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Racism and discrimination versus advantage and favoritism: Bias for versus bias against

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ABSTRACT

Almost all academic literature across disciplines and most of the news media explain racial inequality as the result of the discrimination and racism of whites toward nonwhites. In contrast, I argue that it is the favoritism or advantages that whites provide to other whites that is the primary mechanism by which racial inequality is reproduced in the post-civil rights period in the U.S. I provide evidence for my argument with data at the individual, organizational, and societal levels. I also discuss how my argument accords with management theory about diversity and inequality, considering the literature on anti-racism, implicit or unconscious bias, micro-inequities (or micro-aggressions), the need for mentors, and white privilege. I end with a discussion of objections that might be raised with regard to my framing of racial inequality as the result of whites providing advantages to other whites, including concerns about egregious negative acts toward nonwhites. Overall, I argue that my argument that favoritism takes precedence over racism and discrimination is consistent with the research evidence in the field.

After five decades since the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963 and the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, it is an opportune time for management scholars to assess our current understanding of trends in the diversity of the labor force and the outcomes from the Civil Rights Movement. While there have been many such assessments of the half century anniversary of the Civil Rights Act, especially with recent noteworthy events that have highlighted the continued challenges of racial inequality, organization scholars have not given enough consideration to how our theories of diversity and the labor force explain the patterns that have emerged since the passage of the Civil Rights Act. In this paper, I review evidence at the individual, organizational, and societal levels to argue that in the post-civil rights period racial inequality is reproduced primarily by the advantage or favoritism whites provide to other whites more so than from the discrimination and racism of whites toward nonwhites. I then discuss how my argument compares to alternative theories about diversity and racial inequality. I conclude the paper with a review of some of the potential objections that my argument might invoke, including concerns about egregious negative acts toward nonwhites, and a brief discussion of methodological issues.

Despite the changes over the past fifty years, recent research suggests that far less has changed with regard to access to the best jobs than many would have expected or believed to be the case in the years since the Civil Rights Act was passed. Management research has not explained how larger patterns in the labor force have emerged over the past several decades, especially, how white men continue to dominate the best jobs (Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). Thus, there is a gap in our knowledge of how the labor market works, and especially in how the labor market meets organizational policy and contributes to the outcomes of who gains access to which jobs, with what kinds of job rewards and prospects for future career benefits (Elliott & Smith, 2004; Smith, 2002).

Most academic literature assumes that racial inequality is reproduced primarily through processes of discrimination,

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social closure, or active exclusion of those who are not part of one's social group (Elliott & Smith, 2001; Manza, 1992; Murphy, 1988; Waldinger, 1997; Weber, 1968). Such processes are then attributed to racism on the part of whites (Bobo, Kluegel, & Smith, 1997; Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Essed, 1991; Feagin & Vera, 1995; Krieger, 1995; McConahay, 1986; Sears, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000; Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996a). The news media follows the same narrative by attributing evidence of racial inequality to racism and discrimination. In this paper, I provide an alternative framing to these explanations for racial inequality in the workplace, one which is well supported by the research literature (Brewer, 1999; Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). I argue that in the post-civil rights period, racial inequality is reproduced by whites helping other whites more so than through the discrimination or racism of whites toward non-whites. In this regard, I examine specifically how whites hoard jobs, which they often treat as personal resources when they pass along information, influence, or opportunity to members of their social groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002).

Tilly (1998) calls this opportunity hoarding, which he defines as the effort by a group of people to reserve a valuable resource for members of their own social group. As explanation, he described an example of chain migration among Italian immigrants from a small town in Italy to an area in Westchester, New York. These immigrants created an economic niche that came to be identified with Italians. As Tilly (1998: 151–52) describes it:

> . . .members of a categorically bounded network retain access to a resource – in this case, a set of employers, clients, and jobs – that is valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of network activities, and enhanced by the network's modus operandi. Matching the category Italian-Americans to the business of landscape gardening sequestered opportunities for poor Italian peasants and their descendants, but it also fenced off those opportunities from other people, including the growing number of black residents. . . It reinforced Italian identity as a basis of everyday social relations.

Note that although Tilly acknowledges the consequences of opportunity hoarding as keeping blacks out of these jobs, the mechanism for doing so was through Italians helping each other, not through Italians actively excluding blacks, even though they may have fought to preserve their privileges if their access to these jobs was threatened.

The concept of opportunity hoarding has often been associated with ethnic enclaves and niches (Portes, 1995, 2000; Waldinger, 1996, 1997), but in the post-civil rights period, it is just as likely to be based on social networks that are more general. Across many different contexts, help is primarily given to others within the same social groups through the connections of where people live, go to school, attend church, and interact in social and professional settings (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1981; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977, 1986; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005)[1]. Because on all these dimensions, we still live largely segregated lives, passing along opportunity is still mostly done within racial groups (Massey, 2007; Massey & Denton, 1993; Orfield & Lee, 2006). Further, whites are disproportionately represented in the best jobs, the jobs with the highest incomes, and the jobs with the most training and authority (Keister & Moller, 2000; McCall, 2001; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Smith, 2002; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012), so when whites help other whites, it reproduces existing racial inequality. Thus, despite policies that promise equal opportunity, there are many ways that people in organizations intervene in the processes by which jobs are allocated in order to gain an inside edge – unequal opportunity – for themselves or for friends, family members, and others identified as "like me." Often employers are complicit in these processes for their own purposes, such as ensuring greater loyalty to the firm and meeting labor supply needs at low cost (Moss & Tilly, 2001; Waldinger, 1997).

Access to jobs is required for a decent life in the U.S., especially to jobs that pay a living wage and are protected from market competition. Connections are used in the search for such jobs during periods of both high and low unemployment. It is how most people get jobs most of the time (DiTomaso, 2013; Granovetter, 1995; Royster, 2003). Especially during periods of sustained unemployment, there is keen competition for jobs and an even greater likelihood that people will seek to use networks and connections to family members, friends or acquaintances in order to gain advantage in the access to jobs.

Importantly, I argue that the use of favoritism or advantage by whites toward other whites is not just another form of discrimination or the other side of the same coin. Indeed, favoritism and discrimination differ in fundamental ways: cognitively, socially, legally, and politically. People helping others creates a positive sense of self. It makes people feel good about themselves. Not only is it not illegal, it is something that is applauded in most social groups. People who help others in their social networks in this way gain social standing and good will. Given the positive cognitive and social rewards for helping one's family, friends, and acquaintances, helping others like oneself creates no political motivation for change. Indeed, it creates a sense that things are as they should be and that one is contributing to positive outcomes, not negative ones. And because it is not illegal, there is no sense of wrong-doing associated with helping family members and friends. In contrast, those who engage in discrimination (defined as explicit exclusion of blacks or other nonwhites) rarely feel good about themselves in the post-civil rights context. Discrimination is illegal. It is widely condemned, and those who engage in actions that

[1] These articles on helping behavior find that when there are non-racist reasons that can explain the behavior that whites are helped more often than blacks. The findings, however, are interpreted as indicating discrimination against blacks, rather than as favoritism toward whites. Thus, the empirical findings in one of the key literatures demonstrating that whites receive favor, nevertheless, are interpreted through a frame of discrimination and racism rather than of favoritism or advantage for whites.

might be thought to be discriminatory almost always look for other explanations for their behavior (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2005; Wellman, 1993).

There is also another motivation for the perpetuation of racial inequality through mechanisms of favoritism of whites toward other whites. Long term inequality needs to be legitimated or it creates intergroup conflict and pressure for change of laws and rules of behavior (Jackman, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Proudfoot & Kay, 2014; Tilly, 1998). The Civil Rights Movement perhaps provides the best example, as does more recent attention to issues of economic inequality in the U.S. Especially in the context of the U.S. political system, when there is a widespread sense that things are unfair and that there is injustice, social movements often emerge to press for new laws or social programs. It is not that things have always been fair and just, but rather that most in the U.S. believe that the political system enables remedies to those who are treated unfairly.

This premise was the basis for the famous book by Gunnar Myrdal on racial inequality, which he titled, *An American Dilemma* (1944). Myrdal (1944) argued that the foundational documents of the U.S. political system, including the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, which U.S. citizens cherish, constituted an "American Creed" of belief in liberty, equality, justice, and fair opportunity. He further argued that growing evidence of racial inequality (in the 1930s and 1940s) would be perceived by some whites, especially in the North, as incompatible with the premises of the American Creed. What Myrdal termed "an American dilemma" is that the incompatibility between such cherished beliefs in the fairness of the political system and the growing empirical evidence to the contrary would create a moral dilemma for these whites that would lead them to use the courts and political movements to press for social change.

Others have also argued that long term inequality must be legitimated and that explicit attention to inequality without sufficient explanation of its legitimacy creates instability in the political system (Jackman, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tilly, 1998). Not enough attention in the management and organization literatures has been given to the ways that inequality, including that in organizations, needs to be legitimated, and therefore, why favoritism, preference, or advantage are more likely dynamics than discrimination and racism in the maintenance of inequality over the long term.

I argue that the primary mechanism for reproducing racial inequality in the post-Civil Rights period is a dynamics of *bias for* whites, rather than of *bias against* blacks and other nonwhites. Thus, under normal times, when the existing distribution of resources is not under threat, for example, from social movements for change, I argue that inequality is reproduced by processes of inclusion and favoritism of whites toward other whites, that is, helping people like themselves (i.e., those in the majority or from dominant or advantaged groups), more so than through processes of exclusion or discrimination of whites toward blacks and other nonwhites (meaning actively denying minority or disadvantaged group members access to opportunities). It is not, of course, that inclusion or favoritism is explicit, salient, and visible to those who engage in such behaviors, but it is intentional and actively fostered within and among those who have access to opportunities and the ability to make those opportunities known and available to people of their choosing, which almost always are people like themselves.

Of course, there is no inherent reason why whites might not help nonwhites and pass along opportunities to them as well, but the structure of segregation of neighborhoods, schools, churches, and even jobs fifty years after the Civil Rights Act was passed means that whites primarily know other whites. Thus, when opportunities are made known to whites, they think of and reach out to other whites to pass along information, influence, or opportunity (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Alexander, Entwisle, & Olson, 2014; Massey, 2007; Royster, 2003).

Favoritism and advantage rather than discrimination and racism: Bias for rather than bias against

Instead of highlighting the role of social networks, most discussions about intergroup inequality give primary attention to discrimination defined as negative behavior against minority or disadvantaged groups (Brewer, 1999; DiTomaso, 2013; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). Underneath this framing, there is an assumption that those who discriminate do so because of hostility or negativity toward those being excluded, that is, that "outgroup hostility" is the hallmark of intergroup relations (Brewer, 1999). Research on discrimination has tried to measure such hostility in terms of racism, prejudice, bias or similar concepts (Krieger, 1995). Despite continued evidence of racial inequality on many dimensions (income, education, wealth, authority, and so on), measures of explicit racism and prejudice have dramatically declined over the last several decades (Bobo, Charles, Krysan, & Simmons, 2012; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Therefore, to provide evidence for outgroup hostility, contemporary research on racial inequality has offered an ever-expanding list of alternative ways to conceptualize racism or prejudice. The intent of such conceptualizations has been to show that whites are really racists, even if they do not admit it on national surveys.

For example, political scientists have developed the concept of symbolic or modern racism to conceptualize a combination of anti-black affect and traditional values that contribute to opposition to various civil rights policies (McConahay, 1983; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2005). Symbolic or modern racism is contrasted with what has been called traditional or old-fashioned racism, which connotes overt and explicitly hostile feelings toward blacks based on assumptions of biological inferiority. Symbolic or modern racism is based on the assumption that blacks and other nonwhites violate traditional values. Symbolic or modern racism includes such notions as that blacks have a poor work ethic, that they make illegitimate demands on the government, and that they get too much attention from government (Sears & Henry, 2005: 99). Symbolic or modern racism has been used to explain continued racial inequality in the context of the declining evidence for old-fashioned or traditional

racism on national surveys and for the opposition by whites toward government policies that address civil rights.

Racial resentment (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kinder & Sanders, 1996) is a concept similar to modern or symbolic racism. Racial resentment, like modern or symbolic racism, assumes a mix of negative affect and adherence to traditional values like individualism or belief in the value of hard work that contributes to opposition of many whites to civil rights policies. Related conceptualizations of a new form of racism include, among others: laissez-faire racism (Bobo et al., 1997), everyday racism (Essed, 1991), and color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). Each of these concepts suggests that while there may not be explicit expressions of racial hostility based on the presumption of biological inferiority, there are underlying beliefs that are grounded in traditional values that lead to opposition to various policies intended to bring about civil rights. Research utilizing concepts such as symbolic or modern racism or one of the related concepts has endeavored to show that opposition to civil rights policies are at heart a type of racism, but that whites will just not admit it or be honest about it (Bobo et al., 2012; Schuman et al., 1997; Sears et al., 2000).

Psychologists have offered concepts similar to those of symbolic racism, laissez-faire racism, everyday racism, and color-blind racism, but their concepts are of a different nature. Implicit or unconscious bias, which is measured, for example, by reaction time to stimulus words, is based on the understanding that we develop cultural associations that are imprinted cognitively when long term inequality is overlaid on categorical groups (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Jost et al., 2009). Although there is extensive evidence to show that such widely shared cultural associations favor whites over blacks or men over women (and so on), these data are usually interpreted as support for bias "against" nonwhites and others rather than as bias "for" whites (and men) (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Brewer, 1999; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). The negative framing is evident in the concept, also from psychologists, of aversive racism, which uses another type of unobtrusive measure, namely, the helping behavior of respondents, for example, toward whites versus blacks under different conditions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000, 2004; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Such research shows that these kinds of implicit attitudes or aversive behaviors continue to be prevalent among whites, even if explicit racist attitudes are not (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Jost et al., 2009). But the key point is that the findings from such studies show evidence of both racism or hostility toward blacks and other nonwhites and preference or favoritism toward whites.

There is nothing in these concepts or their measurement that requires that one interpret the data as bias "against" nonwhites, rather than as bias "for" whites. By calling these attitudes "racism" and "bias," we are primed to think of hostility and negative affect, when the dynamic may actually be preference or favoritism toward the ingroup, rather than hostility toward the outgroup. For example, two summaries of this research both interpret the findings as "racism against blacks" rather than as "favoritism toward whites" when the evidence in the empirical studies are that whites are helped more often than are blacks (Crosby et al., 1980; Saucier et al., 2005). As noted, giving preference to whites is not the other side of discriminating against nonwhites. It is experienced quite differently and has very different implications.

That we emphasize outgroup hostility and bias against outgroups (such as race and ethnic minorities or women) rather than ingroup favoritism has been recently addressed at some length by others in social psychology. This is a theme that has long concerned Brewer (1998, 1999); Brewer & Campbell, 1976. In research she conducted with Campbell in East Africa, they found that there was no correlation between measures of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility. Brewer (1999) has endeavored to show that the disconnect between favoritism and hostility in intergroup relations is an often overlooked conclusion in the important work by Allport (1979). She also reviews findings from minimal group studies by Tajfel and others which have been the basis for much of the contemporary research on ingroup and outgroup relations and concludes that the research from the minimal group paradigm found "that individuals are willing to differentially benefit the ingroup compared to outgroups but are reluctant to harm outgroups more directly" (Brewer, 1999: 432; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel, Billig, Bunday, & Flament, 1971).

A more recent review by Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) of the literature in the social psychology of intergroup relations makes the point that, despite constant reports of violence, intimidation, or other horrific accounts of negative behavior toward race and ethnic minorities, that the research evidence in social psychology does not support that such behavior is normative or that it is the primary dynamic in the relationships between whites and blacks in the U.S. Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) review research in social psychology that has examined racial and other forms of inequality and conclude, as does Brewer, that both the theoretical arguments that have been widely used and the empirical evidence from research suggest that "discrimination" occurs more from favoring whites than from hostility and harming behaviors toward blacks or other nonwhites. Further, they argue: "Our strong conclusion is that, in present-day America, discrimination results more from helping ingroup members than from harming outgroup members" (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014: 680). Note that they are not saying that racial inequality does not exist, nor am I. But we are both arguing that the mechanisms through which racial inequality gets reproduced are through the favoritism of whites toward other whites, more so than the hostility or racism of whites toward blacks or other nonwhites. They call such favoring "discrimination," whereas, I am trying to make the distinction between favoritism and discrimination to underline the point that racial inequality can exist without racism (DiTomaso, 2013).

The same type of distinction could be brought to bear in discussions about structural or institutional racism that suggest that inequality is built into the way resources are distributed and accessed (Blauner, 1972; Wellman, 1993). Structural or institutional racism implies that institutions work better for whites than for nonwhites and that the

reproduction of racial inequality does not require personal hostility in order for whites to gain the benefit of existing structures (Blauner, 1972; Lin, 2001). In other words, the structure of inequality favors whites without their having to actively and intentionally engage in hostile or exclusionary actions toward nonwhites. Rather than providing a counter to my argument, the concept of structural inequality, or what has been called "institutional racism," is consistent with my claims. In fact, it provides an explanation for one of the key ways that whites help other whites, namely, by building favorable outcomes for whites into the way we structure institutions and the rules that govern them.

Because many interpret these concepts as a form of "racism," it underlines my point that so many of us seem to want to hold on to the negative framing of racism and discrimination in order to explain racial inequality (Dixon et al., 2012). My argument diverges from these conceptualizations, because I argue that the ultimate white privilege is the privilege not to be racist and to still benefit from the existence of racial inequality[2]. In making this point, I am not arguing that inequality is no longer built into the structure of intergroup relations and the unequal distribution of resources that overlay such relations, nor am I arguing that there are not implicit cultural messages that have emerged because of the association of categorical distinctions with resource inequality. Both structural inequality and widespread, but implicit, cultural associations regarding race (i.e., implicit "bias") are consistent with inequality being reproduced more through mechanisms of advantage or favoritism toward whites than through acts of discrimination or feelings of racism toward nonwhites. Structural inequality is one way whites help other whites, and embedded or implicit cultural associations are consistent with favoritism toward whites as much as with disfavor toward nonwhites.

To understand intergroup relations in management and organizations, we need to understand inequality in the long term in its broader social context, as well as understand how specific forces shape such differences. Among other things, we need to understand processes of legitimation that make explicit and overt hostility from whites toward blacks provocative, and hence, unwise. Thus, hostility from whites toward blacks and other nonwhites is less actively expressed than is favoritism or preference of whites toward other whites. Further, we need to understand how the resource distribution and power among groups enables whites to create the conditions for their continued racial advantages without their having to explicitly exclude or confront blacks or other nonwhites. By engaging in favoritism toward other whites rather than discriminating against blacks, whites who gain such advantages can believe that they deserve their successes. Given the individualism that so strongly pervades U.S. culture and hides the group-based nature of such white privilege, whites can also believe that they have earned it as individuals rather than as members of a privileged group. Understanding the ongoing reproduction of racial inequality requires that we see how everyday interactions that privilege whites contribute to the reinforcement of existing inequalities, to unearned privileges for whites, while blacks and other nonwhites experience the "absence of equivalent favoritism" (Brewer, 1999: 434). Group differences in access to resources, though hidden in the strong individualist beliefs Americans hold, also reinforce categorical differences over time and provide a foundation for belief in personal competence and confidence building for whites, who then serve as the normative ingroup whose worthiness is affirmed by all (DiTomaso, 2013; DiTomaso, Post, Smith, Farris, & Cordero, 2007b).

Although past research recognizes the advantages that social capital or social networks provide in the job search process (Baker, 2000; Bourdieu, 1985; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Burt, 1997; Mouw, 2003; Putnam, 2000), discussions of networking in business schools have tended to have an individualist framing, suggesting that anyone who networks will have more positive outcomes. But research on networking has not followed through to the implications of networks as scarce resources that are group-based, unequally distributed, and also unequally effective in the translation of social capital to positive life outcomes. Because of continued and extensive segregation in housing, education, and even jobs, people network within groups of people who are mostly like them. Gaining access to jobs from knowing the right people or having the right friends is easier for some and problematic for others, depending on the characteristics of the groups to which they belong (Massey, 2007; Massey & Denton, 1993; Orfield & Lee, 2006; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). Networking is not a means to equal opportunity. Indeed, when people rely on help from friends and others, the purpose is to gain an inside edge. Networking undermines equal opportunity.

This is the context in which networking and the exchange of social capital take place, and in doing so, they reproduce existing inequality and forestall efforts to create greater diversity throughout organizations. Whites help other whites, because whites live with other whites (Boustan, 2011; Sharkey, 2013; Yinger, 1997), go to school with them (Orfield & Lee, 2005, 2006), attend church with them (Amerson & Carroll, 1979; Emerson & Smith, 2000), and mostly work with them (Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). Whites are much more likely to know other whites, to feel a sense of obligation to them, and to recognize when opportunities could be matched to their needs. Networking is categorical and patterned (Massey, 2007). It is not based on random friendships, nor happenstance, but rather on the structures of existing inequality both outside and inside organizations (Tilly, 1998). While other groups help their own as well, they are less able to do so to the

[2] It is perhaps important to note that not all whites are privileged in the U.S., but as a group, they are relatively more privileged than are nonwhites. Thus, when I argue that the ultimate white privilege is the privilege not to be racist, it applies to all whites, but because some are more privileged than others, not all whites may react to issues of racial inequality in the same way. Those among whites who are relatively less privileged economically are also more likely to perceive realistic group conflict with blacks for jobs and other resources, and in this circumstance, they are also likely to be openly hostile (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; DiTomaso, 2013).

extent that they do not hold jobs with the same levels of authority, training, income, and rewards as the jobs held by whites (Alexander et al., 2014; Elliott & Smith, 2004; Royster, 2003; Smith, 2002; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012; Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 1999; Waldinger, 1996). Whites, especially white men, are disproportionally in charge, are more likely to have the authority to decide who gets jobs or opportunities, and even without authority are in a position to influence or affect outcomes in terms of who is offered jobs, training, promotions, or career visibility (Smith, 2002).

In both evaluations and the allocation of resources, white men are given the benefit of the doubt, are rewarded for promise more than performance, and are often forgiven or not held accountable for mistakes or misdirection (Devos & Banaji, 2005; DiTomaso et al., 2007b; Pager, 2003; Pager & Karafin, 2009; Pager & Quillian, 2005; Pager, Western, & Sugie, 2009; Pettigrew, 1979; Royster, 2003). For example, parents in a position to do so frequently reach out to family members, neighbors, and friends to ask for their help or influence in finding jobs for their children (DiTomaso, 2013). Those who find jobs in this way are not necessarily the best qualified candidates; they are just the best connected. At the same time, if those children fail to meet expectations, they are often given second or third chances to find appropriate niches (Pager & Karafin, 2009). Whites, who are likely to have much denser social networks and knowledge about a greater range of opportunities, can be more helpful to members of their social networks than blacks or other nonwhites are likely to be (Alexander et al., 2014; Royster, 2003; Smith, 2007). Whites are also more likely to have the resources to protect those in their networks from missteps (Blau, 2003; DiTomaso, 2013). I discuss research findings that support this argument at three levels: in terms of the individual job seeker, for employees within specific organizations and occupations, and then at the societal level across organizations.

Inequality and advantage in individual job histories

In a recent study of the detailed job histories of 246 whites from different parts of the U.S., DiTomaso (2013) found that 99 percent of the people in her sample obtained 70 percent of the jobs they had held over their lifetimes with the help of people they knew. Respondents for this study were randomly selected from zip codes in different parts of the U.S. based on the demographic characteristics of the area. The data came from semi-structured interviews. DiTomaso defined help (or social capital) using definitions from Adler and Kwon (2002) in terms of providing information, using influence, or offering opportunity. The findings from this study applied to a wide range of jobs that the respondents obtained using help from personal networks and were equally applicable to both middle class and working class interviewees. DiTomaso explained that the 30 percent of jobs where help was not used included, for example, jobs that did not offer much in the way of benefits or security (e.g., many waitress jobs), jobs found during times of labor shortages (e.g., during the Vietnam War when the unemployment rate was low), and jobs sought by those who were offered help but who were not competent enough to use it (e.g., a physician was not able to help his daughter get a job with a pharmaceutical company, despite frequent efforts).

DiTomaso's research findings are consistent with Granovetter's research on "getting a job" (1995). Although Granovetter's estimates of the amount of help received in the process of job search are somewhat lower than those of DiTomaso, he examined only a five-year period, targeted employees in professional jobs, and counted as having received help, only those cases where informal help was not combined with formal search processes. In contrast, DiTomaso looked at the whole career experience of the interviewees and counted all instances of help, whether or not there might also have been the use of formal search processes.

Despite the attention given in the management literature to the importance of networks for career success (Burt, 2000; Fagenson, 1989; Kram, 1985; Ragins, 1997; Ragins & Scandura, 1999), there has not been nearly as much attention in these discussions to the ways that social networks are patterned and categorical, and therefore, to how they contribute to the reproduction of inequality rather than to individual mobility. Networks draw on the positive regard among people who know or identify with each other. They are powerful mechanisms for reproducing inequality in the labor force. Given that white men disproportionately hold the best jobs, they are more likely to be in a position to help each other, and indeed, they do so (Burt, 2000). Women and minorities also need social networks to be successful in their careers, but they often need to "borrow" social resources from white men (Burt, 1997, 1998; Ibarra, 1992, 1995; Thomas & Gabarro, 1999). That is, networks are important for access to jobs for everyone, but whites and men are better positioned for helping, and most often they help other whites and men.

Favoritism or advantage in organizational policies

In another very different sort of study of inequality among scientists and engineers, DiTomaso et al. (2007b) found a consistent pattern that reinforces the importance of understanding advantage in the reproduction of inequality at the organizational level. The sample included data from 24 major industrial firms on 3200 scientists and engineers who filled out surveys about their work experiences, including their productivity, while managers provided information on their performance. The study examined two primary dependent variables based on the evaluations of managers: innovativeness (contributing something new and useful to the organization) and promotability into management (should a position be available).

Using multiple regression, DiTomaso et al. (2007b) made several changes to the usual procedures in the study of labor force inequality that have contributed to new insights about how inequality works in the labor force. First, the study used effect coding rather than dummy coding in the analyses. Whereas dummy coding of categorical variables provides coefficients that are interpreted in comparison to the reference category (the category "left out" of the equation),

effect coding provides coefficients that are interpreted in comparison to the grand mean. When there are more than two groups, effect coding is actually the more appropriate choice for analysis, although it is less well known. Second, DiTomaso et al. (2007b) made another key change in the analysis. Instead of using U.S. born white men as the reference category, U.S. born white men were included in the equation and another group represented the "left out" or reference category. In most analyses that examine inequality in the labor market, there is a presumption that discrimination is the mechanism that leads to inequality, and therefore, whites or white men are used as the reference category so that nonwhites or women can be compared to them. If there are statistically significant effects, then approaching the analysis in this way ensures a discrimination narrative. When there are no statistically significant effects, the assumption is that discrimination was absent (or sometimes is attributed to unexplained variance).

By including white men in the equation and using effect coding in this study, DiTomaso et al. (2007b) found that the coefficients for U.S. born white men predicting evaluations of both innovativeness and promotability were positive and statistically significant, rather than that the coefficients for women and minority groups were negative. The results are mathematically identical, even though presented in alternative formats, but very different theoretical interpretations are likely to emerge from presenting the data in this alternative way. The convention in studies of inequality of using dummy variables and using white men as the reference group suggests a discrimination frame. The use of effect coding and including U.S. born white men in the equation makes it possible to see more clearly the advantages given to U.S. born white men. Overall, DiTomaso et al. (2007b) found that U.S. born white men experienced greater access to favorable work experiences (in this case, being able to determine the kind of work that they did) and that in itself is an advantage, but it also then contributed to their being evaluated as both more innovative and more promotable into management (defined as receiving higher performance ratings from their managers). These results were net of past performance, education and experience, and even of who rated whom.

DiTomaso et al. (2007b) drew on the work of Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002) on stereotype content to frame the analyses and results of their study. Fiske et al. (2002) argued that in the context of long term, intergroup inequality, the most prevalent responses toward various groups are favoritism toward the normative ingroup and ambivalence or indifference toward other groups more so than outgroup derogation (Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). A similar point is made by Brewer (1999) who argues that the outgroup is not as likely to experience hostility as they are to face the "absence of equivalent favoritism." In other words, the normative ingroup receives favorable responses, while most other groups are treated with ambivalence or indifference. Instead of facing explicit hostility or active harm, outgroups are more likely to be ignored or overlooked when favoritism or advantages are allocated. These conclusions are consistent with the findings in the DiTomaso et al. (2007b) study, but they are also relevant to research broadly in sociology and social psychology on intergroup relations.

While this claim may seem inconsistent with perceptions that there is a great deal of outgroup harm evident in everyday life, the research evidence suggests that in the context of long term inequality and absent explicit threat or perceived competition for resources, indifference or ambivalence by the normative ingroup toward outgroups are more the norm than outgroup hostility (Brewer, 1999; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). That is, in democratic systems where there is long term inequality, the legitimacy of the system is supported by interactions among groups that avoid explicit conflict (Brewer, 1999; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Jackman, 1994; Jost et al., 2004; Proudfoot & Kay, 2014; Tilly, 1998). I will discuss subsequently the conditions under which ingroup favoritism might turn toward outgroup hostility (Brewer, 1999).

Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that white men will get favor both in the allocation of favorable work experiences and in the evaluation of their performance. For example, Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) argue that the empirical evidence in a range of theoretical frameworks is consistent with ingroup favoring more than outgroup hostility or negativity. They include in their review the research on similarity-attraction (Byrne, 1971), minimal group studies (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel et al., 1971), studies of intergroup affect (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), research on helping behavior (Crosby et al., 1980; Saucier et al., 2005), audit studies (e.g., of housing and hiring) (Bendick, 2004; Turner, Ross, Galster, & Yinger, 2002), policing behavior, and surveys of support for public policies (Schuman et al., 1997). Evidence from such studies support an interpretation of favoritism toward whites as much as one of discrimination against blacks or others, yet, discrimination and racism are much more frequently used to interpret such findings. This is so, even when the results are more consistent with a favoritism than a discrimination interpretation. For example, Brewer (1999) noted that participants in minimal group studies are more likely to allocate resources to ingroups, but are less likely to directly harm outgroups. Because of the strong emphasis on discrimination and racism as explanations for racial inequality, however, the processes of favoritism or advantage are rarely used to interpret such findings.

Thus, studies of intergroup relations look for comparisons in how whites and nonwhites are treated, but emphasize in the interpretation of results that blacks get less rather than that whites get more. In studies of the labor market, performance appraisal, and other such processes, researchers have generally structured their analyses to look specifically for discrimination, while overlooking the evidence of how favoritism or advantage reproduces inequality. In both types of studies, favoritism toward whites has been under emphasized, while discrimination and racism have been assumed.

It is also important to note, however, that the process of favoritism toward whites is not only about ingroup favoritism in the sense of each group favoring their own. Indeed, the DiTomaso et al. (2007b) study found that white

men got the benefit of the doubt, not only from other white men, but from everyone, because white men constitute the normative ingroup, and as such, define the prototype of competence within the labor force as a whole (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Pettigrew, 1979; Smith, et al., 2001). As suggested by Ridgeway, status differences are widely shared when the structure of inequality overlays categorical distinctions (Ridgeway, 2001a; Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998). Thus, even subordinate groups may believe that the status quo of inequality is both natural and merited (Jost et al., 2004; Proudfoot & Kay, 2014).

Fiske et al. (2002) also argue in their analysis that there is rarely a single outgroup, but instead there is an array of different outgroup positions, depending on the competitiveness and threat that the outgroups pose to the normative ingroup (i.e., white men). Each outgroup can be characterized by the two primary dimensions of stereotyping, warmth (friendliness or trustworthiness) and competence. In the DiTomaso et al. (2007b) study, for example, white women were evaluated as warm or nice, but not technically competent, while immigrant groups and black men were evaluated as competent, but not socially skilled, and therefore, less likely to be promotable (Cuddy et al., 2011; Lee & Fiske, 2006; Post, DiTomaso, Farris, & Cordero, 2009). In the DiTomaso et al. (2007b) analyses, it was only black women who were treated with derogation, in being evaluated as neither technically competent, nor nice or socially skilled. Fiske et al. (2002) argue that having an array of outgroups to whom mixed or ambivalent attributions are made makes it harder to infer conflict in intergroup relations (Dixon et al., 2012). Consistently, however, the normative ingroup (i.e., U.S. born white men) are evaluated as both competent and nice or warm.

The DiTomaso et al. (2007b) research suggests how organizational policies are infused with embedded social relations that contribute to the reproduction of inequality. Status construction theory tells us that when resources are overlaid onto categorical distinctions that we attribute competence and worth to those with more resources (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Ridgeway, 1991, 2001a; Ridgeway et al., 1998). In circumstances of long term inequality, these cognitive images become part of the implicit cultural associations that are reinforced every time we observe the relationship between categorical membership and the distribution of resources, including income and wealth, as well as authority. Such assumptions lead to everyday interactions in which the normative ingroup gets favor while others are treated with ambivalence or indifference, but rarely with disdain (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). These status distinctions are then reproduced and reinforced in the everyday decisions about who gets hired, promoted, gets good assignments, salary increases, and in general, receives the benefit of the doubt (Baldi & McBrier, 1997; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Castilla, 2005, 2008; Deitch et al., 2003; DiTomaso et al., 2007b; Fiske et al., 2002; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). Such status differences become legitimized, and often accepted widely, including by low status groups (Jost et al., 2004; Ridgeway, 2001a).

The findings discussed here on how individuals get jobs aligns with the research reported on how people are recognized and rewarded within organizations. The research at both the individual and the organizational levels uncover processes by which whites are favored and get an inside edge in both obtaining jobs and being rewarded on the job. These processes also contribute to assumptions about what is fair and who has merit. In general, anything that interrupts or interferes with the favor given to whites and men is broadly perceived as unfair by them or as a special and unearned privilege of others. Importantly, the competence and worthiness of whites and men are normative, and so they are evaluated more favorably, not only by other whites and men but more generally. In other words, these are global prototypes, not individual perceptions (Hogg, 2001; Smith, DiTomaso, Farris, & Cordero, 2001). Those who are favored in allocation and evaluation processes tend to think of government policies that might enhance the opportunities for the disadvantaged as akin to their "cutting in line," while at the same time, those who are advantaged can "save a place in line" for friends, family members, or those with whom they identify, and feel that that is perfectly reasonable or fair. In other words, the existing structure of inequality in which whites and men are favored reinforces cognitive prototypes about who is competent or worthy that lead to whites and men subsequently being given both the benefit of the doubt and advantages in the allocation of resources or opportunities.

Labor force inequality at the national level

The evidence of favoritism or advantage accruing to white men in the job market can be seen in larger patterns at the national level, as well as at the organizational level or in individual job histories. For example, Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey (2012) found from analyses of data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on private-sector organizations from 1966–2005 that since the passage of the Civil Rights Act, white men have continued to have disproportionate access to the best jobs, defined as managerial, professional and craft jobs. In fact, they found that in some occupations and industries, opportunities for white men have even expanded. In contrast, Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey found that after an initial change, there was little further desegregation of jobs held by white and black men after about 1980. The segregation of black women from private sector jobs held by white men has always been high and the levels have changed very little since the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Although there has been somewhat more desegregation in the jobs held by white women and white men, the progress was initially slow, accelerated somewhat after the 1970s and then leveled off by about 2000. White women have gained greater access to jobs that were previously available only to white men, but as some white women have moved into professional and managerial jobs, it has contributed to the resegregation of the jobs held by black and white women in the last few years (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012).

These findings suggest that although there has been growing diversity in the labor force, it has tended to be for jobs that have less authority, lower pay, and lower promotion opportunities, especially in the private sector. That is, the growing diversity of the labor force has occurred because of growth in jobs in some occupations and industries that have pulled race and ethnic minorities and women into the lower ranks of these various distributions, while pushing white men further into the most favored positions (Sokoloff, 1992; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). Growing diversity has also been facilitated by increased immigration of Asians and Hispanics, during a time when the population growth of U.S. born whites and blacks has been leveling off (Friedman & DiTomaso, 1996).

Favoritism and advantage versus discrimination and racism

Thus, in individual job histories, we see evidence of whites getting substantial help to gain access to jobs that are protected from market competition (DiTomaso, 2013). We see them getting advantages in organizational decisions about access to favorable work experiences and in the performance appraisal process (DiTomaso et al., 2007b), and we also see that the patterns across the labor force, at least among private sector employers, have not changed nearly as much since the passage of the Civil Rights Act fifty years ago as we might have assumed (Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). At each of these levels, whites, especially white men, can be seen to gain advantages, often without having to actively discriminate against blacks or other nonwhites. These findings document how racial inequality is reproduced in both everyday decisions and over the long term by the advantages that whites and men provide to each other, especially in the job market. And the reproduction of inequality can take place without invoking racism or discrimination as the primary mechanisms. But these findings are also consistent with other research that argues that ingroup favoritism takes precedence over outgroup hostility or bias (Brewer, 1999; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014).

Reproducing inequality through acts of favoritism of whites toward each other can reproduce racial inequality without heightening hostility and conflict, in part, because the favoritism of whites toward other whites is less visible and less salient in organizational decision-making than blatant or explicit discrimination or the exclusion of blacks would be. In this way, favoritism, rather than discrimination, contributes to the reproduction of long term inequality. The notion that whites are "really" racists, but that they just will not admit it or be honest about it does not accord, therefore, with the experiences and self-concept of most whites. What does accord with their self-concept and experience is that they are good family members and neighbors, and as such, they extend themselves to help each other, especially when there is knowledge of opportunities that they can pass along to those who might benefit. As noted, because of extensive segregation, those who end up being the beneficiaries of the help offered by most whites are primarily other whites and those who are most like themselves. To label this type of reaching out to friends and family members as racism mischaracterizes the dynamics and, thus, also contributes to misunderstanding the mechanisms by which racial inequality is reproduced. As I have already argued, helping friends and family members has different cognitive, social, legal, and political outcomes than would be likely if taking actions to purposely exclude or reject nonwhites. Further, helping friends and family members is an act of inclusion more than exclusion, and while discriminatory in effect, it is not an act of discrimination against nonwhites, but rather discrimination for whites. Thus, it is understandable why many whites express dismay or offense when they are charged with being racists. They do not understand or experience themselves in that way, and most of the time, they do not have to actively exclude or discriminate against blacks in order to gain the benefits of their social positions. In other words, the ultimate white privilege is the privilege not to be a racist and to still benefit from racial inequality.

From the early days of the Civil Rights Movement to the current focus on diversity, a key goal has been access to jobs that pay a living wage. When the subject of jobs is discussed, however, it is inevitably framed in terms of the job "market," which invokes an imagery of people with different qualifications and levels of experience competing with each other. Out of such a contest, the "best" person is supposedly chosen and the process is perceived as fair, as long as everyone has an "equal opportunity" to be considered. In fact, research on decision-making in organizations has long shown that decision-makers do not make a "best" decision, but instead, make choices that satisfy acceptable criteria or meet the need (Simon, 1947). The same is true in the job "market," where most people obtain jobs by having an inside edge through ties to social networks (DiTomaso, 2013; Granovetter, 1995; Royster, 2003). Further, while there is a lot of emphasis given to equal opportunity as the standard of fairness, the way that people seek and receive help from family and friends constitutes a process of "unequal opportunity." That is both the goal and the effect. Such processes underline the importance of seeing organizations as integrally related to the external social context, and to the social relations that exist in general in society. These social relationships come into the organization and get reinforced and reproduced within them (Tilly, 1998). As such, racially unequal outcomes do not require racist decision-makers or explicit exclusion of blacks or other nonwhites, but can emerge from those in more advantaged positions and with greater access to power, resources, and authority reaching out to those who are like them and making decisions that favor people from the same social groups and networks.

Our language in trying to explain these processes, in my view, often leads us astray. For example, in law and social policy, there is monitoring of "under-represented minorities," when the reality is more likely that there are "over-represented majorities." Similarly, the focus on bias or discrimination is always framed in the negative, as bias against excluded groups, rather than as bias for included groups (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). Even our concepts of inclusion and exclusion are difficult to comprehend when we think only of social closure, but not of opportunity hoarding

(Tilly, 1998). And even in our statistical tests, we set up our analyses to assess discrimination, but not to assess the favoritism or advantages that are suggested in the research literature from minimal group studies to macro-analyses of the labor force (Brewer, 1998; DiTomaso, 2013; Fiske, 2002; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). The taken-for-granted negative framing of racism and discrimination as the mechanisms by which racial inequality is maintained and reproduced, contrary to what might be expected, enables most whites to remove themselves from the narrative. Not believing that they themselves have discriminated or that they hold racist feelings, most whites displace blame for racial inequality to often unnamed and unidentified "racists," who are others, but not they themselves (DiTomaso, 2013; Hughey, 2014; Sullivan, 2014). Thus, in the context of racial inequality, most whites end up not understanding "what the fuss is about" (Hochschild, 1995). In fact, they often express confusion about why others would continue to be racists and engage in racial discrimination (DiTomaso, 2013). But they rarely take ownership of their own participation in the reproduction of racial inequality. Acts of favoritism and offering advantage and opportunity to friends, family members, acquaintances, or others like them, even though positive actions, may be the most important determinant of reproducing racial inequality in the post-civil rights period (DiTomaso, 2013).

Theories of diversity and racial inequality

After three decades of attention among major corporations to issues of diversity and inclusion and frequent publication of well-regarded research on diversity, it would seem that we should have a firm grasp of the issues with regard to diversity and inequality and a clear understanding of where the levers of change are to be found. Yet, the research evidence does not suggest that that is the case (Bezrukova, Jehn, & Spell, 2012; Kalev et al., 2006; Kulik & Roberson, 2008b; Paluck & Green, 2009). Indeed, there are many accounts that suggest that much less has changed than companies claim to want and that research claims is needed for effective and productive company performance, such as the research by Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey (2012). As such, there seems to be either an error in our thinking or in the application of the extensive research and policy commitments to the areas of diversity and inclusion and to our understanding of how diversity and inequality work together (DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 2007a). Within the context of my main theme about recognizing the importance of favoritism and advantage as the primary mechanisms for reproducing racial inequality in the post-civil rights period, rather than the continued over-emphasis (from my view) on racism and discrimination, I want to briefly address some of the main approaches to explaining why racial and other forms of inequality persist and what needs attention from company leaders to help them become both more diverse and more inclusive. In this section, I look specifically at theories of anti-racism embedded in diversity training, unconscious or implicit bias, the importance of mentors, micro-inequities (also called microaggressions), and white privilege.

Anti-racism, anti-bias, prejudice reduction, and diversity training

Corporations were subject to government regulations and guidelines with regard to fair employment practices in the labor force long before the Civil Rights Act was passed, but passage of the legislation in 1964 created a new set of obligations, which in practice were initially targeted primarily toward blacks (Skrentny, 2001). Like all legislation, the Act itself did not specify the details of what companies should do; the specifics evolved as regulations were written, case law developed, and both company personnel and external constituents had influence over how companies responded to these new obligations (Dobbin, 2009; Frymer, 2003). Initially corporate programs were about compliance with legal obligations, and later about assimilating minority and women employees into management positions (Anand & Winters, 2008). Only after the political environment became more hostile toward enforcement of civil rights regulations did companies, encouraged in part by human resource professionals themselves, reorient programs toward managing diversity and toward the strategic link between diversity and firm performance (Anand & Winters, 2008; Dobbin, 2009; Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-Drita, 2001; Kelly & Dobbin, 1998; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012; Thomas & Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1990). As such, corporate diversity programs became relevant to all employees (or at least all managerial and professional employees), rather than exclusively toward minorities and women (Berrey, 2015).

Once corporate diversity programs included white as well as nonwhite employees as participants (and men as well as women) and were framed as programs of organizational change, the goals of such programs became more about learning and personal transformation than compliance and assimilation to a normative culture (Ely & Thomas, 2001; Kulik & Roberson, 2008a). At the heart of such programs has been an assumption that effective diversity management requires ridding the company of prejudice and bias against women and minority group members, or sometimes more broadly, toward anyone. Indeed, most of the work in the area of race relations prior to the advent of corporate diversity language focused on prejudice reduction and anti-racism or anti-bias programs (Dixon et al., 2012; Paluck & Green, 2009; Sugrue, 2001), and many of the professionals who worked at the outset on issues of corporate diversity had previously worked in race relations programs (Kelly & Dobbin, 1998). But these orientations are not especially new. Even as early as the 1940s, civil rights activists endeavored to demonstrate the value of placing blacks in managerial and professional jobs as a way to change attitudes toward blacks. As explained by Sugrue (2001: 35):

> The central strategy was to persuade employers to hire blacks in 'breakthrough' jobs, primarily in white-color and skilled jobs that had been formerly reserved for whites. Underlying this strategy was the belief that

> racism was at root an individual pathology that needed to be solved at the individual level through reasoned debate and education... The presence of black 'pioneers' in jobs that had been all-white preserves would break down the racial status quo by demonstrating to skeptical whites that blacks were capable of work in any sector of the economy. If a firm hired a single black, a mortal blow would be struck against discrimination.

Thus, the "business case for diversity," which is a fairly recent theme in the campaign for civil rights, is consistent with the argument that the value of black (and more recently, all) employees should be recognized and encouraged (Thomas & Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1990). Company members are told that having a diverse workforce brings significant benefits to the company in the form of creativity, innovation, greater access to untapped markets, and greater productivity (Cox, 1991; Cox & Blake, 1991; Ely & Thomas, 2001). Some also acknowledge that diversity among employees can contribute to greater conflict and misunderstanding, but it is precisely for this reason that corporate programs for managing diversity are focused on helping employees learn to get along with each other (Bezrukova et al., 2012; Kulik & Roberson, 2008a).

Whether in corporations, schools, or in other types of organizations, the consistent message in diversity training is that we need to become more accepting and tolerant of others, and to do so, requires ridding ourselves of biases against people who are different from us (Dixon et al., 2012; Paluck & Green, 2009). Although rarely given the name within a corporate context, this is the premise of what has in other contexts been called "anti-racism" training (Rex, 1989). Participants in diversity training programs (sometimes called "sensitivity" or awareness training) are asked to recognize the erroneous assumptions they make about other people, to accept and value the contributions that others can make, and to develop interpersonal and intergroup skills that enable working well together (Anand & Winters, 2008; Bezrukova et al., 2012; Kulik & Roberson, 2008a). The utilization of this kind of diversity training skyrocketed at the time that the "business case" took precedence over affirmative action and equal opportunity policies (Edelman et al., 2001; Kelly & Dobbin, 1998). Coinciding with this shift was a greater emphasis on cultural differences among groups that required knowledge and skill to navigate (Edelman et al., 2001). Thus, even though couched in terms of the business case and the strategic needs of the organization, the content of diversity training shifted from a civil rights and justice focus to one of understanding other people (Ely & Thomas, 2001), a large component of which is about overcoming prejudice and ridding ourselves of biases against others. For example, Kulik and Roberson (2008a: 313) review diversity education in terms of three components: knowledge about the culture and customs of different groups, attitudinal change (i.e., prejudice reduction) with regard to those groups, and behavioral changes that "enable individuals to avoid or overcome misunderstandings that might otherwise result from demographic differences".

One could, thus, summarize the premise of diversity training even in the "business case" context as: stop being racists, eliminate prejudice, and don't stereotype. The difficulty with this message as the foundation for diversity training is that it is wrong-headed with regard to what we know about how stereotypes develop and persist, and it is also one-sided in the way the message is formulated. Research on stereotyping suggests that it is automatic and often takes place sub-consciously (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Further, while we can influence what stereotypes are activated, we cannot rid ourselves of stereotypes, because they are part of the efficiency of thinking (Brewer, 1999, 2000; Devine, 1989; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Nelson, Acker, & Melvin, 1996).

Although there are ways to influence how stereotypes affect our thinking, we cannot simply rid ourselves of stereotypes. To change such automatic responses, we must intentionally and purposefully alter the way we think about other people, for example, through such processes as decategorization or recategorization of group differences (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 2000; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). Although there is an extensive literature on what is called prejudice reduction that shows some success with such strategies as cooperative learning, the use of peer influence, intergroup contact under certain conditions, appealing to value consistency, and so on, the typical diversity training used in most companies does not utilize these sorts of strategies, is not based on the theories that would induce such strategies to have positive outcomes, and has rarely been evaluated in methodologically rigorous ways (Paluck & Green, 2009). Further, careful studies that have examined the effects of diversity training that is conducted for the purpose of reducing managerial bias have found it to not have substantive effects on important outcomes such as increasing the hiring of nonwhite and non-male managers (Kalev et al., 2006).

Most important for my point, however, is that when attention is directed at attitude change, i.e., reducing bias, within diversity training programs, it takes the form of trying to rid participants of bias "against" outgroups or "under-represented" groups. There is hardly ever attention within these programs to the biases that operate in favor of those already in advantaged positions, i.e., to whites and men. Further, research indicates that those in positions of power and authority are likely to be better liked, thought to be more competent, and are likely to be given the benefit of the doubt (Fiske et al., 2002; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Hogg, 2001; Pettigrew, 1979; Ridgeway, 2001a,b). Because they fit a prototype of competence and worthiness that is widely shared by both high and low status members, they are often offered opportunities for visibility, training, and good assignments, as well as for promotions and other types of rewards (DiTomaso et al., 2007b; Haslam et al., 1999; Jost et al., 2004; Pettigrew, 1979; Proudfoot & Kay, 2014; Ridgeway et al., 1998; Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000).

In other words, although diversity training programs give a great deal of attention to the "bias against" outgroups, there is almost no attention to the "bias for" the normative ingroup, i.e., white men. Although occasionally there is some mention of privilege in these programs, there are few, if any, efforts in most major

corporations to make any changes in how opportunities, resources, and benefits are unequally distributed. As Sugrue (2001: 49) argued with regard to the resistance to affirmative action programs in the construction industry, the charges that affirmative action constituted reverse discrimination against whites and that minorities were violating the principles of "color-blind" selection procedures ignored the history of white advantage in which color was very much part of the selection process, but to the benefit of white employees. A similar argument is provided by Katznelson (2005) in his analysis of "when affirmative action was white". The emphasis on "bias against" minorities and women, rather than the "bias for" whites and men is especially noteworthy, given that in contrast to programs like diversity training and associated programs like mentoring and networking, affirmative action is one of the diversity programs that is effective in changing behavioral outcomes, specifically, in increasing the proportion of women and minorities in managerial jobs (Kalev et al., 2006). As long as bias for the normative ingroup is invisible and hidden from view, inequality within companies will be reproduced without anyone being liable for discriminatory behavior or for charges of racism as we usually think about those concepts.

Implicit or unconscious bias

The same issues could be applied to the way that implicit or unconscious bias has been discussed within the management literature (Banaji et al., 2003; Greenwald et al., 1998; Jost et al., 2009). Measured in terms of the time it takes to link associations with different affective meaning to persons from different categorical groups, the research on implicit bias makes clear that it takes less time for most of us to link positive words to higher status group members and negative words to lower status group members than vice versa. But this evidence has been interpreted primarily in terms of the negative framing of bias against low status groups, rather than as evidence of bias for high status groups. This is so, even though a widely read article that outlines the evidence about implicit bias and its consequences for managerial decisions makes clear that the evidence can be interpreted as either bias for or bias against (Banaji et al., 2003). In almost all of the discussions about implicit bias in a corporate context, those who have raised the issue have done so to call attention to the biases that are levied against women or minority groups or others of lower status in companies, with the expectation that making such biases salient will lead to less stereotyping and fewer decisions based on unconscious biases.

It is also important to note that in most of the research and reporting on implicit or unconscious bias, it is rarely the case that the origin of these associations is taken into account and used to inform desirable policy responses. Research, for example, on status construction theory shows that the associations that we make with regard to high status and low status groups derive from our cognitive response to the link between categorical differences and resource distributions. That is, those with more resources are assumed to be more competent and worthy and are thought of as being of higher status. If whites or men are more likely to hold positions of authority, higher income, and to be disproportionately in more favorable positions, then, according to status construction theory, they will be thought of as deserving of such positions. That is, the prototype of those thought to be appropriate to hold high status positions will be those who are already most prevalent in such positions (Ridgeway, 2001a; Ridgeway et al., 1998). To understand that status attributions emerge out of the cognitive link we make between the distribution of resources and categorical distinctions (e.g., white men hold positions of high authority and high income) underlines that implicit biases are not just a result of backward ways of thinking or of hostility toward certain groups. Instead, our assumptions about who deserves high status reflects widely shared associations that are accepted by both high and low status groups, often by both whites and blacks, by men and women, and by managers and their subordinates. In other words, although such assumptions are cognitive, the justification for inequality is based on and reinforced by the structure of social relationships among groups within the society, and especially with reference to the distribution of power and resources between groups (Jost, 2001; Proudfoot & Kay, 2014; Ridgeway, 2001a; Ridgeway et al., 1998).

Micro-inequities and microaggressions

Micro-inequities, which are patterns of behaviors, words, or actions that cumulatively contribute to undermining the sense of value and competence of those who are overlooked, ignored, or treated in ways that may appear to be disrespectful, is another concept that has received a lot of attention in recent years within the context of diversity. It is what Rowe calls (Rowe, 1981, 1990) the "minutiae of discrimination." Such behaviors have been thought of as "death by a thousand cuts," in that any one such behavior may seem inconsequential, but the accumulation of this sort of treatment over time can reduce opportunities available to those who are the recipients of such behaviors and, importantly, can undermine their confidence and their ability to be effective. Everyday discrimination is a related concept that also refers to the importance of relatively minor negative, but daily and cumulative experiences that can adversely affect the well-being of women and race/ethnic minorities (Deitch et al., 2003).

In the fields of counseling, social work, education, and increasingly in management as well, the term microaggression has been used to refer to similar kinds of experiences (Basford, Offermann, & Behrend, 2014; Davis, 1989; Forrest-Bank & Jenson, 2015; Sue, 2010; Sue et al., 2007). Sue et al. (2007: 273) define microaggressions as "brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults". The focus on microaggressions has grown, among other things, because of the increasing need for practitioners in various fields to develop cultural competence and the belief that in many professional contexts where whites are predominant that

they may not be aware of the ways their daily interactions might undermine the mental health and well-being of their clients (Sue et al., 2007). Sue et al. (2007: 274) define microaggressions as having three forms: microassaults, which are explicit derogatory behaviors that are intended to hurt the victims; microinsults, which are rude and insensitive communications that are deemed to be demeaning; and microinvalidations, which are interactions that exclude, negate or nullify the experiences of the targets. While some have argued that microassaults, which are akin to explicit racist behaviors, should not be included in the concept of microaggressions because it seems to minimize the insights with regard to the more implicit behaviors (Minikel-Lacocque, 2013), others have argued that the power of the concept is precisely that it incorporates interactions that range from explicit to implicit, and therefore, it captures a broader range of experiences for those who are the targets of such behaviors (Basford et al., 2014). Increasingly, the concept has been applied to analysis of the experiences of race and ethnic minorities from varied backgrounds, to gender, and to other groups thought of as disadvantaged in society (Basford et al., 2014; Constantine & Sue, 2007; Ong, Burrow, Ja, Fuller-Rowell, & Sue, 2013; Sue, 2010).

The sorts of behaviors often mentioned in discussions of micro-inequities include things such as not being included in important conversations, being asked to do trivial tasks on behalf of the group that others are not asked to share, being interrupted when speaking, or being asked to make more of an effort on behalf of the group that others are not asked to make. Sue et al. (2007: 278) outline nine types of behaviors that they feel capture the experiences of microaggressions: having one's intelligence undermined, being treated like a second-class citizen, having one's culture pathologized, being assumed a criminal, treated like an alien in one's own land, the assumption of color blindness (because it invalidates racial identity), assuming outcomes depend on merit (because it ignores the structure of inequality), the denial of racism from dominant group members, and what they call environmental microaggressions (where the environment is structured without evidence of minority presence). Through a series of articles and a recent book, Sue and his collaborators elaborate the ways such interactions cause harm and discomfort, and they make the case for why the accumulation of microaggressions undermines mental health (Sue, 2010; Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal, & Torino, 2009; Sue, Capodilupo, & Holder, 2008; Sue et al., 2007).

Although being the recipient of such behaviors can have cumulative effects that can be aversive and that can undermine confidence and self-esteem, I would argue that the other side of micro-inequities or microaggressions is more consequential. I call these micro-advantages. For example, one of the advantages of having networks with people who have social resources is that one can get valuable information and insight from those who have already succeeded in specific occupations or industries or who can provide an insider's view that will help prepare one to grasp opportunity. Knowing what a job entails, what will be asked in an interview, what is likely to be on the test, and having the opportunity to practice or try things out before the real evaluation takes place all provide advantages that can help one succeed (DiTomaso, 2013; Fiske et al., 2002; Foschi, 2000; Haslam et al., 1999; Hogg, 2001; Lareau, 2000, 2003; Pettigrew, 1979). Being visible to key decision makers or having someone certify your trustworthiness are similarly important, as is not having rules apply as strictly as they might for others. Those without such inside information will have more difficulty achieving goals.

Such advantages, however, are patterned. If women or minorities are left out of conversations, it is white men who are the ones who are participants in such conversations and who are brought in. If women and minorities are overlooked when important meetings are being planned, it is white men who are considered to be essential participants. If women and minorities are asked to do the dirty work or the caring work that is necessary for groups to function (such as taking notes, getting coffee or running errands), it is white men who are allowed to spend their time being full participants and who can give their full attention to the tasks or conversations at hand. While micro-inequities or microaggressions may have adverse outcomes for minority groups and women, micro-advantages that are enjoyed by white men position them for cumulative success. White men get the benefit of the doubt, are offered opportunities because of their promise, rather than their performance, and are rewarded with experiences that give them both greater capacity to act and greater rewards for the actions that they take (DiTomaso et al., 2007b). I argue that the reproduction of inequality has more to do with the daily micro-advantages that benefit whites and men than it does with micro-inequities or microaggressions against minorities and women.

Mentors

There is one place within the management literature where networks are addressed and that is with regard to the need for mentors for those who want to get ahead. Mentoring programs are often associated with corporate diversity programs because it is assumed that mentors are needed for those who want to obtain better jobs with more responsibility and rewards (Burt, 1997, 2000; Fagenson, 1989; Ibarra, 1992, 1995; Kalev et al., 2006; Thomas, 1989, 2001). Further, discussions of mentoring explicitly recognizes the network connections available to white men that gives them access to mentoring that is often not available or less available to women and minority employees (Fagenson, 1989; Kram, 1985; Thomas & Gabarro, 1999).

But even in this domain, what is usually defined as the problem with mentoring is that women and minorities lack mentors rather than that white men are more likely to have them. Corporate diversity programs focus on finding ways to assign mentors to women and minority employees or to teach them how to reach out and find mentors on their own. They do not address that whites and men may have an over-abundance of mentors. There are limitations, though, to how helpful mentors can be. The term mentor is usually defined as someone who gives advice. While advice can be helpful for those who are not well attuned to the climate or culture of the organizations for which they work

or who may not know what is likely to be expected in their occupations or industries, what is far more important than getting advice is having someone who will look out for your interests and actively provide you with opportunities. Within the human resources literature, such a person is called a sponsor, and sponsors are far more valuable to one's career than is having a mentor to give advice (DiTomaso et al., 2007b; Hewitt, 2013).

Corporate mentoring programs that try to match women or minority employees with those who can give advice do not give the same kind of attention to how sponsors pass along opportunities within their companies. As we know, white men are still disproportionately in the positions with the most authority and resources, and thus, they have greater access to opportunities that can be shared. In most cases, white men in the positions to pass along opportunities do so to other white men. Presumably, this is a key reason why white men have retained their advantages in the labor market (DiTomaso et al., 2007b; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012). In other words, women and minority employees are likely to have mentors who give them advice, while white men are likely to have sponsors who provide them with opportunities. For those who have access to information, influence, or opportunity that would be valuable to share (Adler & Kwon, 2002), we know already that these opportunities are more likely to be passed along to those who are in our own social groups. White men are advantaged as well, because being over represented in positions of authority in companies, they are thus more likely to fit the normative prototype and to be thought of as competent, worthy, trustworthy, and likable (Fiske et al., 2002; Foschi, 2000; Haslam et al., 1999; Hogg, 2001).

White privilege

There has also been a growing interest in and a proliferation of research on the topic of what is called "white privilege." In such research, attention is called to the ways that whites gain advantages and positions of authority and power, along with income, wealth, and jobs that are privileged (Banaszynski, 2000; Gallagher, 2003; Ignatiev, 2008; McIntosh, 1989; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Painter, 2011; Roediger, 1991; Rothenberg, 2002). Thus, there is an overlap between the arguments about white privilege and my argument about favoritism or advantage as the mechanisms for reproducing racial inequality. In fact, McIntosh (1989) argues in her foundational piece on white privilege that one of the reasons for raising the issue was to acknowledge the advantages that accrue to whites and men rather than only the disadvantages experienced by nonwhites and women.

But there is another dimension to the argument about white privilege that differs from the argument I am making in this paper. In much of the white privilege literature, the intent is to show not only that whites have advantages, such as income, wealth, and authority, but also to show that by holding such favored positions that they are also racists. In other words, white privilege is associated in the academic literature with the argument that whites are "really" racists, if they would just acknowledge it and come to terms with it. It is often a component of anti-racism training, with the assumption that if whites will acknowledge their privileged positions and the benefits that they gain from the existence of racial inequality that they will come to terms with their racism and begin to undo these otherwise hidden attitudes.

Although there has always been a segment of corporate diversity training that addressed issues of white privilege, most occurred in the early days with some of the diversity consultants who had started their careers with anti-racism programs (Cross, 2000; Katz, 1978). In corporate diversity programs in most companies, white privilege is rarely addressed, although some discussions of privilege have been finding their way into programs in connection with discussions of micro-inequities and implicit bias (Personal communication). In this context, the discussion might call attention to everyday practices in which whites or men may feel more comfortable than would be likely for nonwhites or women, e.g., along the lines of McIntosh's knapsack (1989). As noted by Berrey (2015), such discussions are rarely linked to structural inequality or even to differences in income and access to jobs, of course, because hierarchy and inequality are part of corporate life and considered legitimate differentiators.

My argument, in contrast, to the ways that white privilege has been discussed in the academic literature and in corporate diversity programs when it has been addressed is that the ultimate white privilege is the privilege not to be a racist and to still benefit from racial inequality. Because long term inequality must be legitimated in order to reduce the conflict that might otherwise be likely between groups (Tilly, 1998), legitimizing myths emerge that justify resource differences among groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Ideologies of individualism and merit are especially prevalent within the U.S. and are frequently applied to explaining racial inequality (DiTomaso, 2013; Hochschild, 1995; Kluegel & Smith, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Whites benefit from advantages they can draw from social resources over the long term that cumulatively improve their well-being, but they explain their life outcomes in terms of their individual hard work and competence (DiTomaso, 2013). And because the advantages that they obtain through the help of family, friends, and other connections are rarely acknowledged and not salient to them or most others, they can explain inequality as the fault of "those racists" (meaning other people, not them) and feel that they are part of the solution rather than part of the problem. The over emphasis on racists and discriminators takes attention away from the reproduction of inequality through advantage and favoritism.

Counter arguments and response

Although many will acknowledge that whites, on average, enjoy greater resources in terms of income, wealth, and access to good jobs than do nonwhites, it is more difficult to get agreement that these constitute privileges rather than earned outcomes, because of greater investment in education, hard work, and motivation. Indeed, this distinction constitutes a major political divide within the country. But there are other points that can (and

have) been made with regard to my argument about favoritism or advantage being a more important mechanism for reproducing racial inequality than racism and discrimination in the post-civil rights period. I want to briefly address some of these counter-arguments.

Perhaps most important is the question of why I argue that favoritism and advantage are not just another form of discrimination and racism. I have argued that there are cognitive, social, legal, and political differences in how the two are experienced. I have also argued that using charges of racism in this context enables most whites to assume that such charges do not apply to them, given that they express support for civil rights, do not believe that they have actively or purposely excluded nonwhites from opportunity, and do not feel any hostility or ill will of which they are aware toward nonwhites whom they might encounter. In other words, often using a definition of racism as old fashioned racism, most whites will disavow any association of such beliefs or feelings to themselves. Indeed, they will often join in the condemnation of racism and discrimination and attribute such beliefs to an older generation or to "those racists," a term often meant to refer to white working class men (Sullivan, 2014). Emphasizing racism and discrimination in the explanations for racial inequality deflects attention from the favoritism and advantages that I argue are the more important mechanisms for reproducing racial inequality in the post-civil rights period. Emphasizing racism and discrimination also removes most whites from the argument, because they cannot recognize themselves in such charges. Further, the beliefs in individualism and that people get what they deserve out of life helps legitimate long term inequality, and the espoused commitment among most whites to civil rights and equal opportunity further confirms for them that others contribute to racial inequality, but not them. Consistent with the research on minimal group studies that finds that derogation of outgroups is less likely than favoritism given to ingroups (Brewer, 1999; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014), offering favor, advantages, or opportunities to friends makes whites feel good about how they live their lives, whereas they would likely experience a sense of guilt or dismay if they had to express hostility toward nonwhites and think of themselves as racists (Wellman, 1993).

There are other objections to my argument as well. For example, even acknowledging that most people seek out networks of friends and acquaintances to help them find better jobs, one might ask why that should pose a problem. Doesn't everyone help their own, and aren't companies better off if they hire people who are known to current employees, because they will have been pre-screened and are likely to be more loyal and committed? While it may be the case that everyone helps people like themselves if they can, especially with regard to the search for jobs, the fact that we live such segregated lives and that there is already significant intergroup inequality in which whites are more privileged and have greater access to valuable opportunities means that we do not all start from the same place. Thus, there is a valid public policy reason to be concerned about the ways that some gain an inside edge and are able to have a friend "save a place in line." Indeed, gaining access to jobs and freedom were the main themes of the civil rights movement. Although surely there are policies in place that are supposed to overcome the kind of favoritism and nepotism that I am discussing, DiTomaso (2013) found that favoritism worked as much in public agencies as in private organizations and as often in "equal opportunity employers" as in those who made no such commitments. She even found examples of favoritism for civil service jobs for which tests were required. In several cases, she heard about applicants who were given the tests in advance or who were told how to respond. And of course, even with civil service tests, there are often subjective components that enable people to help their friends in the scoring. As one of DiTomaso's interviewees said, "If you like the guy, you give him a higher score."

Some have also argued that using networks to provide opportunities to friends and acquaintances is not problematic because most companies, especially those with a commitment to diversity and inclusion, would be happy to hire qualified minorities (or women) if they could find them. In fact, many believe that minorities and women themselves are advantaged because of affirmative action policies and the commitment to diversity in many companies. If this were the case, however, then why do we see the patterns, for example, in the Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey (2012) study in which white men have not only retained access to the best jobs, but in some cases have actually expanded their representation in good jobs (Kalev et al., 2006)?

Another argument that might be raised is that companies should hire only the "best" people, and if those happen to be whites or men, then the right thing to do is to hire them for opportunities that are available. This is a variant of "the best person should get the job," which is often heard when any discussions about affirmative action or diversity policies are mentioned. This argument, though, ignores the overwhelming evidence that we are often subject to substantial biases in our evaluation of who is competent or worthy (both biases for and biases against). We know from a great deal of existing research that those who fit the prototype of the normative ingroup are likely to be better liked, to be thought of as more competent, and to be given the benefit of the doubt (Fiske et al., 2002; Haslam et al., 1999; Hogg, 2001). Although these kinds of personal qualities are thought to be even more important for jobs that deal with uncertainty and require value judgments (Kanter, 1977; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), one of the claims about the value of diversity is that having people from varied backgrounds will lead to better decision-making and more creative outlooks. Hence, companies that select people for top management jobs who are homogeneous are likely to be at a disadvantage. When those in top management can predict how similar others will think and act, that is a problem for most companies rather than an advantage. Thus, companies need to encourage objective criteria for assigning people to jobs and to be concerned about the ways that subjective evaluations come into play when making decisions about who gets what opportunities.

Given the availability of new forms of technology for finding jobs, some have argued that personal networks no

longer play the same role that they have in the past. Further, they have argued that if minorities or women are not as connected to networks of people who might be able to help their careers that they should learn how to network and actively look for people who can serve as mentors or sponsors. While this may be good advice, the evidence that we just recounted about continued patterns in the labor force in which white men are over represented in the best jobs do not suggest that technology has replaced personal networks in terms of how most people get jobs. Even if one applies online, there is still a selection process that includes the evaluation and judgment of those who make hiring decisions, so technology does not remove the need for vigilance about whether processes are fair to all.

Finally, some might argue that calling attention to race is itself racist and that perhaps because there have always been winners and losers in life that inequality in itself is not something with which companies should be concerned. I would argue in this regard that long term inequality is about structural issues more than attitudes and values. Indeed, my main point is that racism is not the issue as much as the distribution of resources and how they get allocated to people from different groups and networks. And, while it is the case that life often has winners and losers, there are many issues with which companies should be concerned if they want to hire the best labor forces, benefit from new knowledge, and be effective in an increasingly diverse and global environment. In other words, if the business case for diversity is relevant, and to the extent that much less has changed than companies claim to want and less than scholars have argued is necessary for effective and productive management, then issues of inequality, especially when it comes together with organizational policies and practices that reproduce it unfairly, should be a matter of concern.

Egregious oppression and violence toward nonwhites

By arguing that racial inequality gets reproduced more through mechanisms of favoritism and advantage than through racism and discrimination, I am not trying to argue that racism and discrimination do not exist. They clearly do. But I argue that the need for the legitimacy of long term inequality requires processes that minimize conflict between groups. Otherwise, the overall system would be unstable and social movements for change would likely emerge, which they do from time to time. In this respect, I agree with the conclusions drawn by Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014: 679):

> First, ingroup-directed positivity is pervasive, and there is no comparable evidence for an equivalent pervasiveness of outgroup-directed negativity. Second, discrimination frequently occurs in the form of differential favoring, and there is no comparable evidence for discrimination occurring so frequently in the form of differential harming. Third, established theories offer multiple bases for understanding the development of positive regard for others...

Importantly, though, the pervasiveness of positivity toward ingroups in the context of long term inequality is contingent on the claims to legitimacy being accepted and taken for granted. Thus, it is under "normal" times and under "normal" circumstances that both high and low status groups accept the justification of the system (Jost et al., 2004; Proudfoot & Kay, 2014; Ridgeway, 2001a). As long as lower status groups accept the inequality that exists within the society and do not contest how resources are distributed, then higher status groups can "afford to be generous" (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991). But boundaries in unequal societies are always policed, and what otherwise might be ambivalence or indifference from high status groups toward lower status ones can turn into more actively negative behaviors, even to the point of violence (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

As documented by Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, and Pratto (1994) and Sidanius, Pratto, Sinclair, and van Laar (1996b), those in positions they term as hierarchy enhancing (rather than hierarchy attenuating), such as police officers, tend to be high in social dominance orientation. Those in such positions are more likely to accept inequality, strongly value order, and want subordinate groups to know their place. It is when low status groups undertake strategies of social competition and try to challenge inequality that they become threatening to the status quo and are more likely to invoke more aggressive behaviors (Cuddy et al., 2008; Dixon et al., 2012; Sidanius, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Fiske and her collaborators have shown that in intergroup relations stereotypes and attributions toward others tend to be guided by two primary concerns, warmth (whether the other group will act with good will and is trustworthy) and competence (whether the other group competes for resources and is capable of success in doing so) (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske, Xu, & Cuddy, 1999). Those who feel that their privileges are threatened and that other groups cannot be trusted are likely to react more negatively toward others in order to protect themselves and members of their group from competition. Such intergroup competition is complicated by the visibility of faultlines between groups and by the ideologies that govern an understanding of how inequality persists. There is lots of evidence to show that dominant groups are often able to mute attention to their role in generating inequality, while subordinate groups fight with each other instead of joining in solidarity against more privileged groups (Gilens, 1999; Katz, 1989; Roediger, 1991; Tomaskovic-Devey & Roscigno, 1996).

Blacks and other nonwhites in the U.S. are particularly vulnerable to both official and unofficial violence, because they constitute a lower status group that has organized politically for change in the distribution of resources and made demands for access to resources, government benefits, and especially jobs from which they had previously been excluded. As such, they have challenged or threatened those who feel entitled to these resources, and especially those whose hold on resources is more tenuous and uncertain. DiTomaso (2013), for example, argued that whites hoard job opportunities for family and friends, because gaining access to jobs that pay a family wage is the only way to have a decent life in the U.S. She further argued that those in her study who were more explicitly racist in

their comments about blacks and who were more opposed to government civil rights policies were those who felt that the Civil Rights Movement undermined their ability to continue to hoard opportunities, especially jobs, for family and friends. Under these conditions intergroup competition can change from ingroup favoritism and outgroup indifference to outgroup hostility and active harm (Brewer, 1999). Over the long term in the overall context of an unequal society, legitimacy is generally maintained, and explicit conflict between groups is minimized, but when groups feel that privileges that they have enjoyed are being contested or threatened, they are as likely to fight as to share (Jackman, 1994).

Methodological issues

Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014: 676) argue that in order to empirically differentiate ingroup favoritism from outgroup hostility, two conditions are needed that have rarely been met in studies of intergroup relations: (1) an unambiguous neutral point that is neither favorable nor hostile in measures that assess favorability and hostility and (2) a within-subjects design that asks each participant to evaluate both the ingroup and the outgroup. Studies that show differences in allocations to or evaluations of an ingroup and an outgroup might show either favoritism or discrimination, but cannot distinguish between the two. Studies that compare allocations or evaluations of ingroups and outgroups can show group but not individual effects.

Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014: 676–79) review six types of studies to explain why most do not meet the criterion of an unambiguous neutral point. Studies that use overt behavior measures, such as studies of helping behavior, often measure whether helping has taken place or not, but the absence of helping is not the same as harming. Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) could find only seven studies that used harm toward subjects to assess discrimination (e.g., electric shock, aversive noise), and even in these studies, the findings do not support outgroup hostility. They also explain that studies of nonverbal behavior, of interpersonal judgment, and studies of implicit attitudes fail to meet the criterion of a neutral point, despite being able to show differences in treatment toward various groups. Two types of studies can be designed with a neutral point, but may not be conducted in this way. Behavioral intention measures, such as minimal group studies, are able to identify a neutral point, for example, when an average across intended payments is used to determine when one payment is higher or lower than the average. Self-reported attitude measures, such as feeling thermometers, can also be constructed with a neutral point. In both of these types of studies, however, Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014: 677–78) report that most findings also suggest ingroup favoritism, but not outgroup hostility.

There are obvious ethical issues that come into play if one wants to document harm or hostility toward a research participant, which is undoubtedly why such research designs are rarely used in experimental research. While there is certainly evidence of conflict and harm between groups in many societies, Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014: 680) argue that despite our concern for widespread hostile behavior, the evidence actually suggests, for example, that both lynchings and hate crimes have declined in frequency over time. Thus, there are methodological reasons why we have more evidence of ingroup favoritism than of outgroup hostility, and there are also strong theoretical reasons why we should expect ingroup favoritism to predominate in intergroup relations (Brewer, 1999; Dixon et al., 2012; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014).

Conclusions

Many companies have declared their commitment to diversity and inclusion because they believe that globalization and the growing interconnectedness to the world, both domestically and abroad, require that they hire more broadly, use talent more effectively, and encourage greater collaboration. Yet, many have fallen short of their own goals and have often looked to scholars to help them better understand workforce dynamics that might enable them to better meet their goals for a more diverse and inclusive organization. In doing so, they have given substantial attention in recent years to implicit or unconscious bias, to concerns about micro-inequities, and to developing a global mindset and cross-cultural experiences. They have also put in place policies encouraging more diverse hiring and promotion, with the expectation that wishing will make it so. But many have found themselves with much less diversity as they go up the corporate ladder than they say they want and need. In some cases, corporate leaders have even expressed dismay at the composition of their middle management, and they have perceived middle managers as the point of resistance to their charge to be more inclusive and to identify talent more broadly. What companies have not done, however, is to give as much attention to the "bias for" people from the same social networks as their current managers as they have to ridding the company of the "bias against" minorities and women. In focusing their attention only on "bias against" and on adopting policies against discrimination, they have, perhaps, missed a great deal of what happens in their own firms that contributes to the less diverse population of middle management and to the accretion of embedded structures of inequality that reproduce themselves, despite commitments to and efforts to change lower organizational levels. In this paper, I have tried to highlight the importance of looking at the way that favoritism or advantage is passed along from those who are already in positions of power, authority, and privilege to those with whom they identify, often know, and usually welcome.

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