil` parameter
- CA policy (398 days → 10 days by 2029)

DNSSEC Validation

- **Draft:** SHOULD validate signatures
- **Alternative:** MUST use validating resolver
- **Trade-off:** Security vs. private PKI flexibility

Changes in -00

✓ Pre-validation optimization

- CA checks existing records during order creation
- Authorization becomes "valid" immediately if found
- Skips challenge flow with persistent record

✓ Security Considerations expanded - Record risks, account binding, subdomain validation

✓ Long TXT record guidance - Multi-string format for >255 characters

✓ Error handling - `malformed` for syntax, `unauthorized` for auth failures

✓ Document renamed - `draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist`

Seeking WG Input (1/2)

Acknowledging concerns: Use case definition, trust relationships, existing validation interactions

Questions:

1. DNSSEC requirement?

- Draft: SHOULD validate
- Alternative: MUST validate
- Which level?

2. Protocol validation caps?

Beyond `persistUntil`

3. Security considerations?

What else to address?

Seeking WG Input (2/2)

4. Timeline?

Given industry momentum

5. AccountURI flexibility? (PR #30)

Multiple URIs per account?

- **Pro:** Privacy, access control
- **Con:** CA cannot predict client's choice
- Trade-off: Privacy vs. simplicity

Path Forward

- Incorporate Montreal feedback
- Expand security considerations
- Resolve PR #30 (accounturi flexibility)
- Address use case and trust concerns
- Target WGLC after 1-2 revisions
- Coordinate with CA/Browser Forum

Feedback → Revision → WGLC → RFC

Questions & Discussion

Thank you!

Contact:

- Mailing list: acme@ietf.org
- GitHub: <https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist>
- Draft: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist/>