

Foundation of Cryptography, Lecture 6

Interactive Proofs and Zero Knowledge

Iftach Haitner, Tel Aviv University

Tel Aviv University.

May 7, 2013

Part I

Interactive Proofs

\mathcal{NP} as a Non-interactive Proofs

Definition 1 (\mathcal{NP})

$\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ iff $\exists \ell \in \text{poly}$ and poly-time algorithm V such that:

- $\forall x \in \mathcal{L} \cap \{0, 1\}^n$ there exists $w \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$ s.t. $V(x, w) = 1$
- $V(x, w) = 0$ for every $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$

\mathcal{NP} as a Non-interactive Proofs

Definition 1 (\mathcal{NP})

$\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ iff $\exists \ell \in \text{poly}$ and poly-time algorithm V such that:

- $\forall x \in \mathcal{L} \cap \{0, 1\}^n$ there exists $w \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$ s.t. $V(x, w) = 1$
- $V(x, w) = 0$ for every $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$

- A non-interactive proof

\mathcal{NP} as a Non-interactive Proofs

Definition 1 (\mathcal{NP})

$\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ iff $\exists \ell \in \text{poly}$ and poly-time algorithm V such that:

- $\forall x \in \mathcal{L} \cap \{0, 1\}^n$ there exists $w \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$ s.t. $V(x, w) = 1$
- $V(x, w) = 0$ for every $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$

- A non-interactive proof
- Interactive proofs?

Interactive protocols

- Interactive algorithm

Interactive protocols

- Interactive algorithm
- Protocol $\pi = (A, B)$

Interactive protocols

- Interactive algorithm
- Protocol $\pi = (A, B)$
- RV describing the parties joint output $\langle A(i_A), B(i_B) \rangle(i)$

Interactive protocols

- Interactive algorithm
- Protocol $\pi = (A, B)$
- RV describing the parties joint output $\langle A(i_A), B(i_B) \rangle(i)$
- m -round algorithm, m -round protocol

Interactive Proofs

Definition 2 (Interactive Proof (IP))

A protocol (P, V) is an **interactive proof** for \mathcal{L} , if V is PPT and:

Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\langle (P, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \geq 2/3$

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and **any** algorithm P^* $\Pr[\langle (P^*, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \leq 1/3$

Interactive Proofs

Definition 2 (Interactive Proof (IP))

A protocol (P, V) is an **interactive proof** for \mathcal{L} , if V is PPT and:

Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\langle (P, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \geq 2/3$

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and **any** algorithm P^* $\Pr[\langle (P^*, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \leq 1/3$

- $IP = PSPACE!$

Interactive Proofs

Definition 2 (Interactive Proof (IP))

A protocol (P, V) is an **interactive proof** for \mathcal{L} , if V is PPT and:

Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\langle (P, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \geq 2/3$

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and **any** algorithm P^* $\Pr[\langle (P^*, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \leq 1/3$

- $IP = PSPACE$!
- We typically consider (and achieve) perfect completeness

Interactive Proofs

Definition 2 (Interactive Proof (IP))

A protocol (P, V) is an **interactive proof** for \mathcal{L} , if V is PPT and:

Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\langle (P, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \geq 2/3$

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and **any** algorithm P^* $\Pr[\langle (P^*, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \leq 1/3$

- $IP = PSPACE$!
- We typically consider (and achieve) perfect completeness
- Negligible “soundness error” achieved via repetition.

Interactive Proofs

Definition 2 (Interactive Proof (IP))

A protocol (P, V) is an **interactive proof** for \mathcal{L} , if V is PPT and:

Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\langle (P, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \geq 2/3$

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and **any** algorithm P^* $\Pr[\langle (P^*, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \leq 1/3$

- $IP = PSPACE$!
- We typically consider (and achieve) perfect completeness
- Negligible “soundness error” achieved via repetition.
- Sometime we have efficient provers via “auxiliary input”

Interactive Proofs

Definition 2 (Interactive Proof (IP))

A protocol (P, V) is an **interactive proof** for \mathcal{L} , if V is PPT and:

Completeness $\forall x \in \mathcal{L}, \Pr[\langle (P, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \geq 2/3$

Soundness $\forall x \notin \mathcal{L}$, and **any** algorithm P^* $\Pr[\langle (P^*, V)(x) \rangle = 1] \leq 1/3$

- $IP = PSPACE$!
- We typically consider (and achieve) perfect completeness
- Negligible “soundness error” achieved via repetition.
- Sometime we have efficient provers via “auxiliary input”
- *computationally sound proofs/interactive arguments*: Soundness only guaranteed against **efficient** (PPT) provers

Section 1

Interactive Proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

- We assume a reasonable mapping from graphs to strings

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

- We assume a reasonable mapping from graphs to strings
- $\mathcal{GI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

- We assume a reasonable mapping from graphs to strings
- $\mathcal{GI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$
- Does $\mathcal{GINI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \not\equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$?

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

- We assume a reasonable mapping from graphs to strings
- $\mathcal{GI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$
- Does $\mathcal{GNI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \not\equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$?
- We will show a simple interactive proof for \mathcal{GNI}

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

- We assume a reasonable mapping from graphs to strings
- $\mathcal{GI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$
- Does $\mathcal{GNI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \not\equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$?
- We will show a simple interactive proof for \mathcal{GNI}

Graph isomorphism

Π_m – the set of all permutations from $[m]$ to $[m]$

Definition 3 (graph isomorphism)

Graphs $G_0 = ([m], E_0)$ and $G_1 = ([m], E_1)$ are **isomorphic**, denoted $G_0 \equiv G_1$, if $\exists \pi \in \Pi_m$ such that $(u, v) \in E_0$ iff $(\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_1$.

- We assume a reasonable mapping from graphs to strings
- $\mathcal{GI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$
- Does $\mathcal{GNI} = \{(G_0, G_1) : G_0 \not\equiv G_1\} \in \mathcal{NP}$?
- We will show a simple interactive proof for \mathcal{GNI} Idea: Beer tasting...

Protocol 4 ((P, V))

Common input $G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1)$

- 1 V chooses $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$, and sends $\pi(E_b) = \{(\pi(u), \pi(v)) : (u, v) \in E_b\}$ to P
- 2 P send b' to V (tries to set $b' = b$)
- 3 V accepts iff $b' = b$

IP for \mathcal{GNI}

Protocol 4 ((P, V))

Common input $G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1)$

- 1 V chooses $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$, and sends $\pi(E_b) = \{(\pi(u), \pi(v)) : (u, v) \in E_b\}$ to P
- 2 P send b' to V (tries to set $b' = b$)
- 3 V accepts iff $b' = b$

Claim 5

The above protocol is IP for \mathcal{GNI} , with perfect completeness and soundness error $\frac{1}{2}$.

Proving Claim 5

- Graph isomorphism is an equivalence relation (separates the set of all graph pairs into separate subsets)

Proving Claim 5

- Graph isomorphism is an equivalence relation (separates the set of all graph pairs into separate subsets)

Proving Claim 5

- Graph isomorphism is an equivalence relation (separates the set of all graph pairs into separate subsets)
- $([m], \pi(E_i))$ is a random element in $[G_i]$ — the equivalence class of G_i

Proving Claim 5

- Graph isomorphism is an equivalence relation (separates the set of all graph pairs into separate subsets)
- $([m], \pi(E_i))$ is a random element in $[G_i]$ — the equivalence class of G_i

Proving Claim 5

- Graph isomorphism is an equivalence relation (separates the set of all graph pairs into separate subsets)
- $([m], \pi(E_i))$ is a random element in $[G_i]$ — the equivalence class of G_i

Hence,

$$G_0 \equiv G_1: \Pr[b' = b] \leq \frac{1}{2}.$$

Proving Claim 5

- Graph isomorphism is an equivalence relation (separates the set of all graph pairs into separate subsets)
- $([m], \pi(E_i))$ is a random element in $[G_i]$ — the equivalence class of G_i

Hence,

$$G_0 \equiv G_1: \Pr[b' = b] \leq \frac{1}{2}.$$

$$G_0 \not\equiv G_1: \Pr[b' = b] = 1 \text{ (i.e., } P \text{ can, possibly inefficiently, extract } \pi(E_i) \text{)}$$



Part II

Zero knowledge Proofs

Where is Waldo?



Where is Waldo?



Question 6

Can you prove you know where Waldo is **without** revealing his location?

The concept of zero knowledge

- Proving w/o revealing any additional information.

The concept of zero knowledge

- Proving w/o revealing any additional information.
- What does it mean?

The concept of zero knowledge

- Proving w/o revealing any additional information.
- What does it mean?
Simulation paradigm.

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that $\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$.

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

- 1 \mathcal{ZK} is a property of the **prover**.

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

- 1 \mathcal{ZK} is a property of the **prover**.
- 2 \mathcal{ZK} only required to hold with respect to true statements.

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

- 1 \mathcal{ZK} is a property of the **prover**.
- 2 \mathcal{ZK} only required to hold with respect to true statements.
- 3 wlg. V^* 's outputs is its "view".

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

- 1 \mathcal{ZK} is a property of the **prover**.
- 2 \mathcal{ZK} only required to hold with respect to true statements.
- 3 wlg. V^* 's outputs is its "view".
- 4 Trivial to achieve for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{BPP}$

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

- 1 \mathcal{ZK} is a property of the **prover**.
- 2 \mathcal{ZK} only required to hold with respect to true statements.
- 3 wlg. V^* 's outputs is its "view".
- 4 Trivial to achieve for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{BPP}$
- 5 Extension: auxiliary input

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

- 1 \mathcal{ZK} is a property of the **prover**.
- 2 \mathcal{ZK} only required to hold with respect to true statements.
- 3 wlg. V^* 's outputs is its "view".
- 4 Trivial to achieve for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{BPP}$
- 5 Extension: auxiliary input
- 6 The "standard" \mathcal{NP} proof is typically not zero knowledge

Zero knowledge Proof

Definition 7 (computational \mathcal{ZK})

An interactive proof (P, V) is **computational zero-knowledge proof** (\mathcal{CZK}) for \mathcal{L} , if \forall PPT V^* , \exists PPT S such that

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}.$$

Perfect \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{PZK})/statistical \mathcal{ZK} (\mathcal{SZK}) – the above dist. are identically/statistically close, even for **unbounded** V^* .

- 1 \mathcal{ZK} is a property of the **prover**.
- 2 \mathcal{ZK} only required to hold with respect to true statements.
- 3 wlg. V^* 's outputs is its "view".
- 4 Trivial to achieve for $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{BPP}$
- 5 Extension: auxiliary input
- 6 The "standard" \mathcal{NP} proof is typically not zero knowledge
- 7 Next class — \mathcal{ZK} for all \mathcal{NP}

Section 2

Zero-Knowledge Proof go Graph-Isomorphism

\mathcal{ZK} Proof for Graph Isomorphism

Idea: route finding

ZK Proof for Graph Isomorphism

Idea: route finding

Protocol 8 ((P, V))

Common input $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

P's input a permutation π such that $\pi(E_1) = E_0$

- ➊ P chooses $\pi' \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi'(E_0)$ to V
- ➋ V sends $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to P
- ➌ if $b = 0$, P sets $\pi'' = \pi'$, otherwise, it sends $\pi'' = \pi' \circ \pi$ to V
- ➍ V accepts iff $\pi''(E_b) = E$

\mathcal{ZK} Proof for Graph Isomorphism

Idea: route finding

Protocol 8 ((P, V))

Common input $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

P's input a permutation π such that $\pi(E_1) = E_0$

- ➊ P chooses $\pi' \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi'(E_0)$ to V
- ➋ V sends $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to P
- ➌ if $b = 0$, P sets $\pi'' = \pi'$, otherwise, it sends $\pi'' = \pi' \circ \pi$ to V
- ➍ V accepts iff $\pi''(E_b) = E$

Claim 9

The above protocol is \mathcal{SZK} for \mathcal{GI} , with perfect completeness and soundness $\frac{1}{2}$.

Proving Claim 9

- Completeness: Clear

Proving Claim 9

- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: If exist $j \in \{0, 1\}$ for which $\nexists \pi' \in \Pi_m$ with $\pi'(E_j) = E$, then V rejects w.p. at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

Assuming V rejects w.p. less than $\frac{1}{2}$ and let π_0 and π_1 be the values guaranteed by the above observation (i.e., mapping E_0 and E_1 to E respectively).

Then $\pi_0^{-1}(\pi_1(E_1)) = \pi_0 \implies (G_0, G_1) \in \mathcal{GI}$.

Proving Claim 9

- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: If exist $j \in \{0, 1\}$ for which $\nexists \pi' \in \Pi_m$ with $\pi'(E_j) = E$, then V rejects w.p. at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

Assuming V rejects w.p. less than $\frac{1}{2}$ and let π_0 and π_1 be the values guaranteed by the above observation (i.e., mapping E_0 and E_1 to E respectively).

Then $\pi_0^{-1}(\pi_1(E_1)) = \pi_0 \implies (G_0, G_1) \in \mathcal{GI}$.

- \mathcal{ZK} : Idea – for $(G_0, G_1) \in \mathcal{GI}$, it is easy to generate a random transcript for Steps 1-2, and to be able to open it with prob $\frac{1}{2}$.

The simulator

For a start consider a deterministic cheating verifier V^* that never aborts.

The simulator

For a start consider a deterministic cheating verifier V^* that never aborts.

Algorithm 10 (S)

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

Do $|x|$ times:

- 1 Choose $b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$, and “send” $\pi(E_{b'})$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Let b be V^* ’s answer. If $b = b'$, send π to V^* , output V^* ’s output and halt.
Otherwise, **rewind** the simulation to its first step.

Abort

The simulator

For a start consider a deterministic cheating verifier V^* that never aborts.

Algorithm 10 (S)

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

Do $|x|$ times:

- 1 Choose $b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$, and “send” $\pi(E_{b'})$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Let b be V^* ’s answer. If $b = b'$, send π to V^* , output V^* ’s output and halt.
Otherwise, **rewind** the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Claim 11

$$\{ \langle (P, V^*)(x) \rangle \}_{x \in \mathcal{GI}} \approx \{ S(x) \}_{x \in \mathcal{GI}}$$

Proving Claim 11

Algorithm 12 (S')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

Do $|x|$ times:

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Let b be V^* 's answer.
W.p. $\frac{1}{2}$, find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$ and send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.
Otherwise, rewind the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Proving Claim 11

Algorithm 12 (S')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

Do $|x|$ times:

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Let b be V^* 's answer.
W.p. $\frac{1}{2}$, find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$ and send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.
Otherwise, rewind the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Claim 13

$S(x) \equiv S'(x)$ for any $x \in \mathcal{GI}$.

Proving Claim 11

Algorithm 12 (S')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

Do $|x|$ times:

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Let b be V^* 's answer.
W.p. $\frac{1}{2}$, find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$ and send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.
Otherwise, rewind the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Claim 13

$S(x) \equiv S'(x)$ for any $x \in \mathcal{GI}$.

Proof: ?

Proving Claim 11 cont.

Algorithm 14 (S'')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$, send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Proving Claim 11 cont.

Algorithm 14 (S'')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$, send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Claim 15

$\forall x \in \mathcal{GI}$ it holds that

- 1 $\langle (P, V^*(x)) \rangle \equiv S''(x)$.

Proof: ?

Proving Claim 11 cont.

Algorithm 14 (S'')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$, send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Claim 15

$\forall x \in \mathcal{GI}$ it holds that

- 1 $\langle (P, V^*(x)) \rangle \equiv S''(x)$.
- 2 $SD(S''(x), S'(x)) \leq 2^{-|x|}$.

Proof: ?

Proving Claim 11 cont.

Algorithm 14 (S'')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$, send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Claim 15

$\forall x \in \mathcal{GI}$ it holds that

- 1 $\langle (P, V^*(x)) \rangle \equiv S''(x)$.
- 2 $SD(S''(x), S'(x)) \leq 2^{-|x|}$.

Proof: ?

Proving Claim 11 cont.

Algorithm 14 (S'')

Input: $x = (G_0 = ([m], E_0), G_1 = ([m], E_1))$

- 1 Choose $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_m$ and sends $E = \pi(E_0)$ to $V^*(x)$.
- 2 Find π' such that $E = \pi'(E_b)$, send it to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Claim 15

$\forall x \in \mathcal{GI}$ it holds that

- 1 $\langle (P, V^*(x)) \rangle \equiv S''(x)$.
- 2 $SD(S''(x), S'(x)) \leq 2^{-|x|}$.

Proof: ? (1) is clear.

Proving Claim 15(2)

Fix (E, π') and let $\alpha = \Pr_{S''(x)}[(E, \pi')]$.

Proving Claim 15(2)

Fix (E, π') and let $\alpha = \Pr_{S''(x)}[(E, \pi')]$.

It holds that

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{S'(x)}[(E, \pi')] &= \alpha \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{|x|} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right)^{i-1} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \\ &= (1 - 2^{-|x|}) \cdot \alpha\end{aligned}$$

Proving Claim 15(2)

Fix (E, π') and let $\alpha = \Pr_{S''(x)}[(E, \pi')]$.

It holds that

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{S'(x)}[(E, \pi')] &= \alpha \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{|x|} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right)^{i-1} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \\ &= (1 - 2^{-|x|}) \cdot \alpha\end{aligned}$$

Hence, $SD(S''(x), S'(x)) \leq 2^{-|x|} \square$

- 1 Randomized verifiers

Remarks

- 1 Randomized verifiers
- 2 Aborting verifiers

Remarks

- 1 Randomized verifiers
- 2 Aborting verifiers
- 3 Auxiliary input

Remarks

- ➊ Randomized verifiers
- ➋ Aborting verifiers
- ➌ Auxiliary input
- ➍ Negligible soundness error?

Remarks

- ➊ Randomized verifiers
- ➋ Aborting verifiers
- ➌ Auxiliary input
- ➍ Negligible soundness error?

Remarks

- 1 Randomized verifiers
- 2 Aborting verifiers
- 3 Auxiliary input
- 4 Negligible soundness error? Sequential/Parallel composition

Remarks

- 1 Randomized verifiers
- 2 Aborting verifiers
- 3 Auxiliary input
- 4 Negligible soundness error? Sequential/Parallel composition
- 5 Perfect \mathcal{ZK} for “expected time simulators”

Remarks

- 1 Randomized verifiers
- 2 Aborting verifiers
- 3 Auxiliary input
- 4 Negligible soundness error? Sequential/Parallel composition
- 5 Perfect \mathcal{ZK} for “expected time simulators”
- 6 “Black box” simulation

“Transcript Simulation” Might Be Too Weak

“Transcript Simulation” Might Be Too Weak

Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme and let $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

“Transcript Simulation” Might Be Too Weak

Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme and let $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Protocol 16 $((P, V))$

Common input $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

P's input $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- 1 V chooses $(d, e) \leftarrow G(1^{|x|})$ and sends e to P
- 2 P sends $c = E_e(w)$ to V
- 3 V accepts iff $D_d(c) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

“Transcript Simulation” Might Be Too Weak

Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme and let $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Protocol 16 $((P, V))$

Common input $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

P's input $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- 1 V chooses $(d, e) \leftarrow G(1^{|x|})$ and sends e to P
- 2 P sends $c = E_e(w)$ to V
- 3 V accepts iff $D_d(c) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- The above protocol has perfect completeness and soundness.

“Transcript Simulation” Might Be Too Weak

Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme and let $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Protocol 16 $((P, V))$

Common input $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

P's input $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- 1 V chooses $(d, e) \leftarrow G(1^{|x|})$ and sends e to P
- 2 P sends $c = E_e(w)$ to V
- 3 V accepts iff $D_d(c) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- The above protocol has perfect completeness and soundness.
- Is it zero-knowledge?

“Transcript Simulation” Might Be Too Weak

Let (G, E, D) be a public-key encryption scheme and let $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Protocol 16 $((P, V))$

Common input $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

P's input $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- 1 V chooses $(d, e) \leftarrow G(1^{|x|})$ and sends e to P
- 2 P sends $c = E_e(w)$ to V
- 3 V accepts iff $D_d(c) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- The above protocol has perfect completeness and soundness.
- Is it zero-knowledge?
- It has “transcript simulator” (at least for honest verifiers): exists PPT S such that $\{trans(\langle (P(w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)), V)(x)) \rangle\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{S(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$, where $trans$ stands for the transcript of the protocol (i.e., the messages exchange through the execution).

Section 3

Black-box Zero Knowledge

Black-box simulators

Definition 17 (Black-box simulator)

(P, V) is \mathcal{CZK} with **black-box simulation** for \mathcal{L} , if \exists oracle-aided PPT S s.t. for every deterministic polynomial-time^a V^* :

$$\{(P(w_x), V^*(z_x))(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{S^{V^*(x, z_x)}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$$

for any $\{(w_x, z_x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x) \times \{0, 1\}^*\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$.

Black-box simulators

Definition 17 (Black-box simulator)

(P, V) is \mathcal{CZK} with **black-box simulation** for \mathcal{L} , if \exists oracle-aided PPT S s.t. for every deterministic polynomial-time^a V^* :

$$\{(P(w_x), V^*(z_x))(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{S^{V^*(x, z_x)}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$$

for any $\{(w_x, z_x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x) \times \{0, 1\}^*\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$.

Prefect and statistical variants are defined analogously.

^aLength of auxiliary input does not count for the running time.

Black-box simulators

Definition 17 (Black-box simulator)

(P, V) is \mathcal{CZK} with **black-box simulation** for \mathcal{L} , if \exists oracle-aided PPT S s.t. for every deterministic polynomial-time^a V^* :

$$\{(P(w_x), V^*(z_x))(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{S^{V^*(x, z_x)}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$$

for any $\{(w_x, z_x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x) \times \{0, 1\}^*\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$.

Prefect and statistical variants are defined analogously.

^aLength of auxiliary input does not count for the running time.

❶ “Most simulators” are black box

Black-box simulators

Definition 17 (Black-box simulator)

(P, V) is \mathcal{CZK} with **black-box simulation** for \mathcal{L} , if \exists oracle-aided PPT S s.t. for every deterministic polynomial-time^a V^* :

$$\{(P(w_x), V^*(z_x))(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{S^{V^*(x, z_x)}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$$

for any $\{(w_x, z_x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x) \times \{0, 1\}^*\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$.

Perfect and statistical variants are defined analogously.

^aLength of auxiliary input does not count for the running time.

- 1 “Most simulators” are black box

Black-box simulators

Definition 17 (Black-box simulator)

(P, V) is \mathcal{CZK} with **black-box simulation** for \mathcal{L} , if \exists oracle-aided PPT S s.t. for every deterministic polynomial-time^a V^* :

$$\{(P(w_x), V^*(z_x))(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \approx_c \{S^{V^*(x, z_x)}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$$

for any $\{(w_x, z_x) \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x) \times \{0, 1\}^*\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$.

Prefect and statistical variants are defined analogously.

^aLength of auxiliary input does not count for the running time.

- 1 “Most simulators” are black box
- 2 Strictly weaker than general simulation!

Section 4

Zero Knowledge for all NP

- Assuming that OWFs exists, we give a (black-box) \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL .

\mathcal{CZK} for 3COL

- Assuming that OWFs exists, we give a (black-box) \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL .
- We show how to transform it for any $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ (using that $3\text{COL} \in \mathcal{NPC}$).

\mathcal{CZK} for 3COL

- Assuming that OWFs exists, we give a (black-box) \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL .
- We show how to transform it for any $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ (using that $3\text{COL} \in \mathcal{NPC}$).

- Assuming that OWFs exists, we give a (black-box) \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL .
- We show how to transform it for any $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ (using that $3\text{COL} \in \mathcal{NPC}$).

Definition 18 (3COL)

$G = (M, E) \in 3\text{COL}$, if $\exists \phi: M \mapsto [3]$ s.t. $\phi(u) \neq \phi(v)$ for every $(u, v) \in E$.

- Assuming that OWFs exists, we give a (black-box) \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL .
- We show how to transform it for any $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ (using that $3\text{COL} \in \mathcal{NPC}$).

Definition 18 (3COL)

$G = (M, E) \in 3\text{COL}$, if $\exists \phi: M \mapsto [3]$ s.t. $\phi(u) \neq \phi(v)$ for every $(u, v) \in E$.

We use commitment schemes.

The protocol

Let π_3 be the set of all permutations over $[3]$.

The protocol

Let π_3 be the set of all permutations over [3]. We use perfectly binding commitment Com.

The protocol

Let π_3 be the set of all permutations over $[3]$. We use perfectly binding commitment Com .

Protocol 19 $((P, V))$

Common input: Graph $G = (M, E)$ with $n = |G|$

P 's input: a (valid) coloring ϕ of G

- 1 P chooses $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_3$ and sets $\psi = \pi \circ \phi$
- 2 $\forall v \in M$: P commits to $\psi(v)$ using Com (with security parameter 1^n).
Let c_v and d_v be the resulting commitment and decommitment.
- 3 V sends $e = (u, v) \leftarrow E$ to P
- 4 P sends $(d_u, \psi(u)), (d_v, \psi(v))$ to V
- 5 V verifies that (1) both decommitments are valid, (2) $\psi(u), \psi(v) \in [3]$ and (3) $\psi(u) \neq \psi(v)$.

Claim 20

The above protocol is a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL , with perfect completeness and soundness $1/|E|$.

Claim 20

The above protocol is a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL , with perfect completeness and soundness $1/|E|$.

- Completeness: Clear

Claim 20

The above protocol is a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL , with perfect completeness and soundness $1/|E|$.

- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: Let $\{c_v\}_{v \in M}$ be the commitments resulting from an interaction of V with an arbitrary P^* .

Define $\phi: M \mapsto [3]$ as follows:

$\forall v \in M$: let $\phi(v)$ be the (single) value that it is possible to decommit c_v into (if not in $[3]$, set $\phi(v) = 1$).

Claim 20

The above protocol is a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL , with perfect completeness and soundness $1/|E|$.

- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: Let $\{c_v\}_{v \in M}$ be the commitments resulting from an interaction of V with an arbitrary P^* .

Define $\phi: M \mapsto [3]$ as follows:

$\forall v \in M$: let $\phi(v)$ be the (single) value that it is possible to decommit c_v into (if not in $[3]$, set $\phi(v) = 1$).

Claim 20

The above protocol is a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL , with perfect completeness and soundness $1/|E|$.

- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: Let $\{c_v\}_{v \in M}$ be the commitments resulting from an interaction of V with an arbitrary P^* .

Define $\phi: M \mapsto [3]$ as follows:

$\forall v \in M$: let $\phi(v)$ be the (single) value that it is possible to decommit c_v into (if not in $[3]$, set $\phi(v) = 1$).

If $G \notin 3\text{COL}$, then $\exists (u, v) \in E$ s.t. $\phi(u) \neq \phi(v)$.

Claim 20

The above protocol is a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL , with perfect completeness and soundness $1/|E|$.

- Completeness: Clear
- Soundness: Let $\{c_v\}_{v \in M}$ be the commitments resulting from an interaction of V with an arbitrary P^* .

Define $\phi: M \mapsto [3]$ as follows:

$\forall v \in M$: let $\phi(v)$ be the (single) value that it is possible to decommit c_v into (if not in $[3]$, set $\phi(v) = 1$).

If $G \notin 3\text{COL}$, then $\exists (u, v) \in E$ s.t. $\phi(u) \neq \phi(v)$. Hence V rejects such x w.p. at least $1/|E|$

Proving \mathcal{ZK}

Fix a deterministic, non-aborting V^* that gets no auxiliary input.

Proving \mathcal{ZK}

Fix a deterministic, non-aborting V^* that gets no auxiliary input.

Algorithm 21 (S)

Input: A graph $G = (M, E)$ with $n = |G|$

Do $n \cdot |E|$ times:

- ➊ Choose $e' = (u, v) \leftarrow E$. Set $\psi(u) \leftarrow [3]$, $\psi(v) \leftarrow [3] \setminus \{\psi(u)\}$, and $\psi(w) = 1$ for $w \in M \setminus \{u, v\}$
- ➋ $\forall v \in M$: commit to $\psi(v)$ to V^* (resulting in c_v and d_v)
- ➌ Let e be the edge sent by V^* .
If $e = e'$, send $(d_u, \psi(u)), (d_v, \psi(v))$ to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.
Otherwise, **rewind** the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Claim 22

$\{(P(w_x), V^*)(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \approx_c \{S^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$, for any $\{w_x \in R_{3\text{COL}}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$.

Consider the following (inefficient simulator)

Algorithm 23 (S')

Input: $G = (V, E)$ with $n = |G|$

Find (using brute force) a valid coloring ϕ of G

Do $n \cdot |E|$ times

1 Act as the honest prover does given private input ϕ

2 Let e be the edge sent by V^* .

W.p. $1/|E|$, S' sends $(\psi(u), d_u), (\psi(v), d_v)$ to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Otherwise, rewind the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Consider the following (inefficient simulator)

Algorithm 23 (S')

Input: $G = (V, E)$ with $n = |G|$

Find (using brute force) a valid coloring ϕ of G

Do $n \cdot |E|$ times

1 Act as the honest prover does given private input ϕ

2 Let e be the edge sent by V^* .

W.p. $1/|E|$, S' sends $(\psi(u), d_u), (\psi(v), d_v)$ to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Otherwise, rewind the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Claim 24

$$\{S^{V^*}(x)(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \approx_c \{S'^{V^*}(x)(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$$

Consider the following (inefficient simulator)

Algorithm 23 (S')

Input: $G = (V, E)$ with $n = |G|$

Find (using brute force) a valid coloring ϕ of G

Do $n \cdot |E|$ times

1 Act as the honest prover does given private input ϕ

2 Let e be the edge sent by V^* .

W.p. $1/|E|$, S' sends $(\psi(u), d_u), (\psi(v), d_v)$ to V^* , output V^* 's output and halt.

Otherwise, rewind the simulation to its first step.

Abort

Claim 24

$$\{S^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \approx_c \{S'^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$$

Proof: ?

Proving Claim 24

Assume \exists PPT D , $p \in \text{poly}$ and an infinite set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 3\text{COL}$ s.t.

$$\left| \Pr[D(|x|, S^{V^*(x)}(x)) = 1] - \Pr[D(|x|, S'^{V^*(x)}(x)) = 1] \right| \geq 1/p(|x|)$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{I}$.

Proving Claim 24

Assume \exists PPT D , $p \in \text{poly}$ and an infinite set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 3\text{COL}$ s.t.

$$\left| \Pr[D(|x|, S^{V^*}(x)) = 1] - \Pr[D(|x|, S'^{V^*}(x)) = 1] \right| \geq 1/p(|x|)$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{I}$.

Hence, \exists PPT R^* and $b \neq b' \in [3]$ such that

$$\{\text{View}_{R^*}(S(b), R^*(x))(1^{|x|})\}_{x \in \mathcal{I}} \not\approx_c \{\text{View}_{R^*}(S(b'), R^*(x))(1^{|x|})\}_{x \in \mathcal{I}}$$

where S is the sender in Com .

Proving Claim 24

Assume \exists PPT D , $p \in \text{poly}$ and an infinite set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq 3\text{COL}$ s.t.

$$\left| \Pr[D(|x|, S^{V^*}(x)) = 1] - \Pr[D(|x|, S'^{V^*}(x)) = 1] \right| \geq 1/p(|x|)$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{I}$.

Hence, \exists PPT R^* and $b \neq b' \in [3]$ such that

$$\{\text{View}_{R^*}(S(b), R^*(x))(1^{|x|})\}_{x \in \mathcal{I}} \not\approx_c \{\text{View}_{R^*}(S(b'), R^*(x))(1^{|x|})\}_{x \in \mathcal{I}}$$

where S is the sender in Com .

We critically used the non-uniform security of Com

S' is a good simulator

Claim 25

$\{(P(w_x), V^*)(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \approx_c \{S'^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$, for any $\{w_x \in R_{GI}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$.

S' is a good simulator

Claim 25

$\{(P(w_x), V^*)(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \approx_c \{S'^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$, for any $\{w_x \in R_{GI}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}}$.

Proof: ?

- Aborting verifiers

Remarks

- Aborting verifiers
- Auxiliary inputs

Remarks

- Aborting verifiers
- Auxiliary inputs
- Soundness amplification

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Let (P, V) be a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL , and let Map_x and Map_w be two poly-time functions s.t.

- $x \in \mathcal{L} \iff \text{Map}_x(x) \in 3\text{COL},$

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Let (P, V) be a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL, and let Map_x and Map_w be two poly-time functions s.t.

- $x \in \mathcal{L} \iff \text{Map}_x(x) \in 3\text{COL},$
- $(x, w) \in R_L \iff \text{Map}_w(x, w) \in R_{3\text{COL}}(\text{Map}_x(x))$

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Let (P, V) be a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL, and let Map_x and Map_w be two poly-time functions s.t.

- $x \in \mathcal{L} \iff \text{Map}_x(x) \in 3\text{COL},$
- $(x, w) \in R_L \iff \text{Map}_w(x, w) \in R_{3\text{COL}}(\text{Map}_x(x))$

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$

Let (P, V) be a \mathcal{CZK} for 3COL, and let Map_X and Map_W be two poly-time functions s.t.

- $x \in \mathcal{L} \iff \text{Map}_X(x) \in \text{3COL}$,
- $(x, w) \in R_L \iff \text{Map}_W(x, w) \in R_{\text{3COL}}(\text{Map}_X(x))$

Protocol 26 $((P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}}))$

Common input: $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$

$P_{\mathcal{L}}$'s input: $w \in R_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$

- 1 The two parties interact in $\langle (P(\text{Map}_W(x, w)), V(\text{Map}_X(x))) \rangle$, where $P_{\mathcal{L}}$ and $V_{\mathcal{L}}$ taking the role of P and V respectively.
- 2 $V_{\mathcal{L}}$ accepts iff V accepts in the above execution.

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ cont.

Claim 27

$(P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}})$ is a \mathcal{CZK} for \mathcal{L} with the same completeness and soundness as (P, V) as for 3COL.

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ cont.

Claim 27

$(P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}})$ is a \mathcal{CZK} for \mathcal{L} with the same completeness and soundness as (P, V) as for 3COL.

- Completeness and soundness: Clear.

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ cont.

Claim 27

$(P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}})$ is a \mathcal{CZK} for \mathcal{L} with the same completeness and soundness as (P, V) as for 3COL .

- Completeness and soundness: Clear.
- Zero knowledge: Let S (an efficient) \mathcal{ZK} simulator for (P, V) (for 3COL).

Define $S_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ to output $S(\text{Map}_X(x))$, while replacing the string $\text{Map}_X(x)$ in the output of S with x .

$\{(P(w_x), V^*)(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \not\approx_c \{S_{\mathcal{L}}^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$ for some $V_{\mathcal{L}}^*$, implies
 $\{(P(\text{Map}_W(x, w_x)), V^*)(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \not\approx_c \{S^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}},$

Extending to all $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{NP}$ cont.

Claim 27

$(P_{\mathcal{L}}, V_{\mathcal{L}})$ is a \mathcal{CZK} for \mathcal{L} with the same completeness and soundness as (P, V) as for 3COL .

- Completeness and soundness: Clear.
- Zero knowledge: Let S (an efficient) \mathcal{ZK} simulator for (P, V) (for 3COL).

Define $S_{\mathcal{L}}(x)$ to output $S(\text{Map}_X(x))$, while replacing the string $\text{Map}_X(x)$ in the output of S with x .

$\{(P(w_x), V^*)(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}} \not\approx_c \{S_{\mathcal{L}}^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in \mathcal{L}}$ for some $V_{\mathcal{L}}^*$, implies
 $\{(P(\text{Map}_W(x, w_x)), V^*)(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}} \not\approx_c \{S^{V^*(x)}(x)\}_{x \in 3\text{COL}},$

- $V^*(x)$: find $x^{-1} = \text{Map}_X^{-1}(x)$ and act like $V_{\mathcal{L}}^*(x^{-1})$