QUIC-Aware Proxying

draft-ietf-masque-quic-proxy-01

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Agenda

Protocol recap

Design Team encryption proposal

Loop issue

Protocol recap


Client tells proxy about inner QUIC connection's CIDs (using capsules!)

Proxy may reuse target-facing ports

Client and proxy may skip encapsulation and encryption for proxied SH packets — avoiding cumulative MTU overhead issues


Forwarded mode packets on the wire use virtual CIDs instead of the inner connection's real CIDs

Protocol recap



Need for encryption

Traffic analysis recognizing packets on both sides of a forwarding proxy



Client-to-proxy-A

(Forwarded with virtual CIDs) Client-to-proxy-B

Client-to-target

Goal: analyze the threat of traffic analysis on forwarded mode, and propose a mechanism for adding encryption to forwarded mode

Proposed solution:

- Add "packet transforms" for forwarded mode
- Define the "scramble" transform, using AES-128 block ciphers
- Prevents passive byte recognition attacks; like tunneling, does not prevent passive timing attacks or active injection/corruption attacks

Design team proposal PR #99

```
STREAM(44): HEADERS
  :method = CONNECT
  :protocol = connect-udp
  :scheme = https
  :path = /target.example.com/443/
  :authority = proxy.example.org
  proxy-quic-forwarding = ?1; accept-transform=scramble,null; \
      scramble-key=:abc...789=:
  capsule-protocol = ?1
                  <---- STREAM(44): HEADERS
                                :status = 200
                               proxy-quic-forwarding = ?1; \
                                    transform=scramble; \
                                    scramble-key=:ABC...321=:
                               capsule-protocol = ?1
```

The base proposal does not cover transforms to add padding or chaff packets to avoid timing attacks

Techniques to prevent timing attacks would need to be analyzed and designed even for tunneled mode

New transforms can be defined to handle work in this area

Next steps

Renaming "null" transform to "identity"

Are we ready to merge the PR and close the design team?

Open issue: CID loops | Ssue #88 |

Clients can create forwarding loops if:

- Proxy shares a client-facing IP (VIP) with other proxies; and
- Proxy reuses target-facing sockets for multiple tunnels; and
- Client picks Virtual Client Connection ID

Open issue: CID loops Issue #88

- Prohibiting VIP sharing is incompatible with some deployments
- Eliminating target-facing port sharing may necessitate additional target-facing IPs for sufficient port space
- Proxy-chosen Virtual Client CIDs require clients to receive QUIC packets with CIDs it doesn't generate. May affect ability to demultiplex. Complicates capsule exchange. (PR#104)

Proxy-chosen Virtual Client CIDs PR #104

Client

Proxy

REGISTER_CLIENT_CID ->

<- ACK_CLIENT_CID (Virtual Client CID)

ACK_CLIENT_VCID ->

REGISTER_TARGET_CID ->

<- ACK_TARGET_CID (Virtual Target CID)