

Reshaping mobile crowd sensing using cross validation to improve data credibility

6 December 2017


Tony T. Luo*, Leonit Zeynalvand^

* Institute for Infocomm Research (I²R), A*STAR, Singapore

^ School of CSE, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore


IoT & mobile crowd sensing

- Ultimate goal of IoT: improve people's life



Internet of People

- People's role in IoT:
People are not merely **service consumers**;
They can also act as **data providers**



A critical issue in MCS

- **Data credibility:** Quality of crowdsensed data can be poor and inconsistent
- Existing solution approaches
 - Incentive mechanisms
 - Trustworthiness/quality of worker or data
 - Truth discovery
- **“Power of crowds”** not fully explored



New approach: Cross validation

- Introduce **Validating Crowd**



Contributing Crowd




- To clarify:
 - Not expert-sourcing
 - Not the same concept as in statistics or machine learning

Challenges


1. Introduces another **quality/credibility** issue? (of validation)
2. How to **present** crowdsensed data to validators?
3. How to deal with validators' **bias**?
4. **Privacy** issue?
5. How to **consolidate** validation result with original crowdsensed data?
6. Need **incentives** for validators? And How?

Cross validation mechanism



1) Profiling

- To obtain $\chi = (V, P)$
 - $V = \{v_i\}$: representative values of original data
 - $P = \{p_i\}$: probabilities of each $v_i \in V$
- Procedure
 - Create histogram
 - Select representative values
 - Normalize to probability measure



How to present data to validators?

- Candidate methods
 - Expose χ or V at a public venue (e.g., website)
 - Ex: [Amazon](#), [Quora](#), [Stackoverflow](#), [TripAdvisor](#)
 - Expose χ or V to a selected group of workers
 - Ex: “Elite users” or forum admins
 - Present a subset of V to each selected worker
 - For each of the above, ask for a ranking or picking the best
 - Then perform *preference aggregation*, e.g., by using [Borda count](#) or [Condorcet winner](#)
 - All have issues: details see paper; more discussion in upcoming arXiv version
- Our method
 - **Single value, single rating**



Illustration

Rating Task

Is the following value representative of the avg. traffic speed of Broadway NY during morning peak hours today?


How to select this "single value"? → **40 mph**

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree

The illustration shows a rating task interface. At the top, a yellow box with a scroll-like border is titled "Rating Task". Inside this box, a question is posed: "Is the following value representative of the avg. traffic speed of Broadway NY during morning peak hours today?". Below the question, the value "40 mph" is displayed in red text inside a black oval. An arrow points from a text box on the left, which asks "How to select this 'single value'?", to the "40 mph" value. Below the rating task box, there is a horizontal row of five yellow circular smiley faces representing a Likert scale. From left to right, the faces show: a crying face (Strongly Disagree), a sad face (Disagree), a neutral face (Neutral), a happy face (Agree), and a very happy face (Strongly Agree). Each face has its corresponding label written below it.


2) Sampling

- How to select that “single value”?
 - **Sample** V with a certain probability distribution
 - Present each sampled value (not necessarily unique) to a (unique) validator
- Sampling methods:
 - **Random sampling**: $s_i = 1/n$, where $n = |V|$
 - **Proportional sampling**: $s_i = p_i, \forall p_i \in P$
- Other thoughts
 - Frequent values may need less validation
 - Catch “**outliers**”: could they be uncommon truth?
- Additional sampling methods
 - **Reverse sampling**: $s_i \propto d - p_i$
 - We use: $s_i = \frac{d - p_i}{nd - 1}$ where $d = p_{min} + p_{max}$
 - note: **avoid** $d=1$ (see paper)
 - **Inverse sampling**: $s_i \propto 1/p_i$
 - So by normalization, $s_i = \frac{1/p_i}{\sum_i 1/p_i}$



Given the sampled values...

- How to approach workers to seek ratings?



3) Privacy-aware competency-adaptive push (PACAP)

- **Proactive** approach: **Push** rating tasks to a set of strategically selected validators (raters)
- Issues with push:
 - (Privacy) intrusive
 - **Competency**: “are you pushing to the right people?”
- Other restrictions:
 - **Quantity** requirement: desire m ratings with a shortfall tolerance α , i.e., below $m(1-\alpha)$ unacceptable
 - **Time** constraint: collect all ratings within deadline T_o
- Solution: privacy-aware competency-adaptive push (PACAP)

Design considerations

- Anti-bias
- Competency control
- Privacy awareness

Select a rater j at time t with prob. $q_j(t)$:

$$q_j(t) = \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda_j(t-t_j^-)(R_j+\epsilon)}}{\sum_{j \in \Psi} \left[1 - e^{-\lambda_j(t-t_j^-)(R_j+\epsilon)} \right]}$$

R_j : Reputation of j ; $R_j \geq 0$

λ_j : personalized elasticity parameter catering for j 's privacy preference; $\lambda_j \in [1, \lambda_{max}]$

t_j^- : the time when j receives the last offer

ϵ : ensure users with $R_j=0$ (e.g. new users) still have chance

Intuition:

- 1) higher reputation, higher chance
- 2) avoid too frequent pushes to the same rater while mitigating starvation
- 3) privacy customization via λ (details in paper)

Challenge

- **Rater behaviors are highly uncertain and dynamic** (decline offer, accept offer, delay, non-response)

Solution:

- Divide T_o into multiple cycles
- Perform **progressive push** over cycles
 - Each cycle to approach a different group of raters of a different group size with a different number of offers
 - Accumulate **statistics** for each cycle
 - Determine group size for next cycle by **predicting** an *effective response ratio* by learning from historical statistics
 - Select the group members using the selection probability $q_j(t)$

Algorithm

Algorithm 1: Progressive PACAP


Input: Crowdworkers \mathcal{U} , contributors \mathcal{C} , representatives \mathcal{V} , target m , tolerance α , deadline T_0

Output: $\mathcal{R} = \{\langle r_j(v_i), j, v_i \rangle \mid r_j(v_i) \neq 0, j \in \mathcal{U}, v_i \in \mathcal{V}\}$ with $|\mathcal{R}| \geq m \cdot (1 - \alpha)$, or FAIL otherwise

<pre> 1 $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow \emptyset, \Psi \leftarrow \mathcal{U} \setminus \mathcal{C}$ 2 $m(1) \leftarrow m, M_Y(0) \leftarrow 0, M_N(0) \leftarrow 0$ 3 for $k \leftarrow 1$ to T_0/τ do 4 select $m(k)$ raters, denoted by a set $\mathcal{M}(k)$, from Ψ according to Eq. (3) 5 for each $j \in \mathcal{M}(k)$ do 6 obtain one $v_i \in \mathcal{V}$ using a sampling method from Section III-B 7 wrap v_i in a rating task and push it to rater j to seek rating $r_j(v_i)$ 8 end 9 wait for τ while collecting ratings: ◦ $\mathcal{R}(k) \leftarrow \{\langle r_j(v_i), j, v_i \rangle \mid r_j(v_i) \neq 0\}$ ◦ $m_N(k) \leftarrow \sum_j r_j(v_i)=0$ 10 $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{R}(k), m_Y(k) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(k)$ </pre>	<pre> 11 if $\mathcal{R} \geq m$ then 12 return \mathcal{R} // SUCCESS * 13 end // Prepare for the next cycle: 14 update $\Psi \leftarrow \Psi \setminus \mathcal{M}(k)$ 15 $M_Y(k) \leftarrow M_Y(k-1) + m_Y(k),$ $M_N(k) \leftarrow M_N(k-1) + m_N(k),$ determine the scale of next outreach: $m(k+1) \leftarrow [m - M_Y(k)] \left[1 + \frac{M_N(k)}{M_Y(k)} \right]$ 17 end 18 if $\mathcal{R} < m(1 - \alpha)$ then 19 return FAIL 20 else 21 return \mathcal{R} // SUCCESS 22 end </pre>
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Next...

- Given the ratings, how to consolidate them with the original data?




4) Reshaping

- Given: $\chi = \{V, P\}$ and R (set of ratings)
- Output: $\chi' = \{V, P'\}$ (reshaped profile)

$$\hat{p}_i = \frac{\kappa_i + \eta g_i \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \kappa_i}{|\mathcal{R}|}}{\sum_{i=1}^n \kappa_i + \eta (g_i + b_i) \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \kappa_i}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$$
$$= \frac{p_i + \eta \frac{g_i}{|\mathcal{R}|}}{1 + \eta \frac{g_i + b_i}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$$

$$g_i = \frac{1}{w_l} \sum_j r_j(v_i) \mathbb{1}_{r_j(v_i) > 0},$$
$$b_i = -\frac{1}{w_l} \sum_j r_j(v_i) \mathbb{1}_{r_j(v_i) < 0}$$

Intuition: each original p_i can be interpreted as the ratio of contributors who “**voted**” for v_i to be the truth; during CV, each v_i receives another set of votes from the raters to whom the same v_i was pushed.



5) Incentive scheme

- Need to cater for **two crowds**
- **Raters**: update reputation as

$$R'_j = [R_j + \Delta_j(v_i)]^+$$

where $[x]^+ = \max(0, x)$, and

$$\Delta_j(v_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{p'_i - p_i}{1 - p_i} \frac{r_j(v_i)}{w_l}, & \text{if } p'_i > p_i \\ \frac{p'_i - p_i}{p_i} \frac{r_j(v_i)}{w_l}, & \text{if } p'_i < p_i. \end{cases}$$

Intuition: reputation depends on

- 1) how **consistent** is her rating r_i with the final belief adjustment $(p'_i - p_i)$
- 2) how much her rating r_i has **contributed** to the belief adjustment

- **Contributors**: receive payments as


$$\pi'_c = \pi_c \left(u_c \frac{p'_i(c)}{p_i(c)}, \mathbf{u}'_{-c} \right),$$
$$\mathbf{u}'_{-c} = \left\{ u_{\tilde{c}} \frac{p'_i(\tilde{c})}{p_i(\tilde{c})} \mid \tilde{c} \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{c\} \right\}$$

Intuition: p'_i and p_i can be interpreted as the **quality** of contribution v_i (likelihood of v_i being the truth)


Performance evaluation

- Application: avg. traffic speed of a major road in CBD
- A platform like *mTurk* has 50,000 registered users
- 1,000 contributors
- Aim to collect $m=1,000$ ratings from the rest 49,000 users within $T_o=1$ hour, shortfall tolerance $\alpha=0.1$
- Raters: commuters who work in the CBD and travelers who frequent the CBD
- Simulate rater behaviors: prob. of accepting /declining offers, distribution of individual beliefs of truth, how each rater rates, delay in response, etc. (details in paper)


Result of Profiling: $\chi=(V,P)$



Case A: Truth reinforcement



Case B: Scavenging hidden truth



Conclusion

- Cross validation **approach** (general)
 - Further exploits power of crowds: [crowd validates crowd](#)
 - “Plug-in” (rather than redesign): [co-crowdsourcing](#)
- Cross validation **mechanism** (specific)
 - Profiling + Sampling + PACAP + Reshaping + Incentive
 - Suitable for time-sensitive and quality-critical applications
- **Practicality:**
 - No assumption on (game-theoretical) rationality
 - No assumption on underlying distribution (e.g., Gaussian) of the sensing phenomenon
 - No assumption on single or multiple truths
 - Minimal effort from validators
 - Simple to implement & operate

Thank You!



- Slides can be downloaded at: <https://tonylt.github.io>
(including arXiv version once available)