Foundation of Cryptography (0368-4162-01), Lecture 6

More on Zero Knowledge

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Part I

Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge

Interaction is crucial for ZK

Claim 1

Assume that $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ has a one-message ZK proof (even computational), with standard completeness and soundness,[a] then $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{BPP}$.

[a] That is, the completeness is $\frac{2}{3}$ and soundness error is $\frac{1}{3}$.

Proof: HW

1. To reduce interaction we relax the zero-knowledge requirement
   1. Witness Indistinguishability $\{\langle(\mathsf{P}(w_x^1), \mathsf{V}^*)(x)\rangle\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{\langle(\mathsf{P}(w_x^2), \mathsf{V}^*)(x)\rangle\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}}$, for any $\{w_x^1 \colon (x, w_x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}}$ and $\{w_x^2 \colon (x, w_x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)\}_{x\in\mathcal{L}}$
   2. Witness Hiding
   3. Non-interactive “zero knowledge"

Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK)

Definition 2 (NIZK)

The *non interactive* PPT's (P, V) is a NIZK for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{NP}$, if $\exists \ell \in$ poly s.t.

- **Completeness:** $\Pr_{c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(|x|)}}[\mathrm{V}(x, c, \mathrm{P}(x, w(x), c)) = 1] \geq 2/3$, where $w(x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ for any $x \in \mathcal{L}$ (w is an arbitrary function)
- **Soundness:** $\Pr_{c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(|x|)}}[\mathrm{V}(x, c, \mathrm{P}^*(x, c)) = 1] \leq 1/3$, for any P^* and $x \notin \mathcal{L}$
- **ZK:** $\exists$ PPT S s.t. $\{(x, c, \mathrm{P}(x, w(x), c))\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}, c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(|x|)}} \approx_c \{x, \mathrm{S}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$

- c – common (random) reference string (CRS)
- CRS is chosen by the simulator
- What does the definition stand for?

Section 1

NIZK in HBM

Hidden Bits Model (HBM)

A CRS is chosen at random, but only the prover can see it. The prover chooses which bits to reveal as part of the proof.
Let c^H be the “hidden" CRS:

- Prover sees c^H, and outputs a proof π and a set on indices $\mathcal{I}$
- Verifier only sees the bits in c^H that are indexed by $\mathcal{I}$
- Simulator outputs a proof π, a set of indices $\mathcal{I}$ and a partially hidden CRS c^H

Soundness, completeness and ZK are naturally defined.

We give a NIZK for HC - Directed Graph Hamiltonicity, in the HBM, and then transfer it into a NIZK in the standard model.

Implies a (standard model) NIZK for all NP

Useful Matrix

- Permutation matrix: an $n \times n$ Boolean matrix, where each row/column contains a single 1
- Hamiltonian matrix: an $n \times n$ adjacency matrix of a directed graph that consists of a single Hamiltonian cycle (note that this is also a permutation matrix)
- An $n^3 \times n^3$ Boolean matrix is called *useful*: if it contains a generalized $n \times n$ Hamiltonian sub matrix, and all the other entries are zeros

Claim 3

Let T be a random $n^3 \times n^3$ Boolean matrix where each entry is 1 w.p n^{-5}. Hence, $\Pr[T \text{ is useful}] \in \Omega(n^{-3/2})$.

Proving Claim 3

- The expected one entries in T is $n^6 \cdot n^{-5} = n$ and by extended Chernoff bound, w.p. $\theta(1/\sqrt{n})$ T contains *exactly* n ones.
- Each row/colomn of T contain more than a single one entry with probability at most $\binom{n^3}{2} \cdot n^{-10} < n^{-4}$. Hence, wp at least $1 - 2 \cdot n^3 \cdot n^{-4} = 1 - O(n^{-1})$, no raw or column of T contains more than a single one entry.
- Hence, wp $\theta(1/\sqrt{n})$ the matrix T contains a permutation matrix and all its other entries are zero.
- A random permutation matrix forms a cycle wp $1/n$ (there are $n!$ permutation matrices and $(n-1)!$ of them form a cycle)

NIZK for Hamiltonicity in HBM

- Common input: a directed graph $\mathrm{G} = ([n], E)$
- Common reference string T viewed as a $n^3 \times n^3$ Boolean matrix, where each entry is 1 w.p n^{-5} ??

Algorithm 4 (P)

Input: G and a cycle C in G. A CRS $T \in \{0,1\}_{n^3 \times n^3}$

1. If T not useful, set $\mathcal{I} = n^3 \times n^3$ (i.e., reveal all T) and $\phi = \perp$ Otherwise, let H be the (generalized) $n \times n$ sub matrix containing the hamiltonian cycle in T.
2. Set $\mathcal{I} = T \setminus H$ (i.e., , reveal the bits of T outside of H)
3. Choose $\phi \leftarrow \Pi_n$, s.t. C is mapped to the cycle in H
4. Add all the entries in H corresponding to non edges in G (with respect to ϕ) to $\mathcal{I}$
5. Output $\pi = (\mathcal{I}, \phi)$

NIZK for Hamiltonicity in HBM cont.

Algorithm 5 (V)

Input: a graph G, index set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n^3] \times [n^3]$, ordered set $\{T_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$ and a mapping ϕ

1. If all the bits of T are revealed and T is not useful, accept. Otherwise,
2. Verify that $\exists$ $n \times n$ submatrix $H \subseteq T$ with all entries in $T \setminus H$ are zeros.
3. Verify that $\phi \in \Pi_n$, and that all the entries of H not corresponding (according to ϕ) to edges of G are zeros

Claim 6

The above protocol is a perfect NIZK for HC in the HBM, with perfect completeness and soundness error $1 - \Omega(n^{-3/2})$

Proving Claim 6

- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: Assume T is useful and V accepts. Then ϕ^{-1} maps the unrevealed “edges" of H to the edges of G. Hence, ϕ^{-1} maps the cycle in H to an Hamiltonian cycle in G
- Zero knowledge?

Algorithm 7 (S)

Input: G

1. Choose T at random, according to the right distribution.
2. If T is not useful, set $\mathcal{I} = n^3 \times n^3$ and $\phi = \perp$. Otherwise,
3. Set $\mathcal{I} = T \setminus H$
4. Let $\phi \leftarrow \Pi_n$. Replace all the entries of H not corresponding to edges of G (according to ϕ) with zeros
5. Add the entries in H corresponding to non edges in G to $\mathcal{I}$
6. Output $\pi = (T, \mathcal{I}, \phi)$

- Perfect simulation for non useful T's.
- For useful T, the location of H is uniform in the real and simulated case.
- ϕ is a random element in Π_n is both cases
- Hence, the simulation is perfect

Section 2

From HBM to Standard NIZK

Trapdoor Permutations

Definition 8 (trapdoor permutations)

A triplet $(\mathsf{G}, f, \mathsf{Inv})$, where G is a PPT, and f and Inv are polynomial-time computable functions, is a family of trapdoor permutation (TDP), if:

1. On input 1^n, $\mathsf{G}(1^n)$ outputs a pair (sk, pk).
2. $f_{pk} = f(pk, \cdot)$ is a permutation over $\{0,1\}^n$, for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $pk \in \mathrm{Supp}(\mathsf{G}(1^n)_2)$.
3. $\mathsf{Inv}(sk, \cdot) \equiv f_{pk}^{-1}$ for every $(sk, pk) \in \mathrm{Supp}(\mathsf{G}(1^n))$
4. For any PPT A,
   $\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n, pk \leftarrow \mathsf{G}(1^n)_2}[\mathsf{A}(pk, x) = f_{pk}^{-1}(x)] = \mathrm{neg}(n)$

Hardcore Predicates for Trapdoor Permutations

Definition 9 (hardcore predicates for TDP)

A polynomial-time computable $b\colon \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}$ is a hardcore predicate of a TDP $(\mathsf{G}, f, \mathsf{Inv})$, if

$$\Pr_{e\leftarrow \mathsf{G}(1^n)_2, x\leftarrow\{0,1\}^n}[\mathsf{P}(e, f_e(x)) = b(x)] \le \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{neg}(n),$$

for any PPT P.

Goldreich-Levin: any TDP has an hardcore predicate (ignoring padding issues)

example, RSA

In the following $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and all operations are modulo n.

- $\mathbb{Z}_n = [n]$ and $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{x \in [n] \colon \gcd(x, n) = 1\}$
- $\phi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*|$ (equals $(p-1)(q-1)$ for $n = pq$ with $p, q \in \mathrm{P}$)
- For every $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(n)}^*$, the function $f(x) \equiv x^e$ is a permutation over $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$.
  In particular, $(x^e)^d \equiv x \bmod n$, for every $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, where $d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$

Definition 10 (RSA)

- $\mathrm{G}(p, q)$ sets $pk = (n = pq, e)$ for some $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(n)}^*$, and $sk = (n, d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n))$
- $f(pk, x) = x^e \bmod n$
- $\mathrm{Inv}(sk, x) = x^d \bmod n$

Factoring is easy $\implies$ RSA is easy. Other direction?

The transformation

- Let $(\mathrm{P}_H, \mathrm{V}_H)$ be a HBM NIZK for $\mathcal{L}$, and let $\ell(n)$ be the length of the CRS used for $x \in \{0,1\}^n$.
- Let $(\mathrm{G}, f, \mathrm{Inv})$ be a TDP and let b be an hardcore bit for f. For simplicity we assume $\mathrm{G}(1^n)$ chooses (sk, pk) as follows
  1. $sk \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$
  2. $pk = PK(sk)$

  where $PK\colon \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^n$ is a polynomial-time computable function.

We construct a NIZK (P, V) for $\mathcal{L}$, with the same completeness and “not too large" soundness error.

The protocol

Algorithm 11 (P)

Input: $x \in \mathcal{L}$, $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ and CRS $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_\ell) \in \{0,1\}^{n\ell}$, where $n = |x|$ and $\ell = \ell(n)$.

1. Choose $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \mathrm{G}(sk)$ and compute $c^H = (b(z_1 = f_{pk}^{-1}(c_1)), \ldots, b(z_{\ell(n)} = f_{pk}^{-1}(c_\ell)))$
2. Let $(\pi_H, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \mathrm{P}_H(x, w, c^H)$ and output $(\pi_H, \mathcal{I}, pk, \{z_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}})$

Algorithm 12 (V)

Input: $x \in \mathcal{L}$, CRS $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_\ell) \in \{0,1\}^{np}$, and $(\pi_H, \mathcal{I}, pk, \{z_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}})$, where $n = |x|$ and $\ell = \ell(n)$.

1. Verify that $pk \in \{0,1\}^n$ and that $f_{pk}(z_i) = c_i$ for every $i \in \mathcal{I}$
2. Return $\mathrm{V}_H(x, \pi_H, \mathcal{I}, c^H)$, where $c_i^H = b(z_i)$ for every $i \in \mathcal{I}$.

Claim 13

Assuming that $(\mathsf{P}_H, \mathsf{V}_H)$ is a NIZK for $\mathcal{L}$ in the HBM with soundness error $2^{-n} \cdot \alpha$, then (P, V) is a NIZK for $\mathcal{L}$ with the same completeness, and soundness error α.

Proof: Assume for simplicity that b is unbiased (i.e., $\Pr[b(U_n) = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$).
For every $pk \in \{0,1\}^n$: $\left(b(f_{pk}^{-1}(c_1)), \ldots, b(f_{pk}^{-1}(c_\ell))\right)_{c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{np}}$ is uniformly distributed in $\{0,1\}^\ell$.

- Completeness: clear
- Soundness: follows by a union bound over all possible choice of $pk \in \{0,1\}^n$.
- Zero knowledge:?

Proving zero knowledge

Algorithm 14 (S)

Input: $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ of length n.

- Let $(\pi_H, \mathcal{I}, c^H) = \mathrm{S}_H(x)$, where S_H is the simulator of $(\mathrm{P}_H, \mathrm{V}_H)$
- Output $(c, (\pi_H, \mathcal{I}, pk, \{z_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}))$, where
    - $pk \leftarrow \mathrm{G}(U_n)$
    - Each z_i is chosen at random in $\{0,1\}^n$ such that $b(z_i) = c_i^H$
    - $c_i = f_{pk}(z_i)$ for $i \in \mathcal{I}$, and a random value in $\{0,1\}^n$ otherwise.

- Exists efficient M s.t. $M(\mathrm{S}_H(x)) \equiv \mathrm{S}(x)$ and $M(\mathrm{P}_H(x, w_x)) \approx_c \mathrm{P}(x, w_x)$
- Distinguishing $\mathrm{P}(x, w_x)$ from $\mathrm{S}(x)$ is hard

Section 3

Adaptive NIZK

Adaptive NIZK

x is chosen *after* the CRS.

- **Completeness:** $\forall f \colon \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)} \mapsto \mathcal{L} \cap \{0,1\}^n$:
  $\Pr_{c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}}[\mathsf{V}(f(c), c, \mathsf{P}(f(c), w(f(c)), c)) = 1] \geq 2/3$
- **Soundness:** $\forall f \colon \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)} \mapsto \{0,1\}^n$ and P^*
  $\Pr_{c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}}[\mathsf{V}(f(c), c, \mathsf{P}^*(c)) = 1 \wedge f(c) \notin \mathcal{L}] \leq 1/3$
- ZK**:** $\exists$ pair of PPT's $(\mathsf{S}_1, \mathsf{S}_2)$ s.t. $\forall f \colon \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)} \mapsto cl \cap \{0,1\}^n$

$$\{(f(c), c, \mathsf{P}(f(c), w(f(c)), c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)})\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \approx_c \{\mathsf{S}^f(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}.$$

where $\mathsf{S}^f(n)$ is the output of the following process

1. $(c, s) \leftarrow \mathsf{S}_1(1^n)$
2. $x = f(c)$
3. Output $(x, c, \mathsf{S}_2(x, c, s))$

- Adaptive completeness and soundness are easy to achieve from any non-adaptive NIZK.
- Not every NIZK is adaptive (but the above protocol is).

Theorem 15

Assume TDP exist, then every NP *language has an adaptive* NIZK *with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error.*

In the following, when saying adaptive NIZK, we mean negligible completeness and soundness error.

Section 4

Simulation Sound NIZK

Simulation Soundness

A NIZK system (P, V) for $\mathcal{L}$ has *(one-time) simulation soundness*, if $\exists$ a pair of PPT's $\mathsf{S} = (\mathsf{S}_1, \mathsf{S}_2)$ satisfying the ZK property of P with respect to $\mathcal{L}$, such that the following holds $\forall$ pair of PPT's $(\mathsf{P}_1^*, \mathsf{P}_2^*)$: let

Experiment 16 ($\mathsf{Exp}^n_{\mathsf{V},\mathsf{S},\mathsf{P}^*}$)

1. $(c, s) \leftarrow \mathsf{S}_1(1^n)$
2. $(x, p) \leftarrow \mathsf{P}_1^*(1^n, c)$
3. $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{S}_2(x, c, s)$
4. $(x', \pi') \leftarrow \mathsf{P}_2^*(p, \pi)$
5. Output (c, x, π, x', π')

We require $\Pr[(r, x, \pi, x', \pi') \leftarrow \mathsf{Exp}^n_{\mathsf{V},\mathsf{S},\mathsf{P}^*} : x' \notin \mathcal{L} \wedge \mathsf{V}(x', \pi', c) = 1 \wedge (x', \pi') \neq (x, \pi)] = \mathrm{neg}(n)$.

- Even for $x \notin \mathcal{L}$, hard to generate additional false proofs
- Definition only considers efficient provers
- (P, V) might be adaptive or non-adaptive
- Adaptive NIZK guarantees weak type of simulation soundness
- Does the adaptive NIZK we seen in class have simulation soundness?

Construction

We present a simulation sound NIZK (P, V) for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{NP}$

Ingredients:

1. Strong signature scheme $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ (one time suffice)
2. Non-interactive, perfectly-binding commitment Com
   - Pseudorandom range: for some $\ell \in$ poly $\{\mathsf{Com}(s, r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)}\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^*} \approx_c \{u \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(|s|)}\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^*}$
     * implied by OWP (or TDP)
   - Negligible support: a random string is a valid commitment only with negligible probability.
     * achieved from any commitment scheme by committing to the same value many times
3. Adaptive NIZK $(\mathsf{P}_A, \mathsf{V}_A)$ for $\mathcal{L}_A := \{(x, c, s) \colon x \in \mathcal{L} \vee \exists z \in \{0,1\}^* \colon c = \mathsf{Com}(s, z)\}$
   *adaptive WI suffices

Algorithm 17 (P)

Input: $x \in \mathcal{L}$ and $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$, and CRS $r = (r_1, r_2)$

1. $(sk, vk) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^{|x|})$
2. $\pi_A \leftarrow \mathrm{P}_A((x, r_1, vk), w, r_2)$
3. $\sigma \leftarrow \mathrm{Sign}_{sk}(x, \pi_A)$
4. Output $\pi = (vk, \pi_A, \sigma)$

Algorithm 18 (V)

Input: $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, $\pi = (vk, \pi_A, \sigma)$ and a CRS $r = (r_1, r_2)$
Verify that $\mathrm{Vrfy}_{vk}((x, \pi), \sigma) = 1$ and $\mathrm{V}_A((x, r_1, vk), r_2, \pi_A) = 1$

Claim 19

The proof system (P, V) is an adaptive NIZK for $\mathcal{L}$ with one-time simulation soundness.

Proving Claim 19

- **Adaptive Completeness:** Clear
- **Adaptive** ZK**:**
  - $\mathsf{S}_1(1^n)$:
    1. Let $(sk, vk) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$, $z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ and $r_1 = \mathsf{Com}(vk, z)$.
    2. Output $(r = (r_1, r_2), s = (z, sk, vk))$, where r_2 is chosen uniformly at random
  - $\mathsf{S}_2(x, r, s = (z, sk, vk))$:
    1. let $\pi_A \leftarrow \mathsf{P}_A((x, r_1, vk), z, r_2)$
    2. $\sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{Sign}_{sk}(x, \pi_A)$
    3. Output $\pi = (vk, \pi_A, \sigma)$

  Proof follows by the adaptive WI of $(\mathsf{P}_A, \mathsf{V}_A)$ and the pseudorandomness of Com
  - **Adaptive soundness:** Implicit in the proof of simulation soundness, given below

Proving simulation soundness

Let $\mathsf{P}^* = (\mathsf{P}_1^*, \mathsf{P}_2^*)$ be a pair of PPT's attacking the simulation soundness of (V, S) with respect to $\mathcal{L}$, and let $r = (r_1, r_2)$, x , π, x' and $\pi' = (vk', \pi'_A, \sigma')$ be the values generated by a random execution of $\mathsf{Exp}^n_{\mathsf{V},\mathsf{S},\mathsf{P}^*}$.

Assuming $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{vk'}((x', \pi'_A), \sigma') = 1$, $x' \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $(x', \pi') \neq (x, \pi)$, then with save but negligible probability:

- vk' is not the signing key in π
- $\nexists z \in \{0,1\}^*$ s.t. $r_1 = \mathsf{Com}(vk', z)$
- $x'_A = (x', r_1, vk') \notin \mathcal{L}_A$

Since r_2 was chosen at random by S_1, the adaptive soundness of $(\mathsf{P}_A, \mathsf{V}_A)$ yields that $\Pr[\mathsf{V}_A(x'_A, r_2, \pi'_A) = 1] = \mathsf{neg}(n)$.

Part II

Proof of Knowledge

Proof of Knowledge

The protocol (P, V) is a *proof of knowledge* for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{NP}$, if P convinces V to accepts x, only if it “knows" $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$.

Definition 20 (knowledge extractor)

Let (P, V) be an interactive proof $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{NP}$. A probabilistic machine E is a knowledge extractor for (P, V) and $R_{\mathcal{L}}$ with error $\eta \colon \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$, if $\exists t \in$ poly s.t. $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$ and deterministic algorithm P^*, $\mathsf{E}^{\mathsf{P}^*}(x)$ runs in expected time bounded by $\frac{t(|x|)}{\delta(x) - \eta(|x|)}$ and outputs $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$, where $\delta(x) = \Pr[(\mathsf{P}^*, \mathsf{V})(x) = 1]$.

If (P, V) is a proof of knowledge (with error η), is it has a knowledge extractor with such error.

- A property of V
- Why do we need it? Proving that you know the password
- Relation to ZK

Examples

Claim 21

The ZK proof we've seen in class for GI, has a knowledge extractor with error $\frac{1}{2}$.

Proof: ?

Claim 22

The ZK proof we've seen in class for 3COL, has a knowledge extractor with error $\frac{1}{|E|}$.

Proof: ?