

# REASONABLE DOUBT: EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION OF JOB-LEVEL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

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This paper develops methods for detecting discrimination by individual employers using correspondence experiments that send fictitious resumes to real job openings. We establish identification of higher moments of the distribution of job-level callback rates as a function of the number of resumes sent to each job and propose shape-constrained estimators of these moments. Applying our methods to three experimental data sets, we find striking job-level heterogeneity in the extent to which callback probabilities differ by race or sex. Estimates of higher moments reveal that while most jobs barely discriminate, a few discriminate heavily. These moment estimates are then used to bound the share of jobs that discriminate and the posterior probability that each individual job is engaged in discrimination. In a recent experiment manipulating racially distinctive names, we find that at least 85% of jobs that contact both of two white applications and neither of two black applications are engaged in discrimination. To assess the potential value of our methods for regulators, we consider the accuracy of decision rules for investigating suspicious callback behavior in various experimental designs under a simple two-type model that rationalizes the experimental data. Though we estimate that only 17% of employers discriminate on the basis of race, we find that an experiment sending 10 applications to each job would enable detection of 7–10% of discriminatory jobs while yielding Type I error rates below 0.2%. A minimax decision rule acknowledging partial identification of the distribution of callback rates yields only slightly fewer investigations than a Bayes decision rule based on the two-type model. These findings suggest illegal labor market discrimination can be reliably monitored with relatively small modifications to existing correspondence designs.

**KEYWORDS:** Audit study, discrimination, empirical Bayes, indirect evidence, partial identification.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

IT IS ILLEGAL to use information on race, sex, or age to make employment decisions in the United States.<sup>1</sup> The voluminous empirical literature on labor market discrimination has focused primarily on establishing whether *markets* discriminate against particular groups

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<sup>1</sup>Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex, while the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits certain forms of discrimination on the basis of age.

of workers on average (Altonji and Blank (1999), Guryan and Charles (2013)). However, a finding of market-level discrimination provides little guidance to regulators tasked with enforcing anti-discrimination law, who must decide which specific employers to investigate (US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2016)). Indeed, classic models of discrimination emphasize that market-level disparities can be generated by many different *distributions* of discriminatory behavior across employers (Becker (1957)). This paper extends the frontier by developing new tools to characterize discriminatory behavior in markets and to detect discrimination by individual employers.

Our approach adapts insights from the literature on empirical Bayes (EB) analysis of large scale testing problems (Efron (2012)) to the study of correspondence experiments that submit fictitious applications with randomly generated characteristics to actual job vacancies (Bertrand and Duflo (2017) provided a review). Since the influential work of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), correspondence experiments typically sample thousands of jobs and send each a few applications with distinctive names that signify race or sex. Our basic insight is that such studies are best viewed as *ensembles* of exchangeable micro-experiments. From the ensemble, one can infer properties of the distribution of discriminatory behavior which can, in turn, be used to form empirical posteriors about the probability that any given job is discriminating.

As in classic EB analyses of count data (Efron and Morris (1975), Brown (2008)), we treat callback outcomes as independent Bernoulli trials governed by job- and race- (or sex)-specific callback probabilities, a modeling choice we show closely approximates callback behavior in correspondence experiments. Because few applications are sent to each job, the distribution of job-specific callback probabilities is under-identified, invalidating standard nonparametric EB approaches (e.g., Efron (2016)). However, we establish identification of a set of moments of the joint distribution of white and black callback probabilities determined by the number of applications sent to each job. To estimate these moments, we propose a shape-constrained Generalized Method of Moments (SCGMM) estimator that requires the estimated moments to be consistent with a proper bivariate probability distribution. Applying this estimator to three experimental data sets reveals tremendous heterogeneity across jobs in the extent to which callback probabilities differ by race or sex. Estimates of third and higher moments reveal that while most jobs barely discriminate, a few discriminate heavily.

Extending classic results on the identification of False Discovery Rates (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), Efron, Tibshirani, Storey, and Tusher (2001), Storey (2002)), we compute sharp lower bounds on the share of jobs engaged in discrimination given the identified moments. In the Bertrand and Mullainathan experiment, we estimate that at least 13% of jobs discriminate against black applicants. The corresponding estimate in a more recent study by Nunley, Pugh, Romero, and Seals (2015) is 17%. In a study by Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (2014), we find that at least 6% of jobs discriminate against women, while at least 14% discriminate against men. These population shares are then used to compute bounds on posterior probabilities that particular jobs are discriminating given their callback patterns. We find that these posterior bounds are often highly informative even with few applications per job. For example, we estimate that at least 72% of jobs calling both of two white applicants and neither of two black applicants in the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) experiment are engaged in discrimination, while at least 85% of such jobs in the Nunley et al. (2015) experiment are discriminating. In the Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (2014) experiment, we find that at least 97% of the jobs that call back four women and no men discriminate against men, while at least 88% of jobs that call back four men and no women discriminate against women.

To explore the potential policy implications of our findings, we assess the prospects for systematically detecting discriminators based on callback evidence generated by alternative hypothetical correspondence study designs. This investigation is based on detection/error tradeoffs that arise under a parametric two-type model fit to the [Nunley et al. \(2015\)](#) data. With only two white and two black applications per job, it is difficult to reliably identify discriminating employers. But with 10 applications per job, we find that a regulator who knows the joint distribution of callback probabilities can correctly identify 7% of discriminating jobs while incurring Type I error rates of less than 0.2%.

Finally, to probe the sensitivity of these conclusions to our modeling assumptions, we consider the problem of a hypothetical regulator who knows only the identified moments of the distribution of callback probabilities. This regulator decides which jobs to investigate using a minimax decision rule that minimizes the maximum risk consistent with the known moments. We develop a tractable approach to estimating the maximum risk function and find that a minimax regulator investigates only slightly fewer jobs than would a Bayesian regulator who knows the joint distribution of callback probabilities. This robustness emerges because the risk function is nearly identified at realistic posterior thresholds that might be used to trigger investigations.

Our results illustrate the potential of experimental methods to assist with regulatory enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. Because employers vary tremendously in their propensity to discriminate against protected groups, regulators face a difficult inferential task. Our findings suggest correspondence experiments can be paired with simple decision rules to reliably identify discriminators. More generally, the methods developed here provide a tractable empirical framework for making decisions when the population distribution of unit heterogeneity is only partially identified by an experiment. Candidate applications of these methods include detecting judges engaged in illegal discrimination ([Arnold, Dobbie, and Hull \(2020\)](#)), targeting of workplace safety inspections based on experimental audit data ([Levine, Toffel, and Johnson \(2012\)](#)), identifying violations of rationality with laboratory choice experiments ([Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill \(2018\)](#)), and evaluating the performance of individual teachers and schools based upon student achievement data ([Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff \(2014a\)](#), [Angrist, Hull, Pathak, and Walters \(2017\)](#)).

## 2. DEFINING DISCRIMINATION

We now develop a formal notion of discrimination tailored to the analysis of correspondence experiments. To simplify exposition, we focus on race, which we code as binary (“white”/“black”). Suppose that we have a sample of  $J$  jobs with active vacancies. To each of these jobs, we send  $L_w$  applications with distinctively white names and  $L_b$  applications with distinctively black names as in [Bertrand and Mullainathan \(2004\)](#), for a total of  $L = L_w + L_b$  applications. Denote the race associated with the name used in application  $\ell \in \{1, \dots, L\}$  to job  $j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$  as  $R_{j\ell} \in \{w, b\}$ . The potential callback function  $Y_{j\ell} : \{w, b\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  indicates whether job  $j$  would call back application  $\ell$  as a function of that applicant’s assigned race. Observed callbacks are then given by  $Y_{j\ell} = Y_{j\ell}(R_{j\ell})$ .

When  $Y_{j\ell}(w) \neq Y_{j\ell}(b)$ , job  $j$  has engaged in racial discrimination with application  $\ell$ . Notably, even if racially distinctive names influence employer behavior only through their role as a proxy for parental background ([Fryer and Levitt \(2004\)](#)), using the names at any point in the hiring process is likely to be viewed by courts as a pretext for discrimination.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, the discussion in *U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Target Corporation*, 460 F.3d 946, 7th Cir. Wis. (2006) and footnote 27 of [Fryer and Levitt \(2004\)](#).

While courts are typically interested in establishing whether a particular plaintiff experienced discrimination in precisely this sense, we will take the perspective of a regulator tasked with assessing prospectively whether an employer systematically treats applicants differently based upon race. For example, the mission of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is to “prevent and remedy unlawful employment discrimination and advance equal opportunity for all in the workplace” (emphasis added). The following assumption formalizes this prospective notion of discrimination at the employer level.

ASSUMPTION 1: *Callbacks are race- and job-specific Bernoulli trials:*

$$Y_{j\ell}(r)|R_{j1} \cdots R_{jL} \stackrel{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} \text{Bernoulli}(p_{jr}) \quad \text{for } r \in \{w, b\}.$$

Note that random assignment of racially distinctive names to applications guarantees independence of  $Y_{j\ell}(r)$  from  $\{R_{jk}\}_{k=1}^L$ . The key behavioral restriction in Assumption 1 is that the  $\{Y_{j\ell}(r)\}_{\ell=1}^L$  are i.i.d. Even if application characteristics other than race are chosen in an i.i.d. manner, this assumption rules out, for example, scenarios in which a job calls back the first qualified applicant and disregards all subsequent applications.<sup>3</sup> We discuss below how to test for such violations. The probability  $p_{jr}$  may be interpreted as the callback rate that would emerge in a hypothetical experiment in which a large number of applications of race  $r$  are sent to job  $j$ .<sup>4</sup>

Letting  $C_{jr} = \sum_{\ell=1}^L 1\{R_{j\ell} = r\} Y_{j\ell}$  denote the number of applications of race  $r$  to job  $j$  that were called back, Assumption 1 implies the probability  $\Pr(C_{jw} = c_w, C_{jb} = c_b | p_{jw}, p_{jb})$  that employer  $j$  calls back  $c_w$  white applications and  $c_b$  black applications is

$$f(c_w, c_b | p_{jw}, p_{jb}) = \binom{L_w}{c_w} \binom{L_b}{c_b} p_{jw}^{c_w} (1 - p_{jw})^{L_w - c_w} p_{jb}^{c_b} (1 - p_{jb})^{L_b - c_b}. \quad (1)$$

We are now ready to offer a job-level definition of discrimination, which we will henceforth refer to simply as discrimination.

DEFINITION: Job  $j$  engages in discrimination when  $p_{jb} \neq p_{jw}$ .

Discriminatory jobs are labeled with the indicator function  $D_j = 1\{p_{jb} \neq p_{jw}\}$ . This definition is prospective in that an employer with  $D_j = 1$  will eventually discriminate against an applicant even if it has not done so yet.

### 3. ENSEMBLES AND POSTERiors

The above framework treats each job's callback decisions as a set of race-specific Bernoulli trials. We next consider what can be learned from an ensemble of experiments conducted at many jobs. This idea is formalized in the following exchangeability assumption on the jobs.

<sup>3</sup>One could equivalently view such behavior as a violation of our specification of potential outcomes, which builds in the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption of Rubin (1980).

<sup>4</sup>If hundreds of applications were sent to a single job, the employer would likely be overwhelmed and Assumption 1 would fail. We show below, however, that this assumption provides a suitable approximation to an experiment with 8 applications, which is an unusually large choice of  $L$ .

ASSUMPTION 2: *Race-specific callback probabilities are independent and identically distributed:*

$$p_{jw}, p_{jb} \stackrel{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} G(\cdot, \cdot).$$

The distribution function  $G : [0, 1]^2 \rightarrow [0, 1]$  describes callback rate heterogeneity among jobs in the population from which the study samples. In practice, audit studies usually draw small random samples of jobs from online job boards. The i.i.d. assumption abstracts from the fact that there are a finite number of jobs on these boards. Note that, by virtue of random assignment,  $p_{jw}$  and  $p_{jb}$  are independent of the racial mix of applications to job  $j$ .

Assumption 2 implies that the unconditional distribution of callbacks can be expressed as a mixture of binomial trials. We denote the unconditional probability of observing the callback vector  $(c_w, c_b)$  by

$$\bar{f}(c_w, c_b) = \int f(c_w, c_b | p_w, p_b) dG(p_w, p_b). \quad (2)$$

The distribution  $G$  will serve as a key object of interest in our analysis. One reason for interest in  $G$  is that it characterizes both the prevalence and severity of discrimination in a population. Prevalence is captured by the proportion of jobs that are engaged in discrimination, which can be written

$$\bar{\pi} = \Pr(D_j = 1) = \int_{p_w \neq p_b} dG(p_w, p_b).$$

Likewise, the severity of discrimination can be summarized by moments of the form  $\int (p_w - p_b)^m dG(p_w, p_b)$ , which will equal zero for any  $m \in \mathbb{N}$  if all jobs call back applicants independently of race.

A second reason for interest in  $G$  lies in its potential forensic value as a tool for identifying which jobs are discriminating. The quantity  $\pi(c_w, c_b) = \Pr(D_j = 1 | C_{jw} = c_w, C_{jb} = c_b)$  gives the prevalence of discrimination among jobs with callback vector  $(c_w, c_b)$ . We can also think of  $\pi(C_{jw}, C_{jb})$  as the posterior probability that a job is discriminating given the callback evidence  $(C_{jw}, C_{jb})$ . Invoking Bayes's rule,  $\pi(c_w, c_b)$  can be expressed as a functional of the “prior” distribution  $G$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(c_w, c_b) &= \frac{\Pr(C_{jw} = c_w, C_{jb} = c_b | D_j = 1) \bar{\pi}}{\bar{f}(c_w, c_b)} \\ &= \frac{\int_{p_w \neq p_b} f(c_w, c_b | p_w, p_b) dG(p_w, p_b)}{\bar{f}(c_w, c_b)} \\ &= \mathcal{P}(\underbrace{c_w, c_b}_{\text{direct}}, \underbrace{G}_{\text{indirect}}). \end{aligned}$$

The dependence of  $\pi(c_w, c_b)$  on  $G$  is an example of what Efron (2010) referred to as “indirect evidence.” To understand the logic of incorporating indirect evidence, suppose  $\bar{\pi} = 0$  so that no jobs discriminate. Then  $\pi(C_{jw}, C_{jb}) = 0$  with probability 1: any seemingly suspicious callback decisions are due to chance. Likewise, if  $\bar{\pi} = 1$ , all jobs are discriminators and there is no need for direct evidence on the behavior of particular jobs. But in

intermediate cases, where some share of jobs are discriminators, and some are not, it is rational to blend the direct evidence from a particular job with contextual information on the population from which that job was drawn.

Empirical Bayes approaches seek to form empirical posteriors  $\mathcal{P}(c_w, c_b, \hat{G})$  that substitute the unknown  $G$  with an estimator  $\hat{G}$ . Important applications of this idea arise in the literature on multiple hypothesis testing, where a key concept is the False Discovery Rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)), which can be thought of as a posterior expectation of the share of null hypotheses under consideration that are true (Efron et al. (2001), Storey (2002), Storey (2003)). In our setting, a hypothetical regulator investigating jobs with evidence vector  $(c_w, c_b)$  can expect a False Discovery Rate of  $1 - \pi(c_w, c_b)$ . Appendix A of the Supplemental Material (Kline and Walters (2021)) develops this connection in more detail.

#### 4. IDENTIFICATION OF $G$

Each job's realized callback rates  $(C_{jw}/L_w, C_{jb}/L_b)$  provide noisy estimates of the latent callback probabilities  $(p_{jw}, p_{jb})$ . The binomial structure of this noise is not classical, which leads point identification of  $G$  to fail when the number of applications per job is small.<sup>5</sup> In this section, we establish that certain moments of  $G$  are nonetheless identified by simple linear transformations of unconditional callback probabilities. We then proceed to derive bounds on the posterior probability function  $\pi(c_w, c_b)$  consistent with these moments.

##### *Moments*

From (2), we can write

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{f}(c_w, c_b) &= \binom{L_w}{c_w} \binom{L_b}{c_b} \mathbb{E}[p_{jw}^{c_w} (1 - p_{jw})^{L_w - c_w} p_{jb}^{c_b} (1 - p_{jb})^{L_b - c_b}] \\ &= \binom{L_w}{c_w} \binom{L_b}{c_b} \sum_{m=0}^{L_w - c_w} \sum_{n=0}^{L_b - c_b} (-1)^{m+n} \binom{L_w - c_w}{m} \binom{L_b - c_b}{n} \mathbb{E}[p_{jw}^{c_w+m} p_{jb}^{c_b+n}], \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$  denotes the expectation with respect to  $G$ . Hence, the reduced form callback rates can be written as linear functions of uncentered moments of the latent callback probabilities.

We index these moments via the function

$$\mu(m, n) \equiv \mathbb{E}[p_{jw}^m p_{jb}^n] \quad \text{for } (m, n) \in \mathbb{N}^2.$$

Letting  $\bar{f} = (\bar{f}(1, 0), \dots, \bar{f}(L_w, 0), \dots, \bar{f}(L_w, L_b))'$  denote the vector of frequencies for all possible callback outcomes excluding  $(0, 0)$  and  $\mu = (\mu(1, 0), \dots, \mu(L_w, 0), \dots, \mu(L_w, L_b))'$  the corresponding list of moments, we can write the equations in (3) as a linear system  $\bar{f} = B\mu$ , where  $B$  is a known nonsingular square matrix

<sup>5</sup>If  $L$  were to grow large, one could invoke a normal approximation on each job's sample callback rates and then apply a variance stabilizing transform to make the noise approximately homoscedastic, as in classic EB studies of batting averages (Efron and Morris (1975), Brown (2008)). With homoscedastic normal estimation error,  $G$  could then be estimated via deconvolution (e.g., as in Efron (2016)). However, Brown (2008) cautioned against using such approximations with 10 or fewer observations per group.



of binomial coefficients. Inverting the linear system yields

$$\mu = B^{-1} \bar{f}, \quad (4)$$

which immediately implies the following lemma.

**LEMMA 1—Identification of Moments:** *Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and for a given application design  $(L_w, L_b)$ , all moments  $\mu(m, n)$  for  $0 \leq m \leq L_w$  and  $0 \leq n \leq L_b$  are identified.*

Lemma 1 formalizes the sense in which the identifying power of a correspondence experiment is increasing in the number of applications of each type sent to each job. As  $\min\{L_w, L_b\}$  grows large, the entire joint distribution of black and white callback probabilities becomes identified, which motivates nonparametric deconvolution approaches such as Efron (2016). With a finite number of applications per job, Lemma 1 establishes which moments of  $G$  are identified from (4).

For example, when  $L_w = L_b = 2$  as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Lemma 1 establishes identification of the first two moments of black and white callback probabilities. From these moments, one can identify the variance of the racial difference in callback rates:

$$\mathbb{V}[p_{jb} - p_{jw}] = \mu(0, 2) + \mu(2, 0) - 2\mu(1, 1) - \mu(0, 1)^2 - \mu(1, 0)^2 + 2\mu(0, 1)\mu(1, 0).$$

With more applications per job, higher moments of the distribution of job-level discrimination become identified. Furthermore, when the application design  $(L_w, L_b)$  varies randomly across jobs, some moments of  $G$  will be over-identified. We later exploit these over-identifying restrictions in estimation to improve precision and test our modeling assumptions.

### Analytic Bound on Posterior Probabilities

Though the study of moments of the callback distribution  $G$  can shed light on underlying heterogeneity in callback behavior, the posterior probability  $\pi(c_w, c_b)$  need not admit a representation in terms of a finite number of moments. However, a simple analytic bound on the posterior can be derived from an application of Bayes's rule that conditions on the total number of callbacks  $C_{jb} + C_{jw}$  to job  $j$ . Let  $\bar{f}_t(c_w) = \Pr(C_{jw} = c_w, C_{jb} = t - c_w | C_{jb} + C_{jw} = t)$  denote the probability mass function for white callbacks in the stratum of jobs that call back  $t$  applicants in total, and let  $\bar{f}_t^0(c_w) = \binom{L_w}{c_w} \binom{L_b}{t-c_w} / \binom{L}{t}$  denote the corresponding probability mass function that would arise under Assumptions 1 and 2 if no discrimination were present in this stratum. Finally, let  $\bar{\pi}_t = \Pr(D_j = 1 | C_{jb} + C_{jw} = t)$  denote the share of jobs calling back  $t$  total applicants that are engaged in discrimination.

One can write the posterior probability of discrimination in terms of these objects as follows:

$$\pi(c_w, c_b) = 1 - \frac{\underbrace{(1 - \bar{\pi}_{c_w+c_b})}_{\text{prior that } D=0} \underbrace{\bar{f}_{c_w+c_b}^0(c_w)}_{\text{likelihood if } D=0}}{\underbrace{\bar{f}_{c_w+c_b}(c_w)}_{\text{marginal likelihood}}}.$$

Because the probability mass function  $\bar{f}_t(c_w)$  is directly identified by the experiment, the only nuisance parameters entering the posterior are the stratum-specific priors  $\{\bar{\pi}_t\}_{t=0}^L$ .

For example, in an experiment with  $L_w = L_b = 2$ , the prevalence of discrimination among jobs that call back only white applications is  $\pi(2, 0) = 1 - (1 - \bar{\pi}_2)(1/6)/\bar{f}_2(2)$ . By contrast, in this design, the exact  $p$ -value on the null hypothesis that a job calling back only white applications is *not* discriminating is simply  $\bar{f}_2^0(2) = 1/6$ . Note that  $\pi(2, 0) > \bar{f}_2^0(2)$  if and only if  $\bar{\pi}_2 > 1 - 5\bar{f}_2(2)$ , which highlights the crucial role of the stratum prior in drawing posterior inferences.

The following lemma, which is proved in Appendix B of the Supplemental Material, provides a tractable bound on both the stratum prior  $\bar{\pi}_t$  and, consequently, the posterior prevalence function  $\pi(c_w, t - c_w)$ .

LEMMA 2—Bounds on Stratum Prior and Posterior:

- (i)  $\bar{\pi}_t \geq \max_{c_w \in \{0, \dots, t\}} \max \left\{ \frac{\bar{f}_t^0(c_w) - \bar{f}_t(c_w)}{\bar{f}_t^0(c_w)}, \frac{\bar{f}_t(c_w) - \bar{f}_t^0(c_w)}{1 - \bar{f}_t^0(c_w)} \right\}, \quad t \in \{1, \dots, L-1\},$
- (ii)  $\pi(c_w, t - c_w) \geq 1 - \frac{\bar{f}_t^0(c_w)}{\bar{f}_t(c_w)} \min_{c'_w \in \{0, \dots, t\}} \min \left\{ \frac{\bar{f}_t(c'_w)}{\bar{f}_t^0(c'_w)}, \frac{1 - \bar{f}_t(c'_w)}{1 - \bar{f}_t^0(c'_w)} \right\}, \quad t \in \{c_w, \dots, L-1\}.$

Part (i) of this lemma shows that the experiment places a lower bound on the share of jobs engaged in discrimination in each callback stratum that is increasing in the discrepancy between the distribution of callback outcomes and the distribution predicted by the nondiscrimination null. Efron et al. (2001, p. 1154) proposed an analogous bound to control the False Discovery Rate in a multiple testing analysis of a microarray experiment. Part (ii) establishes via standard Bayesian updating arguments that the bound on the prior translates into a corresponding lower bound on the posterior.

### Sharp Bounds

While the bounds in Lemma 2 are easy to compute, they need not be sharp, as restrictions across callback strata have been ignored. A lower bound on the stratum prior  $\bar{\pi}_t$  that exploits all of the logical restrictions in our framework can be written as the solution to the following constrained optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{G \in \mathcal{G}} & 1 - \frac{\binom{L}{t}}{\sum_{c'_w=0}^t \bar{f}(c'_w, t - c'_w)} \int p^t (1-p)^{L-t} dG(p, p), \\ \text{s.t. } & \bar{f}(c_w, c_b) = \binom{L_w}{c_w} \binom{L_b}{c_b} \int p_w^{c_w} (1-p_w)^{L_w-c_w} p_b^{c_b} (1-p_b)^{L_b-c_b} dG(p_w, p_b) \\ & \text{for } (c_w = 0, \dots, L_w; c_b = 0, \dots, L_b). \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

$$(6)$$

To make this problem computationally tractable, we consider a space  $\mathcal{G}$  of discretized approximations to the unknown distribution function  $G$ .<sup>6</sup> Because both the objective and

<sup>6</sup>See Noubiap and Seidel (2001) for a closely related approach and an asymptotic analysis of the effects of discretization.



TABLE I  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR RESUME CORRESPONDENCE STUDIES<sup>a</sup>

	Bertrand & Mullainathan	Nunley et al.	Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vasquez
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of jobs	1112	2305	799
Applications per job	4	4	8
Treatment/control	Black/white	Black/white	Male/female
Callback rates: Total	0.079	0.167	0.123
Treatment	0.063	0.154	0.108
Control	0.094	0.180	0.138
Difference	-0.031 (0.007)	-0.026 (0.007)	-0.033 (0.008)

<sup>a</sup>This table reports sample characteristics based on data from three resume correspondence experiments. Columns (1) and (2) show statistics from Bertrand and Mullainathan's (2004) and Nunley et al.'s (2015) studies of racial discrimination in the United States. Column (3) reports statistics from Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vasquez's (2014) study of gender discrimination in Mexico. Standard errors for treatment/control differences, clustered at the job level, are in parentheses.

constraints are linear in the probability mass function associated with  $G$ , we can apply linear programming (LP) routines to compute bounds on  $\bar{\pi}_t$  given an estimate of the callback probabilities  $\{\bar{f}(c_w, c_b)\}_{c_w, c_b}$ . Details of our computational procedure are given in Appendix C of the Supplemental Material. Since the distribution  $G$  is not indexed by  $t$ , the solution to (5) enforces constraints across callback strata. Consequently, we may obtain informative bounds on the share of discriminatory jobs even among those jobs that call no (or all) applications back.<sup>7</sup>

Analogous LP formulations can be used to bound any linear functional of  $G$ . For example, the lower bound on the unconditional prevalence of discrimination  $\bar{\pi}$  is obtained by replacing the objective in (5) with  $\min_{G \in \mathcal{G}} 1 - \int dG(p, p)$ . Likewise, we can bound from below the proportion of jobs discriminating against whites by replacing the objective in (5) with  $\min_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \int_{p_w < p_b} dG(p_w, p_b)$ . We leverage these insights to compute bounds on the prevalence of a variety of directional notions of discrimination in the empirical work to follow.

## 5. DATA

We apply our methods to data from three correspondence experiments summarized in Table I. Bertrand and Mullainathan (BM, 2004) applied to 1112 job openings in Boston and Chicago, submitting four applications to each job. Of the four applications, two were assigned black-sounding names while the remaining two were assigned white-sounding names. The callback rate to applications with black-sounding names was 3.1 percentage points lower than that of applications with white-sounding names.

Nunley et al. (NPRS, 2015) studied racial discrimination in the market for new college graduates by applying to 2305 listings on an online job board, again sending four resumes per job opening. Unlike BM, the names assigned to the four resumes were sampled without replacement from a pool of eight names, four of which were distinctively black and four of which were distinctively white. This led the share of black names sent to each job to vary randomly in increments of 25% from 0% to 100%. The overall callback rate

<sup>7</sup>Suppose, for instance, that  $G$  is a two-type mixture with  $\Pr(p_{jw} = 1, p_{jb} = 1) = 1/2$  and  $\Pr(p_{jw} = 1/2, p_{jb} = 0) = 1/2$ . Then all jobs with zero callbacks must be discriminators.

in the NPRS study was more than twice as high as in the BM study, perhaps because the fictitious applicants were more highly educated. On average, black names had a 2.6 percentage point lower callback rate than white names.

Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (AGCV, 2014) applied to 799 job openings through an online job portal in a study of race and gender discrimination in Mexico City, Mexico. AGCV sent eight fictitious applications to each job, and the applicants were all recent college graduates. While the AGCV experiment looks at a different context than BM or NPRS, this data set allows us to demonstrate the gains from doubling the number of applications per job opening. To illustrate the identifying power of sending four applications to each protected group, we focus on gender in this experiment, as AGCV used a three-category definition of race.<sup>8</sup> In the AGCV experiment, women were 3.3 percentage points more likely to receive callbacks than men.

## 6. ARE CALLBACKS INDEPENDENT TRIALS?

We begin by considering tests of the Bernoulli trials assumption that undergirds our econometric framework. This assumption would be violated if the likelihood of a callback depends not just on an application's own characteristics but also on the characteristics of other applications sent to the same job. To assess this possibility, we fit linear probability models of the form

$$Y_{j\ell} = \lambda_0 + X'_{j\ell}\lambda_1 + \bar{X}'_{j\ell}\lambda_2 + \varepsilon_{j\ell}, \quad (7)$$

where  $X_{j\ell}$  is a vector of application characteristics and  $\bar{X}_{j\ell} = (L - 1)^{-1} \sum_{k \neq \ell} X_{jk}$  gives the “leave out” mean of those characteristics among the applications sent to job  $j$  excluding application  $\ell$ . While the coefficient vector  $\lambda_1$  gives the direct effect of application characteristics on callbacks, the coefficient vector  $\lambda_2$  captures the “peer effect” of other applications to the same job on application  $\ell$ 's callback propensity. Assumption 1 restricts these peer effects to be zero ( $\lambda_2 = 0$ ).

For OLS estimates of  $\lambda_2$  to identify causal effects,  $\bar{X}_{j\ell}$  must be uncorrelated with any omitted application characteristics  $Z_{j\ell}$  that influence callbacks. We therefore focus on the NPRS study which assigned both race and a large number of other application characteristics independently of each other and across applications.<sup>9</sup>

Columns (1) and (2) of Table II report estimates of the parameters in (7) for the NPRS study, with each row showing the coefficients from a separate regression. While applications with distinctively black names are significantly less likely to be called back, we find no significant effect on callback probabilities of changing the racial mix of the other three applications to the same job. Across the 12 covariates we consider, only one (an indicator for 3+ months of unemployment) finds a significant peer effect at conventional levels, and a joint test fails to reject that all of the leave out mean coefficients are zero ( $p = 0.45$ ). As another composite test, we report the results of a model in which the peer effects

<sup>8</sup>In principle, the methods developed here could be extended to a multivariate distribution of callback probabilities for three or more groups. Section 8 explores this possibility by allowing callback rates to differ by resume quality in addition to race or gender.

<sup>9</sup>In contrast, BM assigned application characteristics according to their joint distribution in a training sample, making it likely that the characteristics we study  $X_{j\ell}$  are correlated with other omitted characteristics  $Z_{j\ell}$  that predict callbacks. The application characteristics were also chosen to yield a good match with the job (see BM, p. 996), leading  $Z_{j\ell}$  to be correlated with its leave out mean  $\bar{Z}_{j\ell}$  and hence with  $\bar{X}_{j\ell}$ . The AGCV study includes only a small number of randomized resume characteristics that are not predictive of callback outcomes.

are restricted to be proportional to the main effects of the application's own characteristics  $X_{j\ell}$ . The row titled "predicted callback rate" pools all the application characteristics into an index  $X'_{j\ell} \hat{\lambda}_{1(j)}$ , where  $\hat{\lambda}_{1(j)}$  is the leave out OLS coefficient vector obtained from regressing the callback indicator on application covariates after leaving out all applications to job  $j$ . A unit increase in  $X'_{j\ell} \hat{\lambda}_{1(j)}$  is associated with roughly half of a callback on average. Though  $X'_{j\ell} \hat{\lambda}_{1(j)}$  strongly predicts callbacks, its average value among competing applications  $(L-1)^{-1} \sum_{k \neq \ell} X'_{jk} \hat{\lambda}_{1(j)}$  has no statistically discernible impact on callbacks.

A second set of tests for independence exploits data on the specific order in which resumes were sent to jobs in the AGCV experiment (corresponding data were unavailable for BM and NPRS). With independent trials, all callback sequences leading to a particular total number of callbacks  $t$  should be equally likely, so each such sequence should constitute a share  $\binom{L}{t}^{-1}$  of the sample calling  $t$  applications in total. Many plausible forms of dependence would manifest as violations of this condition. If employers stop calling after seeing enough high quality applicants, for example, we should expect to see sequences with runs of callbacks followed by non-callbacks. Likewise, if some employers detect the experiment after receiving several applications, we should see sequences with early callbacks over-represented and fewer callbacks at later positions in the order.

Columns (3)–(7) of Table II provide tests of the independence assumption in each callback stratum  $t$  of the AGCV data. We form Pearson (1900)  $\chi^2$  test statistics equal to quadratic forms in the difference between observed and expected callback sequence frequencies, scaled by the covariance matrix of these differences under the null that each sequence in a stratum is equally likely. Panel A splits the sample of eight applications into two sequences of four at each job in order to increase the expected frequency of each sequence, which may improve the power of the test against certain alternatives. Panel B displays results using the full eight-application sequence. These tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of independence in any callback stratum ( $p \geq 0.07$ ) or across all strata jointly ( $p = 0.57$ ). As shown in columns (7) and (8), the conclusions of this exercise are similar when we base inference on an asymptotic approximation to the distribution of the  $\chi^2$  statistic and when we use exact finite-sample  $p$ -values computed by summing probabilities of all sequence configurations that are less likely than the observed configuration under the null.

Tests based on the full set of callback sequences may have low power against some alternatives. Panel C of Table II therefore reports the results of three additional tests for specific plausible forms of dependence. A test that callback rates are equal across the eight resume order positions fails to reject ( $p = 0.62$ ). Similarly, a linear regression of a callback indicator on resume order suggests that the callback rate declines slightly with order, but the slope coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels ( $p = 0.15$ ). Finally, to test if earlier applications influence an employer's perception of resume quality, the bottom row of panel C regresses a callback indicator on the share of the four total female applications to the job sent prior to the current application, controlling for whether the current application is female. This test again fails to reject the null of independence ( $p = 0.79$ ). These results indicate that the independent Bernoulli trials model provides a good approximation to correspondence studies sending eight or fewer applications to each job. While we are not aware of any existing experiments sending more than eight applications to each job, a potentially interesting topic for future research is to study the nature of any dependence that arises as additional applications are sent to a given employer.

TABLE II  
TESTS FOR DEPENDENCE<sup>a</sup>

Nunley et al. Data: Resume Characteristics			Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vasquez: Resume Order			Exact <i>p</i> -Value (7)		
Variable	Main effect (1)	Leave-Out Mean (2)	Callbacks	Observations (3)	$\chi^2$ Statistic (4)		d.f. (5)	<i>P</i> -Value (6)
Black	-0.028 (0.010)	-0.019 (0.027)	1	142	Panel A. Four-application sequences 1.4			0.708
Female	0.010 (0.010)	0.009 (0.027)	2	99	10.0			0.075
High SES	-0.233 (0.174)	-0.674 (0.522)	3	64	3.2 Panel B. Eight-application sequences 7.8			0.367
GPA	-0.043 (0.066)	-0.153 (0.198)	1	56	7			0.347
Business major	0.008 (0.008)	0.010 (0.021)	2	37	23.6			0.651
Employment gap	0.011 (0.009)	0.034 (0.023)	3	36	58.4			0.352
Current unemp.: 3+	0.013 (0.012)	0.005 (0.032)	4	39	75.2			0.286
6+	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.038 (0.029)	5	16	40.7			0.924
12+	0.001 (0.012)	0.021 (0.032)	6	20	28.6			0.379
Past unemp.: 3+	0.029 (0.012)	0.065 (0.031)	7	6	8.4			0.300
6+	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.033)	Panel C. Joint tests Independence in all callback strata: $\chi^2(247) = 242.7, p = 0.565$					
12+	-0.004 (0.012)	0.019 (0.031)	No order effects: $\chi^2(7) = 5.3, p = 0.622$					
Predicted callback rate	0.476 (0.248)	-0.041 (0.626)	Regression of callback on order: coef. = -0.0021, s.e. = 0.0015, $p = 0.147$					
Joint <i>p</i> -value	Regression of callback on frac. females sent earlier: coef. = -0.003, s.e. = 0.013, $p = 0.788$							
sample size	9220							

<sup>a</sup>This table reports results from tests of the assumption that applications at each job are independent Bernoulli trials with race-specific success probabilities. Columns (1) and (2) show tests based on resume characteristics using data from Nunley et al. (2015). Estimates come from regressions of a callback indicator on a resume characteristic and the mean of this characteristic across other resumes at the same job. The predicted callback rate is the fitted value from a regression of a callback indicator on all resume characteristics, leaving out the reference job. The joint *p*-value comes from a test of the hypothesis that coefficients on the leave-out mean are zero for all individual characteristics. Standard errors, clustered at the job level, appear in parentheses. Columns (3)–(7) show tests based on resume order in the Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (2014) data. These results come from Wald tests of the hypothesis that all callback sequences leading to a particular total number of callbacks are equally likely. Column (3) shows the number of observed sequences in each callback stratum, column (4) shows the Pearson  $\chi^2$  goodness-of-fit statistic, column (5) shows the degrees of freedom for the test, column (6) shows the corresponding *p*-value, and column (7) shows an exact multinomial goodness-of-fit *p*-value obtained by summing probabilities of all sequence configurations that occur with probability less than or equal to the observed configuration under the null. Panel A constructs sequences separately for the first four and last four applications at each job, and panel B uses the full eight-application sequence. The first two rows of panel C show the results of a joint test of independence across all callback strata and a test that mean callback rates are equal across the eight resume order positions. The third row displays the slope coefficient from a linear regression of a callback indicator on order and a constant. The final row shows the slope coefficient from a regression of a callback indicator on the fraction of the four total female applications to the job that were sent prior to the reference application. This regression also includes a female indicator and a constant. Standard errors are clustered by job.

TABLE III

NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATES OF TREATMENT EFFECT VARIATION IN RESUME CORRESPONDENCE STUDIES<sup>a</sup>

	Bertrand & Mullainathan			Nunley et al.			Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vasquez		
	$p_b$ (1)	$p_w$ (2)	$p_b - p_w$ (3)	$p_b$ (4)	$p_w$ (5)	$p_b - p_w$ (6)	$p_m$ (7)	$p_f$ (8)	$p_m - p_f$ (9)
Mean	0.063 (0.006)	0.094 (0.007)	-0.031 (0.006)	0.153 (0.007)	0.176 (0.007)	-0.023 (0.005)	0.109 (0.009)	0.137 (0.010)	-0.028 (0.008)
Standard deviation	0.152 (0.012)	0.199 (0.012)	0.082 (0.016)	0.290 (0.008)	0.307 (0.007)	0.102 (0.012)	0.229 (0.012)	0.257 (0.011)	0.178 (0.014)
Correlation with $p_w$ or $p_f$	0.927 (0.051)	1.00 —	-0.717 (0.119)	0.944 (0.017)	1.00 —	-0.336 (0.066)	0.738 (0.039)	1.00 —	-0.498 (0.058)
Skewness	—	—	—	3.76 (0.08)	3.65 (0.08)	-4.49 (0.82)	4.04 (0.13)	3.74 (0.10)	-1.64 (0.56)
Excess kurtosis	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.59 (1.13)	5.91 (0.71)	13.6 (3.5)
$J$ -statistic:	0.0			23.0			2.7		
$p$ -value:	1.00			0.226			0.891		

<sup>a</sup>This table reports shape-constrained generalized method of moments (SCGMM) estimates of key features of the joint distribution of treatment and control callback rates in three resume correspondence studies. Columns (1)–(3) show estimates for black and white callback rates in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), columns (4)–(6) display estimates for black and white callback rates in Nunley et al. (2015), and columns (7)–(9) show estimates for male and female callback rates in Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (2014). Standard errors are computed using the numerical bootstrap procedure described by Hong and Li (2020).  $J$ -statistics are minimized SCGMM criterion functions.  $p$ -values come from bootstrap tests of the hypothesis that the model restrictions are satisfied.

## 7. MOMENT AND POSTERIOR ESTIMATES

To estimate the identified moments in each experiment, we compute shape-constrained GMM (SCGMM) estimates that require the callback frequencies to be rationalizable by a proper discretized probability distribution defined on a  $150 \times 150$  grid of support points. Imposing shape constraints serves two goals. First, we need the moment estimates to be rationalizable by some  $G \in \mathcal{G}$  in order to subsequently use them as constraints when estimating bounds via our linear programming method. Second, imposing valid shape constraints in estimation typically improves accuracy and precision (see Chetverikov, Santos, and Shaikh (2018) for a review). Details of the SCGMM estimation procedure, which involves solving a quadratic programming (QP) problem, appear in Appendix D of the Supplemental Material.

Table III uses the shape-constrained estimates to summarize key features of the distribution of callback probabilities in each experiment, and reports minimized SCGMM criterion functions ( $J$ -statistics) and  $p$ -values from bootstrap tests of the shape constraints based on the methods of Chernozhukov, Newey, and Santos (2015). The full set of unconstrained moment estimates appear in Appendix Tables A.I–A.III. Because the shape constraints may make the criterion non-differentiable, we rely on the “numerical bootstrap” procedure of Hong and Li (2020) to construct pointwise valid estimates of standard errors.<sup>10</sup>

Table IV reports LP estimates of the lower bound probability that a given employer is discriminating. In computing both the analytic bounds of Lemma 2 and the sharp bounds of (5), we replace the unknown callback probabilities  $\bar{f}$  with estimates  $\hat{f} = B\hat{\mu}$ , where  $\hat{\mu}$

<sup>10</sup>Because the asymptotic distribution of the shape-constrained estimator will tend to be non-normal (Fang and Santos (2018)), standard errors provide only a heuristic guide to the uncertainty associated with each moment estimate.

TABLE IV  
LOWER BOUNDS ON PROBABILITIES OF DISCRIMINATION<sup>a</sup>

Callbacks	Bertrand & Mullainathan			Nunley et al.			Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vasquez		
	$\Pr(p_w \neq p_b)$	$\Pr(p_w < p_b)$	$\Pr(p_b < p_w)$	$\Pr(p_w \neq p_b)$	$\Pr(p_w < p_b)$	$\Pr(p_b < p_w)$	$\Pr(p_f \neq p_m)$	$\Pr(p_f < p_m)$	$\Pr(p_m < p_f)$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
All	0.130	0.000	0.130	0.361	0.155	0.175	0.207	0.064	0.142
0	0.038	0.000	0.038	0.155	0.094	0.050	0.065	0.023	0.042
1	0.424	0.000	0.424	0.679	0.187	0.438	0.721	0.307	0.414
	{0.363}			{0.176}			{0.071}		
2	0.442	0.000	0.442	0.700	0.016	0.684	0.708	0.226	0.481
	{0.379}			{0.282}			{0.524}		
3	0.508	0.000	0.508	0.826	0.069	0.739	0.584	0.050	0.533
	{0.440}			{0.126}			{0.502}		
4	0.212	0.000	0.212	0.434	0.270	0.128	0.518	0.053	0.465
							{0.492}		
5							0.320	0.153	0.167
							{0.286}		
6							0.372	0.176	0.197
							{0.308}		
7							0.453	0.122	0.331
							{0.170}		
8							0.069	0.008	0.062
J-statistic:	29.3	0.0	29.3	62.5	23.4	62.5	427.8	27.1	421.0
P-value:	0.000	1.00	0.000	0.000	0.193	0.009	0.000	0.018	0.000

<sup>a</sup>This table reports lower bounds on the probability that jobs discriminate based upon race or sex. Bounds are computed via linear programming. Where possible, corresponding analytic bounds based on the formula in Lemma 2 appear in brackets. The first row shows bounds in the population of all jobs, and the remaining rows display bounds conditional on the total number of callbacks. Columns (1)–(3) show results for racial discrimination in the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) data, while columns (4)–(6) show results for racial discrimination in the Nunley et al. (2015) data. Columns (1) and (4) display lower bounds on the fraction of jobs with equal callback rates for white and black applicants, columns (2) and (5) report lower bounds on the fraction discriminating against white applicants, and columns (3) and (6) report lower bounds on the fraction discriminating against black applicants. Results for the Nunley et al. (2015) data that condition on the number of callbacks refer to jobs receiving two white and two black applications. Columns (7)–(9) show results for sex discrimination in the Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (2014) data. Column (7) reports a lower bound on the fraction of jobs with equal callbacks for men and women, column (8) shows a lower bound on the fraction discriminating against women, and column (9) reports a lower bound on the fraction discriminating against men. J-statistics and p-values come from bootstrap tests of the hypothesis that the lower bound equals zero for all jobs.

is the relevant vector of shape-constrained moment estimates produced by our SCGMM procedure. Because the LP algorithm used to solve (5) scales efficiently to large problems, we use a finer discretization with 36 times as many points as the grid used in our earlier SCGMM step.<sup>11</sup>

### *Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)*

The first rows of columns (1) and (2) of Table III show the mean callback probabilities of white and black applications across jobs. The J-statistic of zero reported in column (2) of Table III indicates that the shape constraints do not bind in the BM data, that is, that the sample frequencies can be rationalized to numerical precision by a discretized probability

<sup>11</sup>Appendix Table A.IV in the Supplemental Material assesses the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative discretization schemes. The results show that the moment estimates are not sensitive to the number of grid points used in the SCGMM step (as evidenced by the goodness-of-fit statistic) and that the bounds stabilize with a sufficiently large number of grid points in the linear programming step.



distribution. Because the shape constraints do not bind and the BM application design is balanced, the mean callback probabilities match the callback rates reported in Table I perfectly. More interesting are the second moments: there is substantial over-dispersion in callback probabilities, with standard deviations across jobs for each race-specific probability more than double the mean probability. As expected, there is also a strong positive correlation between white and black callback rates, reflecting that some employers simply call back more applications of all types.


Column (3) of Table III reveals substantial heterogeneity in the difference in race-specific callback rates  $p_{jb} - p_{jw}$  across jobs, with a standard deviation more than twice as large as the mean. The third row shows a strong negative correlation between the discriminatory gap in callback rates  $p_{jb} - p_{jw}$  and the white callback probability  $p_{jw}$ , suggesting that discrimination tends to be stronger when jobs have higher chances of calling back more white workers. This reflects, in part, a mechanical boundary effect, as an employer with very low callback rates has little opportunity to discriminate. Since the white callback rate in this study is only around 10%, boundary effects are likely to be a quantitatively important phenomenon.

Column (1) of Table IV reports lower bounds on the share of jobs engaged in discrimination by the number of total callbacks in the BM experiment. Estimates of the analytic bounds from Lemma 2 (presented in brackets) suggest that at least 38% of the jobs that call back two applications are engaged in discrimination, while at least 44% of jobs that call back three applications are discriminating. The sharp LP bounds are somewhat tighter than their analytical counterparts, revealing that at least 44% of the jobs calling back two applicants are discriminating on the basis of race. Among jobs that call back three applications, at least half are discriminating. Hence, in this callback stratum, our estimates suggest jobs should not logically be presumed “innocent” of discrimination.

The LP approach also generates informative bounds in callback strata for which analytical bounds are not available. Overall, at least 13% of jobs discriminate on the basis of race. Notably, at least 4% of jobs that call back no applications are engaged in discrimination, while at least 21% of jobs that call back all four applications discriminate on the basis of race. Since neither of these strata exhibit any difference in black-white callback rates, all of the relevant information on discrimination in these strata comes from the total number of callbacks blended with the indirect evidence from the population distribution  $G$ .

Column (2) of Table IV reports LP-based lower bounds on the proportion of jobs with white callback probabilities less than their black callback probabilities. We find a lower bound of exactly zero in each callback stratum, indicating that the callback probabilities can be rationalized without any employers engaging in “reverse discrimination” against whites. Column (3) reports lower bounds on the proportion of jobs with white callback probabilities greater than their black callback probabilities. These lower bound estimates coincide exactly with those reported in column (1). Accordingly, we easily reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination against blacks.

Figure 1 converts the lower bound estimates in column (3) of Table IV to lower bound posterior probabilities of discrimination. Overall, at least 13% of jobs engage in discrimination. However, at least 72% of jobs that call back two white and no black applications are discriminating, while a job that calls back one white and no black applications has at least a 58% chance of being engaged in discrimination.



Notes: This figure displays lower bounds on the probability that jobs in the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) data discriminate based upon race given their callback configurations. Each bar reports a lower bound on the posterior probability of discrimination conditional on  $(C_w, C_b)$ , where  $C_w$  is the number of white callbacks and  $C_b$  is the number of black callbacks.

FIGURE 1.—Lower bounds on posterior probabilities of discrimination, BM data.


*Nunley, Pugh, Romero, and Seals (2015)*

Moment estimates from the NPRS study are reported in columns (4)–(6) of Table III. Recall that NPRS employed five distinct application designs with  $(L_{jw}, L_{jb}) \in \{(4, 0), (3, 1), (2, 2), (1, 3), (0, 4)\}$ . Appendix Table A.II reports design-specific method of moments estimates of all identified moments for the three designs with the largest sample sizes.<sup>12</sup> As expected, the design-specific estimates are generally close to one another and we cannot reject that they are identical. To pool the designs efficiently, we again use an SCGMM estimator that requires the moments be rationalizable by a proper probability distribution  $G \in \mathcal{G}$ . The minimized SCGMM criterion function provides a measure of the goodness of fit of our model. Applying the bootstrap method of Chernozhukov, Newey, and Santos (2015) yields a  $p$ -value of 0.23 for the null hypothesis that the results for all experimental designs are jointly rationalized by a common distribution  $G$ .

Consistent with our findings for the BM data, columns (4)–(6) of Table III reveal substantial heterogeneity in race-specific callback rates in the NPRS experiment, with standard deviations roughly twice their mean. The imbalanced designs used by NPRS allow us to identify higher moments than the earlier BM study even though the two studies sent the same number of applications per job. While race-specific callback rates are right-skewed, racial gaps in callback probabilities  $p_{jb} - p_{jw}$  are left-skewed, indicating a long tail of heavy discriminators.

Columns (4)–(6) of Table IV report estimated lower bounds on the probability of discrimination from the NPRS study for the full population of jobs as well as bounds conditional on total callbacks in a balanced design with  $L_{jw} = L_{jb} = 2$ . In column (1), our analytic bound formula suggests at least 28% of the jobs calling back two applicants in this design are discriminating—slightly lower than the corresponding estimate in BM.

<sup>12</sup>The remaining designs were omitted from this analysis due to small sample sizes. Only 22 jobs were in the  $(L_{jw} = 0, L_{jb} = 4)$  design while 43 jobs fell in the  $(L_{jw} = 4, L_{jb} = 0)$  design.



Notes: This figure displays lower bounds on the probability that jobs in the Nunley et al. (2015) data discriminate against black applicants for the 10 callback configurations with highest posterior bounds. Each bar reports a lower bound on the posterior probability that  $p_w > p_b$ , conditional on  $(C_w, C_b)$ , where  $C_w$  is the number of white callbacks and  $C_b$  is the number of black callbacks. The (3,1) design corresponds to an experiment with 3 white and 1 black application, the (2,2) design corresponds to an experiment with 2 white and 2 black applications, and the (1,3) design corresponds to an experiment with 1 white and 3 black applications. The "All" bar reports the lower bound on the prior probability of discrimination.

FIGURE 2.—Lower bounds on posterior probabilities of discrimination, NPRS data.

Applying the LP approach tightens the analytic bounds dramatically and provides additional bounds on the prevalence of discrimination among jobs that make no callbacks or that call every application. We estimate that at least 36% of all jobs have different white and black callback probabilities, with that share rising to 70% among employers who call back two applicants in a balanced (2, 2) design.

Some of this discrimination is estimated to be against whites. Column (5) shows that the shape-constrained callback probabilities  $\hat{f}$  imply that at least 15% of employers have white callback probabilities less than their black probabilities. These moments are estimated with error, however, and a bootstrap test of the null hypothesis that all employers have white callback probabilities weakly exceeding their black callback probabilities yields a  $p$ -value of 0.19. If we attribute the evidence of reverse discrimination to sampling error, we can take the estimates in column (6) as the relevant lower bounds on discrimination. These results imply that at least 17% of jobs discriminate against black applicants. We decisively reject the null hypothesis that this lower bound is zero.

Figure 2 converts these lower bound priors into posterior estimates of the share of employers with selected callback configurations engaged in discrimination against black applicants. We estimate that at least 85% of the employers calling back two white and no black applicants in a balanced (2, 2) design are discriminating against blacks. Interestingly, calling back three whites and no blacks in a (3, 1) design is estimated to be even more suspicious, with at least 90% of the employers generating this callback evidence engaged in discrimination against black applicants.

*Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (2014)*

The full set of moment estimates for the AGCV experiment (reported in Appendix Table A.III) reveal that the shape constraints bind strongly in this case, presumably because the design of the AGCV experiment involves many small cells. Despite substantial movement in some moment estimates, the bootstrap  $p$ -value from a test of the null hypothesis that the callback frequencies are generated by the model is 0.89, indicating that the raw callback frequencies are rationalizable by a well-behaved underlying joint distribution of callback probabilities.

Columns (7)–(9) of Table III report key moment estimates from the AGCV data. The behavior of the first two moments is similar to that reported in the prior two experiments, with gender-specific standard deviations roughly twice their mean callback probabilities. However, the greater number of applications used in this design helps enormously with the precision of higher moment estimates. We find strong evidence of left-skew in the distribution of gender gaps in callback probabilities as well as evidence of excess kurtosis in the distribution of gaps. While many jobs discriminate little, there is a thick tail of heavy discriminators.

Columns (7)–(9) of Table IV report estimated lower bounds on the probability of discrimination in the AGCV experiment. Focusing on the sharp bounds reported in column (7), we find that at least 21% of jobs are engaged in discrimination. Remarkably, this share rises to 72% among jobs calling back one applicant and 71% among jobs calling two. These shares are much higher than the corresponding analytic bounds, showing that cross-stratum restrictions in a design with eight applications are useful for tightening bounds in strata with few callbacks. Evidently, jobs that call back few applicants in the AGCV experiment are very likely to engage in discrimination.

Some of this discrimination appears to be “reverse” discrimination against women. Column (8) shows that at least 6% of jobs discriminate against women, and a bootstrap test of the null hypothesis that this bound equals zero is decisively rejected ( $p < 0.02$ ). An employer that calls back a single application has at least a 31% chance of discriminating against women. Column (9) shows that at least 14% of jobs discriminate against men, and the bootstrap  $p$ -value indicates this bound is also statistically distinguishable from zero. The mean difference in callback rates in the AGCV experiment therefore masks gender discrimination operating in both directions. An employer that calls back a single application has at least a 41% chance of discriminating against men.

Figure 3 plots lower bound posterior probabilities of discrimination against men and women, respectively, for selected callback configurations. At least 97% of the jobs that call back four women and no men are estimated to discriminate against men, and at least 88% of jobs that call back four men and no women are estimated to discriminate against women. But even an employer that calls back a single woman and no men has at least a 74% chance of discriminating against men. Likewise, at least 66% of jobs that call back a single man and no women are estimated to discriminate against women. That we obtain such informative posteriors in settings with a single callback demonstrates the tremendous value of indirect evidence in this setting.

## 8. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DETECTION ERROR TRADEOFFS

The above analysis demonstrated that it is possible to achieve high posterior certainty that individual jobs are engaged in discrimination when callback rates at those jobs differ dramatically across protected groups. Can such evidence be used to reliably detect a nontrivial share of discriminating jobs? We address this question by studying the tradeoff




FIGURE 3.—Lower bounds on posterior probabilities of discrimination, AGCV data.

between Type I and II errors that arises under a simple two-type mixture specification calibrated to match callback rates in the NPRS data given race and other resume characteristics. We then consider how the resulting detection error tradeoffs change as the experimental design is altered to send more applications to each job.

### A Mixed Logit Model

We work with a mixed logit model for callbacks of the form

$$\Pr(Y_{j\ell} = 1 | R_{j\ell}, X_{j\ell}, \alpha_j, \beta_j) = \Lambda(\alpha_j - \beta_j 1\{R_{j\ell} = b\} + X'_{j\ell} \psi),$$

where  $\Lambda(\cdot) = \frac{\exp(\cdot)}{1 + \exp(\cdot)}$  is the standard logistic CDF,  $X_{j\ell}$  is a vector of de-meaned application covariates, and  $(\alpha_j, \beta_j)$  are random coefficients governing the odds of a white callback and discrimination against blacks, respectively. To allow for heterogeneity in white callback rates, we assume that  $\alpha_j \stackrel{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} N(\alpha_0, \sigma_\alpha^2)$ . Discrimination is modeled as a two-type (conditional) mixture:

$$\beta_j | \alpha_j = \begin{cases} \beta_0 & \text{w/ prob. } \Lambda(\tau_0 + \tau_\alpha \alpha_j), \\ 0 & \text{w/ prob. } 1 - \Lambda(\tau_0 + \tau_\alpha \alpha_j). \end{cases}$$

This specification allows for some share of jobs to not discriminate at all, while the remaining jobs depress the odds of calling back blacks relative to whites by roughly  $\beta_0\%$ . When  $\tau_\alpha \neq 0$ , the probability of discrimination depends on  $\alpha_j$ , which governs the white callback rate. Note that random assignment of the covariates  $X_{j\ell}$  implies they are independent of  $(\alpha_j, \beta_j)$  and therefore excludable from the type probability equation.

TABLE V  
MIXED LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES, NPRS DATA<sup>a</sup>

	Constant (1)	Types	
		No Selection (2)	Selection (3)
Distribution of $\logit(p_w)$ :			
$\alpha_0$	-4.71 (0.22)	-4.93 (0.24)	-4.93 (0.28)
$\sigma_\alpha$	4.74 (0.22)	4.99 (0.25)	4.98 (0.29)
Discrimination intensity:			
$\beta_0$	0.456 (0.108)	4.05 (1.56)	4.05 (1.58)
Discrimination logit:			
$\tau_0$	-	-1.59 (0.42)	-1.56 (1.10)
$\tau_\alpha$	-	-	-0.005 (0.180)
Fraction with $p_w \neq p_b$ :	1.00	0.168	0.170
Log-likelihood	-2792.1	-2788.2	-2788.2
Parameters	15	16	17
Sample size	2305	2305	2305


<sup>a</sup>This table reports simulated maximum likelihood estimates of mixed logit models for callback probabilities in the Nunley et al. (2015) data. Columns (2)–(3) allow for two discrete types of firms, one of which does not discriminate based upon race. All models include resume covariates (sex, high SES, GPA, business major, employment gap, internship, underemployment, and indicators for durations of current and past unemployment). Covariates are de-measured in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

### Model Estimates

Table V shows the results of fitting the above model to the NPRS experiment by simulated maximum likelihood. Column (1) provides a standard random effects logit model with heterogeneity confined to the intercept as in Farber, Silverman, and von Wachter (2016). We find substantial variability across jobs in the overall odds of a callback: a 0.1 standard deviation increase in the intercept  $\alpha_j$  is estimated to raise the odds of a callback by 47%. We also find clear evidence of market-wide discrimination: black applications have roughly 46% lower odds of being called back than their white counterparts.

Column (2) allows the race effect  $\beta_j$  to vary across employers, which yields a significant improvement in model fit. The types specification finds that only about 17% of jobs discriminate against blacks—very near the nonparametric lower bound estimate produced earlier by our LP routine (see column (6) of Table IV). The degree of discrimination among such jobs is estimated to be severe: the odds of receiving a callback are roughly  $\exp(4) - 1 \approx 53$  times higher for white applications than for blacks. Column (3) allows the probability of discrimination to vary with the white callback rate, which yields a negligible improvement in model fit. Surprisingly,  $\alpha_j$  and  $\beta_j$  are found to be nearly independent, which implies that the negative correlation between  $p_{jb} - p_{jw}$  and  $p_{jw}$  reported in Table III is attributable to boundary effects. Again, this model finds roughly 17% of jobs discriminate against blacks. Because we cannot reject the null hypothesis that  $\tau_\alpha = 0$ , we work with the more parsimonious model in column (2) in the exercises that follow. Appendix Figure A.1 provides a goodness-of-fit diagnostic for this model, plotting the empirical callback rates in each black/white callback by application design cell against the





Notes: This figure displays mixed logit estimates of the posterior probability that jobs in the Nunley et al. (2015) data discriminate against black workers conditional on  $(C_w, C_b)$ , where  $C_w$  is the number of white callbacks and  $C_b$  is the number of black callbacks. LQ and HQ refer to low quality and high quality applications, respectively, where low and high quality are defined based on a logit covariate index 1 standard deviation below or above the mean.

FIGURE 4.—Mixed logit estimates of posterior discrimination probabilities, NPRS data.

logit model's predicted callback probability in that cell. The empirical frequencies track the model predictions closely and a naive Pearson  $\chi^2$  test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the model rationalizes the cell frequencies up to sampling error.


### Posteriors

Figure 4 reports the distribution of posterior probabilities  $\Pr(D_j = 1 | \{Y_{j\ell}, R_{j\ell}, X'_{j\ell}\psi\}_{\ell=1}^L)$  implied by the parameter estimates reported in column (2) of Table V. To summarize the influence of the covariates, we evaluate the posteriors at two points within each race group, corresponding to the estimated index  $X'_{j\ell}\hat{\psi}$  being a standard deviation above or below its empirical mean, which we refer to as “high” and “low” quality applications. By construction, the mean posterior coincides with the estimated share of jobs that discriminate. The types model finds that only 17% of jobs are discriminating, yielding a strong prior that the typical job is not violating employment law. Yet calling back only white applicants still justifies a substantial degree of suspicion: 62% of the jobs that call back two whites and no blacks are discriminating.

Imbalances in the covariate mix of applicants can substantially intensify this suspicion. For example, 79% of the jobs that call back two low quality white applications and neither of two high quality black applications are discriminating. Evidently, even in models with a strong presumption of innocence, four applications can provide enough information to cast substantial doubt on whether individual employers are in compliance with employment law. However, it is only under the most extreme callback configurations that we can detect discriminators with reasonable certainty.

### Detection Error Tradeoffs

Consider now a hypothetical regulator who forms posteriors taking as prior knowledge the two-type estimates reported in Table V. One may think of the regulator as first



Notes: This figure displays detection/error tradeoff curves based on models fit to the Nunley et al. (2015) data. Estimates come from decision rules applied to experiments generated from the logit model in column (2) of Table V. The horizontal axis measures the share of discriminating jobs investigated by each decision rule, while the vertical axis measures the share of non-discriminating jobs not investigated. The curves are generated by varying the posterior threshold at which jobs are investigated. The solid curve corresponds to an experiment that sends two white and two black applications to each job, and the dashed curve corresponds to sending five applications of each race. These two curves randomly assign a 2-valued covariate index of resume quality (high or low), defined as  $\pm 1$  the empirical standard deviation of this index. The dotted curve shows results from sending five low-quality white and five high-quality black applications. Bold points correspond to 80% posterior thresholds.

FIGURE 5.—Detection/error tradeoffs, NPRS data.

learning the parameters of the two-type model from a large experiment and then sending applications to additional jobs drawn from the same population from which the original study sampled.

Figure 5 illustrates the detection error rates that arise from investigating all jobs exceeding various posterior thresholds. The horizontal axis gives the share of jobs engaged in discrimination that are investigated. The vertical axis plots the share of non-discriminators that are not investigated, which can equivalently be viewed as 1 minus the Type I error rate. Each point gives the values of these shares corresponding to a particular posterior decision threshold. The bold point corresponds to a posterior threshold of 80%.

In the canonical design with only two white and two black applications per job, the 80% posterior threshold yields almost no false accusations. This control over Type I errors comes at the cost of a high Type II error rate—few accusations of any sort are made, leading to a negligible share of discriminators detected. Note that conducting a classical hypothesis test (e.g., Fisher's exact test) at the 1% level is equivalent to controlling the share of non-discriminators that are not investigated, which is depicted by the horizontal line at 0.99. This rule would yield more investigations but most of these would be erroneous: the equivalent posterior threshold in the two-pair design is only 33%.

Expanding the design to five pairs of applications yields a substantial outward shift in the detection error tradeoff curve. Using a posterior threshold of 80% keeps the share of employers erroneously investigated for discrimination below 0.2% while allowing detection of roughly 7.5% of jobs that discriminate. Lowering the posterior threshold further boosts the detection rate above 10% while modestly increasing the Type I error rate. This shows that ten applications is enough to accurately detect a nontrivial share of discriminators.

The third line shows the results of an experiment where each job is sent five high quality black applications and five low quality white applications.<sup>13</sup> Modifying the experimental design in this way yields additional improvements in Type I and II error rates. Using an 80% posterior threshold, the share of non-discriminators investigated remains below 0.2%, while the share of discriminators investigated rises to almost 10%.

## 9. INDIRECT EVIDENCE AND POLICY

The findings of the previous section indicate that correspondence experiments with as few as 10 applications can reliably detect a substantial share of discriminating employers when the population distribution of callback probabilities is known. We now consider how a Bayesian regulator might go about deciding which jobs to investigate and then assess how partial identification of the callback rate distribution affects this decision rule.<sup>14</sup>

### *The Regulator's Problem*

Suppose the regulator must decide which jobs to investigate based on a vector of direct evidence  $\mathcal{E}_j = \{Y_{jt}, R_{jt}, X_{jt}\}_{t=1}^L$  revealed by a correspondence study. The regulator uses a deterministic decision rule  $\delta(\mathcal{E}_j)$  that maps this evidence vector to a binary inquiry decision.<sup>15</sup> Each job has a pair of race-specific callback probabilities  $\{p_{jw}(x), p_{jb}(x)\}$  that may vary with applicant quality  $x$ . We use  $H(\cdot)$  to denote the i.i.d. randomization distribution of  $X_{jt}$ . Consistent with our earlier analysis of the NPRS experiment, we rule out the possibility of discrimination against whites by assuming  $\Pr(p_{jw}(x) \geq p_{jb}(x)) = 1$  for all quality levels  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ .

The regulator's loss from applying decision rule  $\delta(\mathcal{E}_j) = \delta_j \in \{0, 1\}$  to job  $j$  is modeled as

$$\mathcal{L}_j(\delta_j) = \delta_j \left( \kappa - \Lambda \left( \int [\Lambda^{-1}(p_{jw}(x)) - \Lambda^{-1}(p_{jb}(x))] dH(x) \right) \right). \quad (8)$$

One can think of the parameter  $\kappa \in (1/2, 1]$  as capturing the cost of conducting an investigation. The term  $\Lambda(\int [\Lambda^{-1}(p_{jw}(x)) - \Lambda^{-1}(p_{jb}(x))] dH(x)) \in [1/2, 1]$  gives the benefit to the investigation, which is increasing in the average log callback odds advantage of whites over blacks at job  $j$  across quality levels. To ensure this benefit remains bounded, the racial difference in log odds is then mapped back to the unit interval by the logistic CDF to produce the payoff to an investigation. Note that, under the logit model of the previous section, this payoff reduces to  $\Lambda(\beta_j)$ . The regulator would like to investigate whenever this payoff exceeds the investigation cost, in which case  $\mathcal{L}_j(1)$ , the loss of investigating, is negative.

<sup>13</sup>Of course, the results of such an experiment would be difficult to interpret without an earlier experiment revealing the model parameters, as one would not be able to parse the effects of race from those of quality.

<sup>14</sup>Our analysis is based loosely on the functioning of the EEOC, which has the authority to conduct systematic investigations into the discriminatory behavior of particular organizations. Because investigations are costly, the EEOC uses a priority system based on human judgement to decide which complaints to investigate (US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2016)). The results below illustrate how direct callback evidence from a correspondence experiment can be blended with indirect evidence to assist or replace informal human judgements.

<sup>15</sup>We confine ourselves to deterministic rules because randomized decision rules violate commonly held horizontal equity principles.

Because the  $\{p_{jw}(x), p_{jb}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{X}}$  are not known, the regulator minimizes expected loss (i.e., risk). When the regulator knows the joint distribution of callback probabilities in the population, the risk function can be written

$$\mathcal{R}_j(G, \delta(\cdot)) = \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{L}_j(\delta_j)] = \mathbb{E}\left[\delta_j(\mathcal{E}_j)\left(\kappa - \Lambda\left(\int [\Lambda^{-1}(p_{jw}(x)) - \Lambda^{-1}(p_{jb}(x))] dH(x)\right)\right)\right],$$

where  $G : [0, 1]^{2|\mathcal{X}|} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is the joint distribution of quality-specific callback rates. Because  $\{\mathcal{E}_j, p_{jw}(x), p_{jb}(x)\}_{j=1}^J$  are i.i.d. across jobs, we can drop the  $j$  subscripts and refer to the risk function as  $\mathcal{R}(G, \delta(\cdot))$ . Choosing  $\delta(\mathcal{E}_j)$  to minimize the risk function pointwise yields the following lemma, which characterizes the regulator's optimal decision rule in the case where  $G$  is known.

LEMMA 3—Optimal Decision Rule: *The decision rule*

$$\delta(\mathcal{E}_j) = 1\left\{\mathbb{E}\left[\Lambda\left(\int [\Lambda^{-1}(p_{jw}(x)) - \Lambda^{-1}(p_{jb}(x))] dH(x)\right) | \mathcal{E}_j\right] > \kappa\right\} \quad \text{minimizes } \mathcal{R}(G, \delta).$$

One can think of Lemma 3 as offering an economically motivated standard of *reasonable doubt*: when the posterior expected benefit of an investigation exceeds the investigation cost  $\kappa$ , it is rational to conduct an investigation. Note that, in the two-type logit model, the difference in log odds at job  $j$  equals  $\beta_0 D_j$  for all quality levels, so the optimal decision rule amounts to investigating when the posterior probability of discrimination exceeds a cost-based threshold. In this case, the decision rule can be written  $\delta(\mathcal{E}_j) = 1\{\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{E}_j, G_{\text{logit}}) > (\kappa - 1/2)/(\Lambda(\beta_0) - 1/2)\}$ .


### Ambiguity

When  $G$  is only known to lie in some identified set  $\Theta$  of distributions, many possible decision rules are consistent with rationality. Among those rules, an important benchmark is the minimax decision rule (Wald (1945), Savage (1951), Manski (2000)), which minimizes the maximum risk that may arise from the regulator's decisions. We can define the maximum risk function and the associated minimax decision rule respectively as

$$\mathcal{R}^m(\Theta, \delta) = \sup_{G \in \Theta} \mathcal{R}(G, \delta) \quad \text{and} \quad \delta^{mm} = \arg \inf_{\delta \in \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{R}^m(\Theta, \delta), \quad (9)$$

where  $\mathcal{D}$  is the set of deterministic decision rules. Unlike in the case where  $G$  is known, a regulator that only knows  $G \in \Theta$  cannot consult a single posterior expectation to make the decision of whether to investigate. Rather, the maximum risk of each decision rule must be computed to obtain the minimax decision rule.

Relying on a discretized function space for  $G$  simplifies computation of the maximum risk function  $\mathcal{R}^m$  consistent with a set of experimental callback probabilities. As explained in Appendix E of the Supplemental Material, when  $\Theta$  consists of a family of discrete distributions,  $\mathcal{R}^m(\Theta, \delta)$  can be computed numerically as the solution to a linear programming problem. The minimax decision rule  $\delta^{mm}(\cdot)$  is found by computing  $\mathcal{R}^m(\Theta, \delta)$  for each candidate rule  $\delta \in \mathcal{D}$  and choosing the rule that yields lowest maximal risk.



Notes: This figure displays risk functions generated by a hypothetical experiment sending five white and five black applications to jobs in the population studied by Nunley et al. (2015). Resumes are randomly assigned to high or low quality with equal probability, where quality is defined as  $\pm 1$  the empirical standard deviation of the logit covariate index. The horizontal axis plots the posterior threshold at which jobs are accused of discrimination. The dashed curve displays risk based on the logit data generating process in column (2) of Table V. The cost of an investigation is calibrated so that a Bayesian regulator sets the posterior cutoff at 0.8. The solid curve plots maximum risk calculated by choosing the joint distribution of callback probabilities to maximize risk for each decision rule subject to the moments identified by the Nunley et al. (2015) experiment, restricted to decision rules that order jobs by the logit posterior threshold. Vertical lines indicate risk-minimizing thresholds. The window displays logit and minimax risk at thresholds of 0.75 and above. Risk-minimizing points are indicated with stars.

FIGURE 6.—Bayes and minimax risk, NPRS data.

### Bayes versus Minimax Decisions

We now compare the decisions made by a Bayesian regulator with a minimax regulator in the hypothetical five-pair generalization of the NPRS experiment considered in Section 8. As in Figure 4, we assume applications take on only two quality levels (high or low) with equal probability.

We consider a restricted family  $\mathcal{D}^+ \subset \mathcal{D}$  of decision rules of the form  $\delta(\mathcal{E}_j) = 1\{\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{E}_j, G_{\text{logit}}) \geq q\}$ , where  $q \in (0, 1)$  is a posterior cutoff and  $G_{\text{logit}}$  is the logit model reported in column (2) of Table V. Computing the maximal risk for this family of decision rules can be thought of as a way of “second guessing” the risk associated with each logit posterior threshold without debating the logit model’s ordering of the underlying evidence configurations.<sup>16</sup> In computing  $\mathcal{R}^m(\theta, \delta)$ , we use the logit model predictions of callback probabilities within each of the two quality bins as constraints (see the Appendix for details) and calibrate  $\kappa$  so that, under the logit DGP, an 80% posterior threshold minimizes risk.

Figure 6 plots logit (i.e., Bayes) risk and  $\mathcal{R}^m(\theta, \delta)$  against the nominal logit posterior threshold  $q$ . As  $q$  approaches 1, both the maximal and Bayes risks approach zero, as no

<sup>16</sup>With  $L_w$  white and  $L_b$  black applications, there are  $2^{(1+L_w)(1+L_b)}$  logically possible decision rules which, in practice, prohibits brute force enumeration when  $L_w + L_b > 4$ . Restricting attention to logit posterior threshold rules allows us to circumvent this obstacle. In cases where multiple evidence configurations yield the same logit posterior, we consider separate rules that investigate each of these configurations individually.

jobs are investigated in the limit. Conversely, as the posterior threshold approaches zero, at which point all jobs are investigated, the maximum risk diverges from the Bayes risk because the least favorable  $G$  is one where nearly all jobs are engaged in trivial levels of discrimination that fail to justify the investigation cost. Recall from Table IV, however, that some jobs in the NPRS experiment must be discriminating, which limits the magnitude of this divergence.

While the Bayes risk function is minimized by the decision rule with a posterior threshold of 80%,  $\mathcal{R}^m(\theta, \delta)$  is minimized by a rule with a logit-based threshold of 83%. This higher threshold implies that a minimax regulator would investigate fewer jobs than a Bayesian regulator with the same preferences who believes  $G$  to be logit. The change in behavior is minimal, however, suggesting that, at least for this specification of preferences, the Bayes decision rule is relatively robust to ambiguity over the nature of the true DGP. As shown in Appendix Figure A.2, however, had we considered a more aggressive Bayesian benchmark (e.g., a 40% threshold), the minimax and Bayes rules would have departed more substantially, as the maximum risk can greatly exceed the Bayes risk.

That the Bayes and minimax thresholds are nearer each other for higher nominal thresholds is to be expected, as our risk function must approach zero as the posterior cutoff approaches 1. In practice, state and regulatory agencies are likely to exhibit preferences requiring relatively high posterior thresholds that, as in our example, make the bounds on the risk function relatively narrow over the relevant range of decision rules. The concordance of maximum and Bayes risk over this range suggests that flexible parametric models such as the mixed logit specification employed in Section 8 may serve as a useful heuristic for decisionmaking by such entities.

## 10. CONCLUSION

Correspondence studies are powerful tools that have been extensively used to detect market-level averages of discriminatory behavior. Revisiting three such studies, we find tremendous heterogeneity in discriminatory behavior across jobs. This heterogeneity presents authorities charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws with a difficult inferential task. Our analysis suggests that when ensemble evidence is used, sending 10 applications per job enables accurate detection of a nontrivial share of discriminatory employers. This finding opens the possibility that discrimination can be monitored—perhaps in real time—at the employer level.

Our results also provide a number of methodological lessons regarding the design and analysis of correspondence studies, and of experimental ensembles more generally. First, we demonstrate that indirect evidence can serve as a valuable supplement to direct evidence even when heterogeneity distributions are not point identified. Using a few moments of the callback rate distribution in conjunction with only four applications per job, we derived informative lower bounds on the share of jobs engaged in illegal discrimination in the NPRS experiment. In the AGCV study, which sent eight applications to each job, we deduced informative lower bound rates of discrimination against men and women separately.

Second, our analysis highlights that the appropriate use of indirect evidence depends critically on the objectives of the investigator, formalized in our framework by the loss function of a hypothetical regulator. While in point identified settings it is straightforward to characterize the tradeoffs presented by different decision rules, partial identification of heterogeneity distributions tends to undermine identifiability of this tradeoff itself. In our setting, acknowledging the ambiguity stemming from partial identification turns out to



lead to only slightly more conservative decisions with a plausible loss function. An important topic for future research is the extent to which the policy implications of recent econometric evaluations of teachers, schools, hospitals, and neighborhoods (e.g., Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014b), Angrist et al. (2017), Hull (2018), Chetty and Hendren (2018), Chetty, Friedman, Hendren, Jones, and Porter (2018)) vary with alternative notions of risk.

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