Foundation of Cryptography, Lecture 5
MACs and Signatures

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Part I

Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

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Definition 1 (MAC)

A trippet of PPT's $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ such that:

1. $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$ outputs a key $k \in \{0,1\}^*$
2. $\mathsf{Mac}(k, m)$ outputs a "tag" t
3. $\mathsf{Vrfy}(k, m, t)$ output 1 (YES) or 0 (NO)

Consistency: $\mathsf{Vrfy}_k(m, t) = 1$
$\forall k \in \mathsf{Supp}(\mathsf{Gen}(1^n))$, $m \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $t = \mathsf{Mac}_k(m)$

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Definition 2 (Existential unforgability)

A MAC $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ is existential unforgeable (EU), if $\forall$ PPT A:

$$\Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n) \\ (m,t) \leftarrow \mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{Mac}_k, \mathsf{Vrfy}_k}(1^n)}} [\mathsf{Vrfy}_k(m, t) = 1 \wedge \mathsf{Mac}_k \text{ was not asked on } m] = \mathsf{neg}(n)$$

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Remark: convention

Definition of MAC cont.

- “Private key" definition

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- Strong existential unforgeable MACS (for short, strong MAC): infeasible to generate new valid tag (even for message for which a MAC was asked)

Restricted MACs

Definition 3 (Length-restricted MAC)

Same as in Definition 1, but for $k \in \text{Supp}(G(1^n))$, Mac_k and Vrfy_k only accept messages of length n.

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Definition 4 (ℓ-time MAC)

A MAC scheme is existential unforgeable against ℓ queries (for short, ℓ-time MAC), if it is existential unforgeable as in Definition 2, but A can only make ℓ queries.

Section 1

Constructions

Zero-time MAC

Construction 5 (Zero-time MAC)

- $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$: output $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$.
- $\mathsf{Mac}_k(m)$: output k.
- $\mathsf{Vrfy}_k(m,t)$: output 1 iff $t = k$.

Zero-time MAC

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Claim 6

The above scheme is zero-time MAC

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Claim 6

The above scheme is zero-time MAC

Does it remind you something?

Subsection 1

Restricted-Length MAC

ℓ-wise independent functions

Definition 7 (ℓ-wise independent)

A function family $\mathcal{H}$ from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^m$ is ℓ-wise independent, if for every *distinct* $x_1, \ldots, x_\ell \in \{0,1\}^n$ and every $y_1, \ldots, y_\ell \in \{0,1\}^m$, it holds that $\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[h(x_1) = y_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge h(x_\ell) = y_\ell] = 2^{-\ell m}$.

ℓ-times, restricted-length MAC

Construction 8 (ℓ-time MAC)

Let $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n \colon \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^n\}$ be an efficient $(\ell + 1)$-wise independent function family.

- $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$: output $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n$.
- $\mathsf{Mac}(h, m)$: output $h(m)$.
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The above scheme is a length-restricted, ℓ-time MAC

Proof: ?

OWF $\implies$ restricted-length MAC

Construction 10

Same as Construction 8, but uses function $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_n \colon \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^n\}$ instead of $\mathcal{H}$.

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Claim 11

Assuming that $\mathcal{F}$ is a PRF, then Construction 10 is an existential unforgeable MAC.

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Assuming that $\mathcal{F}$ is a PRF, then Construction 10 is an existential unforgeable MAC.

Proof: Easy to prove if $\mathcal{F}$ is a family of random functions. Hence, also holds in case $\mathcal{F}$ is a PRF.$\square$

Subsection 2

Any Length

Collision Resistant Hash Family

Definition 12 (collision resistant hash family (CRH))

A function family $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n \colon \{0,1\}^* \mapsto \{0,1\}^n\}$ is collision resistant, if

$$\Pr_{\substack{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n \\ (x,x') \leftarrow \mathsf{A}(1^n,h)}} [x \neq x' \in \{0,1\}^* \wedge h(x) = h(x')] = \operatorname{neg}(n)$$

for any PPT A.

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for any PPT A.

- Not known to implied by OWFs.

Length-restricted MAC $\implies$ MAC

Construction 13 (Length restricted MAC $\implies$ MAC)

Let $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ be a length-restricted MAC, and let $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n \colon \{0,1\}^* \mapsto \{0,1\}^n\}$ be an efficient function family.

- $\mathsf{Gen}'(1^n)$: Sample $k \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$ and $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n$. Output $k' = (k, h)$
- $\mathsf{Mac}'_{k,h}(m) = \mathsf{Mac}_k(h(m))$
- $\mathsf{Vrfy}'_{k,h}(t, m) = \mathsf{Vrfy}_k(t, h(m))$

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Claim 14

Assume $\mathcal{H}$ is an efficient collision-resistant family and $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ is existential unforgeable, then $(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Mac}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ is existential unforgeable MAC.

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- $\mathsf{Gen}'(1^n)$: Sample $k \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$ and $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n$. Output $k' = (k, h)$
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Proof: ?

Part II

Signature Schemes

Signature schemes

Definition 15 (Signature schemes)

A trippet of PPT's $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ such that

1. $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$: output a pair of keys $(s, v) \in \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^*$
2. $\mathsf{Sign}(s, m)$: output a "signature" $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^*$
3. $\mathsf{Vrfy}(v, m, \sigma)$: output 1 (YES) or 0 (NO)

Consistency: $\mathsf{Vrfy}_v(m, \sigma) = 1$ for any $(s, v) \in \mathsf{Supp}(\mathsf{Gen}(1^n))$, $m \in \{0,1\}^*$ and $\sigma \in \mathsf{Supp}(\mathsf{Sign}_s(m))$

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A signature scheme is existential unforgeable (EU), if $\forall$ PPT A

$$\Pr_{\substack{(s,v)\leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)\\ (m,\sigma)\leftarrow \mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{Sign}_s}(1^n, v)}} \left[\mathsf{Vrfy}_v(m, \sigma) = 1 \wedge \mathsf{Sign}_s \text{ was not asked on } m\right] = \mathsf{neg}(n)$$

Signature schemes cont.

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Theorem 17

OWFs imply strong existential unforgeable signatures.

Section 2

OWFs $\Longrightarrow$ Signatures

Subsection 1

One-time signatures

Length-restricted signatures

Definition 18 (length-restricted signatures)

Same as in Definition 15, but for $(s, v) \in \mathrm{Supp}(G(1^n))$, Sign_s and Vrfy_v only accept messages of length n.

Bounded-query signatures

Definition 19 (ℓ-time signatures)

A signature scheme is existential unforgeable against ℓ-query (for short, ℓ-time signature), if it is existential unforgeable as in Definition 16, but A can only ask for ℓ queries.

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Claim 20

Assuming CRH exists, then length restricted k-time signatures can be used to construct k-time signatures.

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Assuming CRH exists, then length restricted k-time signatures can be used to construct k-time signatures.

Proof: ?

Proposition 21

Wlg, the signer of a k-time signature scheme, for fixed k, is deterministic

Proof: ?

OWF $\implies$ length-restricted one-time signatures

Construction 22 (length-restricted, one-time signature)

Let $f\colon \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^n$.

1. $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$:
   1. $s_1^0, s_1^1, \ldots, s_n^0, s_n^1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$,
   2. $s = \left(s_1^0, s_1^1, \ldots, s_n^0, s_n^1\right)$
   3. Output $v = \left(v_1^0 = f(s_1^0), v_1^1 = f(s_1^1), \ldots, v_n^0 = f(s_n^0), v_n^1 = f(s_n^1)\right)$
2. $\mathsf{Sign}(s, m)$: $\sigma = (s_1^{m_1}, \ldots, s_n^{m_n})$
3. $\mathsf{Vrfy}(v, m, \sigma = (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n))$: check that $f(\sigma_i) = v_i^{m_i}$ for all $i \in [n]$

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Lemma 23

If f is a OWF, then Construction 22 is a length restricted one-time signature scheme.

OWF $\Longrightarrow$ length-restricted one-time signatures

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Is this a strong signature scheme? With some additional work, it can be turned into a strong one.

Proving Lemma 23

Let a PPT A, $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ and $p \in \text{poly}$ that break the security of Construction 22, we use A to invert f.

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Algorithm 24 (Inv)

Input: $y \in \{0,1\}^n$

1. Choose $(s, v) \leftarrow Gen(1^n)$ and replace $v_{j^*}^{i^*}$ for a random $i^* \in [n]$ and $j^* \in \{0,1\}$, with y.
2. Abort, if $A(1^n, v)$ asks to sign message $m \in \{0,1\}^n$ with $m_{i^*} = j^*$.
   Otherwise, use s to answer the query.
3. Let (m', σ') be A's output.
   Abort, if σ' is not a valid signature for m', or $m'_{i^*} \neq j^*$.
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- v is distributed as is in the real “signature game"
- v is independent of i^* and j^*.

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   Abort, if σ' is not a valid signature for m', or $m'_{i^*} \neq j^*$.
   Otherwise, return σ_{i^*}.

- v is distributed as is in the real “signature game"
- v is independent of i^* and j^*.
- Therefore Inv inverts f w.p. $\frac{1}{2np(n)}$ for every $n \in \mathcal{I}$.

Subsection 2

Stateful Schemes

Stateful signature schemes[1]

Definition 25 (Stateful scheme)

Same as in Definition 15, but Sign might keep state.

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Stateful signature schemes[1]

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Same as in Definition 15, but Sign might keep state.

- Make sense in many applications (e.g., smartcards)
- We'll later use it a building block for building stateless scheme

[1] Also known as memory-dependant schemes

Stateful schemes — straight-line construction

Let $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ be a strong one-time signature scheme.

Construction 26 (straight-line construction)

- $\mathsf{Gen}'(1^n)$: Output $(s', v') = (s_1, v_1) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$.
- $\mathsf{Sign}'_{s_1}(m_i)$, where m_i is i'th message to sign:
  1. Let $(s_{i+1}, v_{i+1}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$
  2. Let $\sigma_i = \mathsf{Sign}_{s_i}(m_i, v_{i+1})$
  3. Output $\sigma'_i = (\sigma'_{i-1}, m_i, v_{i+1}, \sigma_i)$.[a]
- $\mathsf{Vrfy}'_{v_1}(m, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_i, v_{i+1}, \sigma_i))$:
  Check that
  1. $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{v_j}((m_j, v_{j+1}), \sigma_j) = 1$ for every $j \in [i]$
  2. $m_i = m$

[a] σ'_0 is the empty string.

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Construction 26 (straight-line construction)

- $\mathsf{Gen}'(1^n)$: Output $(s', v') = (s_1, v_1) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$.
- $\mathsf{Sign}'_{s_1}(m_i)$, where m_i is i'th message to sign:
  1. Let $(s_{i+1}, v_{i+1}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$
  2. Let $\sigma_i = \mathsf{Sign}_{s_i}(m_i, v_{i+1})$
  3. Output $\sigma'_i = (\sigma'_{i-1}, m_i, v_{i+1}, \sigma_i)$.[a]
- $\mathsf{Vrfy}'_{v_1}(m, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_i, v_{i+1}, \sigma_i))$:
  Check that
  1. $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{v_j}((m_j, v_{j+1}), \sigma_j) = 1$ for every $j \in [i]$
  2. $m_i = m$

[a] σ'_0 is the empty string.

Straight-line construction cont.

- The state of Sign' is used for maintaining the most recent signing key (e.g., s_i), and the last published signature that connects s_i to v_1.

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- While polynomial time, it is rather inefficient scheme: both running time and signature size are linear in number of published signatures.

Straight-line construction cont.

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- That $(\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Vrfy})$ works for any length (specifically, it is possible to sign message that is longer than the verification key), is critically used.

Straight-line construction cont.

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Lemma 27

$(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ *is a stateful, strong signature scheme.*

Straight-line construction cont.

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$(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ *is a stateful, strong signature scheme.*

Proof: Assume $\exists$ PPT A', $p \in \mathrm{poly}$ and infinite set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$, such that A' breaks the strong security of $(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ with probability $\frac{1}{p(n)}$ for all $n \in \mathcal{I}$.

Straight-line construction cont.

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Straight-line construction cont.

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- We assume for simplicity that p also bounds the query complexity of A'

Proving Lemma 27 cont.

Let $(m_t, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_t, v_{t+1}, \sigma_t))$ be the pair output by A'

Proving Lemma 27 cont.

Let $(m_t, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_t, v_{t+1}, \sigma_t))$ be the pair output by A′

Claim 28

Whenever A′ succeeds, $\exists \widetilde{i} \in [p]$ such that:

1. Sign′ has output $\sigma'_{\widetilde{i}-1} = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_{\widetilde{i}-1}, v_{\widetilde{i}}, \sigma_{\widetilde{i}-1})$
2. Sign′ has not output $\sigma'_{\widetilde{i}} = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_{\widetilde{i}}, v_{\widetilde{i}+1}, \sigma_{\widetilde{i}})$

Proving Lemma 27 cont.

Let $(m_t, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_t, v_{t+1}, \sigma_t))$ be the pair output by A′

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Proof: ?

Proving Lemma 27 cont.

Let $(m_t, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_t, v_{t+1}, \sigma_t))$ be the pair output by A′

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Proof: ?

It follows that

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Proving Lemma 27 cont.

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It follows that

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  Let $s_{\widetilde{i}}$ be the signing key generated by Sign′ along with $v_{\widetilde{i}}$, and let $\widetilde{m} = (m_{\widetilde{i}}, v_{\widetilde{i}+1})$

Proving Lemma 27 cont.

Let $(m_t, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_t, v_{t+1}, \sigma_t))$ be the pair output by A′

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  Let $s_{\widetilde{i}}$ be the signing key generated by Sign′ along with $v_{\widetilde{i}}$, and let $\widetilde{m} = (m_{\widetilde{i}}, v_{\widetilde{i}+1})$
- $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{v_{\widetilde{i}}}(\widetilde{m}, \sigma_{\widetilde{i}}) = 1$

Proving Lemma 27 cont.

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- $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{v_{\widetilde{i}}}(\widetilde{m}, \sigma_{\widetilde{i}}) = 1$
- $\mathsf{Sign}_{s_{\widetilde{i}}}$ was not queried by Sign′ on $\widetilde{m}$ and output $\sigma_{\widetilde{i}}$.

Proving Lemma 27 cont.

Let $(m_t, \sigma' = (m_1, v_2, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_t, v_{t+1}, \sigma_t))$ be the pair output by A'

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Whenever A' succeeds, $\exists \widetilde{i} \in [p]$ such that:

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Proof: ?

It follows that

- $v_{\widetilde{i}}$ was sampled by Sign'

  Let $s_{\widetilde{i}}$ be the signing key generated by Sign' along with $v_{\widetilde{i}}$, and let $\widetilde{m} = (m_{\widetilde{i}}, v_{\widetilde{i}+1})$
- $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{v_{\widetilde{i}}}(\widetilde{m}, \sigma_{\widetilde{i}}) = 1$
- $\mathsf{Sign}_{s_{\widetilde{i}}}$ was not queried by Sign' on $\widetilde{m}$ and output $\sigma_{\widetilde{i}}$.
- $\mathsf{Sign}_{s_{\widetilde{i}}}$ was queried at most once by Sign'

Definition of A

Algorithm 29 (A)

Input: 1^n, v
Oracle: Sign_s

1. Choose $i^* \leftarrow [p = p(n)]$ and $(s', v') \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}'(1^n)$.
2. Emulate a random execution of $\mathsf{A}'^{\mathsf{Sign}'_{s'}}$ with a single twist:
   - On the i^*'th call to $\mathsf{Sign}'_{s'}$, set $v_{i^*} = v$ (rather than choosing it via Gen)
   - When need to sign using s_{i^*}, use Sign_s.
3. Let $(m, \sigma = (m_1, v_1, \sigma_1), \ldots, (m_q, v_q, \sigma_q)) \leftarrow \mathsf{A}'$
4. Output $((m_{i^*}, v_{i^*}), \sigma_{i^*})$ (abort if $i^* > q$))

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- The emulated game $\mathsf{A}'^{\mathsf{Sign}'_{s'}}$ has the same distribution as the real game.

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- Sign_s is called at most once

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- The emulated game $\mathsf{A}'^{\mathsf{Sign}'_{s'}}$ has the same distribution as the real game.
- Sign_s is called at most once
- A breaks $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ whenever $i^* = \widetilde{i}$.

Subsection 3

Somewhat-Stateful Schemes

A somewhat-stateful scheme

Let $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ be a strong one-time signature scheme.

Construction 30 (A somewhat-stateful scheme)

- $\mathsf{Gen}'(1^n)$: Output $(s', v') = (s_\lambda, v_\lambda) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$.
- $\mathsf{Sign}'_{s_\lambda}(m)$: choose an unused $\boldsymbol{r} \in \{0,1\}^n$
  1. For $i = 0$ to $n-1$: if $a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}$ was not set before:
     1. For both $j \in \{0,1\}$, let $(s_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},j}, v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},j}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$
     2. Let $a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = (v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},0}, v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},1})$.
     3. Let $\sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = \mathsf{Sign}_{s_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}}(a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}})$
  2. Output $(\boldsymbol{r}, a_\lambda, \sigma_\lambda, \ldots, a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}} = \mathsf{Sign}_{s_{\boldsymbol{r}}}(m))$
- $\mathsf{Vrfy}'_{v_\lambda}(m, \sigma' = (\boldsymbol{r}, a_\lambda, \sigma_\lambda, \ldots, a_{\boldsymbol{r}-1}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}})$
  Check that
  1. $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}}(a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}) = 1$ for every $i \in \{0, \ldots, n-1\}$
  2. $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{v_{\boldsymbol{r}}}(m, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}}) = 1$, for $v_{\boldsymbol{r}} = (a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}})_{\boldsymbol{r}_n}$

A somewhat-stateful Scheme, cont.

- Each one-time signature key is used at most once.

A somewhat-stateful Scheme, cont.

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A somewhat-stateful Scheme, cont.

- Each one-time signature key is used at most once.

Lemma 31

$(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ *is a stateful strong signature scheme.*

A somewhat-stateful Scheme, cont.

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$(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ *is a stateful strong signature scheme.*

Proof: ?

A somewhat-stateful Scheme, cont.

- Each one-time signature key is used at most once.

Lemma 31

$(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ *is a stateful strong signature scheme.*

Proof: ?

- Note that Sign' does not keep track of the message history.

A somewhat-stateful Scheme, cont.

- Each one-time signature key is used at most once.

Lemma 31

$(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Vrfy}')$ *is a stateful strong signature scheme.*

Proof: ?

- Note that Sign$'$ does not keep track of the message history.
- More efficient scheme — Enough to construct tree of depth $\omega(\log n)$ (i.e., to choose $\boldsymbol{r} \in \{0,1\}^{\ell \in \omega(\log n)}$)

Subsection 4

Stateless Schemes

Stateless Scheme

Let $\widetilde{\Pi}_k$ be the set of all functions from $\bigcup_{i\in[k]}\{0,1\}^i$ to $\{0,1\}^k$ to $\{0,1\}^n$, let $q \in \text{poly}$ be "large enough", and let $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n\colon \{0,1\}^* \mapsto \{0,1\}^n\}$ be a CRH.

Construction 32 (Inefficient stateless Scheme)

- $\text{Gen}'(1^n)$: Sample $(s_\lambda, v_\lambda) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$ and $\pi \leftarrow \widetilde{\Pi}_{q(n)}$ and $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n$. Output $(s' = (s,\pi,h), v' = v)$.
- $\text{Sign}'_s(m)$: Set $\boldsymbol{r} = \pi(h(m))_{1,\ldots,n}$.
  1. For $i = 0$ to $n-1$: if $a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}$ was not set before:
     1. For both $j \in \{0,1\}$, let $(s_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},j}, v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},j}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n;\pi(\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},j))$
     2. Let $\sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = \text{Sign}_{s_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}}(a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = (v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},0}, v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},1}))$
  2. Output $(\boldsymbol{r}, a_\lambda, \sigma_\lambda, \ldots, a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}} = \text{Sign}_{s_{\boldsymbol{r}}}(m))$
- Vrfy': unchanged

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     2. Let $\sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = \text{Sign}_{s_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}}(a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = (v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},0}, v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},1}))$
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- Vrfy': unchanged

- One one-time signature key might be used several times, but always on the same message.

Stateless Scheme

Let $\widetilde{\Pi}_k$ be the set of all functions from $\bigcup_{i \in [k]} \{0,1\}^i$ to $\{0,1\}^k$ to $\{0,1\}^n$, let $q \in \text{poly}$ be "large enough", and let $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n : \{0,1\}^* \mapsto \{0,1\}^n\}$ be a CRH.

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Let $\widetilde{\Pi}_k$ be the set of all functions from $\bigcup_{i \in [k]}\{0,1\}^i$ to $\{0,1\}^k$ to $\{0,1\}^n$, let $q \in \text{poly}$ be "large enough", and let $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n \colon \{0,1\}^* \mapsto \{0,1\}^n\}$ be a CRH.

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     1. For both $j \in \{0,1\}$, let $(s_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},j}, v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},j}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; \pi(\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}, j))$
     2. Let $\sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = \text{Sign}_{s_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}}}(a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i}} = (v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},0}, v_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,i},1}))$
  2. Output $(\boldsymbol{r}, a_\lambda, \sigma_\lambda, \ldots, a_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}_{1,\ldots,n-1}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{r}} = \text{Sign}_{s_{\boldsymbol{r}}}(m))$
- Vrfy': unchanged

- One one-time signature key might be used several times, but always on the same message.
- Efficient scheme: use PRF (?)

Subsection 5

"CRH free" Schemes

Target collision-resistant functions

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Definition 33 (target collision-resistant functions (TCR))

A function family $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n\}$ is target collision resistant, if

$$\Pr_{(x,a)\leftarrow \mathsf{A}_1(1^n); h\leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n; x'\leftarrow \mathsf{A}_2(a,h)} [x \neq x' \wedge h(x) = h(x')] = \operatorname{neg}(n)$$

for any pair of PPT's $\mathsf{A}_1, \mathsf{A}_2$.

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Theorem 34

OWFs imply efficient compressing TCRs.

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Proof:

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Proof: not that trivial...

Target one-time signatures

For simplicity we will focus on non-strong schemes.

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Definition 35 (target one-time signatures)

A signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is target one-time existential unforgeable (for short, target one-time signature), if

$$\Pr_{\substack{m \leftarrow \mathsf{A}(1^n) \\ (s,v) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n) \\ (m',\sigma) \leftarrow \mathsf{A}(\mathsf{Sign}_s(m))}} [m' \neq m \wedge \mathsf{Vrfy}_v(m',\sigma) = 1] = \mathrm{neg}(n)$$

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Claim 36

OWFs imply target one-time signatures.

Random one-time signatures

Definition 37 (random one-time signatures)

A signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is random one-time existential unforgeable (for short, random one-time signature), if

$$\Pr_{\substack{m \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_n;\ (s,v) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^n) \\ (m',\sigma) \leftarrow \mathrm{A}(m, \mathrm{Sign}_s(m))}} [m' \neq m \wedge \mathrm{Vrfy}_v(m', \sigma) = 1] = \mathrm{neg}(n)$$

for any PPT A and any efficiently samplable string ensemble $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$.

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Claim 38

Assume $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ is target one-time signature scheme, then it is random one-time signature scheme.

“CRH free" schemes

Lemma 39

If $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ *and* $\mathcal{H}$ *in Construction 32 are target-one-time signature scheme and TCR respectively, then it is a signature scheme.*

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If $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ *and* $\mathcal{H}$ *in Construction 32 are target-one-time signature scheme and TCR respectively, then it is a signature scheme.*

Proof:

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If $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ *and* $\mathcal{H}$ *in Construction 32 are target-one-time signature scheme and TCR respectively, then it is a signature scheme.*

Proof:

Focus on the target-one-time signatures. Assume for simplicity that an adversary cannot make the signer use the *same* r for for signing two *different* messages.

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If (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) *and* $\mathcal{H}$ *in Construction 32 are target-one-time signature scheme and TCR respectively, then it is a signature scheme.*

Proof:

Focus on the target-one-time signatures. Assume for simplicity that an adversary cannot make the signer use the *same* r for for signing two *different* messages.

Show that

1. Random-one-time signature suffice for the nodes signatures
2. Target-one-time signature suffice for the leaves signatures