

**Foundation of Cryptography**  
**(0368-4162-01), Lecture 1**  
**Adminstration + Introduction**

Iftach Haitner, Tel Aviv University

November first, 2011

## Part I

# Administration and Course Overview

## Section 1

# Administration

## Important Details

- ❶ Iftach Haitner. Schriber 20, email iftachh at gmail.com
- ❷ Reception: Sundays 9:00-10:00 (please coordinate via email in advance)
- ❸ Who are you?
- ❹ Mailing list: 0368-4162-01@listserv.tau.ac.il
  - Registered students are automatically on the list (need to activate the account by going to <https://www.tau.ac.il/newuser/>)
  - If you're not registered and want to get on the list (or want to get another address on the list), send e-mail to: [listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il](mailto:listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il) with the line: subscribe 0368-3500-34 <Real Name>
- ❺ Course website:  
<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~iftachh/Courses/FOC/Fall11/main.html> (or just Google iftach and follow the link)

## Important Details

- ❶ Iftach Haitner. Schriber 20, email iftachh at gmail.com
- ❷ Reception: Sundays 9:00-10:00 (please coordinate via email in advance)
- ❸ Who are you?
- ❹ Mailing list: 0368-4162-01@listserv.tau.ac.il
  - Registered students are automatically on the list (need to activate the account by going to <https://www.tau.ac.il/newuser/>)
  - If you're not registered and want to get on the list (or want to get another address on the list), send e-mail to: [listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il](mailto:listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il) with the line: subscribe 0368-3500-34 <Real Name>
- ❺ Course website:  
<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~iftachh/Courses/FOC/Fall11/main.html> (or just Google iftach and follow the link)

## Important Details

- ❶ Iftach Haitner. Schriber 20, email iftachh at gmail.com
- ❷ Reception: Sundays 9:00-10:00 (please coordinate via email in advance)
- ❸ Who are you?
- ❹ Mailing list: 0368-4162-01@listserv.tau.ac.il
  - Registered students are automatically on the list (need to activate the account by going to <https://www.tau.ac.il/newuser/>)
  - If you're not registered and want to get on the list (or want to get another address on the list), send e-mail to: [listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il](mailto:listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il) with the line: subscribe 0368-3500-34 <Real Name>
- ❺ Course website:  
<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~iftachh/Courses/FOC/Fall11/main.html> (or just Google iftach and follow the link)

## Important Details

- ❶ Iftach Haitner. Schriber 20, email iftachh at gmail.com
- ❷ Reception: Sundays 9:00-10:00 (please coordinate via email in advance)
- ❸ Who are you?
- ❹ Mailing list: 0368-4162-01@listserv.tau.ac.il
  - Registered students are automatically on the list (need to activate the account by going to <https://www.tau.ac.il/newuser/>)
  - If you're not registered and want to get on the list (or want to get another address on the list), send e-mail to: [listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il](mailto:listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il) with the line: subscribe 0368-3500-34 <Real Name>
- ❺ Course website:  
<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~iftachh/Courses/FOC/Fall11/main.html> (or just Google iftach and follow the link)

## Important Details

- ❶ Iftach Haitner. Schriber 20, email iftachh at gmail.com
- ❷ Reception: Sundays 9:00-10:00 (please coordinate via email in advance)
- ❸ Who are you?
- ❹ Mailing list: 0368-4162-01@listserv.tau.ac.il
  - Registered students are automatically on the list (need to activate the account by going to <https://www.tau.ac.il/newuser/>)
  - If you're not registered and want to get on the list (or want to get another address on the list), send e-mail to: [listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il](mailto:listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il) with the line: subscribe 0368-3500-34 <Real Name>
- ❺ Course website:  
<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~iftachh/Courses/FOC/Fall11/main.html> (or just Google iftach and follow the link)



## Important Details

- ❶ Iftach Haitner. Schriber 20, email iftachh at gmail.com
- ❷ Reception: Sundays 9:00-10:00 (please coordinate via email in advance)
- ❸ Who are you?
- ❹ Mailing list: 0368-4162-01@listserv.tau.ac.il
  - Registered students are automatically on the list (need to activate the account by going to <https://www.tau.ac.il/newuser/>)
  - If you're not registered and want to get on the list (or want to get another address on the list), send e-mail to: [listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il](mailto:listserv@listserv.tau.ac.il) with the line: subscribe 0368-3500-34 <Real Name>
- ❺ Course website:  
<http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~iftachh/Courses/FOC/Fall11/main.html> (or just Google iftach and follow the link)

# Grades

- 1 Grading: Please add your name and email through the course website
  - 1 Class exam 60%
  - 2 Homework 30%: 3-5 exercises. Recommend to use LaTeX (see link in course website) Exercises (separate email per question) should be sent to [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com); Title: Question #, Name, Id
  - 3 Self grading 10 %
    - Please register following the link on the course website, and email [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com); Title: Grader #: Name, ID
    - Submit your solution to the question using Latex (I'll check it)
    - Within two weeks after the submission time. The grader should send the checked exercises to [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com) and to the authors, and send a single excel file (columns: Id, Name, grade) to [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com), Title: Checked Exe # ,

## Grades

- 1 Grading: Please add your name and email through the course website
  - 1 Class exam 60%
  - 2 Homework 30%: 3-5 exercises. Recommend to use LaTeX (see link in course website) Exercises (separate email per question) should be sent to [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com); Title: Question #, Name, Id
  - 3 Self grading 10 %
    - Please register following the link on the course website, and email [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com); Title: Grader #: Name, ID
    - Submit your solution to the question using Latex (I'll check it)
    - Within two weeks after the submission time. The grader should send the checked exercises to [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com) and to the authors, and send a single excel file (columns: Id, Name, grade) to [foc.exc@gmail.com](mailto:foc.exc@gmail.com), Title: Checked Exe # ,

# Grades

- ① Grading: Please add your name and email through the course website
  - ① Class exam 60%
  - ② Homework 30%: 3-5 exercises. Recommend to use LaTeX (see link in course website) Exercises (separate email per question) should be sent to `foc.exc@gmail.com`; Title: Question #, Name, Id
  - ③ Self grading 10 %
    - Please register following the link on the course website, and email `foc.exc@gmail.com`; Title: Grader #: Name, ID
    - Submit your solution to the question using Latex (I'll check it)
    - Within two weeks after the submission time. The grader should send the checked exercises to `foc.exc@gmail.com` and to the authors, and send a single excel file (columns: Id, Name, grade) to `foc.exc@gmail.com`, Title: Checked Exe # ,

and..

1 Slides

2 English

and..

- 1 Slides
- 2 English

## Course Prerequisites

- 1 Some prior knowledge of cryptography (such as 0369.3049) might help, but not necessarily
- 2 Basic probability.
- 3 Basic complexity (the classes P, NP, BPP)

# Course Material

## 1 Books:

- 1 Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography.
- 2 Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. An Introduction to Modern Cryptography.

## 2 Lecture notes

- 1 Ran Canetti. Foundation of Cryptography (The 2008 course)
- 2 Salil Vadhan. Introduction to Cryptography.
- 3 Luca Trevisan. Cryptography.
- 4 Yehuda lindell Foundations of Cryptography.



## Section 2

# Course Topics

## Course Topics

Basic primitives in cryptography (i.e., one-way functions, pseudorandom generators and zero-knowledge proofs).

- Focus on *formal* definitions and *rigorous* proofs.
- The goal is not studying some list, but to understand cryptography.
- Get ready to start researching

## Section 3

# Notations

## Notations I

- For  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ , let  $[t] := \{1, \dots, t\}$ .
- $\text{poly}$  stands for the set of all polynomials.
- The worst-case running-time of a *polynomial-time algorithm* on input  $x$ , is bounded by  $p(|x|)$  for some  $p \in \text{poly}$ .
- A function is *polynomial-time computable*, if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute it.
- PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
- A function  $\mu: \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0, 1]$  is negligible, denoted  $\mu(n) = \text{neg}(n)$ , if for any  $p \in \text{poly}$  there exists  $n' \in \mathbb{N}$  with  $\mu(n) \leq 1/p(n)$  for any  $n > n'$ .

## Distribution and random variables I

- The support of a distribution  $P$  over a finite set  $\mathcal{U}$ , denoted  $\text{Supp}(P)$ , is defined as  $\{u \in \mathcal{U} : P(u) > 0\}$ .
- Given a distribution  $P$  and an event  $E$  with  $\Pr_P[E] > 0$ , we let  $(P \mid E)$  denote the conditional distribution  $P$  given  $E$  (i.e.,  $(P \mid E)(x) = \frac{P(x) \wedge E}{\Pr_P[E]}$ ).
- For  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ , let  $U_t$  denote a random variable uniformly distributed over  $\{0, 1\}^t$ .
- Given a random variable  $X$ , we let  $x \leftarrow X$  denote that  $x$  is distributed according to  $X$  (e.g.,  $\Pr_{x \leftarrow X}[x = 7]$ ).
- Given a finite set  $S$ , we let  $x \leftarrow S$  denote that  $x$  is uniformly distributed in  $S$ .

## Distribution and random variables II

- We use the convention that when a random variable appears twice in the same expression, it refers to a *single* instance of this random variable. For instance,  $\Pr[X = X] = 1$  (regardless of the definition of  $X$ ).
- Given distribution  $P$  over  $\mathcal{U}$  and  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ , we let  $P^t$  over  $\mathcal{U}^t$  be defined by  $D^t(x_1, \dots, x_t) = \prod_{i \in [t]} D(x_i)$ .
- Similarly, given a random variable  $X$ , we let  $X^t$  denote the random variable induced by  $t$  independent samples from  $X$ .

## Part II

# Foundation of Cryptography

# Cryptography and Computational Hardness

## 1 What is Cryptography?

## 2 Hardness assumptions, why do we need them?

## 3 Does $P \neq NP$ suffice?

$P \neq NP$ : i.e.,  $\exists L \in NP$ , such that for any polynomial-time algorithm  $A$ ,  $\exists x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  with  $A(x) \neq 1_L(x)$

**polynomial-time algorithms:** an algorithm  $A$  runs in polynomial-time, if  $\exists p \in \text{poly}$  such that the running time of  $A(x)$  is bounded by  $p(|x|)$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

## 4 Problems: hard on the average. No known solution

## 5 One-way functions: an efficiently computable function that no efficient algorithm can invert.



# Cryptography and Computational Hardness

- 1 What is Cryptography?
- 2 Hardness assumptions, why do we need them?
- 3 Does  $P \neq NP$  suffice?

$P \neq NP$ : i.e.,  $\exists L \in NP$ , such that for any polynomial-time algorithm  $A$ ,  $\exists x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  with  $A(x) \neq 1_L(x)$

**polynomial-time algorithms**: an algorithm  $A$  runs in polynomial-time, if  $\exists p \in \text{poly}$  such that the running time of  $A(x)$  is bounded by  $p(|x|)$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

- 4 Problems: hard on the average. No known solution
- 5 One-way functions: an efficiently computable function that no efficient algorithm can invert.

# Cryptography and Computational Hardness

- 1 What is Cryptography?
- 2 Hardness assumptions, why do we need them?
- 3 Does  $P \neq NP$  suffice?

**$P \neq NP$ :** i.e.,  $\exists L \in NP$ , such that for any polynomial-time algorithm  $A$ ,  $\exists x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  with  $A(x) \neq 1_L(x)$

**polynomial-time algorithms:** an algorithm  $A$  runs in polynomial-time, if  $\exists p \in \text{poly}$  such that the running time of  $A(x)$  is bounded by  $p(|x|)$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

- 1 Problems: hard on the average. No known solution
- 2 One-way functions: an efficiently computable function that no efficient algorithm can invert.

## Cryptography and Computational Hardness

- 1 What is Cryptography?
- 2 Hardness assumptions, why do we need them?
- 3 Does  $P \neq NP$  suffice?

**$P \neq NP$ :** i.e.,  $\exists L \in NP$ , such that for any polynomial-time algorithm  $A$ ,  $\exists x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  with  $A(x) \neq 1_L(x)$

**polynomial-time algorithms:** an algorithm  $A$  runs in polynomial-time, if  $\exists p \in \text{poly}$  such that the running time of  $A(x)$  is bounded by  $p(|x|)$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

- 4 Problems: hard on the average. No known solution
- 5 One-way functions: an efficiently computable function that no efficient algorithm can invert.

# Cryptography and Computational Hardness

- ❶ What is Cryptography?
- ❷ Hardness assumptions, why do we need them?
- ❸ Does  $P \neq NP$  suffice?
  - $P \neq NP$ :** i.e.,  $\exists L \in NP$ , such that for any polynomial-time algorithm  $A$ ,  $\exists x \in \{0, 1\}^*$  with  $A(x) \neq 1_L(x)$
  - polynomial-time algorithms:** an algorithm  $A$  runs in polynomial-time, if  $\exists p \in \text{poly}$  such that the running time of  $A(x)$  is bounded by  $p(|x|)$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$
- ❹ Problems: hard on the average. No known solution
- ❺ One-way functions: an efficiently computable function that no efficient algorithm can invert.

## Section 5

# One Way Functions

## One-Way Functions

### Definition 1 (One-Way Functions (OWFs))

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is one-way, if for any PPT  $A$

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[A(1^n, y) \in f^{-1}(y)] = \text{neg}(n)$$

$U_n$ : a random variable uniformly distributed over  $\{0, 1\}^n$

**polynomial-time computable**: there exists a polynomial-time algorithm  $F$ , such that  $F(x) = f(x)$  for every  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

**PPT**: probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm

**neg**: a function  $\mu: \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0, 1]$  is a *negligible* function of  $n$ , denoted  $\mu(n) = \text{neg}(n)$ , if for any  $p \in \text{poly}$  there exists  $n' \in \mathbb{N}$  such that  $\mu(n) < 1/p(n)$  for all  $n > n'$

We will typically omit  $1^n$  from the parameter list of  $A$

- ❶ Is this the right definition?
  - Asymptotic
  - Efficiently computable
  - On the average
  - Only against PPT's
- ❷ (most) Crypto implies OWFs
- ❸ Do OWFs imply Crypto?
- ❹ Where do we find them
- ❺ Non uniform OWFs

### Definition 2 (Non-uniform OWF))

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is one-way, if for any polynomial-size family of circuits  $\{C_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[C_n(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] = \text{neg}(n)$$

- ❶ Is this the right definition?
  - Asymptotic
  - Efficiently computable
  - On the average
  - Only against PPT's
- ❷ (most) Crypto implies OWFs
- ❸ Do OWFs imply Crypto?
- ❹ Where do we find them
- ❺ Non uniform OWFs

### Definition 2 (Non-uniform OWF))

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is one-way, if for any polynomial-size family of circuits  $\{C_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[C_n(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] = \text{neg}(n)$$



- ❶ Is this the right definition?
  - Asymptotic
  - Efficiently computable
  - On the average
  - Only against PPT's
- ❷ (most) Crypto implies OWFs
- ❸ Do OWFs imply Crypto?
- ❹ Where do we find them
- ❺ Non uniform OWFs

### Definition 2 (Non-uniform OWF))

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is one-way, if for any polynomial-size family of circuits  $\{C_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[C_n(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] = \text{neg}(n)$$

## Length preserving functions

### Definition 3 (length preserving functions)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is length preserving, if  $|f(x)| = |x|$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

### Theorem 4

*Assume that OWFs exist, then there exist length-preserving OWFs*

Proof idea: use the assumed OWF to create a length preserving one

## Length preserving functions

### Definition 3 (length preserving functions)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is length preserving, if  $|f(x)| = |x|$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

### Theorem 4

*Assume that OWFs exist, then there exist length-preserving OWFs*

Proof idea: use the assumed OWF to create a length preserving one

## Length preserving functions

### Definition 3 (length preserving functions)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is length preserving, if  $|f(x)| = |x|$  for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

### Theorem 4

*Assume that OWFs exist, then there exist length-preserving OWFs*

Proof idea: use the assumed OWF to create a length preserving one

## Partial domain functions

### Definition 5 (Partial domain functions)

For  $m, \ell: \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$ , let  $h: \{0, 1\}^{m(n)} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  denote a function defined over input lengths in  $\{m(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ , and maps strings of length  $m(n)$  to strings of length  $\ell(n)$ .

The definition of one-wayness naturally extends to such functions.

## OWFs imply Length Preserving OWFs cont.

Let  $f$  be a OWF, let  $p \in \text{poly}$  be a bound on its computing-time and assume wlg. that  $p$  is monotonly increasing (can we?).

### Construction 6 (the length preserving function)

Define  $g: \{0, 1\}^{p(n)} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$  as

$$g(x) = f(x_1, \dots, x_n), 0^{p(n) - |f(x_1, \dots, x_n)|}$$

Note that  $g$  is length preserving and efficient (why?).

### Claim 7

$g$  is one-way.

How can we prove that  $g$  is one-way?

Answer: using reduction

## OWFs imply Length Preserving OWFs cont.

Let  $f$  be a OWF, let  $p \in \text{poly}$  be a bound on its computing-time and assume wlg. that  $p$  is monotonly increasing (can we?).

### Construction 6 (the length preserving function)

Define  $g: \{0, 1\}^{p(n)} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$  as

$$g(x) = f(x_1, \dots, x_n), 0^{p(n) - |f(x_1, \dots, x_n)|}$$

Note that  $g$  is length preserving and efficient (why?).

### Claim 7

$g$  is one-way.

How can we prove that  $g$  is one-way?

Answer: using reduction

## OWFs imply Length Preserving OWFs cont.

Let  $f$  be a OWF, let  $p \in \text{poly}$  be a bound on its computing-time and assume wlg. that  $p$  is monotonly increasing (can we?).

### Construction 6 (the length preserving function)

Define  $g: \{0, 1\}^{p(n)} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$  as

$$g(x) = f(x_1, \dots, x_n), 0^{p(n) - |f(x_1, \dots, x_n)|}$$

Note that  $g$  is length preserving and efficient (why?).

### Claim 7

$g$  is one-way.

How can we prove that  $g$  is one-way?

Answer: using reduction



## OWFs imply Length Preserving OWFs cont.

Let  $f$  be a OWF, let  $p \in \text{poly}$  be a bound on its computing-time and assume wlg. that  $p$  is monotonly increasing (can we?).

### Construction 6 (the length preserving function)

Define  $g: \{0, 1\}^{p(n)} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$  as

$$g(x) = f(x_1, \dots, x_n), 0^{p(n) - |f(x_1, \dots, x_n)|}$$

Note that  $g$  is length preserving and efficient (why?).

### Claim 7

$g$  is one-way.

How can we prove that  $g$  is one-way?

Answer: using reduction

## Proving that $g$ is one-way

Proof:

Assume that  $g$  is not one-way. Namely, there exists PPT  $A$  a  $q \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \{p(n) : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ , with

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n)}[A(y) \in g^{-1}(y)] > 1/q(n) \quad (1)$$

for any  $n \in \mathcal{I}$  (?).

We would like to use  $A$  for inverting  $f$ .

## Proving that $g$ is one-way

Proof:

Assume that  $g$  is not one-way. Namely, there exists PPT  $A$  a  $q \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \{p(n) : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ , with

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n)}[A(y) \in g^{-1}(y)] > 1/q(n) \quad (1)$$

for any  $n \in \mathcal{I}$  (?).

We would like to use  $A$  for inverting  $f$ .

**Algorithm 8 (The inverter B)**

Input:  $1^n$  and  $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .

- 1 Let  $x = A(1^{p(n)}, y, 0^{p(n)-|y|})$ .
- 2 Return  $x_{1,\dots,n}$ .

**Claim 9**

Let  $\mathcal{I}' := \{n \in \mathbb{N} : p(n) \in \mathcal{I}\}$ . Then

- 1  $\mathcal{I}'$  is infinite
- 2 For any  $n \in \mathcal{I}'$ , it holds that  $\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(u_n)}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] > 1/q(p(n))$ .

in contradiction to the assumed one-wayness of  $f$ .  $\square$

**Algorithm 8 (The inverter B)**

Input:  $1^n$  and  $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$ .

- 1 Let  $x = A(1^{p(n)}, y, 0^{p(n)-|y|})$ .
- 2 Return  $x_{1,\dots,n}$ .

**Claim 9**

Let  $\mathcal{I}' := \{n \in \mathbb{N} : p(n) \in \mathcal{I}\}$ . Then

- 1  $\mathcal{I}'$  is infinite
- 2 For any  $n \in \mathcal{I}'$ , it holds that  $\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n)}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] > 1/q(p(n))$ .

in contradiction to the assumed one-wayness of  $f$ .  $\square$

## Conclusion

### Remark 10

- We directly related the hardness of  $f$  to that of  $g$
- The reduction is not “security preserving”

## From partial domain functions to all-length functions

### Construction 11

Given a function  $f: \{0, 1\}^{m(n)} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$ ,  
 $f_{all}: \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  as

$$f_{all}(x) = f(x_1, \dots, x_{k(n)}), 0^{n-k(n)}$$

where  $n = |x|$  and  $k(n) := \max\{m(n') \leq n: n' \in \mathbb{N}\}$ .

### Claim 12

Assume that  $f$  is a one-way function and that  $m$  is monotone, polynomial-time computable and satisfies  $\frac{m(n+1)}{m(n)} \leq p(n)$  for some  $p \in \text{poly}$ , then  $f_{all}$  is a one-way function. Further, if  $f$  is length preserving, then so is  $f_{all}$ .

Proof: ?

## From partial domain functions to all-length functions

### Construction 11

Given a function  $f: \{0, 1\}^{m(n)} \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$ ,  
 $f_{all}: \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  as

$$f_{all}(x) = f(x_1, \dots, x_{k(n)}), 0^{n-k(n)}$$

where  $n = |x|$  and  $k(n) := \max\{m(n') \leq n: n' \in \mathbb{N}\}$ .

### Claim 12

Assume that  $f$  is a one-way function and that  $m$  is monotone, polynomial-time computable and satisfies  $\frac{m(n+1)}{m(n)} \leq p(n)$  for some  $p \in \text{poly}$ , then  $f_{all}$  is a one-way function. Further, if  $f$  is length preserving, then so is  $f_{all}$ .

Proof: ?



## Weak One Way Functions

### Definition 13 (weak one-way functions)

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is  $\alpha$ -one-way, if

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[A(1^n, y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \leq \alpha(n)$$

for any PPT  $A$  and large enough  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

- 1 (strong) OWF according to Def 1, are  $\text{neg}(n)$ -one-way according to the above definition
- 2 Examples
- 3 Can we “amplify” weak OWF to strong ones?

## Weak One Way Functions

### Definition 13 (weak one-way functions)

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is  $\alpha$ -one-way, if

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[A(1^n, y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \leq \alpha(n)$$

for any PPT  $A$  and large enough  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

- 1 (strong) OWF according to Def 1, are  $\text{neg}(n)$ -one-way according to the above definition
- 2 Examples
- 3 Can we “amplify” weak OWF to strong ones?

## Weak One Way Functions

### Definition 13 (weak one-way functions)

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is  $\alpha$ -one-way, if

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[A(1^n, y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \leq \alpha(n)$$

for any PPT  $A$  and large enough  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

- 1 (strong) OWF according to Def 1, are  $\text{neg}(n)$ -one-way according to the above definition
- 2 Examples
- 3 Can we “amplify” weak OWF to strong ones?

## Weak One Way Functions

### Definition 13 (weak one-way functions)

A polynomial-time computable function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \{0, 1\}^*$  is  $\alpha$ -one-way, if

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[A(1^n, y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \leq \alpha(n)$$

for any PPT  $A$  and large enough  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

- 1 (strong) OWF according to Def 1, are  $\text{neg}(n)$ -one-way according to the above definition
- 2 Examples
- 3 Can we “amplify” weak OWF to strong ones?

## Strong to weak OWFs

### Claim 14

Assume there exists OWFs, then there exist functions that are  $\frac{1}{3}$  one-way, but not (strong) one-way

Proof: let  $f$  be a owf. Define  $g(x) = (1, g(x))$  if  $x_1 = 1$ , and 0 otherwise.

## Strong to weak OWFs

### Claim 14

Assume there exists OWFs, then there exist functions that are  $\frac{1}{3}$  one-way, but not (strong) one-way

Proof: let  $f$  be a owf. Define  $g(x) = (1, g(x))$  if  $x_1 = 1$ , and 0 otherwise.

## Weak to Strong OWFs

### Theorem 15

*Assume there exists  $(1 - \alpha)$ -weak OWFs with  $\alpha(n) > 1/p(n)$  for some  $p \in \text{poly}$ , then there exists (strong) one-way functions.*

Proof: we assume wlg that  $f$  is length preserving (can we do so?)

### Construction 16 ( $g$ – the strong one-way function)

Let  $t: \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$  be a polynomial-time computable function satisfying  $t(n) \in \omega(\log n / \alpha(n))$ . Define  $g: (\{0, 1\}^n)^{t(n)} \mapsto (\{0, 1\}^n)^{t(n)}$  as

$$g(x_1, \dots, x_t) = f(x_1), \dots, f(x_t)$$

### Claim 17

$g$  is one-way.

## Weak to Strong OWFs

### Theorem 15

*Assume there exists  $(1 - \alpha)$ -weak OWFs with  $\alpha(n) > 1/p(n)$  for some  $p \in \text{poly}$ , then there exists (strong) one-way functions.*

Proof: we assume wlg that  $f$  is length preserving (can we do so?)

### Construction 16 ( $g$ – the strong one-way function)

Let  $t: \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$  be a polynomial-time computable function satisfying  $t(n) \in \omega(\log n / \alpha(n))$ . Define  $g: (\{0, 1\}^n)^{t(n)} \mapsto (\{0, 1\}^n)^{t(n)}$  as

$$g(x_1, \dots, x_t) = f(x_1), \dots, f(x_t)$$

### Claim 17

$g$  is one-way.



## Weak to Strong OWFs

### Theorem 15

*Assume there exists  $(1 - \alpha)$ -weak OWFs with  $\alpha(n) > 1/p(n)$  for some  $p \in \text{poly}$ , then there exists (strong) one-way functions.*

Proof: we assume wlg that  $f$  is length preserving (can we do so?)

### Construction 16 ( $g$ – the strong one-way function)

Let  $t: \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{N}$  be a polynomial-time computable function satisfying  $t(n) \in \omega(\log n / \alpha(n))$ . Define  $g: (\{0, 1\}^n)^{t(n)} \mapsto (\{0, 1\}^n)^{t(n)}$  as

$$g(x_1, \dots, x_t) = f(x_1), \dots, f(x_t)$$

### Claim 17

$g$  is one-way.

## Proving that $g$ is one-way – the naive approach

Let  $A$  be a potential inverter for  $g$ , and assume that  $A$  tries to attacks each of the  $t$  outputs of  $g$  *independently*. Then

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n^{t(n)})} [A(y) \in g^{-1}(y)] \leq (1 - \alpha(n))^{t(n)} \leq e^{-\omega(\log n)} = \text{neg}(n)$$

A less naive approach would be to assume that  $A$  goes over output sequentially.

Unfortunately, we can assume none of the above.

## Proving that $g$ is one-way – the naive approach

Let  $A$  be a potential inverter for  $g$ , and assume that  $A$  tries to attacks each of the  $t$  outputs of  $g$  *independently*. Then

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n^{t(n)})} [A(y) \in g^{-1}(y)] \leq (1 - \alpha(n))^{t(n)} \leq e^{-\omega(\log n)} = \text{neg}(n)$$

A less naive approach would be to assume that  $A$  goes over output sequentially.

Unfortunately, we can assume none of the above.

## Proving that $g$ is one-way – the naive approach

Let  $A$  be a potential inverter for  $g$ , and assume that  $A$  tries to attacks each of the  $t$  outputs of  $g$  *independently*. Then

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow g(U_n^{t(n)})} [A(y) \in g^{-1}(y)] \leq (1 - \alpha(n))^{t(n)} \leq e^{-\omega(\log n)} = \text{neg}(n)$$

A less naive approach would be to assume that  $A$  goes over output sequentially.

Unfortunately, we can assume none of the above.

# Failing Sets

## Definition 18 (failing set)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  has a  $(\delta(n), \varepsilon(n))$ -failing set for  $A$ , if for large enough  $n$ , exists set  $S(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in S(n)] \geq \delta(n)$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] < \varepsilon(n)$ , for every  $y \in S(n)$

## Claim 19

Let  $f$  be a  $(1 - \alpha)$ -OWF. Then  $f$  has  $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/p(n))$ -failing set for any PPT  $A$  and  $p \in \text{poly}$ .

Proof: Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $A$ , a  $p \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite set  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$  such that for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\exists S(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in S(n)] \geq 1 - \alpha(n)/2$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/p(n)$ , for every  $y \in S(n)$

We'll use  $A$  to contradict the hardness of  $f$ .

## Failing Sets

### Definition 18 (failing set)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  has a  $(\delta(n), \varepsilon(n))$ -failing set for  $A$ , if for large enough  $n$ , exists set  $S(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in S(n)] \geq \delta(n)$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] < \varepsilon(n)$ , for every  $y \in S(n)$

### Claim 19

Let  $f$  be a  $(1 - \alpha)$ -OWF. Then  $f$  has  $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/p(n))$ -failing set for any PPT  $A$  and  $p \in \text{poly}$ .

Proof: Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $A$ , a  $p \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite set  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$  such that for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\exists S(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in S(n)] \geq 1 - \alpha(n)/2$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/p(n)$ , for every  $y \in S(n)$

We'll use  $A$  to contradict the hardness of  $f$ .

## Failing Sets

### Definition 18 (failing set)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  has a  $(\delta(n), \varepsilon(n))$ -failing set for A, if for large enough  $n$ , exists set  $S(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in S(n)] \geq \delta(n)$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] < \varepsilon(n)$ , for every  $y \in S(n)$

### Claim 19

Let  $f$  be a  $(1 - \alpha)$ -OWF. Then  $f$  has  $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/p(n))$ -failing set for any PPT A and  $p \in \text{poly}$ .

Proof: Assume  $\exists$  PPT A, a  $p \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite set  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$  such that for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\exists S(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in S(n)] \geq 1 - \alpha(n)/2$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/p(n)$ , for every  $y \in S(n)$

We'll use A to contradict the hardness of  $f$ .

## Failing Sets

### Definition 18 (failing set)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  has a  $(\delta(n), \varepsilon(n))$ -failing set for  $A$ , if for large enough  $n$ , exists set  $\mathcal{S}(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \geq \delta(n)$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] < \varepsilon(n)$ , for every  $y \in \mathcal{S}(n)$

### Claim 19

Let  $f$  be a  $(1 - \alpha)$ -OWF. Then  $f$  has  $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/p(n))$ -failing set for any PPT  $A$  and  $p \in \text{poly}$ .

Proof: Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $A$ , a  $p \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite set  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$  such that for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ ,  $\exists \mathcal{S}(n) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  with

- 1  $\Pr[f(U_n) \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \geq 1 - \alpha(n)/2$ , and
- 2  $\Pr[A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/p(n)$ , for every  $y \in \mathcal{S}(n)$

We'll use  $A$  to contradict the hardness of  $f$ .



## Using $A$ to invert $f$

### Algorithm 20 (The inverter $B$ )

Input:  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .

Do (with fresh randomness) for  $np(n)$  times:

If  $x = A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)$ , return  $x$

Clearly,  $B$  is a PPT

### Claim 21

For every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ , it holds that

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] > 1 - \alpha(n)$$

Hence,  $f$  is not  $(1 - \alpha(n))$ -one-way  $\square$

## Using $A$ to invert $f$

### Algorithm 20 (The inverter $B$ )

Input:  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .

Do (with fresh randomness) for  $np(n)$  times:

If  $x = A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)$ , return  $x$

Clearly,  $B$  is a PPT

### Claim 21

For every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ , it holds that

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] > 1 - \alpha(n)$$

Hence,  $f$  is not  $(1 - \alpha(n))$ -one-way  $\square$

## Using $A$ to invert $f$

### Algorithm 20 (The inverter $B$ )

Input:  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .

Do (with fresh randomness) for  $np(n)$  times:

If  $x = A(y) \in f^{-1}(y)$ , return  $x$

Clearly,  $B$  is a PPT

### Claim 21

For every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ , it holds that

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] > 1 - \alpha(n)$$

Hence,  $f$  is not  $(1 - \alpha(n))$ -one-way  $\square$

Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over  $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$ ):

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \\ & \geq \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \wedge y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & = \Pr[y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \cdot \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \mid y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - (1 - 1/p(n))^{np(n)}) \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) > 1 - \alpha(n). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over  $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$ ):

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \\ & \geq \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \wedge y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & = \Pr[y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \cdot \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \mid y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - (1 - 1/p(n))^{np(n)}) \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) > 1 - \alpha(n). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over  $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$ ):

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \\ & \geq \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \wedge y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & = \Pr[y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \cdot \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \mid y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - (1 - 1/p(n))^{np(n)}) \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) > 1 - \alpha(n). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over  $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$ ):

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \\ & \geq \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \wedge y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & = \Pr[y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \cdot \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \mid y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - (1 - 1/p(n))^{np(n)}) \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) > 1 - \alpha(n). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Claim 21(all probabilities below are also over  $y \leftarrow f(U_n)$ ):

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \\ & \geq \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \wedge y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & = \Pr[y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \cdot \Pr[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y) \mid y \in \mathcal{S}(n)] \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - (1 - 1/p(n))^{np(n)}) \\ & \geq (1 - \alpha(n)/2) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) > 1 - \alpha(n). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$



## Proving that $g$ is one-way

We show that if  $g$  is not OWF, then  $f$  has no flailing-set of the "right" type.

### Claim 22

Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $A$ ,  $p \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite set  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$  s.t.

$$\Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^{t(n)})}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \geq 1/p(n) \quad (2)$$

for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ . Then  $\exists$  PPT  $B$  and  $q \in \text{poly}$  s.t.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/q(n) \quad (3)$$

for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$  and  $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  with  $\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[\mathcal{S}] \geq \alpha(n)/2$ .

Namely,  $f$  does not have a  $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/q(n))$ -failing set.

## Proving that $g$ is one-way

We show that if  $g$  is not OWF, then  $f$  has no flailing-set of the "right" type.

### Claim 22

Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $A$ ,  $p \in \text{poly}$  and an infinite set  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$  s.t.

$$\Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^{t(n)})}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \geq 1/p(n) \quad (2)$$

for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$ . Then  $\exists$  PPT  $B$  and  $q \in \text{poly}$  s.t.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq 1/q(n) \quad (3)$$

for every  $n \in \mathcal{I}$  and  $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  with  $\Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[\mathcal{S}] \geq \alpha(n)/2$ .

Namely,  $f$  does not have a  $(\alpha(n)/2, 1/q(n))$ -failing set.

## Algorithm B

### Algorithm 23 (No failing set algorithm B)

Input:  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .

- 1 Choose  $z = (z_1, \dots, z_t) \leftarrow g(U_n^t)$  and  $i \leftarrow [t]$
- 2 Set  $z' = (z_1, \dots, z_{i-1}, y, z_{i+1}, \dots, z_t)$
- 3 Return  $A(z')_i$

Fix  $n \in \mathcal{I}$  and a set  $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  of the right probability. We analyze B's success probability using the following (inefficient) algorithm B\*:

## Algorithm B

### Algorithm 23 (No failing set algorithm B)

Input:  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .

- 1 Choose  $z = (z_1, \dots, z_t) \leftarrow g(U_n^t)$  and  $i \leftarrow [t]$
- 2 Set  $z' = (z_1, \dots, z_{i-1}, y, z_{i+1}, \dots, z_t)$
- 3 Return  $A(z')_i$

Fix  $n \in \mathcal{I}$  and a set  $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  of the right probability. We analyze B's success probability using the following (inefficient) algorithm B\*:

# Algorithm B\*

## Definition 24 (Bad)

For  $z \in \text{Im}(g)$  (the image of  $g$ ), we set  $\text{Bad}(z) = 1$  iff  $\nexists i \in [t]$  with  $z_i \in \mathcal{S}$ .

$B^*$  differ from  $B$  in the way it chooses  $z'$ : in case  $\text{Bad}(z) = 1$ , it sets  $z' = z$ . Otherwise, it sets  $i$  to an arbitrary index  $j \in [t]$  with  $z_j \in \mathcal{S}$ , and sets  $z'$  as  $B$  does with respect to this  $i$ .

## Claim 25

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \frac{1/p(n)}{t} \text{neg}(n),$$

$$\text{and therefore } \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \frac{1}{t(n)p(n)} - \text{neg}(n). \square$$

## Algorithm B\*

### Definition 24 (Bad)

For  $z \in \text{Im}(g)$  (the image of  $g$ ), we set  $\text{Bad}(z) = 1$  iff  $\nexists i \in [t]$  with  $z_i \in \mathcal{S}$ .

$B^*$  differ from  $B$  in the way it chooses  $z'$ : in case  $\text{Bad}(z) = 1$ , it sets  $z' = z$ . Otherwise, it sets  $i$  to an arbitrary index  $j \in [t]$  with  $z_j \in \mathcal{S}$ , and sets  $z'$  as  $B$  does with respect to this  $i$ .

### Claim 25

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \frac{1/p(n)}{-} \text{neg}(n),$$

and therefore  $\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \frac{1}{t(n)p(n)} - \text{neg}(n). \square$

Claim 25 follows from the following two claims,

### Claim 26

$$\Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[\text{Bad}(z)] = \text{neg}(n)$$

### Claim 27

Let  $Z = g(U_n^t)$  and let  $Z'$  be the value of  $z'$  induced by a random execution of  $B^*$  on  $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \in S)$ . Then  $Z$  and  $Z'$  are identically distributed.

The claims imply Claim 25.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow S}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U'_n)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] \quad (4)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U'_n)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \\ & \leq \Pr[A(z) \in g^{-1}(Z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] + \Pr[\text{Bad}(z)] \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{y \leftarrow S}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] & \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U'_n)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] - \text{neg}(n) \\ & \geq \frac{1}{p(n)} - \text{neg}(n). \square \end{aligned}$$



The claims imply Claim 25.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] \quad (4)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \\ & \leq \Pr[A(z) \in g^{-1}(Z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] + \Pr[\text{Bad}(z)] \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] & \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] - \text{neg}(n) \\ & \geq \frac{1}{p(n)} - \text{neg}(n). \square \end{aligned}$$

The claims imply Claim 25.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] \quad (4)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \\ & \leq \Pr[A(z) \in g^{-1}(Z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] + \Pr[\text{Bad}(z)] \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] & \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] - \text{neg}(n) \\ & \geq \frac{1}{p(n)} - \text{neg}(n). \square \end{aligned}$$

The claims imply Claim 25.

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] \quad (4)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] \\ & \leq \Pr[A(z) \in g^{-1}(Z) \wedge \neg \text{Bad}(z)] + \Pr[\text{Bad}(z)] \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{S}}[B^*(y) \in f^{-1}(y)] & \geq \Pr_{z \leftarrow g(U_n^t)}[A(z) \in g^{-1}(z)] - \text{neg}(n) \\ & \geq \frac{1}{p(n)} - \text{neg}(n). \square \end{aligned}$$

## Proof of Claim 26?

Proof of Claim 27: Consider the following process for sampling  $Z_i$ :

- 1 Let  $\beta = \Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[S]$ . Set  $\ell_i = 1$  wp  $\beta$  and  $\ell_i = 0$  otherwise.
- 2 If  $\ell_i = 1$ , let  $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \in S)$ . Otherwise, set  $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \notin S)$ .

It is easy to see that the above process is correct (samples  $Z$  correctly).

Now all that  $B^*$  does, is repeating Step 2 for one of the  $i$ 's with  $\ell_i = 1$  (if such exists)  $\square$

Proof of Claim 26?

Proof of Claim 27: Consider the following process for sampling  $Z_i$ :

- 1 Let  $\beta = \Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[S]$ . Set  $\ell_i = 1$  wp  $\beta$  and  $\ell_i = 0$  otherwise.
- 2 If  $\ell_i = 1$ , let  $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \in S)$ . Otherwise, set  $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \notin S)$ .

It is easy to see that the above process is correct (samples  $Z$  correctly).

Now all that  $B^*$  does, is repeating Step 2 for one of the  $i$ 's with  $\ell_i = 1$  (if such exists)  $\square$

Proof of Claim 26?

Proof of Claim 27: Consider the following process for sampling  $Z_i$ :

- 1 Let  $\beta = \Pr_{y \leftarrow f(U_n)}[S]$ . Set  $\ell_i = 1$  wp  $\beta$  and  $\ell_i = 0$  otherwise.
- 2 If  $\ell_i = 1$ , let  $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \in S)$ . Otherwise, set  $y \leftarrow (f(U_n) \mid f(U_n) \notin S)$ .

It is easy to see that the above process is correct (samples  $Z$  correctly).

Now all that  $B^*$  does, is repeating Step 2 for one of the  $i$ 's with  $\ell_i = 1$  (if such exists)  $\square$

## Conclusion

### Remark 28 (hardness amplification via parallel repetition)

- Can we give a more efficient (secure) reduction?
- Similar theorems for other cryptographic primitives (e.g., Captchas, general protocols)?  
What properties of the weak OWF have we used in the proof?

## Conclusion

### Remark 28 (hardness amplification via parallel repetition)

- Can we give a more efficient (secure) reduction?
- Similar theorems for other cryptographic primitives (e.g., Captchas, general protocols)?

What properties of the weak OWF have we used in the proof?



## Conclusion

### Remark 28 (hardness amplification via parallel repetition)

- Can we give a more efficient (secure) reduction?
- Similar theorems for other cryptographic primitives (e.g., Captchas, general protocols)?

What properties of the weak OWF have we used in the proof?