The Role of Employers in Split Labor Markets: An Event-Structure Analysis of Racial Conflict and AFL Organizing, 1917-1919*

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Abstract

This article focuses on employers' responses to AFL organizing efforts in the meatpacking industry in Chicago and the steel industry in Gary, Indiana, between 1917 and 1919. First, I develop a typology of split labor markets that incorporates the insights of the neo-Marxist divide-and-rule perspective. Second, I use event-structure analysis (ESA) to systematically examine causal sequences in the Chicago and Gary union campaigns. The analyses suggest that (1) both capitalist and state actors meditate conflicts between racial groups in the labor market and that (2) employers actively contribute to racial antagonism when emergent interracial coalitions threaten to increase labor costs and polarize class struggle. The revised split labor market theory explains how the features of industrial labor markets affect the strategies of employers as well as majority and minority workers.

Since its inception in the early 1970s, split labor market theory has informed sociological analyses of racial conflict and working-class mobilization (Bonacich 1972; Boswell 1986; Brown & Boswell 1995; Olzak 1989). For understanding black-white relations in the U.S., the theory is particularly relevant for the period from 1916 to the end of the New Deal, when patterns of migration increased

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interracial job competition in most industrial labor markets (Bonacich 1976; Brueggemann & Boswell 1998; Wilson 1980). White workers often responded to the threat of displacement with discrimination and violence; black workers, barred in principle and in practice from most labor unions, provided a pool of potential strikebreakers. Although split labor market theory imbues workers with class-based racial motivations, the model grounds employers' actions in the logic of competitive markets: employers adopt a laissez-faire approach, hiring the least expensive labor independently of racial considerations. Thus, racial inequality and conflict result from workers' behavior rather than capitalists' efforts to divide and rule their employees, as suggested in some neo-Marxist formulations (Bonacich 1972, 1979; Cummings 1977; Reich 1981; Roemer 1979; Szymanski 1974, 1976).

The historical evidence, however, does not fully accord with the theory's postulates. During World War I, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) initiated massive organizing drives in meatpacking and steel, the largest industrial employers of black labor (Barrett 1987; Tuttle 1996). Both drives originated in Chicago under the guidance of labor leaders John Fitzpatrick and William Foster. Ultimately, the campaigns intensified racial divisions in the nation's packinghouses and steel plants. In July 1919, conflict among Chicago's meatpackers contributed to one of the nation's worst race riots. The Chicago race riot marked a turning point in the campaign; subsequent strikebreaking by African Americans contributed to the defeat of the unionists (Barrett 1987; Grossman 1989). Similarly, in October 1919, Indiana's governor ordered state and federal troops to occupy Gary in response to racial violence among steelworkers. The militia crushed Gary's union movement, and black strikebreaking undercut the AFL's efforts to create a national steelworkers' union (Brody [1960] 1998; Foster 1920). Although both campaigns unfolded in the context of racially split labor markets, the theory's emphasis on *workers* obscures significant differences in *employers'* strategies.

The tendency to minimize capitalists' role in split labor markets has been exacerbated in some cases by static, synchronic methodologies. In this article, I focus on employers' role in split labor markets using a dynamic and comparative methodological strategy to examine events in Chicago and Gary. I begin with a broad historical argument and show how the homogenization of industrial labor increased racial job competition by undercutting the position of skilled white workers. By 1916, racially split labor markets had clearly emerged in Chicago's meatpacking industry and Gary's steel industry. I develop a typology of employer strategies that suggests why, how, and under what conditions capitalists manipulate racial conflict in split labor markets. Next, I consider methodological debates in case study research and use event-structure analysis (ESA) to situate the actions of employers, black and white workers, union leaders, and agents of the state in the trajectory of the two AFL organizing campaigns. Case comparison demonstrates how employers' intervention differed in the two cases and illustrates the utility of the typology for explaining variations in employer responses. Finally,

I discuss the implications of the study for understanding race relations and class conflict.

Labor Homogenization and Racial Competition

Beginning in the 1870s, industrial employers systematically deskilled jobs, reduced employees' control, and increased the uniformity of work to maximize output and efficiency. This process of labor homogenization reached its apex in the first two decades of the twentieth century and relied on technological developments, capital consolidation, and new management practices to rationalize production (Edwards 1979; Gordon et al. 1988; Griffin, Wallace & Rubin 1986; Montgomery 1976; Palmer 1975; Stone 1973). Despite many industry-specific changes, similar forces undercut craft production in meatpacking and steel.

Technology, Consolidation, and the Reorganization of Work

Prior to the 1870s, the prevailing technologies in meatpacking and steel limited industrial expansion. The threat of spoilage restricted markets for meat, making the industry regional, seasonal, and highly competitive (Barrett 1987; Halpern 1997). Steel production relied on the crucible process, a low-yield and imprecise method that required highly skilled workers (Ingham 1991; Nuwer 1988; Stone 1973). By the 1870s, both industries had begun to shed these technological constraints, which allowed them to benefit from economies of scale. In meatpacking, refrigeration and the proliferation of railroads allowed companies to serve national and international markets, to integrate slaughtering and packing, and to develop new markets for by-products. As a result, Chicago's meatpacking industry grew by 900% from 1870 to 1890. Later, mechanization and conveyor-based production made meat processing even more integrated and efficient, doubling some workers' productivity (Barrett 1987; Brody 1964; Halpern 1997; Herbst 1932). In steel, the Bessemer converter (and later, open-hearth methods) reduced costs, increased output, and facilitated additional mechanization. Yearly output per worker increased from 25.2 to 42.1 tons between 1869 and 1889, and by 1899, the industry produced 950 times more steel than it had in 1860 (Brody [1960] 1998; Conell & Voss 1990; Fisher 1951; Ingham 1991; Stone 1973).

Before 1870, the meatpacking and steel industries were relatively small-scale and highly competitive. Meatpacking was divided among its slaughtering, packing, marketing, and distribution segments, and few crucible steel companies owned related firms in coal mining or wrought-iron manufacture (Barrett 1987; Ingham 1991). However, intense competition fueled a wave of consolidation and expansion during the 1890s (Edwards 1979). Consolidation enabled large industrial corporations to better "withstand long strikes, shift work from one plant to another,

employ machinery which reduced their dependence on craft skills, and mobilize the forces of the state" (Brecher 1978:6). Meatpackers integrated the production of meat, fertilizer, glue, lard, soap, and pharmaceuticals and, in some cases, entered into pricing agreements with competitors. In 1903, the largest packing firms formed the National Packing Company, which controlled hundreds of subsidiaries and stockyards. Anti-trust litigation undermined National in 1912, but by 1916 the "Big Five" (the Swift, Armour, Morris, Cudahy, and Wilson companies) accounted for 70% of the nation's meatpacking business and 95% of all exported beef. No other firm controlled as much as 1% of the national market (Barrett 1987; Brody 1964; Halpern 1997). Between 1898 and 1900, eleven mergers reorganized nearly 200 previously independent steel companies, and in 1901, J.P. Morgan purchased the Carnegie holdings to form U.S. Steel. By 1918, U.S. Steel produced 50% of the nation's steel and owned 145 steel plants (Brody 1987; Edwards 1979; Fisher 1951; Foner 1964, 1988; Garraty 1960; Hogan 1971).

In concert with technological innovation and capital consolidation, the reorganization of work enabled the "Big Five" and U.S. Steel to subdivide the labor process and reduce reliance on craft labor. By 1901, two-thirds of the nation's meatpackers and 60% of its steelworkers performed unskilled work (Barrett 1987; Garraty 1960). The meatpacking plants continually refined the division of labor, embedding control over work "into the technology and organization of the assembly line" (Barrett 1987:26). By 1900, the industry had decomposed the responsibilities of the highly skilled "all-around butcher" into seventy-eight separate jobs (Barrett 1987; Herbst 1932). Department of Labor officials noted that the largest meatpacking plants employed thousands of workers, "each of whom performs a very small, narrowly defined task, in which by innumerable repetitions he becomes expert" (cited in Barrett 1987:25-26). The packers accommodated the timing and volume of livestock shipments by hiring up to one-third of their employees on an as-needed basis (Barrett 1987; Halpern 1997). Because efficient steel production required continuous operation, workers labored 84 hours weekly and received alternate Sundays off only if they had worked a 24-hour shift the previous Sunday (Garraty 1960). On-the-job training replaced the lengthy apprenticeships characteristic of crucible steelmaking, and jobs became intercoordinated and hierarchically organized. These developments helped reduce labor's share of the costs of steel production from 22.5% to 16.5% between 1890 and 1910 (Brody 1987, [1960] 1998; Conell & Voss 1990; Montgomery 1987; Stone 1973).

The Genesis of Split Labor Markets

During the period of labor homogenization, the packinghouses and the steel mills recruited many of their unskilled workers from an ethnically diverse pool of recent immigrants. By 1916, however, immigration had plummeted and southern blacks

began to flood the labor markets that employed workers in meatpacking, steel production, automaking, coal mining, and construction (Barrett & Roediger 1997; Dickerson 1986; Halpern 1997; Lieberson 1980). The black migration resulted from an acute wartime labor shortage and industrial expansion in the North combined with agricultural difficulties and Jim Crow racism in the South (Florant 1942; Henri 1975; Meier & Rudwick 1994; Spear 1967; Tolnay & Beck 1990, 1992). From 1916 to 1918, more than 400,000 southern blacks migrated to northern cities (Herbst 1932; Marks 1983), and by 1920 nearly half of the North's black population was southern-born (Hill 1925). Separated by about 35 miles, Chicago and Gary offered industrial employment that attracted disproportionate numbers of black migrants. From 1910 to 1920, the black population increased from 44,103 to 109,458 in Chicago and from 383 to 5,299 in Gary (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1935). Employers in meatpacking and steel actively recruited southern blacks during the war (Dickerson 1986; Fogel 1970; Gottlieb 1987; Spear 1967; Tuttle 1996). Between 1916 and 1920, black representation increased from 6.3% to 27.8% in Chicago's packinghouses and from 2.9% to nearly 14% in Gary's steel mills (see Figure 1). African Americans' transition to the industrial sector was fraught with conflict: union discrimination intensified, strikebreaking compromised labor organizing, and urban racial violence surged during the pre-Depression years (Rudwick 1972).

As a consequence of the migration, split labor markets quickly developed in Chicago and Gary.[1] A split labor market exists when the labor costs of comparable workers differ by race (Bonacich 1972). Labor costs include wages and any expenses associated with workers' recruitment, training, benefits, and propensity to unionize. When uneven development impels migration, the relative poverty of minority migrants may also inhibit unionization and prompt new arrivals to work for wages below the prevailing rate. The theory assumes that employers use race-neutral hiring to secure the least expensive labor: recruitment of minorities with lower labor costs and limited militancy represents a competitive threat to the majority. As a result, split labor markets heighten the salience of race and limit possibilities for class-based collective action. To reduce job competition, majority workers use their unions to exclude or intimidate minorities. In turn, minority workers break strikes to access jobs or work "open shop." These dynamics are most likely to ignite racial violence during periods of intense class conflict (Bonacich 1972, 1975, 1976).

In Chicago's meatpacking industry and Gary's steel industry, the racial wage gap was significant: black workers' average earnings were 20% to 30% less than whites'. Of Chicago's black meatpackers, 99% performed unskilled work in 1922, and 70% of Gary's black steelworkers held unskilled jobs in 1918 (Barrett 1987; Chicago Commission on Race Relations 1922; Greer 1976; Herbst 1932; Mohl & Betten 1986).[2] Black workers were also generally less militant. Most AFL unions excluded or segregated African Americans, and black workers hesitated to join a

FIGURE 1: Black Workers in Meatpacking and Steel, 1909-1930



Sources: Mohl and Betten (1986:75), Cayton and Mitchell (1939:231-32), Spero and Harris (1969:268), Fogel (1970:29), and Barrett (1987:47-49). Packinghouse data for 1916-18 are based on one of Chicago's major packinghouses; 1920-28 on two of Chicago's major packinghouses. Packinghouse employment in 1919 is estimated from the December 1918 level.

labor movement with a long history of discrimination (Hill 1984, 1996). Chicago's stockyards unions either barred black workers or segregated African Americans in separate locals (Brody 1964; Cayton & Mitchell 1939; Herbst 1932).[3] In steel, union locals excluded African Americans, and Gary's black workers did not unionize (Dickerson 1986; Foster 1920). Some black leaders advocated strikebreaking as a path to employment, and southern migrants could rarely afford to pay union dues or lose wages during strikes (Marks 1989; Spero & Harris [1931] 1969). Black strikebreaking threatened a larger proportion of strikes as union density began to increase in 1916 (see Figure 2) and was a harbinger of the racial violence that swept America in 1919 (Waskow 1966).

Employer Strategies

While segments of the working class pursue a variety of strategies in a split labor market (including exclusion movements, imposition of a caste system, strikebreaking, displacement, or comprehensive unionism), employers' behavior

FIGURE 2: Unionization and Black Strikebreaking, 1898-1928



Sources: Black strikebreaking is the proportion of all strikes broken with black labor (Whatley 1993; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975:179). Union density is annual union membership as a percentage of the total nonagricultural workforce (Friedman 1999:77; Troy 1965:94). Following Whatley (1993), the data are divided by average annual unemployment (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975:135) and plotted in terms of a three-year moving average.

is assumed to be constant: "Business . . . supports a liberal or laissez faire ideology that would allow all workers to compete freely in an open market" (Bonacich 1972:557). In contrast, the neo-Marxist view suggests that employers actively encourage racial divisions to inhibit union solidarity and keep labor costs low (Szymanski 1974; Wilson 1980). However, economic class theories of racial conflict have contributed to a debate that is premised upon a false dichotomy: either employers passively benefit from racial antagonism and inequality that originates from the actions of workers — the split labor market view — or employers actively promote racial antagonism and inequality to divide workers — the neo-Marxist view (Bonacich 1979, 1980, 1981; Bonilla-Silva 1997; Burawoy 1981; Cummings 1977; Hodson 1995; Marks 1981; Ndabezetha & Sanderson 1988; Wilson 1980). Yet there is nothing logically contradictory about the coexistence of split labor markets *and* employer manipulation of racial inequality and antipathy.[4] To expand the scope of the theory, it is necessary to understand when and why employers deviate from the laissez-faire model.

One source of labor cost differences in a split labor market involves political resources, that is, the extent to which any group can successfully organize to protect its interests or make claims on the state (Bonacich 1972). Majority workers use the political resources of their unions to fight labor homogenization or fend off cheaper labor threats. Their strategies span a continuum from those that are *racially exclusive* (efforts to restrict immigration, limit citizenship, force removal, or erect racial barriers to union membership) to those that are *racially inclusive* (efforts to promote interracial unionizing and racial equality). In between are intermediate strategies, such as the development of a caste system based on racially restrictive union rules or informal practices. Cheaper minority workers can be relatively *nonmilitant* (by refusing to support the union) or *militant* (by honoring union-sanctioned collective action). Intermediate strategies, such as working for lower wages, threaten union pay scales and challenge majority workers' control over the workplace.

The cross-tabulation of these strategies in Table 1 suggests that split labor market scenarios cluster around four ideal types, each of which is associated with a corresponding set of employer strategies. The typology builds upon Bonacich's (1976) contention that employers react to (rather than create) the split in the labor market. In their attempts to manage class conflict, employers' strategic choices are conditioned by (1) the incentives and interests that emerge when the labor market is racially split, (2) historical, regional, or industry characteristics such as the political rights of minorities or the role of technology in production, and (3) the strategies adopted by majority and minority segments of labor. Analytically, the split in the labor market may be most extreme in cell 1 (and least extreme in cell 4) because labor costs are partially a function of groups' militancy and propensity to organize; however, even as minority workers' militancy increases and unions become more inclusive, the labor market split is often maintained by discriminatory wages, racial job segregation, or persistent differences in economic and political resources. The typology allows split labor market theory to become more dynamic (different constellations of strategies can emerge), incorporates a greater emphasis on contingency (the behavior of any group is a strategic response to other groups' actions), and expands the scope of the theory by accounting for cases where employers promote racial conflict. The revised model increases the theory's utility and helps explain anomalies that have contributed to a theoretical impasse between the proponents of split labor market and neo-Marxist perspectives.

Empirically, split labor market research has emphasized cell 1 of the table, a selection bias that has tended to confirm the theory's original assumptions about employer passivity, obscure the potential relevance of the neo-Marxist divide-and-rule perspective, and deemphasize how the strategies of employers (as well as majority and minority segments of labor) change as labor costs begin to converge. In the classic "laissez-faire" split labor market situation, majority workers use

TABLE 1: Employer Strategies in Split Labor Markets[a]

		Minority Labor	
		Nonmilitant	Militant
Majority Labor	Racially Exclusive	(1) Laissez-Faire Capitalism · undercut racial hierarchy via race-neutral hiring · rely on minority strikebreaking and displacement to reduce labor costs	(2) Majority Paternalism · promote racial hierarchy by cultivating majority group loyalty · capitalize on racist ideology to undercut interracial organizing
	Racially Inclusive	(3) Minority Paternalism · prevent solidarity by cultivating minority group loyalty · counter majority unions with company unions for minority group	(4) Divide and Rule · challenge nascent solidarity by fomenting racial antipathy · encourage state actors to quell class mobilization and disorganize workers

[a] This typology is based on the split labor market assumptions that minority labor has lower labor costs overall and fewer economic and political resources relative to majority labor.

their unions to exclude lower-cost minority labor; strikebreaking and displacement drive labor costs down without any active intervention on the part of employers. This challenges unionization and erodes the caste system that reserves better jobs for majority workers. Under the laissez-faire model, minority strikebreakers benefit (even if temporarily) from access to new jobs, and employers benefit from the divisive effects of racial conflict. Superficially at least, many examples of northern labor conflict from 1916 to the mid-1930s fit this pattern (Bonacich 1976).

Cell 2 describes a situation of "majority paternalism," where employers cultivate loyalty among the majority group by offering job security and other benefits to counter the threat of actual or potential minority militancy. Here, employers may capitalize on their own racial identification with majority labor and use existing racist ideologies to subvert solidarity. Employers promote the existing racial hierarchy by offering better jobs, higher wages, and job security to majority workers in an implicit exchange for labor quiescence. The caste system and resulting racial inequalities reinforce racism, discourage interracial alliances, and confer additional psychological and civic privileges upon members of the majority

group (Barrett & Roediger 1997; Roediger 1991). Following World War II, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) promoted a new brand of racial inclusion that drew many black workers into the labor movement. During its efforts to organize industrial unions in the South, the CIO encountered deeply entrenched majority paternalism (Goldfield 1994; Honey 1994). In the tobacco industry, employers actively manipulated racial (and gender) frictions by segregating workers or by using white strikebreakers to replace more militant African Americans (Griffin & Korstad 1995).[5]

Cell 3 suggests that paternalism can also be directed at the minority segment of the workforce. Under "minority paternalism," employers provide resources (jobs, home loans, employee benefits, or funds for community projects) to minority workers or encourage company unionism. Both strategies go against the prevailing racial hierarchy, undercuts unionization, and cultivates minority loyalty (Bonacich 1976). Minority workers' rejection of labor radicalism makes them cheaper to employ, inhibits the possibility of a class coalition, and reproduces the split in the labor market even when majority workers are theoretically open to the possibility of interracial organizing. Examples of minority paternalism can be found in Pittsburgh's steel industry and Chicago's meatpacking industry during the 1920s and at the Ford Motor Company's River Rouge Plant during the 1920s and 1930s (Barrett 1987; Bonacich 1976; Brueggemann 2000; Dickerson 1986). Relative to the laissez-faire approach, both the majority and minority variants of paternalism require that employers take a more active role in maintaining racial divisions; employers use unequal treatment (favoring either minority or majority labor) as a mechanism to perpetuate labor cost differences.

Although the goal of paternalism is to minimize overt conflict by institutionalizing inequality to the point where it may even become unquestioned, employers may also seek to actively promote conflict. Cell 4 suggests that employers are most likely to adopt a divide-and-rule strategy when unions develop racially inclusive organizing strategies and minority workers are (or have the potential to become) militant. Here, employers do not provide benefits or protection to a segment of the working class but instead actively encourage racial conflict to disorganize and demobilize a nascent interracial coalition. Employers will *racialize* class conflict when comprehensive unionism threatens to raise labor costs, especially when the larger social and political climate supports racial inequality.[6] Employers may try to manipulate racial tensions to preserve the split in the labor market, but because "state action may be crucial for setting conditions under which labor organizations can survive to make demands," they may also attempt to mobilize state actors on their behalf (Bonacich 1979:12). Although state intervention need not always benefit employers, both organizing drives considered below show how state intervention can inhibit union mobilization.

Split labor markets declined after World War II as protective legislation introduced during the New Deal promoted broad-based unionization that helped

equalize black-white labor costs.[7] In turn, employers responded to the revitalized (and more racially inclusive) labor movement by embracing mechanization and relocation within or across national borders (Bonacich 1976). However, split labor market analyses have given insufficient attention to the composition of working-class coalitions that employers faced as class struggle evolved from 1916 to the mid-1940s. When minority workers' militancy increases and when majority workers' unions are organizationally receptive to racial inclusion, it is rational for employers to manipulate racial antipathy to the extent that it either maintains the split labor market or reconstitutes its effects. Although racial divisions compromised organizing efforts in Gary and in Chicago, how exactly did employers' actions affect the drives? What does a comparison of the two cases suggest about the roles of the major actors in a split labor market? Finally, how can the cases be analyzed to address these questions?

Case Study and Event-Structure Analysis

Split labor market research has often utilized a historical approach to examine single cases (Boswell 1986; Christiansen 1979; Howell 1982; Ndabezetha & Sanderson 1988; Peled & Shafir 1987) or compare multiple cases (Boswell & Jorjani 1988; Brueggemann & Boswell 1998; Makabe 1981; Wilson 1980).[8] However, most studies have either employed static methodologies that focus on *outcomes* rather than *processes* or relied on narrative case studies that uncritically accept the presumption of employer passivity. This has obscured the ways in which employer actions condition racial conflicts and has truncated theoretical models of employers' role in split labor markets. A new substantive appreciation of how employers fit into the split labor market equation is needed; a systematic assessment of employer actions, in turn, requires a new methodological approach.

Drawing on recent scholarship that has invigorated comparative historical sociology (Abbott 1992; Griffin 1992, 1993; Griffin & Ragin 1994; Kiser & Hechter 1991; Quadagno & Knapp 1992; Ragin 1987; Sewell 1996), I employ a comparative strategy that uses historical narratives to strike a balance between case-oriented and variable-oriented modes of inquiry. Case studies can be particularly useful when they "help inform general theory and explain conditions that deviate from traditional theoretical explanations . . . [by] illuminating phenomena that challenge scholarly consensus on a particular issue" (Bradshaw & Wallace 1991:155). At the extremes, case-oriented strategies provide detail and historical context but can lack generalizability, while variable-oriented research promotes general theory but can obscure characteristics of the cases themselves (Ragin 1987, 1991). Narratives that capture temporal contingency, establish the context within which actions occur, permit the explication of causal processes, and infuse actors with agency enhance the utility of case studies. However, the use of

narrative has been rightly criticized for emphasizing description at the expense of explanation and for a tendency to equate temporal order with causal process. As such, narratives may imbue an account with the analyst's implicit theoretical assumptions, "conflating description, analysis, and explanation" (Griffin 1992:419). Narratives may also obscure immediate or long-term causal connections and may fail to emphasize the relative weight of causal factors (Griffin 1992, 1993).

Some of these limitations have been recently addressed by innovative methodological techniques that allow sociologists to more systematically consider empirical and theoretical questions. At the forefront of new formal methods of qualitative analysis are qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and event-structure analysis (ESA), which use "an inferential logic that is systematic, largely non-probabilistic, and procedurally replicable" (Griffin & Ragin 1994:4). ESA is particularly appropriate for this study given its emphasis on process and contingency. The method builds on the strengths of conventional narrative accounts but also facilitates rigorous case comparisons. ESA helps researchers (1) strip narratives of excess rhetoric and imprecise linkages, (2) impute the underlying structure of causal arguments, (3) focus on logical or empirical gaps, and (4) replicate previous analyses (Griffin 1992; Griffin et al. 1992; Heise 1989; Heise & Lewis 1988).

I examine the AFL organizing drives using ETHNO, ESA's interactive computer program. ETHNO prompts the analyst to enter each of a series of constituent actions that define an event, inquiring whether each new action requires the previous actions. ETHNO tracks the sequential links implied by the analyst's responses, checks the interpretation against a series of logical constraints, and depicts the interpretation as an event-structure diagram that maps the event's causal flow.[9] Initial applications of ESA are particularly useful because they highlight temporal and empirical anomalies that require additional investigation. The event-structure diagrams of the organizing drives are shown in Figures 3 and 4.[10] By removing excess description from the interpretation, a causal argument that might otherwise only be implied is now available for careful scrutiny and critique. The diagrams illustrate ESA's sensitivity to causal heterogeneity (Griffin 1992; Griffin et al. 1992; Quadagno & Knapp 1992), sequential contingency (Griffin et al. 1992; Sewell 1996), and path dependency (Goldstone 1998). ESA also elicits immediate and long-term causal connections, highlights relations that require further elaboration, and helps pinpoint critical actions (Griffin 1993). Perhaps most important, by facilitating a thorough exegesis of an event, ESA enables analysts to more carefully render causal explanations in historical accounts.

Constructed using the insights elicited through ESA, the following case narratives contrast the Chicago and Gary organizing drives and add context for the events depicted in Figures 3 and 4. The event-structure diagrams are particularly useful because they highlight the significance of particular actions within the overall event and help disentangle distinct (but concurrent) causal

sequences. Independent of a formal qualitative method like ESA, it can be exceedingly difficult to separate analytically (much less convey) complex and overlapping causal processes. ESA facilitates the development of intricate explanatory arguments because the method is capable of tracking complicated imputed causal connections through time and insuring that the analyst's structuring of the event does not implicitly violate a series of logical rules (Griffin 1992).

The Stockyards Labor Council Drive

On July 15, 1917, the Chicago Federation of Labor formed the Stockyards Labor Council (SLC), which began coordinating the AFL's efforts to organize workers in the city's major stockyards unions.[11] The largest and most influential of these was the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen (AMCBW). During this phase, the SLC drive most closely corresponded to the scenario represented in cell 1 of Table 1. Given the industry's large black workforce, SLC leadership did appoint several black organizers in an effort to increase recruitment. However, not all of the SLC unions were inclusive; African Americans protested their exclusion from some union locals and their minority status in others. As a compromise, the SLC formed the all-black Local 651, which gave black members more autonomy but also institutionalized racial divisions. Many northern blacks supported the SLC through Local 651, but southern migrants resisted union appeals. By mid-November, roughly 20,000 workers (about 40%) had joined the SLC, which issued demands for union recognition, wage increases, equal pay for males and females, and an end to "discrimination towards any employee or prospective employee because of creed, color, or nationality" (Brody 1964:78).

By this point, the class and racial dynamics of the drive had begun to more closely approximate cell 4 of Table 1: as the SLC became more inclusive, northern blacks became more militant. In turn, employers increased the number of black workers in the plants, fired union supporters, and replaced them with nonunion African Americans. The packers refused to bargain, and the unions voted to strike on November 20. The Secretary of War ordered the parties to submit to mediation, and on December 25, 1917, the unions signed a no-strike pledge. Judge Samuel Alschuler presided over hearings in early 1918 and in March granted wage increases, the eight-hour workday, and overtime provisions. This decisive victory swelled SLC ranks.

Following the November 1918 armistice, discharged soldiers glutted the Chicago labor market, and industrial production slowed. Employers laid off thousands of workers, and by May 1919, 20% of Chicago's unskilled black workers were unemployed (Halpern 1992). Desperate for work, the vast majority of southern blacks eschewed the SLC. When the arbitration period expired, the AMCBW leadership unilaterally agreed to renew the no-strike pledge. This betrayal widened the rift between the SLC and the more conservative and craft-oriented AMCBW

FIGURE 3: Event Structure of the SLC Drive (Chicago)



ABBREVIATIONS:

App: SLC appoints blacks (9/17)
Att: Whites attack blacks/police (8/7/19)
Bre: AFL breaks up SLC (1/8/19)
Cam: SLC campaigns for 100% unionism (6/19)
Cre: AMCBW creates District 9 (7/27/19)
Dis: Military discharges soldiers (1/19)
Emp: Packers employ antiunion blacks (6/19)
End: SLC ends strike (8/11/19)
Enl: SLC enlists 2,200 blacks (7/19)
Enr: SLC enrolls majority (3/30/19)
Esc: Southern blacks eschew SLC (5/19)
Exp: AMCBW expels SLC locals (9/19)
Fir: Packers fire unionists (11/19/17)
For: SLC forms black locals (11/24/17)
Gra: Alschuler grants demands (3/30/18)
Hir: Packers hire blacks (1916-18)
Inc: Packers increase black employment (11/17)
Ini: SLC initiates drive (9/9/17)
Lay: Packers lay off workers (1/19)
Opp: AMCBW opposes strike (8/8/19)
Org: SLC organizes interracial parade (7/6/19)
Par: Workers participate in race violence (6/19)
Pro: Militia protects blacks (8/7/19)
Qui: Blacks quit SLC (12/19)
Reb: Packers rebuff SLC (7/26/19)
Ref: Packers refuse negotiations (11/15/17)
Rem: Alschuler removes police (7/19/19)
Rep: Police repress SLC (7/19)
Req: Packers request arbitration (4/12/19)
Res: SLC resumes strike (8/7/19)
Ret: Workers return to jobs (7/21/19)
Seg: Packers segregate parade (7/6/19)
Sig: AMCBW signs accord (6/19)
Sta: Workers stage walkouts (6/19)
Str: Workers strike (7/18/19)
Sub: SLC submits demands (7/26/19)
Sup: Northern blacks support SLC (11/24/17)
Use: Packers use black strikebreakers (6/19)
Vot: Workers vote to strike (11/21/17)
Wit: Packers withdraw militia (8/9/19)

(Brody 1964; Grossman 1989). SLC leadership responded by renewing its organizing efforts. In June 1919, the SLC began an intensive campaign for "100% unionism," which explicitly appealed to black workers through union publications, Chicago's black clergy, and mass meetings.[12] However, the 100% campaign only brought racial antagonisms into sharper relief (Halpern 1992). Figure 3 suggests that the SLC's 100% campaign (Cam) is partially a response to emerging racial fragmentation (Esc). Because it was an effort to build interracial solidarity, the campaign symbolizes the racially significant context of labor market relations and the fact that racial considerations infused the SLC's efforts to unite meatpackers. However, the SLC's efforts prompted racially charged responses from employers, who manipulated workers' antipathy to counter the threat of an interracial alliance (Emp, Seg, and Use). Employers exploited the SLC's racial fissure by employing more African Americans, some of whom were recruited to agitate against the SLC. In a moment of interracial union solidarity, the SLC's black and white workers violated the terms of the Alschuler agreement by staging spontaneous strikes to protest employers' use of nonunion labor. Employers at the Wilson Company and elsewhere used black strikebreakers, a move that exacerbated racial hostilities and encouraged racial violence (Barrett 1987; Grossman 1989; Halpern 1992; Tuttle 1996).

In early July, the SLC redoubled its efforts. On July 6, the union held a massive interracial parade and recruitment meeting that involved over 30,000 workers. Following an appeal from the packinghouse employers, the mayor ordered that the parade be segregated: on opposite sides of the street, black and white workers marched along the same parade route. Workers reunited near the stockyards, where black and white unionists championed interracial solidarity.[13] During the 100% campaign, repression of SLC organizing efforts escalated. On July 18, 10,000 meatpackers went on strike to protest the presence of both the authorities and nonunion black workers in the stockyards. Judge Alschuler ordered the police from the stockyards, and work resumed on July 21. The SLC submitted a list of demands on July 26 but was rebuffed by the employers. The majority of southern blacks continued to reject SLC appeals, and the following day, a racial conflict at a segregated beach sparked a massive race riot that engulfed Chicago for nearly a week. Labor conflict was not directly responsible, but about half of the clashes occurred in the racially charged stockyards district (Foner 1988; Grossman 1989). In the midst of the turmoil, the AMCBW withdrew from the SLC and created District Council 9, a rival organization that further fragmented stockyards workers by separately organizing skilled butchers (Barrett 1987; Halpern 1997).

Employers enlisted the support of the militia to protect black workers in the riot's aftermath. Despite the military presence in the yards, white unionists attacked and killed one black worker and battled the police when many blacks resumed work on August 7. Thousands of whites quit work to protest employers' use of the militia and strikebreakers to break the union. The SLC demanded the closed shop, but the AMCBW opposed the work stoppage and continued to honor

the no-strike pledge. Two days later, employers withdrew the militia, and lacking the support of the AMCBW, the SLC ended its strike on August 11. In an effort to consolidate its control in the Chicago stockyards, the AMCBW expelled thousands of workers who remained loyal to the SLC in September. Faced with racial hostility, violent attacks, and the fragmentation of the movement, black workers fled Local 651, ending the brief period of biracial unionism in Chicago's packinghouses.[14] Membership in Local 651 dwindled to 800 by December, and the progressive forces in the stockyards were completely eliminated when AFL president Samuel Gompers broke up the SLC in January 1920. By 1921, racial divisions among the packinghouse workers had become even more deeply entrenched; the AMCBW's renewed unionizing efforts were thoroughly crushed by black strikebreaking, rioting, and police repression. For the next decade, employers held sway over Chicago's packinghouses.

The National Committee Drive

In April 1918, the Chicago Federation of Labor proposed a national campaign to organize steelworkers;[15] by September, the National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers (NC) had initiated organizing efforts in the city of Gary. This case most closely conforms to cell 1 of Table 1: although Gary's immigrant workers responded favorably to the drive, most African Americans were wary of the NC. In contrast to the SLC, the NC and the industry's dominant union, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers (AAISTW), made few concrete efforts to overcome union discrimination; both tolerated open exclusion of African Americans in many locals (Dickerson 1986). For their part, employers hired freely from the large pool of recently arrived blacks. By the summer of 1919, momentum was building for a national strike and Gary employers began to fire unionists. As postwar unemployment and inflation soared, black migrants' resistance to unionization increased. Because U.S. Steel officials refused to negotiate, the NC organized a strike vote in August. Over 90% of the workers voted to strike, which galvanized the campaign and swelled union membership. In Gary, U.S. Steel stockpiled provisions, made arrangements to import strikebreakers, and posted armed guards at the plant gates.

The strike began on September 22. Despite an 85% participation rate, racial divisions were apparent as many black workers crossed the picket lines. AFL organizers in Gary lamented that "the Negro seems to be unorganizable" (Blankenhorn Papers, folder 3). "Most of Gary's black steel workers, who numbered about 1,300 in 1919, did not support the strike. In addition, the steel corporation imported black scab labor from Chicago and elsewhere" (Mohl 1981:39). Two days into the strike, the NC sponsored a series of organizing meetings. Speakers implored black steelworkers to support the drive, but with little effect. U.S. Steel housed many of its strikebreakers inside the plants, enabling them

FIGURE 4: Event Structure of the NC Drive (Gary)



ABBREVIATIONS:

Acc:	U.S. Steel accelerates production (10/6/19)	Jai:	Police jail unionists (10/7/19)
App:	Sheriff appeals to governor (10/4/19)	Ord:	Governor orders federal troops (10/6/19)
Att:	Strikers attack blacks (10/4/19)	Pos:	U.S. Steel posts guards (9/22/19)
Ban:	Mayor bans meetings (10/6/19)	Pro:	U.S. Steel protects strikebreakers (10/19)
Bre:	AFL breaks up NC (1/8/19)	Qui:	AAISTW quits strike (11/5/19)
Cla:	Workers/police clash (10/5/19)	Rai:	Troops raid strikers' homes (10/7/19)
Cro:	Blacks cross pickets (9/22/19)	Reb:	Press rebukes NC (10/7/19)
Dec:	Wood declares martial law (10/6/19)	Ref:	U.S. Steel refuses negotiations (6-8/19)
Dem:	Strikers demand troop withdrawal (10/6/19)	Rej:	Public rejects strike (10/15/19)
Enr:	NC enrolls majority (8/20/19)	Rep:	Police repel strikers (10/5/19)
Ent:	Strikebreakers enter mills (10/6/19)	Ret:	Workers return to mills (11/15/19)
Esc:	Police escort strikebreakers (10/15/19)	Rio:	Strikers riot (10/4/19)
Exc:	Unions exclude blacks (1916-19)	Sen:	Governor sends state militia (10/5/19)
Fir:	U.S. Steel fires unionists (6/19)	Sta:	Strikers stage mass protest (10/6/19)
Hir:	U.S. Steel hires blacks (1916-18)	Str:	Workers strike (9/22/19)
Imp:	U.S. Steel imports black labor (10/4/19)	Urg:	NC urges unity (10/5/19)
Inc:	U.S. Steel increases production (10/2/19)	Vot:	Workers vote to strike (8/20/19)
Ini:	NC initiates drive (9/1/18)		

to continue production. By the end of September, racial conflicts were becoming more serious. Attacks on black workers escalated, and U.S. Steel protected some strikebreakers by transporting them to and from work. At a mass meeting on October 4, speakers encouraged black steelworkers to "stand with the white men" and asserted that many blacks had been deceived by employers into returning to work (*Gary Evening Post*, 5 Oct. 1919). However, these efforts did not diffuse racial tensions.

On October 3, two black strikebreakers shot and wounded a picket as they fled a mob of strikers. Racial violence flared again the next day when several thousand strikers left a mass meeting and encountered a streetcar carrying about forty black strikebreakers to work in the steel mills. The crowd surged onto the streetcar, and strikers swept over an eight-block area, beating strikebreakers and leaving them unconscious in the streets. "The first reports were to the effect that a race war was on," and "possibly hundreds of colored people swarmed to the north side shortly after the reports were first heard" (*Gary Evening Post*, 6 Oct. 1919). When several hundred police officers and firefighters arrived on the scene, a mob numbering several thousand engaged the authorities while union sympathizers hurled projectiles from windows. A government agent in Gary stated that "the strikers are expressing themselves in no uncertain terms concerning the Negro residents of the town . . . [many of whom] failed to walk out with the whites. Talk of race rioting jumped today and threats to kill the Negroes and wreck their homes were being made" (Mohl 1981:39). Ultimately, the rioting resulted in 50 arrests and 50 injuries. Sheriff Lewis Barnes appealed to Governor James Goodrich for help, indicating that "race trouble and the conditions relative to the steel strike had gone beyond his control" (*New York Times*, 5 Oct. 1919).

New rioting broke out on the night of October 5 as 500 strikers clashed with strikebreakers at the Tyler Street gates of the U.S. Steel plant. Before the police could repel the strikers, a worker shot and fatally wounded one of Gary's steel mill bosses. Tensions increased the following day; Mayor Hodges banned mass meetings, and Governor Goodrich sent state troops to Gary. On October 6, nearly 2,000 strikers demonstrated in protest of the military presence. The governor, having exhausted the state's supply of available militia, ordered 1,500 federal troops into Gary. Figure 4 suggests that U.S. Steel's protection of strikebreaking workers (Pro) and the governor's sending of the militia and federal troops (Sen and Ord) mark decisive points in the Gary strike. These actions not only lack the overt racial significance of many employer actions in the SLC drive but also symbolize the relatively greater impact of state actions in Gary.

The strikers demanded a withdrawal, but Major General Wood immediately declared martial law; Gary "took on the appearance of a city of occupation, with machine gun squads at all strategic points" (Mohl 1981:40). Martial law totally undercut the organizational basis of the strike in Gary. "Strikers were arrested and held in jail several days without any hearing. In the meantime, they were used to

clean streets in their own neighborhoods under a guard of armed soldiers" (Blankenhorn Papers, folder 1). General Wood banned all public meetings, and the militia escorted strikebreakers into the mills, raided the homes of alleged labor radicals, and jailed unionists and organizers. In the wake of Wood's antiradical campaign, the press rebuked the NC, and fear of bolshevism undercut public support for the strike. As the tide turned in favor of U.S. Steel, production increased. By the middle of November, most workers had returned to the Gary mills. In most other cities, the strike was over by December, and the AFL broke up the NC on January 8, 1920.

Although racial antagonism was evident in both Chicago and Gary, it is not possible to understand employers' contrasting strategies apart from the larger split labor market context in which classes and class segments interact. In Chicago, the racial significance of employer actions was not incidental; rather, employers campaigned to inject racial conflict into class struggle. Figure 3 and the corresponding narrative situate employers' actions vis-à-vis the emergent threat of an interracial coalition. Capitalists employed antiunion blacks (Emp), appealed to the mayor to segregate the SLC's interracial parade (Seg), used black strikebreakers (Use), and then enlisted the militia to protect black strikebreakers after the riot (PRO). This demonstrates the contingent nature of employers' efforts to racially divide and rule the stockyards workers: as the SLC committed more resources to ameliorating the racial split in the labor market, and as northern blacks responded by joining the union, employers abandoned laissez-faire strategies and attempted to influence state actions so as to maximize their racially divisive consequences. It is not at all clear that the SLC's efforts would have succeeded net of employers' divide-and-rule approach, but the Chicago case illustrates the potential liabilities of a laissez-faire strategy when unions actively work to bridge racial divisions. In Gary, employers continued to use a laissez-faire approach to combat the NC because black workers' militancy was low and unionists did not embrace racial inclusion. Figure 4 suggests that employers imported (IMP) and subsequently protected (Pro) black strikebreakers at least in part because African Americans demonstrated a willingness to cross the picket lines (Cro). These dynamics and the subsequent racial significance of state actions (Esc) were a product of class conflict in the split labor market: employers' laissez-faire approach augmented the divisive features of the labor market without active manipulation of racial hostility.

ESA and General Theory

ESA not only facilitates an interrogation of causation in historical events, but it also allows analysts to develop general models, an application of the method that facilitates theory building and case comparison. Analysts use ESA to create a generalized event structure by extracting concepts, relationships, and principles

from the concrete actions that comprise the initial model, again linking them sequentially and causally in terms of ETHNO's queries. The resulting structure can violate neither ETHNO's logical tests nor the temporal and causal assumptions embedded in the initial event structure. The generalized event structure depicts the interrelations among theoretically relevant actions and maps the associated "instantiations" (instances of the general principle in a case-specific action). Decisions about which concrete actions to instantiate reflect the analyst's interpretation of "their causal significance in the concrete structure and their general theoretical and empirical relevance" to the class of events under study (Griffin 1993:1119). The process of abstracting a general account from the concrete event poses new empirical questions, focuses attention on theoretical issues, and may reveal new contradictions that must be resolved.

Figure 5 depicts the theoretical models that emerge from the generalized event analyses of the Chicago and Gary organizing drives. I have underlined actions that are unique; actions that are not underlined are common to both models (although sequencing differs). A comparison of the models highlights several points that facilitate theory building. First, different working-class factions developed in each case. In Chicago, a significant number of local minorities affiliated with the union (Uni) while migrant minorities rejected the union (Rj1). These dynamics highlight the possibility of a coalition between local minorities and white unionists, a scenario that never developed in Gary. Second, the cultivation of a fragile interracial solidarity in the SLC illuminates employers' efforts to incite racial dissent to forestall a sense of common purpose among the meatpackers (Ele and Saf). Racial conflict was a pivotal factor in the defeat of the SLC (Barrett 1987; Fogel 1970; Greene & Woodson 1930; Grossman 1989; Halpern 1992, 1997; Spero & Harris [1931] 1969); conversely, racial conflict was a contributing but secondary factor in the demise of the NC campaign in Gary (Mohl 1981). Employers' active manipulation of racial tension in Chicago contrasts with the laissez-faire approach that prevailed in Gary and does not fit the typical split labor market model.

As an analytical and sequential model of employer actions in split labor markets, Figure 5 suggests that when the union's racial exclusivity prevents minority participation, employers' use of laissez-faire tactics is sufficient to maintain the divisive effects of the split labor market and thus does not require overt manipulation of racial hostility between working-class segments. In contrast, employers are more likely to adopt a divide-and-rule approach when unions promote racially inclusive organizing strategies and at least some minorities respond by joining in collective action. If effective, employers' use of the divide-and-rule strategy reconstitutes the labor market split by forcing both segments of minority labor (local and migrant) into a nonunion pool of potential strikebreakers. However, if the union succeeds in forging a lasting interracial solidarity, the differential labor costs that create a split labor market begin to erode.

FIGURE 5: Generalized Models of Employer Strategies

Divide-and-Rule (Chicago)



INSTANTIATIONS
From Ini to Mob
From App to Ins
From Sup to Uni
From Esc to Rj1
From Emp to Ele
From Use to Stb
From Par to Eng
From Pro to Saf
From Qui to Rj2
From Bre to Dem

Laissez-Faire (Gary)



INSTANTIATIONS
From Exc to Dis
From Ini to Mob
From Enr to Sup
From Cro to Stb
From Pro to Saf
From Rio to Eng
From Dec to Neu
From Bre to Dem

ABBREVIATIONS

Dem:	Union demobilizes
Dis:	Unions discriminate
Ele:	Employers elevate racial tensions
Eng:	Workers engage in racial violence
Ins:	Union institutionalizes inclusion
Mob:	Union mobilizes
Neu:	State neutralizes union
Rj1:	Migrant minorities reject union
Rj2:	Local minorities reject union
Saf:	State/employers safeguard strikebreakers
Stb:	Minorities strikebreak
Sup:	Majority workers support union
Uni:	Local minorities unionize with majority

The eventual successes of the CIO and the larger postwar labor movement resulted from legislative, economic, and labor market shifts that favored racial inclusion and gave greater impetus to industrial organizing strategies. As these historical developments unfolded, divide-and-rule tactics became part of employers' situationally contingent strategic repertoire.

Conclusion

That previous split labor market research has not developed a more dynamic view of employers' role in racial conflict is not surprising given the paucity of serious efforts to institutionalize black participation in the labor movement prior to the New Deal. The laissez-faire model generally fit the data because employers rarely had to contend with meaningful or sustained efforts to incorporate African Americans in industrial unions. Indeed, the SLC was one of the AFL's most progressive labor organizations. By the 1930s, CIO organizing strategies began to emphasize the liabilities of racial separatism; protective legislation undercut the basis of the black-white split in America's industrial labor markets by removing barriers to broad-based unionization and instituting provisions for equal pay (Bonacich 1976). Nevertheless, the labor conflicts of 1919 illustrate the complex and contingent nature of class relations in split labor markets. To assume that employers are passive even when obvious incentives to manipulate racial antipathy develop is to contribute to an oversimplified debate about the sources of racial conflict. My argument is not that employers always incite racial conflict — sometimes prevailing conditions provoke racial conflict without employer intervention — but rather that employers are more likely to racialize class conflict when unions are inclusive and minority workers are militant.

The contrast between the steel and meatpacking cases underscores the revisions to split labor market theory introduced in Table 1, but the implications of this analysis extend well beyond the two cases examined in this article. Between World War I and World War II, split labor markets characterized many northern industrial cities, and the efficacy of union organizing initiatives was often compromised by racial conflict (Bonacich 1976; Whatley 1993). Employers did not act decisively in all (or even most) cases of split labor markets to inflame racial antagonism. However, this analysis suggests that when union inclusion and minority group militancy increase, so does the potential for employers' active manipulation of racial conflict. If employers fail to racially divide workers and cannot reestablish labor cost differentials, then labor solidarity begins to undermine the initial conditions of the split labor market. At least for the interwar period, debates about whether racial inequality and conflict result from the divide-and-rule efforts of employers or the class-based racial motivations of workers overlook the possibility that structural features of the labor market condition employer strategies. This analysis suggests that the question of employers' role in racial conflict can be usefully recast in terms of a more fully contextual model of split labor markets that stresses the strategic options of employers as well as majority and minority workers. The typology and the empirical analysis presented here challenge the truncated view of class relations that has prevailed in much split labor market research and provide a starting point for developing a more refined and dynamic model.

Notes

1. Patterns of residential segregation crystallized as the migration continued. Gary's community leaders sponsored "clean out the Negro" campaigns in 1909 and 1911; by 1920, 98.8% of Gary's blacks lived in three wards on the south side (Betten & Mohl 1974; Mohl & Betten 1986). In 1920, 90% of Chicago's black population lived on the south side and over half lived in neighborhoods that were more than 50% black (Tuttle 1996).

2. The Chicago Urban League found that many workers suspected racial pay inequities but that these were "explained away" by experience, seniority, and production differences that favored whites (Chicago Commission on Race Relations 1922; Herbst 1932; Kennedy 1930; Marks 1983; Spero & Harris [1931] 1969). If a caste system prevents the substitution of cheap minority workers for higher-cost majority employees, the labor market split is submerged but the potential for displacement still exists (Bonacich 1972).

3. Unlike steel, meatpacking employed significant numbers of women. By 1920, 12.6% of Chicago's meatpackers were (mostly white) women. Because women were paid less than men, the labor market was split in terms of gender as well as race. However, white women supported unionization; it was the racial split in the labor market that crippled the AFL campaign (Barrett 1987).

4. Marks (1981) holds that the theory's assumption of employer passivity is untenable for certain cases and historical periods, an argument that I do not dispute here.

5. This is not to oversimplify southern paternalism, which muted class conflict in southern mill towns by supporting complex patterns of employer-employee interaction. Here, I mean to suggest that employers will embrace and elaborate upon the majority-group paternalism when potential labor unionism threatens capitalist accumulation.

6. I borrow the term "racialization" (Omi & Winant 1986) to suggest that employers may actively infuse class struggle with racial significance in their efforts to demobilize a working-class coalition.

7. Specifically, provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), and the Wagner Act (1935) empowered the labor movement by providing legal protection for union organizing. As black workers joined American unions, racial labor cost differences diminished and black strikebreaking declined (Bonacich 1976; Wilson 1980).

8. Cummings (1977) and Hodson (1995) investigate split labor market arguments using multivariate statistical techniques.

9. ETHNO's logical constraints "(a) limit when an action is allowed to occur (i.e., it must be 'primed' by the occurrence of a temporal prerequisite); (b) limit when an action can reoccur (i.e., its antecedents must be repeated and its causal efficacy must be used up or 'depleted' by a consequence); and (c) limit the causal efficacy of an action to a single consequence" (Griffin 1993:1107). ETHNO tracks all exceptions to its logical standards (a list of these "special relations" for the Chicago and Gary cases is available on request);

alternatively, the analyst can modify the structure (also see Griffin & Korstad 1995; Griffin & Korstad 1998; Isaac et al.1994).

10. Consistent with ESA's emphasis on action and agency, ETHNO represents each statement by the first three letters of the verb in the abbreviated description; I have depicted employers' actions in bold italics. Abbreviations that use all capital letters result from "disjunctive" relations, where one of several direct antecedents is a sufficient cause. Many actions do not have to reoccur to have multiple consequences; ETHNO tracks the actions that have causal efficacy at any given moment. For detailed explanations of ESA and ETHNO, see Heise (1989), Griffin (1993), and Griffin and Korstad (1998).

11. This account is derived primarily from Herbst (1932), Brody (1964), Barrett (1987), Grossman (1989), Halpern (1992), and Tuttle (1996).

12. The fact that meatpacking employed a larger share of blacks than did steel production and relied on a more integrated division of labor may partially explain the SLC's racially progressive approach. The SLC also derived a degree of legitimacy in the black community from the endorsement of the Chicago Urban League, although the league's support quickly waned after the race riot. The fact that the SLC employed black organizers, consulted with community leaders, agreed to create Local 651, held interracial rallies and meetings, and pressed for an end to employment discrimination undoubtedly contributed to the union's ability to organize black meatpackers. Previous research has shown that institutionalizing such racially inclusive policies is necessary (but not sufficient) for building interracial unions (Brueggemann & Boswell 1998).

13. Only several days after the parade, racial violence flared again when employers used 600 black strikebreakers to replace striking workers at the nearby Argo corn refinery (Tuttle 1996).

14. Although the SLC enlisted 2,200 blacks in Local 651, no more than 15% of the black stockyards workers ever joined the union (Brody 1964; Fogel 1970; Herbst 1932; Spero & Harris [1931] 1969).

15. This account is derived primarily from the *Gary Evening Post*, the *New York Times*, Foster (1920), Mohl (1981), Mohl and Betten (1986), and Brody (1987).

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