

**TP- Phase 2**

**CENG 519 Network Security**

**Spring semester 2024/2025**

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## I. Introduction :

The objective of this phase is to demonstrate the feasibility of a **covert communication channel** through manipulation of **inter-packet delay** in ICMP traffic. The receiver extracts information that is hidden by the sender, who alters the time between ICMP echo requests, and uses it to rebuild the original message.


Before I proceed to execute the covert channel, I resolved some issues from Phase 1 and proceeded to execute the covert sender and receiver.


## II. Phase 1 Fixes :

In the first phase, I made a few mistakes that affected the accuracy of my results. Most notably, I was mistakenly running the mim container, which generated excessive traffic and interfered with my measurements.

I also realized that my plots weren't being saved correctly. To fix this, I added the right command to save the generated plots as files. This allowed me to visualize and analyze the results more easily.

Here are the generated plots:





### III. Phase 2 :

#### ***A. Implementing covert channel via ICMP timing :***

For this phase, I implemented a covert communication system that encodes binary data into the timing between ICMP packets, using the same Docker-based environment as in Phase 1. Here's how each component works:

##### Sender Logic :

- Converts the message into binary (for example "hi" → 0110100001101001)
- Sends ICMP echo requests (ping) to the insec container
- Encodes each bit using a delay:
  - **100 ms** for bit 0
  - **300 ms** for bit 1

##### Receiver Logic :

- Listens for incoming ICMP echo requests
- Records timestamps of each packet
- Calculates the delay between consecutive packets
- Uses a threshold of **200 ms** to distinguish between 0 and 1

- Reconstructs the binary stream and decodes the original message

### Configuration File:

Both sender and receiver read from a shared `config.json` file for flexibility. Here's an example configuration:

```
{  
  
  "receiver_ip": "10.0.0.21",  
  
  "message": "hi",  
  
  "delay_0": 100,  
  
  "delay_1": 300,  
  
  "threshold": 200,  
  
  "capture_duration": 15  
  
}
```

### ***B. Experimentation campaign :***

To evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of the covert channel implementation, I conducted an experimentation campaign where I varied parameters such as inter-packet delays (`delay_0`, `delay_1`) and decoding threshold values.

I noticed that if delays are too small, the decoded message at the end is wrong. This can be explained by the delay of the delay-processor (eg: `delay_0: 30; delay_1: 50; threshold :40`) And also if the values are so close to each other (eg : `delay_0: 200; delay_1: 250; threshold: 225`)

In addition, capture duration is an issue. It is necessary to know the estimated length of the message before.

For these parameters (`delay_0: 100; delay_1: 300; threshold :200`) the results were always correct.

## **IV. Conclusion :**

This phase demonstrates that **covert timing channels** can be effectively created using inter-packet delays in common protocols like ICMP. Even in environments without packet payload access, timing variations can leak information.