

Application of Information Theory, Lecture 12

Accessible Entropy and Statistically Hiding Commitments

Handout Mode

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Section 1

Commitment Schemes

Motivation

- ▶ Digital analogue of a safe
- ▶ Numerous applications (e.g., zero-knowledge, coin-flipping, secure computations,)

Definition

Definition 1 (Commitment scheme)

An efficient two-stage protocol (S, R) .

- ▶ Commit stage: The sender S has private input bit $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}$ and a common input is 1^n . Let trans be the transcript of this stage.
- ▶ Reveal stage: S sends the pair (σ, r) to R , and R accepts iff trans is consistent with $S(\sigma, r)$.

Hiding: In commit stage: for any R^* ,

$$\Delta^{R^*} \left(\text{view}^{R^*}(S(0), R^*)(1^n), \text{view}^{R^*}(S(1), R^*)(1^n) \right) = \text{neg}(n).$$

$\mu: \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$ is negligible, if $\forall p \in \text{poly} \exists n_p \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\frac{1}{p(n)} < \mu(n)$ for all $n > n_p$.

Binding: The following happens with negligible prob. for any S^* :

$S^*(1^n)$ interacts with $R(1^n)$ in the commit stage resulting in transcript trans . Then S^* outputs two strings r_0 and r_1 such that $R(\text{trans}, r_0, 0) = R(\text{trans}, r_1, 1) = \text{Accept}$.

Definition cont.

- ▶ Naturally extends to strings
- ▶ Hiding: Perfect, statistical, computational.
- ▶ Binding: Perfect, statistical, computational.
- ▶ Impossible to have simultaneously both properties to be statistical.
- ▶ OWF is necessary assumption
- ▶ OWFs imply both statistically binding and computationally hiding commitments, and (more difficult) computationally binding and statistically hiding commitments.
- ▶ We focus on computationally binding, and statistically hiding commitments (SHC)

Section 2

Inaccessible Entropy

Motivation

Definition 2 (collision resistant hash family (CRH))

Function family $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n: \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{n/2}\}$ is **collision resistant**, if \forall PPT A

$$\Pr_{\substack{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n \\ (x, x') \leftarrow A(1^n, h)}} [x \neq x' \in \{0, 1\}^* \wedge h(x) = h(x')] = \text{neg}(n)$$

- ▶ Implies SHC. (?) Believed **not** to be implied by OWFs.
- ▶ Assume for simplicity that $h \in \mathcal{H}_n$ is $2^{n/2}$ to 1 and that a PPT cannot find a collision in any $h \in \mathcal{H}_n$
- ▶ Given $h(U_n)$, the (min) entropy of U_n is $n/2$.
- ▶ Consider PPT A that on input h first outputs h, y , and then outputs $x \in h^{-1}(y)$ (possibly using additional random coins)
- ▶ What is the entropy of x given (h, y) and the coins A 's used to sample y ? (essentially) 0!
- ▶ The generator $G(h, x) = (h, h(x), x)$ has **inaccessible entropy** $n/2$
- ▶ Does inaccessible entropy generator implies SHC?
- ▶ Does OWF implies inaccessible entropy generator?

Real entropy

- ▶ Sample entropy: for rv X let $H_X(x) = -\log \Pr_X [x]$.
- ▶ $H(X) = \mathbb{E}_{x \leftarrow X} [H_X(x)]$
- ▶ For rvs X and Y , let $H_{X|Y}(x|y) = H_{X|Y=y}(x)$.
- ▶ $X_{1,\dots,i}$ stand for X_1, \dots, X_i
- ▶ Let $G: \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto (\{0, 1\}^\ell(n))^{m(n)}$ be an m -block generator
- ▶ Let $(G_1, \dots, G_m) = G(U_n)$
- ▶ For $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_m) \in \text{Supp}(G_1, \dots, G_m)$, let

$$\text{RealH}_G(\mathbf{g}) = \sum_{i \in [m]} H_{G_i|G_1, \dots, G_{i-1}}(g_i|g_1, \dots, g_{i-1})$$

- ▶ The real Shannon entropy of G , wrt security parameter n , is

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{g} \leftarrow G(U_n)} [\text{RealH}_{G,n}(\mathbf{g})]$$

- ▶ $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{g} \leftarrow G(U_n)} [\text{RealH}_{G,n}(\mathbf{g})] = \sum_{i \in [m]} H(G_i|G_1, \dots, G_{i-1}) = H(G(U_n))$

Accessible entropy

- ▶ Let G be an m block generator.
- ▶ Let \tilde{G} be an m -block generator, that uses coins r_i before outputting its i 'th block (w_i, g_i) .
- ▶ $t = (r_1, w_1, g_1, \dots, r_m, w_m, g_m)$ is **valid** with respect to G , and n , if $w_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $(g_1, \dots, g_i) = G(w_i)_{1, \dots, i}$ for every $i \in [m]$.
- ▶ We assume for simplicity that t is **always** valid, and omit w 's.
- ▶ $\tilde{T} = (\tilde{R}_1, \tilde{G}_1, \dots, \tilde{R}_m, \tilde{G}_m)$ —the rv's induced by random execution of $\tilde{G}(1^n)$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{AccH}_{\tilde{G},n}(t) &= \sum_{i \in [m]} H_{\tilde{G}_i | \tilde{R}_1, \tilde{G}_1, \dots, \tilde{R}_{i-1}, \tilde{G}_{i-1}}(g_i | r_1, g_1, \dots, r_{i-1}, g_{i-1}) \\ &= \sum_{i \in [m]} H_{\tilde{G}_i | \tilde{R}_1, \dots, \tilde{R}_{i-1}}(g_i | r_1, \dots, r_{i-1})\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ The **accessible entropy** of \tilde{G} (wrt G), and n , is at most k , if $\Pr_{t \leftarrow \tilde{T}} [\text{AccH}_{\tilde{G},n}(t) > k] \leq \text{neg}(n)$. Why not $\mathbb{E}_{t \leftarrow \tilde{T}} [\text{AccH}_{\tilde{G},n}(t)]$?
- ▶ **inaccessible entropy**
- ▶ We will omit n when clear from the context

Example

- ▶ Let $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n: \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{n/2}\}$ be $2^{n/2}$ -to-1 collision resistant, and assume for simplicity that a PPT cannot find a collision for any $h \in \mathcal{H}_n$.
- ▶ Let G be the 3-block generator $G(h, x) = (h, h(x), x)$
- ▶ Real entropy of G is $\log |\mathcal{H}_n| + n$
- ▶ Accessible entropy of G is $\log |\mathcal{H}_n| + \frac{n}{2}$

Section 3

Manipulating Inaccessible Entropy

Entropy equalization

Let G be m -bit generator.

For $\ell \in \text{poly}$ let $G^{\otimes \ell}$ be the following $(\ell - 1) \cdot m$ -bit generator

$$G^{\otimes \ell}(x_1, \dots, x_\ell, i) = G(x_1)_i, \dots, G(x_1)_m, \dots, G(x_\ell)_1, \dots, G(x_\ell)_{i-1}$$

- ▶ Assume the accessible entropy of G is (at most) k_A , then $k_A^{\otimes \ell}$, the accessible entropy of $G^{\otimes \ell}$, is at most $k(\ell - 2) + m$.
- ▶ Assume the real entropy of G is k_R , then

1. For any $i \in [(\ell - 1) \cdot m]$ and $(g_1, \dots, g_{i-1}) \in \text{Supp}(G_1^{\otimes \ell}, \dots, G_{i-1}^{\otimes \ell})$:

$$H(G_i^{\otimes \ell} | G_1^{\otimes \ell}, \dots, G_{i-1}^{\otimes \ell}) \geq k_R / \ell$$

2. $k_R^{\otimes \ell}$, the real entropy of $G^{\otimes \ell}$, is at least $(\ell - 1)K_R$

- ▶ Assume $k_R \geq k_A + 1$, then for $\ell = m + 2$, it holds that $k_R^{\otimes \ell} \geq k_A^{\otimes \ell} + 1$

Parallel repetition

Let G be an m -block generator and for $\ell \in \text{poly}$, let G^ℓ be the ℓ -fold parallel repetition of G .

- ▶ Assume accessible entropy of G is (at most) k_A , then the accessible entropy of G is at most $k_A^\ell = \ell k_A$.
- ▶ Assume $H(G_i | G_1, \dots, G_{i-1}) = k_R$ for any $i \in [m]$, then for any $i \in [m]$ and $(g_1^\ell, \dots, g_{i-1}^\ell) \in \text{Supp}(G_1^\ell, \dots, G_{i-1}^\ell)$ it holds that

$$k_{\min}^\ell = H_\infty(G_i^\ell | G_1^\ell, \dots, G_{i-1}^\ell) \approx \ell k_R$$

- ▶ If $k_A \leq k_R - 1$, then $\forall n \in \text{poly} \exists \ell \in \text{poly}$ such that $\ell k_{\min}^\ell > k_A^\ell + n$

Section 4

Inaccessible Entropy from OWF

The generator

Definition 3

Given a function $f: \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^n$, let G be the $(n + 1)$ -block generator

$$G(x) = f(x)_1, \dots, f(x)_n, x$$

Lemma 4

Assume that f is a OWF then G has accessible entropy at most $n - \log n$.

- ▶ Recall f is OWF if $\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [\text{Inv}(f(x)) \in f^{-1}(f(x))] = \text{neg}(n)$ for any PPT Inv .
- ▶ The real entropy of G is n
- ▶ Hence, inaccessible entropy gap is $\log n$
- ▶ Proof idea

Proving Lemma 4

Let \tilde{G} be a PPT, and assume $\Pr \left[\text{AccH}_{G, \tilde{G}}(\tilde{T}) \geq n - \log n \right] \geq \varepsilon = \frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)}$.

(recall $\tilde{T} = (\tilde{R}_1, \tilde{G}_1, \dots, \tilde{R}_m, \tilde{G}_m)$ is the coins and output blocks of \tilde{G})

Algorithm 5 ($\text{Inv}(z)$)

1. For $i = 1$ to n , do the following for n^2/ε times:
 - 1.1 Sample r_i uniformly at random and let g_i be the i 'th output block of $\tilde{G}(r_1, \dots, r_i)$.
 - 1.2 If $g_i = z_i$, move to next value of i .
 - 1.3 Abort, if the maximal number of attempts is reached.
 2. Finish the execution of $\tilde{G}(r_1, \dots, r_{n+1})$, and output its $(n+1)$ output block.
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- ▶ We start by assuming that Inv is **unbounded** (replace n^2/ε with ∞)
 - ▶ $\hat{T} = (\hat{R}_1, \hat{G}_1, \dots, \hat{R}_{n+1}, \hat{G}_{n+1})$ is the (final) values of $(r_1, g_1, \dots, r_{n+1}, g_{n+1})$ in a random execution of $\text{Inv}(f(U_n))$.

\tilde{T} vs. \hat{T}

- ▶ Fix $\mathbf{t} = (r_1, g_1, \dots, r_{n+1}, g_{n+1}) \in \text{Supp}(\tilde{T})$
- ▶ Let $P(\mathbf{t}) = \prod_{i=1}^{n+1} \Pr[\tilde{R}_i = r_i \mid (\tilde{R}_{1,\dots,i-1}, \tilde{G}_i) = (r_{1,\dots,i-1}, g_i)]$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{\tilde{T}}[t] &= \Pr[\tilde{G}_1 = g_1] \cdot \Pr[\tilde{R}_1 = r_1 \mid \tilde{G}_1 = g_1] \cdot \Pr[\tilde{G}_2 = g_2 \mid \tilde{R}_1 = r_1] \\ &\quad \cdot \Pr[\tilde{R}_2 = r_2 \mid \tilde{G}_2 = g_2] \cdots \\ &= P(\mathbf{t}) \cdot \Pr[\tilde{G}_1 = g_1] \cdot \Pr[\tilde{G}_2 = g_2 \mid \tilde{R}_1 = r_1] \cdots \\ &= P(\mathbf{t}) \cdot 2^{-\sum_{i=1}^m H_{\tilde{G}_i \mid \tilde{R}_{1,\dots,i-1}}(g_i \mid r_{1,\dots,i-1})} \\ &= P(\mathbf{t}) \cdot 2^{-\text{AccH}_{\tilde{G}}(\mathbf{t})} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ $\Pr_{\hat{T}}[\mathbf{t}] = \Pr[f(U_n) = g_{1,\dots,n}] \cdot \Pr[\tilde{G}_{n+1} = g_{n+1} \mid \tilde{R}_{1,\dots,n} = r_{1,\dots,n}] \cdot P(\mathbf{t})$
- ▶ $\Pr_{\hat{T}}[\mathbf{t}] = \frac{\Pr[f(U_n)=g_{1,\dots,n}] \cdot \Pr[\tilde{G}_{n+1}=g_{n+1} \mid \tilde{R}_{1,\dots,n}=r_{1,\dots,n}]}{2^{-\text{AccH}_{\tilde{G}, \tilde{G}}(\mathbf{t})}} \cdot \Pr_{\tilde{T}}[\mathbf{t}]$

\tilde{T} vs. \hat{T} cont.

- ▶ $\mathbf{t} = (r_1, g_1, \dots, r_{n+1}, g_{n+1}) \in \text{Supp}(\tilde{T})$
- ▶ $\Pr_{\hat{T}}[\mathbf{t}] = \frac{\Pr[f(U_n)=g_1, \dots, n] \cdot \Pr[\tilde{G}_{n+1}=g_{n+1} | \tilde{R}_{1, \dots, n}=r_1, \dots, n]}{2^{-\text{AccH}_{G, \tilde{G}}(\mathbf{t})}} \cdot \Pr_{\tilde{T}}[\mathbf{t}]$
- ▶ Note that $\Pr[f(U_n) = g_1, \dots, n] \cdot \frac{1}{|f^{-1}(g_1, \dots, n)|} = 2^{-n}$
- ▶ Hence, for \mathbf{t} with $\text{AccH}_{G, \tilde{G}}(\mathbf{t}) \geq n - \log n$ and $\Pr[\tilde{G}_{n+1} = g_{n+1} | \tilde{R}_{1, \dots, n} = r_1, \dots, n] \geq \frac{\alpha}{|f^{-1}(g_1, \dots, n)|}$:

$$\Pr_{\tilde{T}}[\mathbf{t}] \geq \frac{\alpha}{n} \cdot \Pr_{\hat{T}}[\mathbf{t}] \quad (1)$$

Inv's success probability

Let $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \text{Supp}(\tilde{T})$ denote the set of transcripts $\mathbf{t} = (r_1, g_1, \dots, r_{n+1}, g_{n+1})$ with

1. $\text{AccH}_{\tilde{G}}(\mathbf{t}) \geq n - \log n$,
2. $H_{\tilde{G}_i | \tilde{R}_1, \dots, i-1}(g_i | r_1, \dots, i-1) \leq \log(\frac{4n}{\varepsilon})$ for all $i \in [n]$,
3. $H_{\tilde{G}_{n+1} | \tilde{R}_1, \dots, n}(g_{n+1} | r_1, \dots, n) \leq \log(\frac{4}{\varepsilon} \cdot |f^{-1}(g_1, \dots, n)|)$.

- ▶ $\Pr_{\tilde{T}} \left[\exists i \in [n]: H_{\tilde{G}_i | \tilde{R}_1, \dots, i-1}(g_i | r_1, \dots, i-1) > \log(\frac{4n}{\varepsilon}) \right] \leq n \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{4n} = \varepsilon/4$
- ▶ $\Pr_{\tilde{T}} \left[H_{\tilde{G}_{n+1} | \tilde{R}_1, \dots, n}(g_{n+1} | r_1, \dots, n) > \log(\frac{4}{\varepsilon} \cdot |f^{-1}(g_1, \dots, n)|) \right] \leq \varepsilon/4$
- ▶ $\Pr_{\tilde{T}}[\mathcal{S}] \geq \Pr[\text{AccH}_{\tilde{G}, \tilde{G}}(T) \geq n - \log n] - 2 \cdot \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \geq \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$
- ▶ By Eq. (1): $\Pr_{\hat{T}}[\mathcal{S}] \geq \frac{\varepsilon/4}{n} \cdot \Pr_{\hat{T}}[\mathcal{S}] \geq \frac{\varepsilon^2}{8n} \dots$

Back the **bounded** version of **Inv**.

- ▶ For $z \in \{0, 1\}^n$ for which $\exists (r_1, z_1, \dots, r_n, z_n, \dots) \in \mathcal{S}$:
 $\Pr[\text{Inv}(z) \text{ aborts}] \leq n \cdot (1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{4n})^{n^2/\varepsilon} = O(n \cdot 2^{-n}) \leq \frac{1}{2}$
- ▶ Hence, $\Pr_{\hat{T}}[\mathcal{S}] \geq \frac{\varepsilon^2}{16n} \implies \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}[\text{Inv}(f(x)) \in f^{-1}(f(x))] \geq \frac{\varepsilon^2}{16n}$

Section 5

Statistically Hiding Commitment from Inaccessible Entropy Generator

High-level description

- ▶ Entropy equalization + gap amplification to get generator that has the **same** min-entropy in each block and whose accessible entropy is n -bit smaller than the sum of the min entropies.
- ▶ Use "hashing protocol" to get a "generator" with **zero** accessible entropy block
- ▶ Use a random block to mask the committed bit, to get a **weakly binding** SHC
- ▶ Amplify the above into full-fledged SHC