

# **KU LEUVEN**

# H05E1A and H05D9A

Cryptography and Network Security 2023-2024

Prof. Bart Preneel

COSIC

Firstname.Lastname(at)esat.kuleuven.be http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~preneel September 2023

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## Relation to other courses Applied Information transmission and processing Digital and analog Cryptography and Network Security Computer algebra for Cryptographic Advanced methods Privacy in cryptology Technologies cryptography

# Related cryptography courses

Kind request

Please register in your ISP

H05E1A Cryptography and Network Security

instead of

H05D9A Cryptografie en Netwerkbeveiliging

#### Semester 1:

- Cryptography and Network Security (3): introduction and applications to payment and network security
- Cryptographic Protocols (4): focus on protocols and applications

- Advanced Methods in Cryptography (4): focus on inner workings of algorithms and security proofs
- Computer Algebra for Cryptography (3): focus on computational tools

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# Related courses: privacy

Uses some cryptographic techniques but also other techniques

#### Semester 1:

- Privacy Technologies (3)
- · Privacy and Big Data (4)

#### Semester 2:

· Advanced Privacy Technologies (4)

#### Other related courses

#### Semester 1:

• E-Security (3)

#### Semester 2:

Hardware Security (3)

Advanced Master Cybersecurity

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#### H05E1A and H05D9A Cryptography and Network Security

- Lectures on Thursday 10:35-12:30
- · Tentative schedule (add two in October to end earlier?)
  - 28 September, 5-19 October (Aula ESAT L)
  - Extra: 3 October 10:35 and 16 October 16:05 (room TBC)
  - No lecture on 12, 26 October, 2 November
  - 9-16-23-30 November, 7 December (C300-00.77 aula E)
- Exercises: (10:35-13:00 default)
  - 6-7 November (ELEC B91.100/200)
  - 10 (16:05) 13 November (ELEC B91.200/100)
  - 1 (16:05) 4 December (ELEC B91.200)
  - For last session: eID card bring laptop
- Presentations: 20-21 December extra slots may be added if needed (details to follow soon on Toledo)

#### H05E1A/H05D9A Cryptography and Network Security

- · Course: Toledo slides and general articles
  - I recommend that you attend/watch the lectures to understand the basic concepts
- Toledo: course, self-study, links, exercises, solutions,...
- 2 exercise sessions
- 1 practicum (eID/WiFi) (mandatory)
- · Install and use PGP or GPG (mandatory)
- Presentation in December: 15 minutes/3 marks out of 20
- Exam: written, 2 exercises (2x6 marks) + 1 quiz (5 marks)
  - open book: you can bring any paper information and a calculator

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#### H05E1A/H05D9A Cryptography and Network Security Presentation on recent topic

- · When:
  - 20-21 December
- · How:
  - Group of 2 students
  - 15 minutes + 5 minutes questions
  - Need to be present for half a day (or 2 sessions) and ask questions
- What
  - Based on an article from a list (Toledo) or self-chosen topic
  - Initiative and broader interest (read more, test something)
- Evaluation
  - 3 marks out of 20
  - If you don't give a presentation, you fail the course
  - For September: contact the lecturer **well in advance** by email

# Overview (1)

- Cryptography overview
- Symmetric cryptography (encryption)
- · Mathematics of public key encryption
- · Public key encryption
- · Data authentication
- · Entity authentication
- · Key Establishment

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# Overview (2)

- · Public Key Infrastructures
- · Electronic Payment and blockchain
- Network security: TLS/IPsec/GSM/3G/4G

#### Exam schedule H05E1A and H05D9A

2 written exams (exam form imposed by KU Leuven)

Tue 16 Jan 09:00 - 12:00 (200L 00.07) Tue 30 Jan 13:00 - 16:00 (ESAT/aula R)

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# Question 1a: modes of operation or public key (6/20)

The "plaintext-ciphertext chaining"-mode is defined as follows  $C_i = E_K(P_i + C_{i-1} + P_{i-1})$ 

with P\_1, ..., P\_t the t plaintext blocks, C\_1, ... C\_t the t ciphertext blocks, C\_0=IV and P\_0=0.

- a) Indicate how you can decrypt.
- b) Discuss the properties of this mode (hiding of patterns and repetitions, error propagation, synchronization, efficiency).
- c) Indicate whether information leaks on the plaintext if too many plaintext blocks are encrypted under the same key (use as example the block cipher DES).
- d) Does this mode offer data authentication in addition to data confidentiality?

### Question 1b: modes of operation or public key (6/20)

Consider an RSA encryption system with modulus n=589.

- a) Choose the smallest non-trivial public exponent. Compute the corresponding secret exponent.
- b) Compute the ciphertext for the message `55'.
- c) Decrypt the result with the Chinese remainder theorem and verify that you obtain the plaintext.
- d) Are there any security issues if in RSA a common modulus is used between all the users (assume that the users do not know the factorization of this modulus), but every user obtains a different public and private exponent?

Expect a slightly more difficult question: RSA with 3 primes, variant of ElGamal, ...

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#### Question 2 (1) (6/20)

Consider the following protocol to establish a session key between a mobile device Alice (A) and a server Bob (B). Alice and Bob have an authentic copy of the public key of a common Certification Authority, but they do not share any other prior information.

Cert A || r

 $E_{P_A}(k_B \parallel CertB) \parallel Sig_B (h(k_B)\parallel CertB))$ 

 $E'_{k_B}(k) \parallel Sig_A(h(r_A) \parallel CertA))$ 

The session key k is computed as k= k<sub>A</sub> ⊕ k<sub>B</sub>

A (B) the identity of the mobile device Alice (the server Bob)

CertA (CertB) the certificate of Alice (Bob)

P<sub>A</sub> is the public encryption key of Alice r<sub>A</sub> is a 128-bit nonce generated by Alice

 $\mathsf{E}_{\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{A}}}\!(.)$  asymmetric encryption computed with the public key of Alice

Sig<sub>X</sub> (.) digital signature computed with the private key of party X (digital signature with message recovery) age recovery)

E'k(.) symmetric encryption with the secret key k

h() a cryptographic hash function.

# Question 2 (2) (6/20)

Cert A  $|| r_A$ 

 $E_{P_A}(k_B \parallel CertB) \parallel Sig_B (h(k_B) \parallel CertB))$ 

 $E'_{k_B}(k) \parallel Sig_A (h(r_A) \parallel CertA))$ 

- a) Explain the role of the final step in the protocol and the actions Bob takes.
- b) Which goals does the protocol achieve (entity authentication, implicit key authentication, key confirmation, explicit key authentication, anonymity w.r.t third parties, key control, key freshness -- both for Alice and for Bob. Define each property in 1-2 sentences and justify your answer for each property with
- c)] What is forward secrecy? Does this protocol offer forward secrecy?
- d)] If necessary, modify the protocol to offer mutual entity authentication and mutual explicit key authentication. Try to avoid introducing new algorithms and minimize the number of rounds.

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# Question 3 (5/20)

Indicate which of the following five statements are correct. If they are wrong, explain why this is the case

- a) The encryption of information that contains redundancy will always result in data authentication as a side-effect.
- The discrete logarithm problem modulo a 512-bit prime is approximately as hard as the factorization of 512-bit primes.
- Finding a collision for an MDC with a 64-bit result can be performed using less than a day on a modern PC.
- Bitcoin is an electronic cash system in which the users are fully anonymous w.r.t. each other but not w.r.t. the central bank that issues Bitcoins.
- The RSA algorithm with a modulus and secret exponent of 128 bits is more secure than double-DES with a 112-bit key.

# Two catch up lectures: please vote

- 1. Friday 29 10:35
- 2. Monday Oct 2 10:35
- 3. Tuesday Oct 3 10:35 x
- 4. Tuesday Oct 3 16:35 ?
- 5. Wednesday Oct 4 10:35 6. Wednesday Oct 4 14:00
- 7. Wednesday Oct 4 16:05 ?
- 8. Friday Oct 6 14:00?
- Friday Oct 13 10:35
- 10. Monday Oct 16: 14:00?
- 11. Monday Oct 16 16:05 xx
- 12. Wednesday Oct 18 10:35

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