

Agglomeration Economies

Urban Economics

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Agenda

1 Quantitative Spatial Models

2 Frechet Shocks

Quantitative Spatial Models

- ▶ One of the most striking economic features of our world is the uneven distribution of economic activity across space.
- ▶ These rich patterns of the concentration of economic activity can be explained by a three-way interaction between natural advantages, agglomeration forces, and dispersion forces.
- ▶ The complexity of modeling these forces in spatial equilibrium has meant that the traditional theoretical literature on cities focused on stylized settings, such as a monocentric city or the Rosen Roback framework.
 - ▶ These models, however, **cannot** capture the rich internal variation in patterns of economic activity within and between real world locations

Quantitative Spatial (Urban) Models

- ▶ Although traditional models in urban economics explain certain features of the data, their simplifying assumptions limit their usefulness for empirical work.
- ▶ These simplifying assumptions abstract from empirically relevant differences in natural advantage across locations, such as access to natural harbors or green parks.
- ▶ To address these limitations, recent quantitative spatial (urban) models allow for empirically relevant differences in natural advantage while also incorporating agglomeration forces.
- ▶ These models are designed to connect directly to observed data on cities.

Introduction to a basic quantitative spatial model

- ▶ Consider a city (or country), embedded in a wider economy.
- ▶ The city/country consists of a set of discrete locations (blocks/cities).
- ▶ These locations are populated by workers, who are mobile between locations and the larger economy.
- ▶ Workers have idiosyncratic preferences for living and working in different locations within the city/country).
- ▶ They consider all the personal, work-related, or amenity-related reasons and pick the locations that yields the highest utility.

Introduction to a basic quantitative spatial model

- ▶ We begin with a twist to Rosen-Roback; between cities
- ▶ Rosen–Roback key insight is that any local shock to the demand or supply of labor in a city is, in equilibrium, fully capitalized in the price of land.
- ▶ As a consequence, shocks to a local economy do not affect worker welfare.
- ▶ This rule's outs some interesting questions

From Traditional Rosen-Roback to Quantitative Models

Limitations of the classical Rosen-Roback model:

- ▶ Assumes perfect worker mobility
- ▶ Extreme prediction: $U_A = U_B$ in equilibrium (equalized utility)
- ▶ All workers are indifferent between cities
- ▶ Cannot explain bidirectional flows between cities

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What do we observe in the data?

- ▶ People move in both directions simultaneously
- ▶ Not everyone responds equally to changes in w and r
- ▶ Heterogeneity in location preferences

The Solution: Idiosyncratic Shocks

Key modification:

Add idiosyncratic location preferences:

$$V_i^c = w_c - r_c + A_c + \varepsilon_i^c$$

where ε_i^c captures personal reasons for preferring city c :

- ▶ Family
- ▶ Social connections
- ▶ Personal tastes
- ▶ Personal history

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Implication: Not all workers are marginal. Only those with $\varepsilon_i^A \approx \varepsilon_i^B$ are indifferent.

Introduction to a basic quantitative spatial model

- ▶ The goal of the model is to clarify what happens to wages, costs of housing and worker utility when a local economy experiences a shock to labor demand or labor supply.
- ▶ An example of a shock
 - ▶ to labor demand is an increase in productivity.
 - ▶ to labor supply is an increase in amenities.

Introduction to a basic quantitative spatial model

- ▶ We'll work through a 2 location case to develop intuition, but it can be easily extended to n locations
- ▶ We assume that workers and firms are mobile across cities, but worker mobility is not necessarily infinite, because workers have **idiosyncratic preferences for certain locations**.

Rosen-Roback model: Exogenous Prices


- ▶ Assume wages, rents, amenities are exogenous
- ▶ Person i 's indirect utility of being in A:

$$V_A^i = w_A - r_A + A_A + \epsilon_A^i \quad (1)$$


- ▶ Person i 's indirect utility of being in B:

$$V_B^i = w_B - r_B + A_B + \epsilon_B^i \quad (2)$$


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
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Closing the Model: We Need Firms and Housing

So far: We have modeled **worker decisions**

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- ▶ Endogenous labor supply

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But for general equilibrium we need:

- 1 **Demand side:** Where do wages w_c come from?
 - ▶ We need firms that hire workers
 - ▶ Marginal product of labor

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But for general equilibrium we need:

- 1 **Demand side:** Where do wages w_c come from?
 - ▶ We need firms that hire workers
 - ▶ Marginal product of labor
- 2 **Housing market:** How are rents r_c determined?
 - ▶ We need housing supply
 - ▶ Construction sector

- ▶ The production function for firms in city c is Cobb–Douglas with constant returns to scale, so that

$$\ln y_c = X_c - hN_c + (1 - h)K_c \quad (3)$$

- ▶ where X_c is a city specific productivity shifter.
- ▶ there is an international capital market, and that capital is infinitely supplied at a given price i


Construction

- ▶ The supply of housing is

$$r_c = z + k_c N_c \quad (4)$$

- ▶ number of housing units in city c is assumed to be equal to the number of workers.
- ▶ k_c is the elasticity of the supply of housing

Complete Model Structure



Equilibrium

► Local labor market supply

$$w_B = w_A + (r_B - r_A) + (A_A - A_B) + s \frac{(N_B - N_A)}{N} \quad (5)$$

► Labor demand

$$w_c = X_c - (1 - h)N_c + (1 - h)K_c + \ln(h) \quad (6)$$

► Local housing demand

$$r_B = r_A + (w_B - w_A) + (A_B - A_A) - s \frac{(N_B - N_A)}{N} \quad (7)$$

► Housing supply

$$r_c = z + k_c N_c \quad (8)$$

Effect of a labor demand shock on wages and prices

- ▶ Two periods
 - ▶ Period 1: cities are identical
 - ▶ Period 2: TFP increases in b: $X_{B2} = X_{B1} + \Delta$ where $\Delta > 0$
- ▶ Workers are more productive in B than A.

Effect of a labor demand shock on wages and prices

Change in nominal wages?

$$w_{B2} - w_{B1} = \Delta \quad (9)$$

$$w_{A2} - w_{A1} = 0 \quad (10)$$

Effect of a labor demand shock on wages and prices

Change in population?

$$w_{B2} = w_{A2} + (r_{B2} - r_{A2}) + s \frac{(N_{B2} - N_{A2})}{N} \quad (11)$$

$$w_{B1} = w_{A1} + (r_{B1} - r_{A1}) + s \frac{(N_{B1} - N_{A1})}{N} \quad (12)$$

$$\Delta = k_B N_{B2} - k_A N_{A2} - k_B N_{B1} + k_A N_{A1} + s \frac{(N_{B2} - N_{A2} - N_{B1} + N_{A1})}{N} \quad (13)$$

$$(N_{B2} - N_{B1}) = \frac{N}{N(k_B + k_A) + 2s} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (14)$$

Effect of a labor demand shock on wages and prices

Change in housing markets?

► In B

$$r_{B2} - r_{B1} = \frac{Nk_B}{N(k_B + k_A) + 2s} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (15)$$

► In A

$$r_{A2} - r_{A1} = \frac{-k_A N}{N(k_B + k_A) + 2s} \Delta \leq 0 \quad (16)$$

Effect of a labor demand shock on wages and prices

Change in Real wages?

► In B

$$(w_{B2} - w_{B1}) - (r_{B2} - r_{B1}) = \frac{Nk_A + 2s}{N(k_B + k_A) + 2s} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (17)$$

► In A

$$(w_{A2} - w_{A1}) - (r_{A2} - r_{A1}) = \frac{k_A N}{N(k_B + k_A) + 2s} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (18)$$

Effect of a labor demand shock on wages and prices

Marginal worker?

$$V_c^i = w_c - r_c + A_c + \epsilon_c^i \quad (19)$$

- ▶ The change in the relative preference for city a of the marginal worker is equal a

$$\left(\epsilon_{A2}^i - \epsilon_{B2}^i \right) - \left(\epsilon_{A1}^i - \epsilon_{B1}^i \right) = \frac{2s}{N(k_B + k_A) + 2s} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (20)$$

- ▶ The marginal worker in period 2 is different from the marginal worker in period 1.
- ▶ Since city b offers higher real wages in period 2, the new marginal worker in period 2 has stronger preferences for city a.

Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

- ▶ Consider the case where there are agglomeration economies so that the productivity of firms in a locality is an endogenous function of the level of economic activity in that locality.
- ▶ This amounts to endogenizing the city-specific productivity shifter.
- ▶ Eg. productivity in a locality is a function of the number of workers in that locality

$$X_c = f(N_c) \quad (21)$$

- ▶ with $f' > 0$
- ▶ Decisions of workers generates a positive externality.

Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

► Assume

$$X_c = x_c + \gamma N_c \quad (22)$$

► The MPL

$$w_c = x_c + (\gamma - (1 - h)) N_c + (1 - h) K_c + \ln(h) \quad (23)$$

Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

- ▶ Two periods
 - ▶ Period 1 both cities are identical
 - ▶ Period 2 amenity increases in B: $X_{B2} = X_{B1} + \Delta$ where $\Delta > 0$

Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

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Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

Change in nominal wages?

$$w_{B2} - w_{B1} = \frac{h(N(k_B + k_A) + 2s) - \gamma N}{h(N(k_B + k_A) + 2s) - 2\gamma N} \Delta \geq \Delta \geq 0 \quad (24)$$

$$\frac{\partial(w_{B2} - w_{B1})}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{Nh(N(k_B + k_A) + 2s)}{(h(N(k_B + k_A) + 2s) - 2\gamma N)^2} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (25)$$

Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

Change in population?

$$(N_{B2} - N_{B1}) = \frac{Nh}{h(N(k_B + k_A) + 2s) - 2\gamma N} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (26)$$

Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

Change in housing markets?

$$r_{B2} - r_{B1} = \frac{hNk_B}{h(N(k_B + k_A) + 2s) - 2\gamma N} \Delta \geq 0 \quad (27)$$

Spatial Equilibrium with Agglomeration Economies

Change in Real wages?

$$(w_{B2} - w_{B1}) - (r_{B2} - r_{B1}) = \frac{(k_A N + 2s)h - \gamma N}{h(N(k_B + k_A) + 2s) - 2\gamma N} \Delta \quad (28)$$

$$\frac{\partial (w_{B2} - w_{B1}) - (r_{B2} - r_{B1})}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{Nh(N(k_A - k_B) + 2s)}{(\gamma N - 2hs - k_B Nh - k_A Nh)^2} \Delta \quad (29)$$

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Empirical Implementation: The Challenge

Problem: With n locations, the model becomes very complex

- ▶ Each worker compares utility across n locations
- ▶ System of n simultaneous equilibrium equations
- ▶ Integration over distribution of ε_i^c is intractable

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How do we take this model to the data?

We need:

- 1 Analytical expressions for location probabilities
- 2 Simple aggregation from individual decisions to flows
- 3 Method to estimate model parameters

The Solution: Frechet Distribution

$$U_{ijo} = \frac{B_i}{d_{ij}} \left(\frac{c_{ijo}}{\beta} \right)^\beta \left(\frac{l_{ijo}}{1-\beta} \right)^{(1-\beta)} z_{ijo} \quad (30)$$

$$z_{ijo} \sim \text{Frechet} \quad (31)$$

$$F(z_{ijo}) = \exp(-T_i E_j z_{ijo}^{-\epsilon}) \quad (32)$$

with

- ▶ scale parameters:
 - ▶ $T_i > 0$ determines the average utility derived from living in block i
 - ▶ $E_j > 0$ determines the average utility derived from working in block j
- ▶ the shape parameter $\epsilon > 1$ controls the dispersion of idiosyncratic utility.

The Solution: Frechet Distribution

Why Frechet?

- 1 **Extreme value:** Appropriate for modeling “max” of utilities

$$\max_j \left\{ U_{ij}^o = \frac{B_i}{d_{ij}^\tau} \left(\frac{c_{ij}^o}{\beta} \right)^\beta \left(\frac{l_{ij}^o}{1-\beta} \right)^{1-\beta} z_{ij}^o \right\}$$

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- 2 **Stability property:** The maximum of Frechets is Frechet
- 3 **Closed form for probabilities:**

$$\pi_{ij} = \Pr[\text{worker lives in } i, \text{ works in } j] = \frac{T_i E_j (\dots)^\epsilon}{\sum_{i'j'} T_{i'} E_{j'} (\dots)^\epsilon}$$

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- 4 **Easy estimation:** Multinomial logit structure

Frechet in Action: Graphical Intuition

Parameter ϵ controls dispersion:

- ▶ ϵ low (high dispersion):
 - ▶ Very heterogeneous preferences
 - ▶ Lower response to changes in w or r
 - ▶ Limited mobility

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Scale parameters T_i and E_j :

- ▶ T_i : Residential amenities of location i
- ▶ E_j : Productivity/job opportunities in j

Fréchet Magic

