Foundation of Cryptography (0368-4162-01), Lecture 1

Adminstration + Introduction

Iftach Haitner, Tel Aviv University

November first, 2011

Part I

Administration and Course Overview

Section 1

Administration

Important Details

1. Iftach Haitner. Schriber 20, email iftachh at gmail.com

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2. Reception: Sundays 9:00-10:00 (please coordinate via email in advance)

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4. Mailing list: 0368-4162-01@listserv.tau.ac.il
   - Registered students are automatically on the list (need to activate the account by going to https://www.tau.ac.il/newuser/)
   - If you're not registered and want to get on the list (or want to get another address on the list), send e-mail to: listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il with the line: subscribe 0368-3500-34 <Real Name>

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    3. Self grading 10 %
        - Please register following the link on the course website, and email foc.exc@gmail.com; Title: Grader #: Name, ID
        - Submit your solution to the question using Latex (I'll check it)
        - Within two weeks after the submission time. The grader should send the checked exercises to foc.exc@gmail.com and to the authors, and send a single excel file (columns: Id, Name, grade) to foc.exc@gmail.com, Title: Checked Exe # ,

and..

1. Slides

and..

1. Slides
2. English

Course Prerequisites

1. Some prior knowledge of cryptography (such as 0369.3049) might help, but not necessarily
2. Basic probability.
3. Basic complexity (the classes P, NP, BPP)

Course Material

1. Books:
   1. Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography.
   2. Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. An Introduction to Modern Cryptography.
2. Lecture notes
   1. Ran Canetti. Foundation of Cryptography (The 2008 course)
   2. Salil Vadhan. Introduction to Cryptography.
   3. Luca Trevisan. Cryptography.
   4. Yehuda lindell Foundations of Cryptography.

Section 2

Course Topics

Course Topics

Basic primitives in cryptography (i.e., one-way functions, pseudorandom generators and zero-knowledge proofs).

- Focus on *formal* definitions and *rigorous* proofs.
- The goal is not studying some list, but to understand cryptography.
- Get ready to start researching

Section 3

Notations

Notations I

- For $t \in \mathbb{N}$, let $[t] := \{1, \ldots, t\}$.
- Given a function f defined over a set $\mathcal{U}$, and a set $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$, let $f(\mathcal{S}) := \{f(x) \colon x \in \mathcal{S}\}$, and for $y \in f(\mathcal{U})$ let $f^{-1}(y) := \{x \in \mathcal{U} \colon f(x) = y\}$.
- poly stands for the set of all polynomials.
- The worst-case running-time of a *polynomial-time algorithm* on input x, is bounded by $p(|x|)$ for some $p \in$ poly.
- A function is *polynomial-time computable*, if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute it.
- PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
- A function $\mu \colon \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0, 1]$ is negligible, denoted $\mu(n) = \mathrm{neg}(n)$, if for any $p \in$ poly there exists $n' \in \mathbb{N}$ with $\mu(n) \leq 1/p(n)$ for any $n > n'$.

Distribution and random variables I

- The support of a distribution P over a finite set $\mathcal{U}$, denoted Supp(P), is defined as $\{u \in \mathcal{U} : P(x) > 0\}$.
- Given a distribution P and en event E with $\Pr_P[E] > 0$, we let $(P \mid E)$ denote the conditional distribution P given E (i.e., $(P \mid E)(x) = \frac{D(x) \wedge E}{\Pr_P[E]}$).
- For $t \in \mathbb{N}$, let let U_t denote a random variable uniformly distributed over $\{0,1\}^t$.
- Given a random variable X, we let $x \leftarrow X$ denote that x is distributed according to X (e.g., $\Pr_{x \leftarrow X}[x = 7]$).
- Given a final set $\mathcal{S}$, we let $x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}$ denote that x is uniformly distributed in $\mathcal{S}$.

Distribution and random variables II

- We use the convention that when a random variable appears twice in the same expression, it refers to a *single* instance of this random variable. For instance, $\Pr[X = X] = 1$ (regardless of the definition of X).
- Given distribution P over $\mathcal{U}$ and $t \in \mathbb{N}$, we let P^t over $\mathcal{U}^t$ be defined by $D^t(x_1, \ldots, x_t) = \Pi_{i \in [t]} D(x_i)$.
- Similarly, given a random variable X, we let X^t denote the random variable induced by t independent samples from X.

Part II

Foundation of Cryptography

Cryptography and Computational Hardness

1. What is Cryptography?

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2. Hardness assumptions, why do we need them?

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3. Does $\mathrm{P} \neq \mathrm{NP}$ suffice?

$\mathrm{P} \neq \mathrm{NP}$: i.e., $\exists L \in \mathrm{NP}$, such that for any polynomial-time algorithm A, $\exists x \in \{0,1\}^*$ with $\mathrm{A}(x) \neq 1_L(x)$

polynomial-time algorithms: an algorithm A runs in polynomial-time, if $\exists p \in$ poly such that the running time of $A(x)$ is bounded by $p(|x|)$ for any $x \in \{0,1\}^*$

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4. Problems: hard on the average. No known solution
5. One-way functions: an efficiently computable function that no efficient algorithm can invert.

Section 5

One Way Functions

One-Way Functions

Definition 1 (One-Way Functions (OWFs))

A polynomial-time computable function $f : \{0,1\}^* \mapsto f : \{0,1\}^*$ is one-way, if for any PPT A

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[A(1^n, y) \in f^{-1}(y)] = \text{neg}(n)$$

U_n: a random variable uniformly distributed over $\{0,1\}^n$

polynomial-time computable: there exists a polynomial-time algorithm F , such that $F(x) = f(x)$ for every $x \in \{0,1\}^*$

PPT : probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm

neg: a function $\mu : \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0,1]$ is a *negligible* function of n, denoted $\mu(n) = \text{neg}(n)$, if for any $p \in \text{poly}$ there exists $n' \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $g(n) < 1/p(n)$ for all $n > n'$

We will typically omit 1^n from the parameter list of A

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   - Asymptotic
   - Efficiently computable
   - On the average
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5. Non uniform OWFs

Definition 2 (Non-uniform OWF))

A polynomial-time computable function $f : \{0,1\}^* \mapsto f : \{0,1\}^*$ is one-way, if for any polynomial-size family of circuits $\{C_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$

$$\Pr_{y\leftarrow f(U_n)}[C_n(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] = \mathrm{neg}(n)$$

Length preserving functions

Definition 3 (length preserving functions)

A function $f : \{0,1\}^* \mapsto f : \{0,1\}^*$ is length preserving, if $|f(x)| = |x|$ for any $x \in \{0,1\}^*$

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Theorem 4

Assume that OWFs exit, then there exist length-preserving OWFs

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Theorem 4

Assume that OWFs exit, then there exist length-preserving OWFs

Proof idea: use the assumed OWF to create a length preserving one

Partial domain functions

Definition 5 (Partial domain functions)

For $m, \ell \colon \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$, let $h \colon \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \mapsto \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ denote a function defined over input lengths in $\{m(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, and maps strings of length $m(n)$ to strings of length $\ell(n)$.

The definition of one-wayness naturally extends to such functions.

OWFs imply Length Preserving OWFs cont.

Let f be a OWF, let $p \in \text{poly}$ be a bound on its computing-time and assume wlg. that p is monotonly increasing (can we?).

Construction 6 (the length preserving function)

Define $g\colon \{0,1\}^{p(n)} \mapsto \{0,1\}^{p(n)}$ as

$$g(x) = f(x_{1,\ldots,n}), 0^{p(n)-\left|f(x_{1,\ldots,n})\right|}$$

Note that g is length preserving and efficient (why?).

OWFs imply Length Preserving OWFs cont.

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How can we prove that g is one-way?
Answer: using reduction

Proving that g is one-way

Proof:
Assume that g is not one-way. Namely, there exists PPT A a $q \in$ poly and an infinite $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \{p(n) : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$, with

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n)}[A(y) \in g^{-1}(y)] > 1/q(n) \tag{1}$$

for any $n \in \mathcal{I}$ (?).

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for any $n \in \mathcal{I}$ (?).
We would like to use A for inverting f.

Algorithm 8 (The inverter B)

Input: 1^n and $y \in \{0,1\}^*$.

1. Let $x = \mathrm{A}(1^{p(n)}, y, 0^{p(n)-|y|})$.
2. Return $x_{1,\ldots,n}$.

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2. Return $x_{1,\ldots,n}$.

Claim 9

Let $\mathcal{I}' := \{n \in \mathbb{N} : p(n) \in \mathcal{I}\}$. Then

1. $\mathcal{I}'$ is infinite
2. For any $n \in \mathcal{I}'$, it holds that $\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n)}[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] > 1/q(p(n))$.

in contradiction to the assumed one-wayness of f. □

Conclusion

Remark 10

- We directly related the hardness of f to that of g
- The reduction is not “security preserving"

From partial domain functions to all-length functions

Construction 11

Given a function $f : \{0,1\}^{m(n)} \mapsto \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$,
$f_{all} : \{0,1\}^* \mapsto \{0,1\}^*$ as

$$f_{all}(x) = f(x_{1,\ldots,k(n)}), 0^{n-k(n)}$$

where $n = |x|$ and $k(n) := \max\{m(n') \leq n : n' \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

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Claim 12

Assume that f is a one-way function and that m is monotone, polynomial-time commutable an satisfies $\frac{m(n+1)}{m(n)} \leq p(n)$ for some $p \in$ poly, then f_{all} is a one-way function. Further, if f is length preserving, then so is f_{all}.

Proof: ?

Weak One Way Functions

Definition 13 (weak one-way functions)

A polynomial-time computable function $f : \{0,1\}^* \mapsto f : \{0,1\}^*$ is α-one-way, if

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[A(1^n, y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \leq \alpha(n)$$

for any PPT A and large enough $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

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1. (strong) OWF according to Def 1, are neg(n)-one-way according to the above definition

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2. Examples

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1. (strong) OWF according to Def 1, are neg(n)-one-way according to the above definition
2. Examples
3. Can we “amplify" weak OWF to strong ones?

Strong to weak OWFs

Claim 14

Assume there exists OWFs, then there exist functions that are $\frac{1}{3}$ one-way, but not (strong) one-way

Strong to weak OWFs

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Proof: let f be a owf. Define $g(x) = (1, g(x))$ if $x_1 = 1$, and 0 otherwise.

Weak to Strong OWFs

Theorem 15

Assume there exists $(1-\alpha)$*-weak OWFs with* $\alpha(n) > 1/p(n)$ *for some* $p \in$ poly*, then there exists (strong) one-way functions.*

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Proof: we assume wlg that f is length preserving (can we do so?)

Construction 16 (g – the strong one-way function)

Let $t\colon \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$ be a polynomial-time computable function satisfying $t(n) \in \omega(\log n/\alpha(n))$. Define $g\colon (\{0,1\}^n)^{t(n)} \mapsto (\{0,1\}^n)^{t(n)}$ as

$$g(x_1, \ldots, x_t) = f(x_1), \ldots, f(x_t)$$

Weak to Strong OWFs

Theorem 15

Assume there exists $(1-\alpha)$*-weak OWFs with* $\alpha(n) > 1/p(n)$ *for some* $p \in$ poly*, then there exists (strong) one-way functions.*

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$$g(x_1, \ldots, x_t) = f(x_1), \ldots, f(x_t)$$

Claim 17

g is one-way.

Proving that g is one-way – the naive approach

Let A be a potential inverter for g, and assume that A tries to attacks each of the t outputs of g *independently*. Then

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n^{t(n)})}[A(y) \in g^{-1}(y)] \leq (1-\alpha(n))^{t(n)} \leq e^{-\omega(\log n)} = \mathrm{neg}(n)$$

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A less naive approach would be to assume that A goes over output sequentially.

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A less naive approach would be to assume that A goes over output sequentially.
Unfortunately, we can assume none of the above.

Failing Sets

Failing Sets

Definition 18 (failing set)

A function $f : \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ has a $(\delta(n), \varepsilon(n))$-failing set for A, if for large enough n, exists set $\mathcal{S}(n) \subseteq \{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ with

1. $\Pr[f(U_n) \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \geq \delta(n)$, and
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Claim 19

Let f be a $(1-\alpha)$-OWF. Then f has $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/p(n))$-failing set for any PPT A and $p \in$ poly.

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Claim 19

Let f be a $(1-\alpha)$-OWF. Then f has $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/p(n))$-failing set for any PPT A and $p \in$ poly.

Proof: Assume $\exists$ PPT A, a $p \in$ poly and an infinite set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ such that for every $n \in \mathcal{I}$, $\exists \mathcal{S}(n) \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ with

1. $\Pr[f(U_n) \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \geq 1 - \alpha(n)/2$, and
2. $\Pr[\mathrm{A}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/p(n)$, for every $y \in \mathcal{S}(n)$

We'll use A to contradict the hardness of f.

Using A to invert f

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Algorithm 20 (The inverter B)

Input: $y \in \{0,1\}^n$.
Do (with fresh randomness) for $np(n)$ times:
If $x = \mathrm{A}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)$, return x

Clearly, B is a PPT

Using A to invert f

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Do (with fresh randomness) for $np(n)$ times:
If $x = \mathsf{A}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)$, return x

Clearly, B is a PPT

Claim 21

For every $n \in \mathcal{I}$, it holds that
$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[\mathsf{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] > 1 - \alpha(n)$

Hence, f is not $(1 - \alpha(n))$-one-way $\square$

Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$):

$$\Pr[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)]$$

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Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$):

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&\Pr[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \\
&\quad \geq \quad \Pr[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \wedge y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\
&\quad = \quad \Pr[y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \cdot \Pr[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \mid y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\
&\quad \geq \quad (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - (1 - 1/p(n))^{np(n)})
\end{aligned}$$

Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$):

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \\
&\quad \geq \quad \Pr[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \wedge y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\
&\quad = \quad \Pr[y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \cdot \Pr[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \mid y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\
&\quad \geq \quad (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - (1 - 1/p(n))^{np(n)}) \\
&\quad \geq \quad (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) > 1 - \alpha(n). \square
\end{aligned}$$

Proving that g is one-way

We show that if g is not OWF, then f has no flailing-set of the “right" type.

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Claim 22

Assume $\exists$ PPT A, $p \in$ poly and an infinite set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ s.t.

$$\Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^{t(n)})}[\mathrm{A}(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \geq 1/p(n) \tag{2}$$

for every $n \in \mathcal{I}$. Then $\exists$ PPT B and $q \in$ poly s.t.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[\mathrm{B}(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/q(n) \tag{3}$$

for every $n \in \mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ with $\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[\mathcal{S}] \geq \alpha(n)/2$.

Namely, f does not have a $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/q(n))$-failing set.

Algorithm B

Algorithm 23 (No failing set algorithm B)

Input: $y \in \{0,1\}^n$.

1. Choose $z = (z_1, \ldots, z_t) \leftarrow g(U_n^t)$ and $i \leftarrow [t]$
2. Set $z' = (z_1, \ldots, z_{i-1}, y, z_{i+1}, \ldots, z_t)$
3. Return $A(z')_i$

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Fix $n \in \mathcal{I}$ and a set $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ of the right probability. We analyze B's success probability using the following (inefficient) algorithm B^*:

Algorithm B*

Definition 24 (Bad)

For $z \in Im(g)$ (the image of g), we set $Bad(z) = 1$ iff $\nexists i \in [t]$ with $z_i \in \mathcal{S}$.

B* differ from B in the way it chooses z': in case Bad$(z) = 1$, it sets $z' = z$. Otherwise, it sets i to an arbitrary index $j \in [t]$ with $z_j \in \mathcal{S}$, and sets z' as B does with respect to this i.

Algorithm B^*

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Claim 25

$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \frac{1/p(n)}{-} \text{neg}(n)$,

and therefore $\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \frac{1}{t(n)p(n)} - \text{neg}(n)$. □

Claim 25 follows from the following two claims,

Claim 26

$\Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[\text{Bad}(z)] = \text{neg}(n)$

Claim 27

Let $Z = g(U_n^t)$ and let Z' be the value of z' induced by a random execution of B^* on $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \in \mathcal{S})$.
Then Z and Z' are identically distributed.

The claims imply Claim 25.

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$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[\mathrm{B}^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[\mathrm{A}(z) \in g^{-1}(z) \wedge \neg \mathrm{Bad}(z)] \tag{4}$$

The claims imply Claim 25.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z) \wedge \neg \mathrm{Bad}(z)] \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \\ &\leq \Pr[A(z) \in g^{-1}(Z) \wedge \neg \mathrm{Bad}(z)] + \Pr[\mathrm{Bad}(z)] \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

The claims imply Claim 25.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[\mathrm{B}^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[\mathrm{A}(z) \in g^{-1}(z) \wedge \neg \mathrm{Bad}(z)] \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[\mathrm{A}(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \\ &\leq \Pr[\mathrm{A}(z) \in g^{-1}(Z) \wedge \neg \mathrm{Bad}(z)] + \Pr[\mathrm{Bad}(z)] \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[\mathrm{B}^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] &\geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[\mathrm{A}(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] - \mathrm{neg}(n) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{p(n)} - \mathrm{neg}(n). \square \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Claim 26?

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Proof of Claim 27: Consider the following process for sampling Z_i:

1. Let $\beta = \Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[\mathcal{S}]$. Set $\ell_i = 1$ wp β and $\ell_i = 0$ otherwise.
2. If $\ell_i = 1$, let $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \in \mathcal{S})$. Otherwise, set $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \notin \mathcal{S})$.

It is easy to see that the above process is correct (samples Z correctly).

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It is easy to see that the above process is correct (samples Z correctly).

Now all that B^* does, is repeating Step 2 for one of the i's with $\ell_i = 1$ (if such exists) $\square$

Conclusion

Remark 28 (hardness amplification via parallel repetition)

- Can we give a more efficient (secure) reduction?

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- Similar theorems for other cryptographic primitives (e.g., Captchas, general protocols)?
  What properties of the weak OWF have we used in the proof?