Foundation of Cryptography (0368-4162-01), Lecture 6

More on Zero Knowledge

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Part I

Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge

Interaction is crucial for ZK

Claim 1

Assume that $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ has a one-message ZK proof (even computational), with standard completeness and soundness,[a] then $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{BPP}$.

[a] That is, the completeness is $\frac{2}{3}$ and soundness error is $\frac{1}{3}$.

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Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK)

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The *non interactive* (P,V) is a NIZK for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{NP}$, if $\exists p \in$ poly s.t.

Completeness: $\Pr_{c \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{p(|x|)}}[\mathsf{V}(x, c, \mathsf{P}(x, w, c)) = 1] \geq 2/3$, for every $(x, w) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}$

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- Amplification?

Section 1

NIZK in HBM

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- Verifier only sees the bits in c^H that are indexed by $\mathcal{I}$
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We give a NIZK for HC - Directed Graph Hamiltonicity, in the HBM, and then transfer it into a NIZK in the standard model.

Implies a (standard model) NIZK for all NP

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Claim 3

Let T be a random $n^3 \times n^3$ Boolean matrix where each entry is 1 w.p n^{-5}. Hence, $\Pr[T \text{ is useful}] \in \Omega(n^{-3/2})$.

Proving Claim 3

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Hence, wp at least $1 - 2 \cdot n^3 \cdot n^{-4} = 1 - O(n^{-1})$, no raw or column of T contains more than a single one entry.
- Hence, wp $\theta(1/\sqrt{n})$ the matrix T contains a permutation matrix and all its other entries are zero.
- A random permutation matrix forms a cycle wp $1/n$ (there are $n!$ permutation matrices and $(n-1)!$ of them form a cycle)

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Algorithm 4 (P)

Input: G and a cycle C in G. A CRRS $T \in \{0,1\}_{n^3 \times n^3}$

1. If T not useful, set $\mathcal{I} = n^3 \times n^3$ (i.e., reveal all T) and $\phi = \perp$ Otherwise, let H be the (generalized) $n \times n$ sub matrix containing the hamiltonian cycle in T.
2. Set $\mathcal{I} = T \setminus H$ (i.e., , reveal the bits of T outside of H)
3. Choose $\phi \leftarrow \Pi_n$, s.t. C is mapped to the cycle in H
4. Add all the entries in H corresponding to non edges in G (with respect to ϕ) to $\mathcal{I}$
5. Output $\pi = (\mathcal{I}, \{T_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \phi)$

NIZK for Hamiltonicity in HBM cont.

Algorithm 5 (V)

Input: a graph G, index set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n^3] \times [n^3]$, ordered set $\{T_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$ and a mapping ϕ

1. If all the bits of T are revealed and T is not useful, accept. Otherwise,
2. Verify that $\exists\ n \times n$ submatrix $H \subseteq T$ with all entries in $T \setminus H$ are zeros.
3. Verify that $\phi \in \Pi_n$, and that all the entries of H not corresponding (according to ϕ) to edges of G are zeros

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Claim 6

The above protocol is a perfect NIZK for HC in the HBM, with perfect completeness and soundness error $1 - \Omega(n^{-3/2})$

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- Zero knowledge?

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Input: G

1. Choose T at random, according to the right distribution.
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- ϕ is a random element in Π_n is both cases
- Hence, the simulation is perfect

Section 2

From HBM to Standard NIZK

trapdoor permutations

Definition 8 (trapdoor permutations)

A triplet of PPT's (G, f, Inv) is called (enhanced) family of trapdoor permutation (TDP), if the following holds:

1. $G\colon \{0,1\}^n \mapsto \{0,1\}^n$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
2. $f_{pk} = f(pk, \cdot)$ is a permutation over $\{0,1\}^n$, for every $pk \in \{0,1\}^n$.
3. $\mathrm{Inv}(sk, \cdot) \equiv f^{-1}_{G(sk)}$ for every $sk \in \{0,1\}^n$
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- For our purposes, somewhat less restrictive requirements will do

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Definition 9 (RSA)

- $G(p,q)$ sets $pk = (n = pq, e)$ for some $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(n)}^*$, and $sk = (n, d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n))$
- $f(pk, x) = x^e \bmod n$
- $\mathrm{Inv}(sk, x) = x^d \bmod n$

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- $\phi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*|$ (equals $(p-1)(q-1)$ for $n = pq$ with $p, q \in \mathrm{P}$)
- For every $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(n)}^*$, the function $f(x) \equiv x^e$ is a permutation over $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$.
  In particular, $(x^e)^d \equiv x \bmod n$, for every $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, where $d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$

Definition 9 (RSA)

- $G(p,q)$ sets $pk = (n = pq, e)$ for some $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(n)}^*$, and $sk = (n, d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n))$
- $f(pk, x) = x^e \bmod n$
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Factoring is easy $\implies$ RSA is easy.

example, RSA

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The transformation

Let $(\mathrm{P}_H, \mathrm{V}_H)$ be a HBP NIZK for $\mathcal{L}$, and let $p(n)$ be the length of the CRRS used for $x \in \{0,1\}^n$.
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We construct a NIZK (P, V) for $\mathcal{L}$, with the same completeness and “not too large" soundness error.

The protocol

Algorithm 10 (P)

Input: $x \in \mathcal{L}$, $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ and CRRS $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_p) \in \{0,1\}^{np}$, where $n = |x|$ and $p = p(n)$.

1. Choose $sk \leftarrow U_n$, set $pk = G(sk)$ and compute $c^H = (b(z_1 = f_{pk}^{-1}(c_1)), \ldots, b(z_{p(n)} = f_{pk}^{-1}(c_p)))$
2. Let $(\pi_H, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \mathsf{P}_H(x, w, c^H)$ and output $(\pi_H, \mathcal{I}, pk, \{z_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}})$

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Algorithm 11 (V)

Input: $x \in \mathcal{L}$, CRRS $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_p) \in \{0,1\}^{np}$, and $(\pi_H, \mathcal{I}, pk, \{z_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}})$, where $n = |x|$ and $p = p(n)$.

1. Verify that $pk \in \{0,1\}^n$ and that $f_{pk}(z_i) = c_i$ for every $i \in \mathcal{I}$
2. Return $\mathrm{V}_H(x, \pi_H, \mathcal{I}, c^H)$, where $c_i^H = b(z_i)$ for every $i \in \mathcal{I}$.

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Assuming that $(\mathsf{P}_H, \mathsf{V}_H)$ is a NIZK for $\mathcal{L}$ in the HBM with soundness error $2^{-n} \cdot \alpha$, then (P, V) is a NIZK for $\mathcal{L}$ with the same completeness, and soundness error α.

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- Zero knowledge:?

Proving zero knowledge

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Input: $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ of length n.

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- Not every NIZK is adaptive (but the above protocol are).

Part II

Proof of Knowledge

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Let (P, V) be an interactive proof $\mathcal{L} \in \mathrm{NP}$. A probabilistic machine E is a knowledge extractor for (P, V) and $R_{\mathcal{L}}$ with error $\eta\colon \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$, if $\exists t \in$ poly s.t. $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}$ and deterministic algorithm P^*, $\mathsf{E}^{\mathsf{P}^*}(x)$ runs in expected time bounded by $\frac{t(|x|)}{\delta(x)-\eta(|x|)}$ and outputs $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$, where $\delta(x) = \Pr[(\mathsf{P}^*, \mathsf{V})(x) = 1]$.

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- Relation to ZK

Examples

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The ZK proof we've seen in class for GI, has a knowledge extractor with error $\frac{1}{2}$.

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