

# The Differentiated Worker: Racial Capitalism in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Ihsaan Bassier

Fourth International Conference on the Unfinished Legacy of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Reconfiguring  
Solidarities around Caste and Race

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

4-6 May 2018

## Abstract

Racism was deliberately fostered to enhance profits in colonial contexts from Africa to India and USA. Social movements highlight this ongoing link in their anti-capitalist, anti-racist calls. Yet the dialectical relation between racism and capital remains under-theorised. I explore three channels of a racialised system of capital accumulation in post-Apartheid South Africa, beyond inheritance which is well explored in the literature. Firstly, black wage-labour is conditioned by structural racial differentiation, such as occupational sorting and group-level disadvantage; secondly, the spatial system of labour relations embodied by racially segregated rural and urban spaces cheapens wage costs for capital; and thirdly, structural coercion as propagated by white institutions constrains the ability of blacks to develop organisations. I argue more generally that capitalism is not separable from racism, presenting indicative evidence that these links persist today in preserving racism as a basis of capital accumulation in South Africa. Similar channels may exist in comparable colonial contexts as well as on a world scale, and may further be present in systems of accumulation based on caste, gender or citizenship.

# 1. Introduction

*“Contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations... Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole.” - A.G. Frank, in *The Development of Underdevelopment*, 1966*

Over the last two centuries, average living standards have grown to historically unimaginable levels. The average person has about twenty times the material wealth compared to if they had lived in any earlier period. Yet, many groups have been left out of this phenomenal economic growth under capitalism. Workers are systematically exploited, as theorised by Marx and empirically observed in class differences today. And despite the apparent tendency for capital to homogenise workers through the competition of abstract labour, racism, patriarchy and nationality have persisted in differentiating workers. I focus on how racial difference is reproduced by capital, and vice versa, in the context of South Africa.

The key puzzle is that legislated racism has long been abolished and anti-discriminatory policies put in place, without the expected convergence in material outcomes by race in South Africa, as in the US and elsewhere. A clue is given by Marx’s analysis of how capital is able to extract surplus *with consent* from the worker, analogously without explicit discrimination, through the relations of production. I therefore approach this question from a political economy perspective, examining the dialectic between capital and race “behind the veil of exchange”. Present racial differences are partly due to capital’s normal logic, which simply reproduces past relations - including racial differences insofar as they correlate with wealth. I argue in addition to this, following Cedric Robinson, that racial difference interacts with capital through a racialised system of accumulation that reproduces both.

This has long been argued by anti-apartheid activists and anti-colonial resisters. For example, Nkrumah (1970) insisted, “It is impossible to separate race relations from the capitalist class relationships in which they have their roots.” Yet, the literature remains sparse in identifying the concrete links between racial difference and capital accumulation. Much Marxist analysis has been sullied by assigning a functionalist role to race, while the literature on race has focused on explicit racism (as opposed to structural) or racism that is separable from capital (as opposed to a racialised system of accumulation).

I begin by describing the South African context, then review theories of reproducing difference in the literatures on capitalism, imperialism, racial capitalism, and South African Marxist history. I focus on three links beyond family and community inheritance, which is well explored in the literature. First, black wage-labour is conditioned by structural racial differentiation, such as occupational sorting and more generally group-level disadvantage; secondly, the spatial system of labour relations embodied by racially segregated rural and urban spaces cheapens costs for capital; and thirdly, structural coercion as propagated by white institutions constrains the ability of blacks to organise and bargain. I integrate this analysis with evidence that these links persist today, preserving racism as a basis of accumulation in South Africa.


## 2. Racial Capitalism in South Africa

Cedric Robinson first heard the phrase “racial capitalism” in the context of South Africa’s political economy under colonialism and Apartheid (Kelley, 2017). This section briefly describes the historical regime of accumulation, based on capital and race, and argues that the links between the two have persisted despite the end of formal systems of discrimination.

Dispossession of land and destruction of socio-economic institutions was coupled with a discriminatory legal system designed to underdevelop non-Europeans and advance whites (Jaffe, 1952). Under Apartheid, 1948-1994, many of the colonial institutions were strengthened: racial categorisation, defining social roles; pass laws, regulating movement; independent Bantustans, small rural regions to which Africans were confined, as reserves of cheap migrant labour; and separate education systems, reproducing the skill structure.

It is worth focusing on the economic growth path between 1952 and 1973, the period over which Apartheid was strongest. Five year moving averages of GDP (data: SARB, own calculations) show strong growth of 4-6%, with even stronger manufacturing growth over the period. Gelb (1990) described this model as one of import substitution of sophisticated consumer goods, where the *white population* developed on par with advanced capitalist nations under what he terms “Racial Fordism”. However, the exclusion and low wages of black workers was unsustainable, leading to a period of economic crisis generated by widespread strikes. South Africa’s political economy eventually reformulates itself in 1994 under a democratic regime where blacks have the right to vote but the distribution of wealth has been preserved through the protection of property largely held by whites.

The links between racist legislation and capital accumulation were not simply theory or coincidence. There is ample evidence of deliberate design, for example a British-appointed governor in 1880 wrote, “The Kaffir [sic<sup>1</sup>] population should be made to furnish as large and as cheap a supply of labour as possible,” and a white Bantu administrator motivated, “We are trying to introduce the migratory pattern as far as possible in every sphere. That is in fact the entire basis of our policy as far as the white economy is concerned, namely a system of migratory labour” (Magubane 1979).



*Figure 1: Growth Incidence Curve for South African adults 1993-2014 (Data: Palms, own calculations). The compounded average growth rate of income is shown (0.02=2%), with the horizontal line representing the mean (approximately 1%).*

Aggregate statistics of the South African economy in 1994 reflect the regime of accumulation based on race and capital. One would expect the pattern of growth and distribution to have changed by 2018, following formal political equality between blacks and whites. Yet, among blacks, there persists high unemployment, low wages, and poverty of ownership and education. Whites maintain a much higher lifestyle on any dimension, with average per capita household income five times that of Coloureds and Africans (NIDS 2017, own calculations). Inequality in South Africa is among the highest in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.63. In figure 1, I show the average growth in income (excluding taxes and transfers) by percentile in the South African adult income distribution: for most people, up to the 90th percentile, real income has decreased or remained the same. It is only the richest in the country that have

---

<sup>1</sup> Derogatory term for those categorised as African

grown, and official tax statistics show that this underestimates growth of the top 5% who have enjoyed real growth rates of 5-6% p.a. over 2003-2015.

The aggregate rate of exploitation is a Marxian indicator which measures the ratio between profit and wages, i.e. the appropriation of surplus value by property owners. Magubane (1979) cites a newspaper quote showing its role during the Apartheid regime in attracting investment at the expense of black workers, “The lure of South Africa for corporate planners stems in part from the unusually high profits on investments there. For the US corporations, the average rate of return on investment in 1974 was 19.1%, compared with a world average of 11% for US investment, according to the US Commerce Department.” This has continued post 1994. I follow the method and definitions that Basu (2017) outlines in section 3 of his paper in calculating the rate of exploitation for South Africa, using industry input-output tables published by the national statistical agency (StatsSA 2017) and microdata of employment and wages (NIDS 2017). I find an extraordinarily high rate of exploitation of 800%, intuitively meaning that that out of every 9-hour day, the value-creating worker in South Africa only works for herself for one hour. For comparison, estimates of the US following a similar methodology find a rate of exploitation of 200% and a rate of profit of 0.5 (Shaikh and Tonak, 1992).

We are left with the puzzle that this paper sets out to investigate: Why have differences between races persisted, despite the end of explicit systems of racial underdevelopment? This pattern is replicated in many contexts including the United States of America, where black unemployment and poverty rates are double that of whites (Wicks-Lim, 2016). I argue that racial disparities are not simply a legacy of past discrimination but rather, like relations under capitalism, structural relations formed the basis of accumulation under past regimes like Apartheid (or, in the case of USA, Jim Crow Laws). These relations remain in place and continue to reproduce both race and capital.

### 3. Theories of reproducing difference

The basic premise is that a relation can be reproduced under an accumulation regime without explicit systems of underdevelopment. I explore four literatures that share this premise, give the structural mechanisms that reproduce the relations.

#### 3.1 Capital: Property Owners and Workers

Marx (1867) identifies the fundamental relation under capitalism as that between property owners, those with access to the means of production, and workers, those without access to the means of

production. While workers are formally free to choose where they work, they are compelled to work for *someone* in order to survive, while property owners can choose their level of investment. The “reserve army of labour”, made up of unemployed, discouraged and latent or potential workers, acts as ready substitutes for any insubordinate workers. As a result, property owners have more bargaining power and are able to pay workers only subsistence wages, reproducing their status as propertyless suppliers of labour, while they appropriate the surplus from production and grow wealthier. This relation is reproduced intergenerationally through inheritance.

This fundamental relation is preserved under a number of extensions, for example where education plays a similar role to property, and has been particularly stark under neoliberalism. Figure 1 demonstrates this relation in South Africa, where growth is preserved for the rich. Similarly, in USA since 1974 non-supervisory workers’ wages have remained the same even as GDP per capita has doubled, with wealth rapidly accumulating in the top percentiles (Sherman, 2014).

Applied to South Africa, this suggests that an historically black propertyless class will be reproduced under capitalism, while an historically white propertied class will similarly persist. However, it is my contention that there is furthermore a racial relation, which reproduces race and class beyond this capitalist relation. An analogy is found in the relation between advanced capitalist countries, known as the metropole, and those countries in a structurally underdeveloped relation with them, known as the periphery, where your relation to property *and national identity* is relevant for accumulation.

### 3.2 Imperialism: Metropole and Periphery

Jaffe (1990) observes that “Capitalism is Apartheid on a world scale”, referring to the imperialist dimension of global capitalism. Indeed, the relationship between the Bantustans and the white South African core intentionally resembled the relationship between former colonies and the metropolises: the Bantustans were nominally independent and the Pass Laws were modelled on the same rules as work visas. What can we learn from imperialism about the continued structural relation in South Africa?

Imperialism is a *relation* of unequal exchange between the metropole and periphery, with an economic and political basis. Lenin (1917) describes the relation as the “diverse forms of dependent countries which, officially, are politically independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence.” I focus on the following channels emphasised in the literature through which the metropole reproduces its advantage and underdevelops the periphery: (a) Monopoly and global value chains, (b) predatory exchange, and (c) indirect political control.

Both monopolies and global value chains represent a redistribution of surplus from the periphery to the metropole. Monopolies enable capitalists to sell commodities above their value, for example the World Systems Theory of Wallerstein (2004) which focuses on product differentiation. Goods produced by the core benefit from super-profits of monopolies, with contemporary examples of seeds, electronics and pharma, while goods produced by the periphery remain subject to competition. Global value chains, or vertical integration as described by Lenin (1917), refers to transnational companies (TNCs) which transport raw materials from the periphery for production in the metropole, where they stow profits from the entire value chain. Jon Smith (2016) argues that TNCs today allow production in the periphery to take advantage of cheap labour conditions before exporting the surplus to the metropole, for example textile workers in Bangladesh. He notes the rapid increase in the share of workers in the periphery, from 34% in 1950 to 79% today, even as labour's share in income has declined, to illustrate the cementing relation between metropole and periphery in a global value chain.

A second channel through which metropolises reproduce advantage is given by Harvey (2004) as “accumulation by dispossession”. One example<sup>2</sup> of this phenomenon is predatory exchange: circumstances force the periphery to sell commodities to the metropole below value, for example during crises at fire-sale prices. The metropole, by definition countries with large accumulated capital stock, is able to act as buyer of last resort. Harvey gives the example of the 1997-8 South East Asian crisis which was created by speculative finance and led to “the biggest peacetime transfer of assets from domestic (i.e. South East Asian) to foreign (i.e. US, Japanese and European) owners in the past fifty years anywhere in the world”. The reverse does not apply: when the US economy was hit by the 2008 recession, it had a global impact and US government bonds remained in high demand as a relatively safe asset (MacEwan, 2015). A second example of predatory exchange is the sale of resources held outside of the circuits of capital to bolster government revenue, such as publicly owned or part of subsistence production, which advantages global capital by increasing supply.<sup>3</sup> Again, It is especially relevant that peripheral countries are politically weaker and hold large reserves of natural resources, and so are greater targets of manipulation. A final example is the lending rate faced by businesses and governments in the periphery, which is typically 2-3% higher due to a “risk premium” and as a result slows down development.

---

<sup>2</sup> Another distinct channel is through military conquest and coercion, but I restrict my analysis of imperialism to consensual exchange (analogous to the consent of the “free” wage labourer analysed by Marx). I have therefore also avoided analysis of exploitation under direct colonial rule.

<sup>3</sup> The benefit from this part of the second channel does not depend on crisis, and so may constitute a separate channel of imperialism.

Thirdly, global institutions such as the WTO and IMF legitimise monopolies and predatory exchange. Wallerstein's (2004) product-differentiation approach emphasises tariffs, patents and subsidies which favour the metropole. Tariff autonomy and product imitation was essential to industrialisation of Britain and USA, and even the import-substitution strategies of Latin America, Egypt and South Korea in the 20th century - these strategies are cut off for peripheral countries today (see for example (Chang, 2003)). Smith (2016) argues that the higher rates of exploitation in the periphery are held in place by the neoliberal consensus of free flow of capital and goods compared to the immobility of labour across borders. Predatory exchange has also increased through the neoliberal push towards privatisation, particularly in moments of crisis through structural adjustment.

The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate in an analogous, well-developed literature that the logic of capital can combine with other processes, here imperialism, to produce a relation based on property as well as another characteristic, here nationality. Further, there are direct analogies with the mechanisms of imperialism. On the first mechanism, there was a monopoly over labour recruitment in Bantustans by the South African Chamber of Mines and over industrial goods for sale to the Bantustans. Secondly, there are historic examples of predatory exchange such as "the largest Afrikaner-controlled companies... and other large businesses [that] were well placed to take advantage of fire-sale prices when foreign capital left the country after the Sharpeville shooting in 1960, the Soweto uprising of 1976, and the widespread protests of the mid-1980s" (Wood, 1998). I would add the 1990s period of liberalisation, when large amounts of capital that had directly benefited from the Apartheid regime were able to privatise the full value and relocate overseas. Thirdly, indirect legitimation through the state is guaranteed through the constitutional protection of private property negotiated by the Apartheid government as part of the transition. However, the analogy with imperialism is limited by a fundamental difference with race, in that racial difference is not nearly as geographically or politically separated. I turn to Cedric Robinson to examine the relation between capital and race directly.

### 3.3 Racial Capitalism: White Property Owners and Black Workers

In *Black Marxism* (Robinson, 1998), Cedric Robinson conceptualises racial differentiation as constructed, fluid, and co-opted by capital to augment accumulation. These characteristics are critical in understanding racial capitalism, the dialectic between race and capital where both shape each other. Robinson traces this dialectic to the industrial revolution, where *existing* racial differentiation was central in allocating who emerged as the rising and dispossessed classes under the turbulence of transitions towards capitalism, for example the first proletarians were "Gypsies" and Jews. European civilisation through capitalism tended to *differentiate*, not homogenise as is usually argued in the Marxist tradition.



Robinson contends that the definition of whiteness evolved as the requirements of capital expanded, most significantly through the homogenisation of Europeans as white and othering of Africans as black.

It is worth taking a brief detour to note that Robinson takes a non-functionalist view of racial differentiation, a view I take on. Post-colonialists critique the Marxist tradition for its economically determinist outlook and its failure to recognise the importance of contingent and social processes, a critique taken and positively developed by postmodern Marxists (Ruccio, 2006). For example, Perlin argues that Marxists have no theory of fusion between the material and cultural, instead opting for an uncritical cultural perspective (Perlin, 1988). Perlin gives the example of the Jajmani system of India, which relied on *substantive* ideology and institutions as well as *instrumental* norms such as the “cognitive behavioural” patterns that evolved with the social setting.

A shortcoming of Robinson’s seminal work is that the specific channels through which race and capital come together remain vague. I find mention of two such channels. Firstly, in line with the first channel of imperialism identified above (and relatedly!), Robinson examines the role of African labour in global production (p125). After European labour became inadequate for capital’s needs, a number of options such as criminals, foreign immigrants, natives and white slavery proved unsustainable. African slavery and industrialisation became linked, where blacks served as cheap labour and markets with inferior political rights.

The following quote describes a second channel:

“In retrospect the Western potential for creating the Negro had moved closer in a way to its realization. The cultural and ideological inventory was at hand. A native racialism had already displayed its usefulness for *rationalizing social order*, and with the advent of the Islamic intrusion into European history it had further proved its value by its transformation into *an instrument of collective resistance* and a negation of an unacceptable past. For the Negro to come into being all what was now required was an immediate cause, a specific purpose. The trade in African slaves, coming as it did as an extension of capitalism and racial arrogance, supplied both a powerful motive and a readily received object.” (p100, emphasis added)

Here, racial differentiation is critical for social order, raising uncomfortable questions: Were African slaves not aware of their exploitation? If so, what purpose did this “ideological inventory” serve?

I return to this question in section 4.3 below, except to note here that examples abound of genuine racial prejudice as drivers of policy.<sup>4</sup>

### 3.4 Apartheid: White Mine Owners and Black Migrants

Finally, there is a Marxian literature examining the links between race and capital in anti-Apartheid movements and later academic writing.<sup>5</sup> A primary relation in this literature is that between black migrant workers from rural Bantustans and white industrial/mine owners. Legassick and Wolpe contrast the normal capitalist process, where a reserve army grows in urban areas, with the South African process of a reserve army confined to rural Bantustans (Legassick and Wolpe, 1976). Whereas the cost of reproduction of the urban worker includes supporting a family, off-season subsistence and a host of reproductive social institutions, the cost of reproduction for the African migrant worker only includes her subsistence while at work. Capitalism therefore thrived off the exploitation enabled not just by free wage-labour, but by the subsidy given to the capitalist through the reproductive function of the Bantustan too.

However, Wolpe (1972) argues that this was unstable. Up to 1920, the vast majority of African workers in capitalist production were migrants supplemented by subsistence, but this rapidly diminished as class structure emerged within Bantustans. In the Ciskei by 1948, 30% of residents were landless and 60% owned less than 5 cattle. Legislation was necessary to oppose these tendencies: the small amount of land allocated to Bantustans was made inaccessible to white farmers vying for more land, and a one-man-one-plot rule within Bantustans ensured that the subsistence subsidy was distributed across migrant workers. Finally, those Africans who had settled in urban centres served the manufacturing sector, but were placed in carefully policed, dense, racially segregated compounds without ownership.

The mining industry epitomises the centrality of migrant labour in South Africa's racial capitalism. Below, I draw from Wilson (2001). Mining is widely recognised as the engine of South African growth, providing stimulus and stability which produced rapid industrialisation. For example, in

---

<sup>4</sup> Magubane (1979) gives one such example, in the report of a white South African commissioner who justified and urged further conquest by describing the African character as "superstitious and warlike... crafty and cunning, at once indolent and excitable; averse to labour; but bloodthirsty and cruel when their passions are inflamed."

<sup>5</sup> The academic literature of the 1970s credits itself with beginning South African Marxist historiography, disregarding earlier contributions arising out of political movements. Lategan (2016) cautions that this new school was fundamentally racist too and failed to adequately theorise the relationship between race and class: "It is therefore no surprise that Legassick could recognise the Cape as non-racial, which is an unrealistic feature of its history."

1981 South Africa was producing 67% of the world's gold, contributing a quarter of the government's revenue, 11% of Gross National Product, and employing nearly 500 000 workers.

Yet, mining thrived off the exploitative confluence between racial differentiation and capital. The Chamber of Mines was a primary lobbying force behind the colonial and Apartheid policy. The Bantustans provided enough subsistence to ensure reproduction of the cheap labour force, but little enough that black men were forced to seek employment in the mines. Lack of ownership and low quality public education prevented upward mobility, holding this labour supply intact. Together, this allowed mines to issue precarious contracts, and keep real wages stagnant between 1889 and 1969 at \$65 per month (calculated in 2016 PPP), which tellingly is almost exactly the official "Food Poverty line" calculated today, the minimum amount required for food subsistence only. Finally, mines were able to use the degraded humanity of blacks to cut back on costs by providing appalling living conditions and a dangerous work environment.<sup>6</sup>

In 1973, this system came under stress when the surrounding countries Malawi and Mozambique withdrew their labour from the mines, which constituted 50% of mineworkers, at the same time as mineworkers went on strike. Fortuitously for the mines, this coincided with the withdrawal of the US from the gold standard, increasing the price of gold fifteen times by 1980. The production crisis was averted by diverting some of the windfall surplus to workers, allowing wages to triple and thereby restoring the labour supply. Yet, by the 1990s gold mining collapsed as a source of government revenue to only 1% in 1994, and by 1999 provided only 40% of its employment level in 1986. If mining can no longer be considered a defining feature of racial capitalism in South Africa, what are the structures that continue to intertwine race and capital?

## 4. Channels of Racial Capitalism

To recap, I am trying to unpack the connections between capital and race as a basis for accumulation, beyond the historical legacy of dispossession along racial lines. Below I focus on three channels through which racial capitalism continues in South Africa, despite the end of legal enforcement under Apartheid. The channels are not novel, in that they draw from the literatures above; yet it is worth

---

<sup>6</sup> Johnson, as quoted in Magubane (1979), reports, "[The compounds] are the dormitories in which as many as 24 workers may sleep, in double-decker concrete bunks. Defecating is also normally a communal activity..." These conditions were world-renowned, such that Luxemburg provides a detailed description of South African diamond mines in her authoritative "The Accumulation of Capital" (1913)

showing how each channel reproduces both capital and race, and is evolutionarily sustained through advantaging both.

Perhaps the most important channel for a racialised pattern of accumulation is family and community inheritance. Historical advantage to white individuals, through wealth and schooling, and communities, through institutions such as better schools and facilities, is passed down in a race-biased way (families and communities tend to be racially clustered). Where there are increasing or constant returns to scale, as is likely for skills and wealth, this historical racial advantage will persist. I do not explore this channel further, since this has been done better elsewhere (for example, Darity 2005). Moreover, the particular channel of inheritance does not by itself create a racial relation, i.e. it predicts the same opportunity set for two wealthy people whether they are from the same or different races. I also do not explore explicit racism much below, except to note that this is present in all the channels.

## 4.1 Black Wage-Labour

Black wage-labour is conditioned by structural racial differentiation, such as occupational sorting and more generally group-level disadvantage. The source of this is the lack of ownership, employment and education among blacks. While this is common to the working class under capitalism in general, it acquires a racial character when clearly defined along racial lines. Poverty in ownership and education remains *exclusive* to blacks in South Africa: less than two percent of Whites are poor, compared to three quarters of Africans and half of Coloureds (NIDS 2017, own calculations).

The result is group level disadvantage. Darity, Mason and Stewart (2006) model how group-level externalities on identity can contribute to a racialised equilibrium. I focus on occupational sorting, where low skilled occupations are preserved for blacks. When combined with the tendency of employers to stereotype under imperfect information (statistical discrimination) and the large role social networks play in accessing the labour market, these occupations become subject to extra penalties yet without any alternative, forming a “trap” or a relation that is reproduced. An analogy is found in the global value chains under imperialism, or more directly the gender wage gap related to occupational segregation by gender. Penner (2008) argues, “... race and gender differences in wages at the point of hire are overwhelmingly a function of occupational sorting. This is significant because it [...] underscores the importance of studies examining the job-matching process.” Occupational sorting is a “hidden” form of discrimination because the penalty applies to the occupation as a whole, and blacks or women are “free” to move between occupations. Lower wages serve as subsidy to capital, yet still grant easier access to

employment in these occupations through networks and expectations - sustaining occupational sorting as a racial differentiator.

In table A1 of the appendix, I give a breakdown of the percentage African and average wage by occupation. Africans, who constitute 90% of the population, dominate all lower paid occupations while being severely underrepresented in higher paid ones. In table A2 of the appendix, I implement a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on logged wages for Africans and Coloureds in 2008 and 2014 as compared to Whites in those years. A large differential in wages is predicted in each case, as expected, for example R8100 for whites and R2100 for Africans in 2008. The explained panel shows how much of this differential disappears if the group characteristics were the same, e.g. for column one, 0.31 of the difference in logged wages is explained by differences in the average level of education. The key result is that, controlling for education and age (proxy for experience) which are most relevant for productivity, occupation *still* explains a large part of the difference (0.32, larger than education). This suggests that occupations dominated by blacks are disadvantaged, and serves as evidence for occupational segregation in addition to discrimination within occupations. This pattern is repeated for Coloureds in 2008 and for both groups in 2014. Again, these results are simply indicative and do not prove occupational sorting by race (for example, this could be occupational sorting by class).

On the other hand, this theory and evidence applies just as much to occupational sorting and group-level advantage among whites. Moreover, black wage-labour generates a consumer market for white business, playing the historical role of African slaves described by Robinson.

A countervailing force is the emergence of an African middle class over the post-Apartheid period, by one estimate increasing from 12% African and 77% white in 1993 to 48% African and 35% white in 2014<sup>7</sup> (Zizzamia et al., 2016). The implication for racial capitalism is not straightforward. Magubane (1979) quotes the Chamber of Mines, a primary driver and beneficiary of racial capitalism as detailed earlier, as proposing the development of a black middle class because “only by having this most responsible section of the urban black population on our side can the whites of South Africa be assured of containing on a long term basis the irresponsible economic and political ambitions of those blacks...” The disruption of this first mechanism by a black middle class is therefore limited as long as the poor remain exclusively black, and group-level disadvantage is thereby reproduced.

---

<sup>7</sup> That is, Africans formed a relatively larger part of the middle class than before, but the absolute number of whites in the middle class is unlikely to have dropped. By 2014, 58% of those that the authors classify as elites were still white (whites make up 9% of the population share).

## 4.2 Space

A second channel is the spatial system of labour relations embodied by racially segregated rural and urban spaces that cheapen costs for capital. The structural development literature, such as the Lewis and Harrod-Todar models, typically models developing economies through a rural subsistence agricultural sector and an urban capitalist industrial sector, with labour migrating to urban centres as investment increases. However, these models fail to capture the spatial system of labour relations in South Africa, where migrant rural labour either returns to rural areas or remains trapped on the urban periphery.

Space was historically shaped through racially motivated dispossession, contributing to the racial confluence with capital. To ensure a labour supply for white-owned mines, a pattern of migrant labour and dependency from the Bantustans was *developed* through the combination of overcrowded agricultural land with insufficient productive capability, and taxes forcing payment in money. The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts further confined the Bantustans, giving 7.5% of the land to 80% of the population. Similarly, the Group Areas Act structured urban spaces with Africans and Coloureds at the outskirts. I examine the role of rural and urban spaces separately below.

The rural pattern described in section 3.4 above has largely continued, where black unpaid rural labour takes on migrant workers' reproductive costs that are typically covered by the urban wage (Legassick and Wolpe, 1976). In addition to increasing profits by reducing wages, these spatial arrangements also ensure a high mobility of labour, reducing transition costs to changes in capitalist production. Sulla and Zikhali (2018) note that "poverty has a strong spatial dimension in South Africa" and "remains concentrated in previously disadvantaged areas, such as the former homelands".

Using survey data (NIDS 2017, own calculations), I find that 34% of the population resided in these areas in 2008, 99.8% of whom were African, and this proportion was stable through 2014. The age demographics by area reveal the social reproductive function of former Bantustans: the children and elderly make up 53% of residents, compared to 38% in urban spaces. Over 2008-2014, the proportion of households receiving remittances *increased* from 17% to 27%, which together with the unchanging proportion of Bantustan households perhaps indicates a deepening of the migrant labour relation.

The persistence of this relation is consistent with other studies. Posel (2001) shows that migrant labour from rural African households increased over 1993-1999, as particularly unmarried and non-caregiving women joined. Posel explains, "In an environment of increasing labour market insecurity and rising unemployment, for example, the household of origin may provide 'insurance' for work-seekers,

care of children, and a preferred place for retirement.” This provides a rationale for the system’s evolutionary stability. Ramutsindela (2007) argues that Bantustans have *enlarged* over the post-Apartheid period. Land restitution programmes have failed to change ownership patterns, since only white farmers on the borders of Bantustans are willing to sell their land to black claimants, effectively enlarging the Bantustans. The production patterns in former Bantustans have also persisted: Ngubane (2017) shows in a case study that a survivalist and social reproduction function dominates, with 65% of able-bodied farmers absent and farming geared towards subsistence rather than profit.

Despite the deepening of many aspects of the migrant labour relation, there is also evidence of change: a recent case study of two particular townships found that 50% of migrants living there intended to settle permanently (Posel and Marx, 2013). Yet, the urban periphery, the township destination of the migrants of this study, still cheapens costs for capital. The South African Communist Party (2017) argues that townships run a second economy which “involve[s] the production of use-values for the working class and poor, while reproducing “cheap labour” for the mainstream (“first” economy) by carrying many burdens that, in a different (eg. more social democratic) capitalist system would be borne by tax-payers and the public sector.” These activities are not limited to social reproduction, in that they include many urban functions such as transport systems that reflect the disparity between public facilities in the urban periphery compared to the urban “metropole”.

A second role of urban spaces is social control. Overcrowding and distance from the city centre of black townships effectively prevent the normal urban process whereby workers win better social benefits through struggle. This is analogous to the phenomenon of suburbanisation that Harvey (2006) explains as a strategy of worker suppression.

Like the rural relation, this role of urban space has not disappeared with the abolition of discriminatory law. Pieterse (2009) notes, “The evidence is unambiguous: South African cities have remained profoundly divided, segregated and unequal despite sixteen years of concerted government efforts to extend development opportunities to the urban poor.” These spatial relations continue to serve as a basis of accumulation.

### 4.3 Structural Coercion

A third channel of race and capital based accumulation is the structural coercion of blacks as propagated by white institutions which constrain the ability of blacks to organise and encourage different

norms. I draw from Robinson's (1998) emphasis on race as an "instrument of collective resistance [... and] rationalising social order".

Whereas in the two channels above racial difference primarily functions to benefit capital, this channel enables a non-functionalist understanding of racial difference by giving primacy to oppressive white institutions. Structural coercion, setting constraints on the ability of blacks to advance, may be enhanced by white institutions to reproduce racial advantage. This need not be intentional, in the same way that capitalists do not explicitly conspire to disempower workers.

The channels explored in sections 4.1 and 4.2 above can both be classified as structural coercion, but here I focus on the role of organisations. North, Wallis and Weingast (2009: pp 8, 158-169) emphasise the development of organisations as a prerequisite for the economic success of advanced capitalist countries, showing a high correlation between the number of organisations and income per capita. Impersonal organisations, defined broadly to include firms, political entities and civil society, ensure economic stability beyond the interests of founding members, and grant efficiency gains by reducing transaction costs, for example generating trust and enforcement under incomplete contracts. Section 3.2 above outlined how the metropole uses its political power, partly measured through organisational power, to disempower the periphery. This analysis need not be confined to countries, however, and the same advantages may accrue to a group such as whites in South Africa.<sup>8</sup> Historically, white organisations were encouraged through political freedoms and, in the case of firms, state subsidies; on the other hand, black organisations were undermined through political and economic constraints (many political organisations were banned once they became too powerful, and the access to markets necessary for economic success was limited). This is an historical legacy of race-based structural coercion; yet organisations, which take time to build, are socially defined through networks which continue to give a racial basis for their impact. The social control role of the urban periphery, described in section 4.2, is another example of structural constraints on organisational development.

One application within organisational power is the setting of norms. While Robinson emphasises the role of race in rationalising social order, it is clear that he does not mean that blacks were successfully deceived into accepting an inferior position. He gives many examples of resistance by slaves, including slowdowns, suicide, runaways, burning crops and breaking tools. Yet, he notes that blacks have often

---

<sup>8</sup> Although I am constrained by data availability, my strong prior is that the proportion of formal organisations is far higher for whites than blacks.



been forced to wear a mask of docility. Under structural coercion, conditional compliance may be the best response to a hostile environment.

A possibility then, is that the social order needed to be rationalised for *whites*, through constructing a collective identity on which to organise (“white”) and enabling a race-based double standard on which to assign rights. Famously, white miners in 1922 united under the slogan “Workers of the world unite for a White South Africa” to secure racist job reservation.

White capital-owners benefit from norms, which influence bargaining outcomes, that are race based when costs are decreased through wages and working conditions, and indirectly through the services of the state. Apartheid policy formally inculcated this, by adopting a higher minimum standard of living for “civilised” white workers on cultural grounds.<sup>9</sup> Fraser (2016) makes a similar argument about the low value of black citizenship in postcolonial societies. Indeed, social norms form part of the compact between capital and labour, visible in the higher minimum standards of the metropole.

As an indirect indicator of organisational power, including norms, I look at the relationship between average income in a country and poverty. In figure 2, I show a strong relationship: as countries get richer, poverty is reduced along a fairly narrow trajectory. An explanation is that poor and working class people in richer countries are able to bargain for a slightly higher minimum living standard (or alternatively norms do not allow complete deprivation). However, where this class is made up of blacks who are organisationally constrained to mobilise and norms are racially differentiated, the same path may not be followed. South Africa is shown as a strong outlier: a far higher level of poverty is sustained relative to its wealth than any country in the world. This is not explained by South Africa’s high inequality, since other countries with high inequality (Gini over 45 highlighted) still broadly fall within the trajectory.

---

<sup>9</sup> Marx refers to different standards determining cost of reproduction in Volume 1, “The number and extent of [the worker’s] necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore on the degree of civilisation of a country... there enters into the determination of the value of labour power a historical and moral element.”



employment connections for occupational segregation, household-based reproduction for spatial systems, and organisations that are influenced by identity. South Africa is extremely socially segregated, giving plausibility to this assumption. From the demand-side, statistical discrimination makes race-based employment and organisational decisions an optimal best-response under imperfect information and incomplete contracts.

The channels in section 4 also have two powerful material-based processes in common that encourage the reproduction of a racialised system of accumulation. Firstly, if firms are dependent for survival on the cheaper costs provided by the channels, the erosion of the channels implies the demise of these firms. It may be that this racialised system of accumulation was built into South Africa's "comparative advantage", and the path-dependent development cannot simply adapt. This provides both an incentive for capitalists to uphold the channels (e.g. through less overt political programmes such as continued lack of service delivery in townships), as well as a selection effect whereby only black workers who remain adhere to these channels (follow occupational segregation, take on reproduction costs, and do not organise) are employed and capitalists who attempt to deviate from these channels perish. Secondly, if the extra surplus generated by these channels enables the above-average lifestyles of whites, then using its organisational advantage as described in section 4.3, the white managerial class may sabotage policies that seek to erode these mechanisms, politically and by withholding resources (capital flight and immigration of skills).

The evidence for the three channels of section 4, as well as the race and materially based processes above, has been far less than satisfactory. This is partly because the purpose of this paper has been to lay out theory; testing and evidence is left to future work.

Some additional indicators are given through analysing specific industries. The mining industry remains strong, despite the collapse of gold mining in the 1980s described in section 3.4. Its contribution to GDP has stabilised at 8%, employment picked up over 2001-2009, and capital stock increased rapidly over 2005-2010 (SARB 2018, own calculations). While real wages did rise dramatically, for example over 2003-2010 by 75% (Palms 2016, own calculations), the systems of migrant labour and occupational segregation remain in place.

Another industry that is intertwined with a racialised system of accumulation is domestic workers. Domestic workers relieve reproductive work, such as cooking, cleaning and caring for children, thereby freeing time for employers particularly from the skilled managerial class to accumulate capital or

simply increase leisure consumption directly. Magubane (1979) remarks during Apartheid, “Every white person, no matter how poor he or she may be, keeps an African servant.” Domestic workers generally come from the historically dispossessed class that fits the profile of the three channels: occupationally segregated as black women, migrant workers, and poorly organised with no union - making the reproductive commodity they provide more accessible by cheapening their labour power. Today, domestic workers number 1.5 million in South Africa or 8% of all workers, and their low median pay of \$290 per month (compared to \$820 for other workers) and greater job insecurity (only 18% have written contracts, compared to 80% of other workers) reflects this (NIDS 2017, own calculations).

## 5.2 Application to Other Contexts

*“The close links between class and race developed in Africa alongside capitalist exploitation... the classic example is South Africa, where Africans experience a double exploitation - both on the ground of colour and of class. Similar conditions exist in the USA, the Caribbean, in Latin America...” - Nkrumah, 1971*

How does this framework relate to other contexts? I focus on two extensions out of the South African context: South Africa’s racialised system of accumulation as it relates to neighbouring countries, and systems of accumulation based on gender, caste or citizenship.

The channels described in this paper have historically reached deep into Southern Africa. South Africa has long maintained a special place in the theorisation of imperialism, for example in Lenin’s references to the Boer War or Luxemburg’s (1913) description of the diamond mines, as the global supplier of gold maintaining the gold standard. Magubane (1979) traces how the imperial interests of Europe and USA provided the capital and technology with which the economy rapidly industrialised over 1940-1970. Because of their investments and South Africa’s control over raw materials, the metropolises supported the channels of race-based accumulation constructed by earlier colonists. For example, these metropolises helped South Africa develop the military technology needed to subdue the black majority, including nuclear weapons. When political unrest threatened stability in 1960 and again in 1976, the IMF, World Bank, USA and Europe responded with massive investment and loans to the Apartheid regime.

Frank (1979) classifies South Africa as an intermediate metropole, since it was also a channel through which the metropolises accessed the cheap labour and export markets of surrounding peripheral countries. Wilson (2001) records nearly 80% of miners coming from surrounding countries. It is no coincidence that Sulla and Zikhali (2018) find that seven of the ten most unequal countries in the world

are from Southern Africa (Zambia, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa).

As Nkrumah's quote indicates, racialised systems of accumulation were also developed outside of South Africa. Posel and Marx (2013) note of the migrant labour system, "The persistence of circular migration in the absence of institutional enforcement is not unique to South Africa and characterises the nature of urbanisation in several sub-Saharan African countries post Independence." The channels are contingent and require close historical analysis, for example they likely operate differently in the settler colonies of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Angola and Mozambique compared to the extractive colonies elsewhere. Further parallels exist in USA and may operate on a global scale between the white metropole and "black Africa".

This framework need not be confined to race. Sandler (1994) uses a similar approach to relate the environment to capitalist accumulation, defining an *accumulation regime* as the "complex of natural, cultural, political, and economic processes relating to environmentalism which overdetermine the constitution of the class process." Using this more general formulation, there are strong parallels with the work on patriarchal capitalism by social reproduction theorists such as Federici (2004). While there are strong differences (reproductive ability is not constructed like race is), similar channels of occupational sorting and organisational capability (including sexist norms) certainly exist. Race and gender based systems of accumulation can come together, such as in the domestic worker industry of South Africa. The parallel with citizenship is much closer, with immigrants typically concentrated in selected trades, residing in spatial clusters, and being organisationally much less developed. The close resemblance is unsurprising given that a key part of the construction of race was awarded different rights or citizenship status.

### 5.3 Conclusion

I have argued that a racialised system of capital accumulation still operates in South Africa, over and above the "normal" capitalist logic that reproduces historical advantage through inheritance. I focus on three channels: occupational sorting and group-based disadvantage in black wage-labour; rural and urban spatial systems of labour relations; and structural coercion particularly through underdeveloping black organisations. These channels are sustained by more race-based processes such as networks and statistical discrimination, as well as more materially-based processes of competition and political agitation.

The implication is that powerful material interests continue to reproduce racism in the post-Apartheid era, despite the absence of overt political enforcement. The inseparability of race and capital in South Africa led black anti-apartheid activist Tabata in 1962 to proclaim, “Without a radical alteration of the socio-economic setup in this country, it is not possible for any herrenvolk government to depart from the so-called traditional policy, whether it is called apartheid, segregation, or multi-racialism.”

Far from being an homogenising force, the logic of capital foster difference as benefiting groups shape the system of accumulation. Like the channels above, differences between the metropole and periphery are reproduced through global value chains, predatory exchange, and political organisations. Similarly, patriarchal capitalism reproduces sexism. The framework can even be extended to the environment: all these processes share the common trait that, while policy may seek to erode it, deep vested material interests reproduce the structures. The approach fundamentally challenges the adequacy and agency of equality in the political sphere under inequality of the social and economic.

## References

- Chang, H.-J., 2003. Kicking Away the Ladder: Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective. *Oxf. Dev. Stud.* 31, 21–32.
- Darity, W. 2005. Stratification Economics: The Role of Intergroup Inequality, *Journal of Economics and Finance*, vol 29(2)144-153.
- Darity, W., Mason, P., and Stewart, J. 2006. The Economics of Identity: The Origin and Persistence of Racial Identity Norms, *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation*, vol 60(2006)283-305.
- Federici, S. 2004. *Caliban and the Witch*. New York: Autonomedia.
- Folbre, N. 1994. Children as public goods. *American Economic Review*.
- Fraser, N. 2016. Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A Reply to Michael Dawson. Available online: <http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=2323>
- Gelb, S. 1990. Democratising Economic Growth: Alternative Growth Models for the Future, in *Transformation*, vol 12.
- Harvey, D. 2004. The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. *Socialist Register*.
- Harvey, D. 2006. "Crises in the space economy of capitalism: the dialectics of imperialism," in *The Limits to Capital*, Second Edition, Verso, 2006, pp. 190-203.
- Kelley, R. 2017. What Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism? In *Boston Review*, January 12 2017.
- Jaffe, H. 1990. Oral History Interview with Hosea Jaffe. Collected interviews over 1985-1990. Accessible: <http://www.digitalcollections.lib.uct.ac.za/oral-history-interview-hosea-jaffe?display=list>
- Jaffe, H. 1952. *Three Hundred Years*. Unity Movement History Series, republished in 1988.
- Lategan, Z. 2016. The contribution of Hosea Jaffe to South African political thought.
- Luxemburg, R. 1913. *The Accumulation of Capital*. Reprinted English edition in 2003 by Routledge.
- Legassick, M., Wolpe, H., 1976. The Bantustans and capital accumulation in South Africa. *Rev. Afr. Polit. Econ.* 3.
- MacEwan, A. 2015. Dollar Dominance, in *Real World Macro*, vol 34.
- Malikane, C. 2017. Some notes on white monopoly capital: Definition, use and denial [Online: <https://blackopinion.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/White-monopoly-capital.pdf>]
- Marx, K., 1867. *Capital Volume One: the process of production of capital*.
- Magubane, B. 1979. *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*.
- Ngubane, M. 2017. The agrarian question of labour and land reform in South Africa: farm work dynamics on redistributed land in the eastern Free State.
- Penner, A. 2008. Race and Gender Differences in Wages: The Role of Occupational Sorting at the Point of Hire, *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol 49(3)597-614,
- Perlin, F., 1988. The Material and the Cultural: An Attempt to Transcend the Present Impasse. *Mod. Asian Stud.* 22.
- Pieterse, E. 2009. Post-Apartheid Geographies in South Africa: Why are urban divides so persistent? *Interdisciplinary Debates on Development and Cultures: Cities in development—spaces, Conflicts and Agency*. 15 December. Leuven University.
- Piraino, P., 2015. Intergenerational Earnings Mobility and Equality of Opportunity in South Africa. *World Development* 67.
- Posel, D., 2001. Have Migration Patterns in Post-Apartheid South Africa Changed?, in: *Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective*.
- Posel, D., Marx, C., 2013. Circular Migration: A View from Destination Households in Two Urban Informal Settlements in South Africa. *J. Dev. Stud.* 49, 819–831.
- Robinson, C., 1998. *Black Marxism, the making of the Black radical tradition*. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C.

- Sandler, B. 1994. Grow Or Die: Marxist theories of capitalism and the environment.
- SACP. 2012. The South African Road to Socialism, ch 8. Accessible:  
<http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=4940#ch8>
- Shaikh, A.M., Tonak, E.A., 1992. Measuring the wealth of nations: The political economy of national accounts. Cambridge University Press.
- Sherman, Z. 2014. What Does It Mean To Be “Better Off”?, in *Real World Macro*, vol 34.
- Smith, J. 2016. Imperialism in the twenty-first century: globalisation, super-exploitation, and capitalism’s final crisis.
- Sulla and Zikhali. 2018. Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa : An Assessment of Drivers, Constraints and Opportunities, *World Bank Group*, Washington DC.
- Tabata, IB. 1962. South African freedom struggle.
- Wallerstein, E. 2004. World Systems Analysis: An Introduction.
- Wicks-Lim, J. 2016. It Pays To Be White, in *Real World Macro*, vol 34.
- Wolpe, H. 1972. Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From segregation to Apartheid. Economy and Society.
- Wood, E.J., 1998. Forging democracy from below: Insurgent transitions in South Africa and El Salvador. Cambridge University Press.
- Zizzamia, R., Schotte, S., Leibbrandt, M., Ranchhod, V. 2016. Vulnerability and the middle class in South Africa.

## Sources of data

- NIDS. 2017. National Income Dynamics Study, wave 1, v6.1. [dataset]
- NIDS. 2017. National Income Dynamics Study, wave 4, v1.1. [dataset]
- (PALMS) Kerr, A, Lam, D, and Wittenberg, M. 2016. Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series [dataset]. Version 3.1. CapeTown: DataFirst [producer and distributor], 2016.
- StatsSA. 2017. Input Output tables for South Africa, 2013 and 2014. Statistics South Africa, Report number 04-04-02.
- SARB. 2017. Online statistical database, South African Reserve Bank. Link:  
<https://www.resbank.co.za/Publications/QuarterlyBulletins/Pages/QBOnlinestatsquery.aspx>
- World Bank. Databank: World Development Indicators. Accessed 12/10/2017. Available at:  
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD&country=#>



## Appendix

*Table A1: Summary Statistics on Occupations in 2014*

Occupation	African	Wage (ZAR)
Armed forces occupations	94%	15,057
Managers	66%	25,558
Professionals	74%	18,299
Technicians and associate professionals	69%	14,992
Clerical support workers	77%	11,653
Service and sales workers	93%	6,194
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishers	88%	4,076
Craft and related trades workers	87%	10,669
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	92%	18,181
Elementary occupations	99%	2,836

*Notes: Data from NIDS wave 4 (2017)*

Table A2: Evidence on Occupational Sorting by Race

	African 2008	African 2014	Coloured 2008	Coloured 2014
<b>Differential</b>				
Predict_White	9.001*** (102.51)	9.608*** (85.46)	9.001*** (102.51)	9.608*** (85.46)
Predict_Black	7.667*** (249.67)	8.297*** (337.69)	7.944*** (103.08)	8.438*** (138.70)
Difference	1.335*** (14.35)	1.311*** (11.39)	1.057*** (9.05)	1.170*** (9.16)
<b>Explained</b>				
Occupation	0.321*** (5.91)	0.285*** (8.14)	0.237** (3.15)	0.221*** (4.28)
Industry	0.121*** (3.99)	0.0683* (2.17)	0.140* (2.22)	0.0684 (1.69)
Age	0.0508* (2.23)	0.0741 (1.90)	0.0519* (2.03)	0.0678 (1.48)
Education	0.310*** (8.75)	0.272*** (7.39)	0.411*** (6.08)	0.398*** (5.44)
Total	0.803*** (10.41)	0.700*** (8.49)	0.840*** (7.97)	0.755*** (7.36)
<b>Unexplained</b>				
Occupation	0.867 (1.91)	-0.605 (-1.11)	1.130 (1.77)	-0.481 (-0.87)
Industry	0.460 (1.79)	0.0527 (0.10)	0.161 (0.57)	-0.195 (-0.34)
Age	-0.116 (-0.49)	0.176 (0.66)	-0.187 (-0.64)	0.222 (0.74)
Education	1.150** (3.19)	1.199 (1.79)	0.881* (2.35)	0.931 (1.43)
Constant	-1.830* (-2.56)	-0.211 (-0.30)	-1.767* (-2.04)	-0.0620 (-0.08)
Total	0.532*** (6.12)	0.611*** (6.65)	0.218* (2.07)	0.415*** (3.84)
N	28226	37979	28226	37979

Note: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using data from NIDS waves 1 and 4 (2017). Dependent variable is the log of wages. The comparison group is Whites, with the columns representing Africans in wave 1, Africans in wave 4, Coloured in wave 1, and Coloured in wave 4.